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Abstract 
The role of language in development has been a central theme in post-war 
English. However, the European history of ideas about the role of signs has 
been insufficiently appreciated. I aim to enrich readings of contemporary 
urban classrooms by recovering something of this history. As the 
culmination of this work, I trace the story of a poem, written by a Black 
student in a London classroom, back into the history of discussions and 
debates that a class conducted with itself over five years. From perspectives 
provided by the history of ideas and recent work in social memory, I show 
how the student's representation of a childhood recollection (a visit to the 
site of a former plantation) was mediated and shaped by 'pedagogical 
artefacts'. I give a history of one such artefact as an instance of the role of 
signs in a contemporary classroom. 
A picture of language as human invention was drawn in the first instance 
during the European Enlightenment. From this picture a seminal theory about 
the role of signs in the mastery of mental operations emerged. On this view, 
memory and imagination depend upon signs. In the aftermath to the French 
Revolution, language was linked to conceptions of citizenship and human 
advancement. In Germany, the picture of language was redrawn in the light 
of Kant's epistemology, and connected to an educational ideal of self-
cultivation. In the nineteenth century, 'cultural' psychology attempted 
unsuccessfully to combine a notion of signs in the development of higher 
mental functions with findings in experimental psychology. Subsequently, 
the introduction of a distinction between mental 'contents' and mental 'acts' 
fostered new research into the role of signs in consciousness. Concurrently, 
an ethical vision of symbolisation as the 'common ground' of humanity 
issued from a philosophy of symbolic forms. As a whole the thesis seeks to 
show the continuing relevance of this history. 
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Introduction 
I never knew at the time 
I had an idea with no real meaning 
Kevin (age 15), Piece of the Past 
When Hackney Downs School opened in1876, The London Illustrated News 
reported admiringly that it was 'constructed of red brick and Bath stone dressings, in 
what is called the domestic Gothic style'. The building was planned to accommodate 
five hundred boys, with fifteen classrooms 'fitted on the Prussian system', a library 
and a large semi-circular theatre capable of seating eight hundred persons. The 
school is gone, the brick and Bath stone dressings obliterated. One morning last 
December, I pressed against the galvanized fence that borders the site and recalled 
my time teaching there. 
My aim is to tell the story of a particular classroom and to describe something of the 
learning that went on there. This will entail recounting events that occurred over a 
long cycle, five years in all. I shall attempt to reconstruct a retrospect of a class's 
history and the only way that I can reconstruct it is through a 'reading' of the past, 
that is, through multiple acts of 'remembrance'. Inevitably, what is recalled will be 
shot through with the reader's preoccupations and prejudices. Such is the historian's 
work - a compromise with objectivity. The material traces of lessons - tapes, 
students' scripts, scraps of writing, textbooks and so on - have been gathered and 
sifted for what they might hold of the past. But it is only through continual acts of 
interpretation - readings and re-readings - that such traces become charged with 
meaning. As the German philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, put it, 'historical objects have 
true being only so long as they are remembered' . Yet material traces have a solidity 
of their own, and reliable historical reconstruction begins with empirical evidence. I 
have mainly fragments to work with. Though incomplete, they must be selected, 
sorted and organized in a coherent fashion to tell the story properly. The problem of 
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interpretation will be a familiar one to students of the arts and humanities. Every act 
of interpretation, every reading is also a 'rewriting' because 'interpretation never 
comes to a complete standstill.' The so-called 'hermeneutic problem' comes to the 
surface whenever and wherever people try to reach agreement. For Cassirer, we 
understand ourselves as well as others through the medium of signs which provide 
us with the common ground on which humanity depends. Interpreting children's 
meanings will be especially important in the final part ofthis study, where I look at 
the relationship between memory and imagination in the writing of a Black student. 
My strategy overall, however, is to enrich and deepen a reading of a London 
classroom through an engagement with the writings of thinkers who have enlarged 
my historical understanding of the role of signs in human development. 
Elsewhere I have argued for a bridging theory of education that is capable of 
connecting language with history and the broader currents of social and cultural 
change. 1 I was reflecting on concerns that had occupied me as an English teacher in 
Hackney school, and I was calling for a unified approach to language, literature and 
culture at a moment when English appeared to be fragmenting. Similar arguments 
and reflections are at the core of this dissertation. 
Much of the empirical material for the present study (written materials, tapes and 
videotapes) was gathered with colleagues between 1979 and 1984? I need to 
acknowledge my indebtedness to them and say a word about what we were trying to 
do. We began with a shared interest in children's writing development. And we were 
especially concerned with the progress of boys from what we called 'West Indian' 
backgrounds. These concerns resonated with national debates about the provision for 
urban school populations in the light of what was perceived to be the 'failure of 
Black children in our schools'. (The setting up ofthe Committee ofInquiry into the 
Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups in 1979, under the 
chairmanship of Anthony Rampton reflected the mood at the time). We were trying 
to look beyond what can be characterized broadly as 'deficit' views of Black (and 
working class) language and culture. In particular, we wanted to challenge the then 
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widely held view that non-standard dialects somehow interfere with children's 
progress in learning to write standard forms. So we looked closely at the relations 
amongst written and spoken, standard and vernacular language with a view to 
establishing the positive strengths of linguistic diversity in the eyes of teachers and 
policy makers. We aimed to influence practice among English teachers by 
describing the present and potential strengths of collaborative ways of working, 
especially in the processes of writing composition.3 Looking back, I can see how 
our some of our ideas about children's writing development fed into the work of the 
National Writing Project. However, the linguistic features of vernacular languages 
and creoles are not my chief concern here, although I touch upon them at some 
points in the story. 
Subsequent research into children's writing has benefited from two powerful 
research traditions that have contributed substantially to work in English. The first 
tradition has been in applied linguistics and it has focused on the forms and 
structures of spoken and written language in relation to use in classrooms. The 
second tradition has its base in anthropology and it has fostered rich ethnographic 
studies of literacy in community settings. Both these traditions reflect a strong sense 
of the social and cultural embeddings of literacy, which is something that I am keen 
to retain. 
I recall that we were encouraged by exciting work was being done on the languages 
spoken in London schools by Tony Burgess and Harold Rosen.4 Jane Miller's study 
of bilingual children, Many Voices, insisted on the importance of taking a cultural 
approach to difference in schools.5 Indeed, such work helped to establish diversity as 
a fundamental principle for contemporary English teaching. Additionally, at the back 
of our early, shared concerns and interests lay the Writing Research Project that was 
based at the London Institute of Education (1966-71), and traditions of thinking 
about language and development that were established by James Britton and his 
associates there.6 Britton's work drew upon linguistics, (particularly Roman 
Jacobson's hierarchy of functions), but it also had a substantial footings in 
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psychology and a characteristic concentration on the role of symbolization in 
children's development. When I first read Britton's work in the early seventies I was 
intrigued by the way that he drew insights from the German philosopher, Ernst 
Cassirer. These insights concerned the intrinsically human ability to create 
representations of 'actuality' with the aid of symbols of our own making - and to 
work on them. 'The world we respond to,' writes Britton, 'in fact the world towards 
which our behaviour is directed, is the world as we symbolise it, or represent it to 
ourselves.'7 The notion that we work on our representations of actuality in order 
both to make sense of the world and to act in it has been a powerful one for me. And 
it provides a starting point for what is to follow, although the chapter, which 
specifically concerns Cassirer's work, comes in the second part of the present study. 
Essentially, Cassirer~pictured the role of signs in creating the conditions of 
possibility for what we might call 'experience'. Britton puts it like this: 
Events take place and are gone: It is the representation that lasts and 
accumulates and undergoes successive modification. It is from representation 
we make that we gain a sense of our continuing existence in the world that 
has a past and a future, a world that remains in existence whether we are 
there to prove it or not. Cassirer calls the world of space and time a human 
world. 'Only symbolic expression', he says, 'can yield the possibility of a 
prospect and retrospect, because it is only by symbols that distinctions are 
not merely made, but fixed in consciousness.'8 
In passages such as this one, generations of English teachers discovered a 
foundational principle for the kind of unified approach to language, literature and 
culture of the kind I that was seeking. But it was much later, and in circumstances I 
shall be describing, that I came back the problem of symbolizing and I began asking 
where such a picture came from in the first place. Much of this dissertation concerns 
the history of these and related ideas. As far as I know the intellectual history of the 
problem of signs in development has not been told in relation to English in education 
before. 
I have mentioned the interest in children's writing development that I shared with 
colleagues. In due course, however, I began to develop separate theoretical interests. 
These grew specifically out of my efforts to get to grips with the life of urban 
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classrooms. Raymond Williams' work was especially important to me, as well as the 
works of the Soviet thinkers, VolosinovlBakhtin and Vygotsky. Three themes in 
particular focused my attention: first, Williams' notion of residual and emergent 
cultural practices; secondly, VolosinovlBakhtin's critique of the Saussurean sign and 
thirdly, Vygotsky's conception of the mediating role of signs in human 
development. Further to this, two questions began to emerge. 'How can we picture 
the curriculum subject English in ways that keep in touch with the present realities 
of social formation and cultural change?' And, 'How can we grasp the historical and 
cultural dimensions of children's learning and development in contemporary 
classrooms?' I wanted to investigate social and cultural interaction in classrooms in 
ways that attended adequately to issues of history and power. Yet at the same time, I 
was intrigued by the way that themes and arguments from Williams, 
Volosinov/Bakhtin and Vygotsky appeared to interlock and to confirm one another. 
This second current of interest carried me towards the project of recovering 
historical perspectives on the role of signs in human development. And thus, in a 
curious way, I found myself pulled in two directions. In one direction there was the 
intractable reality of a Hackney classroom, and in another, there was a dauntingly 
complicated history of European ideas. Slowly, the notion of carrying forward 
problematics - questions, themes and ideas - with a view to deepening and enriching 
a reading of a contemporary classroom began to take shape. 
I have learned much from two traditions in classroom discourse analysis. In the rnid-
eighties, research by socio-linguists into the underlying regularities of classroom 
interaction contrasted strikingly with discourse analyses from research perspectives 
inspired by continental thinkers, especially Foucault and Lacan (Walkerdine and 
Urwin, Venn).9 Socio-linguistic analyses of classroom discourse uncovered the 
underlying patterns of interaction that typify classrooms such as IRF (Initiation, 
Response and Feedback). From a different set of theoretical assumptions, competing 
analyses of classrooms emerged (,incommensurable discourses' Pennycook calls 
them). The 'unified, rational subject' of western psychology was under attack from 
post structuralists and deconstructionists, and 'radical' ways of thinking about 
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subjectivity and power in relation to classroom discourse beckoned. Work that I did 
with Tony Burgess in the eighties reflected our shared interest in the potentials of 
such modes of analysis at the time. But for me, there was always a peculiar tension 
between insights gained from fine-grained analyses of classrooms and the empty 
philosophical outlook of post structuralism generally. I couldn't square the anti-
humanism with the rich picture of human agency that I had met in the work of the 
three thinkers I mentioned above. What is more, I became increasingly suspicious of 
the way that continental ideas gained currency here and in the USA in a manner that 
removed them from the historical contexts that had given rise to them in the first 
instance. lO• 
Historical perspectives on the way that pictures of language have altered over three 
centuries are central to the present study. I needed to explain how and why figures 
like Locke and Condillac, Herder and von Humboldt, Wundt and Brentano, Cassirer 
and Vygotky fit into the present scheme of things. And I also wanted to say how and 
why these particular thinkers might enrich readings of contemporary classrooms. 
I begin with Raymond Williams because his work leads me directly to the problem 
of language studies before the advent of modem, structural linguistics. Williams' 
work has resonated continually for me since I first read him in the sixties. 'I feel 
myself committed to the study of actual language' , he writes: 'that is to say, to the 
words and the sequences of words which particular men and women have used in 
trying to give meaning to their experience.' This remark comes in the Introduction to 
Culture and Society, a work that first appeared in 1958, and it contains the germ of a 
problem that Williams returned to again and again, which is to do with the relations 
among language, human activity and history. Indeed the long theoretical chapter, 
'Language', in Marxism and Literature (1977) represents a sustained discussion of 
just this problem, as Williams explains in conversation with members of the editorial 
committee of New Left Review. They have been speaking about the notion of the 
arbitrariness of the sign: 
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The notion [the 'arbitrariness' of the sign] was introduced in opposition to 
the idea that the sign was an icon, and it is certainly true that there is in 
general no necessary relation of an abstract kind between word and thing in 
language. But to describe the sign as arbitrary or unmotivated prejudges the 
whole theoretical issue. I say it is not arbitrary but conventional, and that the 
convention is the result of a social process. If it has a history, then it is not 
arbitrary - it is the specific product of the people who have developed the 
language in question.!! 
Behind Williams account of the sign stands his reading of Volosinov' s critique of 
Saussurean linguistics.12 The Soviet thinker accepted the notion of arbitrariness only 
in so far as it describes the conventional nature of the internal relation between the 
two components, the signifier and the signified that go to make up the sign. 
Volosinov objected to the notion of arbitrariness because it fails to capture the way 
in which signs are continually made and remade as part of the social process. 
Williams puts it like this: 
... the systematic character of language itself is the result, the always 
changing result, of the activities of real people in social relationships, 
including individuals not simply as products of the society but in precise 
dialectical relation both producing and being produced by it. The failure to 
see this led to the idea of language as a certain socially available quantum of 
signification which is never fully realized, of which all individual speech-
acts are instances; this especially in the harsher theorization of sixties' 
structuralism which was very different from Saussurian linguistics. 13 
Williams insists upon language as constitutive, human activity: the business of 
making and remaking signs on which all social activity depends. 'Human beings 
made language,' he says, 'and they will remake it, not just setting out to do so-
though they do sometimes - but as a normal ongoing process in the course of their 
full social experience.' 14 In the light of such insights I began to envisage English 
classrooms as places where the ordinary miracle of language making goes on 
routinely, and where real children in history - not abstractions like 'the child' or 'the 
leamer' - use words in trying to give meaning to their experiences. 
Williams remarks that the notion 'arbitrariness' was taken up by structuralist 
theorists of the sixties in a manner that differs strikingly from the way the concept 
originally appeared in Saussurean linguistics. This is a crucial point, and one that 
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J.G. Merquior underscores in his critique of French structuralism and post 
structuralism, From Prague to Paris (1986): 
Today the single notion most generally credited to Saussure is the idea of the 
arbitrariness of the sign: the independence of the linguistic sign from non-
verbal reality. The concept of the arbitrary sign is something of which 
structuralism has made heavy, and indeed heavily ideological, use. Yet 
Saussure did not at all assert the arbitrariness thesis as a novelty. IS 
Intriguingly, Merquior goes on to list some of the thinkers for whom the notion of 
'arbitrariness' was a 'commonplace' of linguistic theory: 
They include Hobbes (1655), Locke (1690), Lebnitz (1703), Wolff (1709), 
Berkley (1733), Breitinger (1740), Condillac (1746), Turgot (1751), Lessing 
(1766), D. Stewart (1792), Fichte (1795) and Hegel (1817).16 
The significance of this list can only be truly appreciated in the light of discussions 
and debates that have gone on in the relatively new domain of history of language 
studies: linguistic historiography. Theories about language - the nature of language, 
where language comes from and what it is for - need to be connected to a wider 
history of ideas to gauge their real significance for many different domains. We need 
historical perspectives to make sense of what we are being told. For this reason 
Merquior cites the work of the historian of ideas, Hans Aarsleff in the context of his 
claim that 'arbitrariness' - the notion that signs relate to ideas rather than to things as 
such - was already familiar to eighteenth century thinkers. We have to enlarge our 
picture of language studies to remove several serious misconceptions about the 
development of ideas and institutions. For without a shift in historical perspectives, 
Aarleff argues, it is impossible to grasp 'the role that the study of language has 
played in literature, criticism, religious and social thought, science pedagogy, 
political ideologies and philosophy; and to see those interrelations as something 
more than the scattering of local encounters to be met in an ad-hoc fashion where 
they seem to occur' .17 The important issue here is not especially about Saussure's 
indebtedness to earlier thinkers. Rather it is this: Aarsleff 's lucid history of 
European language studies implies a need for a complicated shift in historical 
perspectives that we have to make if we are to appreciate adequately the richness 
and the depths of 'pre-scientific' linguistic thinking. Such thinking, by definition, 
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predates nineteenth century philology as well as modern structural linguistics. 
Crucially, the thinkers that interested me at the outset, Williams, VolosinovlBakhtin 
and Vygotsky were in touch with these earlier traditions of language studies. 
I am hugely indebted to Aarsleff's work for the way that it has opened up the field of 
the European history of language studies in the modern period in a manner that 
might be related usefully to the history of English studies. Curiously, such 
perspectives are almost entirely missing from contemporary histories of English. I8 
Tony Crowley's book, The Politics of Discourse: The Standard Language Question 
in British Cultural Debates is exceptional in the way he has reconstructed 
discussions around standard language in the nineteenth century and for the way that 
he uncovers the cultural politics involved. Olivia Smith has also produced a superb, 
focused study of the social and political consequences of linguistic theories around 
the turn of the eighteenth century, The Politics of Language. 19 From the standpoint 
of the social historian, Penelope Cornfield has investigated how people have 
understood and described themselves in a variety of cultures in her edited collection, 
Language, History and Class. 2o Rosemary Aston has studied the reception of 
German thought in her book, The German Idea: Four English writers and the 
reception of German Thought, 1800- 1860?I She looks specifically at the work of 
Coleridge, Carlyle, Lewes and George Eliot from the perspectives of literary history. 
And Peter Burke and Roy Porter give a fascinating social history of the role that 
written and spoken language has played in shaping our sense of reality from the 
perspectives of historical anthropology in their book, Language, Self and Society?2 
However, further research is needed into the reception of Continental ideas about 
language that can be linked to the formation of English studies in particular and to 
education generally. Pictures of language were centrally important in the discussions 
that went on among the architects of the first modern education systems in France 
and in Prussia. Essentially, Aarsleff provided me with a standpoint from which to 
start to map the history of the problem of signs and development from the 
perspectives of an intellectual history of linguistic thought. Roy Harris and Talbot 
Taylor added further breadth and substance, especially in their book Landmarks in 
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Linguistic Thought: The Western tradition from Socrates to Saussure. 23 My 
discussion of the ideas of Locke, Condillac, Herder and von Humboldt draws 
extensively on their scholarship. 
For Aarsleff 'the study of language' means something altogether broader than 
modern structural linguistics usually allows. He rejects the history of language 
studies as the record of progress towards modern linguistic science, and he insists 
instead upon the intrinsic interest that the subject might hold for contemporary 
readers. Thus he takes an unusually generous view of the field. 'By language study', 
he says, 'I refer not only to philology in the conventional sense but to any reasonably 
coherent and clearly formulated discussion that is specifically directed toward 
problems that arise in relation to language' .24 Specifically, Aarsleff has recovered 
the significance of work on language in the eighteenth century that specializing 
linguistics has largely ignored because, in order to establish itself as an independent 
'science', linguistics has wanted to get away from 'speculative questions that 
'scientific' linguistics as such could not hope to answer. Above all, Aarsleff provides 
the proper depths of perspectives on why language studies mattered to those who 
were engaged in them during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: 
We may think of the study of language as an activity that has few practical 
and intellectual consequences outside its own domain, whose territory may 
of course shift, expand and contract from one period to another. But during 
the years under consideration, [1780 -1860] language study - even when 
called philology - was not merely a matter of knowing the forms, syntax, 
phonology, historical relationships, and other aspects of particular languages. 
It involves questions of wider significance. What, for instance, was the origin 
of thought? Did the mind have a material basis? Did mankind have a single 
origin? Was the first language given by revelation or had man invented it in 
the process of time? Could etymology be made instructive without lending 
support to skepticism? It is possible to separate philology as a scholarly 
discipline, characterized by certain methods and subject matter, from these 
questions. But it is not possible to deal with its history without including 
them, providing that the aim is not merely to seek to understand connections 
between events?5 
However, it has not been my intention here to attempt to replicate work done in the 
field of the history of linguistic thought. This dissertation does not aim to offer a 
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history of language studies as such. Rather, I have attempted to engage with ideas 
and debates that spring from Aarsleff's research for the way that they relate to 
English in education. 
A striking feature of Aarsleff' s account of the development of language studies in 
the eighteenth century concerns his reappraisal of the significance of the work of the 
French thinker, Etienne Bonnot, Abbe de Condillac. Two aspect of this reappraisal 
will concern us here. The first is the importance of Condillac' s picture of language 
for the thinkers of the French Enlightenment. To give just one important instance 
that I shall be returning to, The Encyclopedie, which represents the supreme 
achievement of the French Enlightenment, was constructed upon the foundations of 
Condillac's epistemology. Secondly, Condillac evolved a theory of the role of signs 
in the developing mastery of mental operations, a notion which figures powerfully in 
the work of Lev Vygotsky and which has a central importance for the story I shall be 
telling. Condillac' s Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746), especially in 
the new translation by Aarsleff, opened a window onto the eighteenth century 
origins of the notion that mental life starts with the invention and use of signs.26 
Indeed, in articles, chapters and books, Aarsleff argues convincingly that histories of 
language studies that begin with the achievements of Schlegel, von Humboldt, Bopp 
and the brothers Grimm - the founding figures of German philology - miss the 
seminal character of French eighteenth century linguistic thought. And much turns 
on the indebtedness of the Germans, Herder and von Humboldt to French thinkers, 
especially von Humboldt's indebtedness to Condillac dating from his contact with 
the ideologues in Paris in the eighteen nineties?7 
To suggest something of the scale of what is at issue here I shall give just one 
illustrative example. This concerns Michel Foucault's attempt to give an historical 
account of the birth of the human sciences and to lay bare the 'fundamental codes' 
of our culture. But if Aarsleff is right - and I believe he is - then German philology 
is essentially continuous with the eighteenth century French linguistic thought, 
allowing for the fact that the motives and methods of Schlegel, Bopp and the Grimm 
15 
brothers were new. Aarsleff's history then is seriously at odds with the account of 
language studies that Foucault gives in his book The Order of Things, An 
Archeology of the Human Sciences (1974) where he speaks of radical discontinuities 
- the famous epistemic breaks - between 'classical' and 'modem' modes of 
thought.28 
I should make it clear, too, that I have elected not to focus on the history of language 
studies in England. My decision to concentrate on the European history of linguistic 
thought goes back to my interest in the way that themes and arguments from 
Williams, Volosinov/Bakhtin and Vygotsky appeared as part of a piece. Earlier, I 
touched on my reservations about structuralist and post-structuralist approaches. 
Reading Habermas proved a turning point. I learned much from Habermas' 
measured critique of Derrida and Foucault, and what he calls the 'unfinished project 
of the Enlightenment'?9 However, it was largely through contact with European 
researchers I was prompted to reflect on my poor gras~uropean ideas and 
especially my inadequate appreciation of the European Enlightenment. 
The journey from Hamburg airport to the main railway station is a short one. The 
streets are wide and the traffic quick. Once, close by the railway station, I found 
myself among a group of 'West Indians'. It could have been Dalston or Railton 
Road. 'Wie geht' s? W' appen '?' It makes little difference the manner is the same. 
Hamburg University is in Von-Melle-Park, a short walk from the U-Bahn. Founded 
in 1919 - Cassirer was Rector there until 1933 -opposite a railway embankment is 
the the main University building. It is less than imposing. In stone above the portico 
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are carved the words: Der Forschung, Der Lehre, Der Bildung. Research, Teaching, 
10 Cultivation. Bildung. It reminded me of Bakhtin's essay, The Bildungsroman, and 
the true significance of German, his second language began to dawn on me. Also I 
began to appreciate for the first time the complexity of the cultural ties that 
connected Vygotsky to German thinkers. 
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Then, one afternoon, during a seminar conducted entirely in English about standard 
language teaching in European multi-lingual schools, a German Professor remarked, 
half teasing, half mocking, 'Of course, we are all the children of Von Humboldt ... ' It 
struck me as faintly comical. At the time, to be truthful, I had no idea what she 
meant. 
Von Humboldt's linguistic thought provides the hub around which this dissertation 
turns, although in some ways his legacy is a problematic one. 3D Peter Heath's 1988 
translation of von Humboldt's classic work on language, published posthumously by 
the Berlin Academy, The Diversity of Human Language-Structure and its Influence 
on the Mental Development of Mankind (1836), with an introduction by Hans 
Aarsleff, enlarged my sense of the trajectory ofVygotsky's thought. 31 The chapters 
on 'The Nature and the Constitution of Languages as Such' and 'Inner Linguistic 
Form' implied powerful connections with familiar Vygotskian concepts, especially 
'inner speech'. I soon became convinced that the Soviet psychologist was the 
inheritor of a powerful- I am tempted to say 'mainstream' -current of European 
linguistic thought that extends back at least as far as Locke. But, perhaps Aarsleff 
underestimates the distinctiveness of German ideas about language. He has rightly 
wanted to restore a proper picture of Condillac' s seminal influence, and there can be 
no doubt that French debates about the origin of language were the forerunners of 
German discussions of the topic. Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis' appointment 
to the Berlin Academy of Science (1746) - he knew Condillac personally and 
corresponded with him - triggered protracted German discussions and debates about 
where language comes from and what it is for. Certainly, Herder and his 
contemporaries were deeply indebted to Condillac. But a combination of external 
and internal factors inflected the German discussions of language differently. 
Resistance to French cultural and political hegemony and the emergence of German 
philosophical idealism created the particular circumstances that shaped language 
studies in Germany for a century to come. Mindful of these circumstances, I have 
touched on French and German nationalism in the aftermath to the French 
Revolution. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer gives a clear, persuasive account of the powerful 
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Kantian element in von Humboldt's early linguistic thought.32 I give a brief 
discussion of Kant's epistemology because without such an account it would be hard 
to appreciate the force of Herder's conception of 'expression' and the depth of von 
Humboldt's theoretical and ethical preoccupation with signification. 
By and large, French thinkers were indifferent to German philosophy in the 
aftermath to the French Revolution. Ironically, as well as reading in Condillac 
intensively during his stay in Paris, von Humboldt also tried unsuccessfully to 
explain Kant to the ideologues. From Kant, German thinkers gained an 
extraordinarily powerful ethical vision of human development that issued in the 
educational ideal of Bildung, or self-cultivation. But, it was from the ideologues that 
von Humboldt gained practical knowledge of the setting up the first coherent state 
education system, which he later applied to the business of reforming the Prussian 
education system. Risking some repetition, I have tried to separate matters relating 
specifically to language from those pertaining directly to education as such, though 
inevitably there is some overlap. My overall aim here is to show the relevance of the 
history of such events and ideas for contemporary discussions in English in 
education. In particular I want to restore a 'sense of scope' that English is in danger 
of losing. However, I have not attempted to trace the reception of continental ideas 
about language in England. Such an undertaking is for the future. 
* * * 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the legacy of the 
European Enlightenment. I look at a change to the prevailing picture of language 
that occurred at the start of the eighteenth century. I begin with the legacy of John 
Locke. I show how his 'sensationalist' epistemology issued in a picture of language 
as human invention and how Locke's pictured language as a vehicle for 
communication. For Locke, words provided the means by which people reach 
common understandings, because with words thoughts can be conveyed between 
individual minds. Behind Locke's picture of language lay a crucial argument for the 
development of science about the public discussion of knowledge that is 
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independent of religious authority. Embedded in this argument is a view of a new 
kind of 'citizen'. I go on to show how the Abbe Condillac took up Locke's picture of 
language, how he constructed a theory of the origins of language and how he 
developed a psychological theory about the role of signs in the mastery of mental 
operations. On Condillac's theory, voluntary control of the faculties, specifically 
memory and imagination depends upon signs of human invention. 
I move on from the discussion of Condillac's ideas to describe how debates about 
the origins of language, which began in France, entered a new phase with the 
German Enlightenment. I elected to concentrate on the works of Herder and von 
Humboldt for the way that these two thinkers especially developed powerful notions 
of the role of signs in the development of Mankind. I connect these notions to Kant's 
critical philosophy and I describe how Kant's epistemology underpinned both a 
radical conception of freedom and a new sense of individual human worth and 
dignity. I touch on the criticism that was levelled at Kant's system at the time, and 
how Herder's theory of the 'expressive' subject was made to stand in contrast to the 
Kantian 'rational subject of cognition' . I tell the story of Herder's Treatise on the 
Origins of Language, and I introduce the work of von Humboldt, saying why he 
thought that the study of language held the key to understanding the guiding 
principle of the history of Mankind. Then, I attempt to how and why language was 
important for the setting up of the first state education systems in Europe by saying 
how language was linked to conceptions of citizenship and of human development. 
The German ideal of Bildung- self-cultivation - provides the focus for my 
discussion. Kant's epistemology is revisited, and the significance of his notion of 
individual moral development as the guiding principle of World history is 
underscored. Herder's 'genetic' theory of development is also described and related 
to his vision of education and I describe von Humboldt's role in the reform of the 
Prussian education system and the place of language studies in it. My line of 
argument is that the German thinker gained hugely from the time he spent in Paris in 
contact with the Idealogues at the moment when the French education system was 
being put in place. 
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In Part Two I concentrate on the legacy of the nineteenth century, and in particular the 
work of three thinkers: the 'cultural' psychology of Wilhelm Wundt, the philosophy 
of Franz Brentano and Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. I have read 
substantially in the major works of Locke, Condillac, Herder and von Humboldt. 
With Wundt, however, I have relied on secondary works where primary sources in 
translation have been difficult to trace. My choosing to look at Wundt's theories may 
seem puzzling. Woodruff Smiths's superb study, Politics and the Sciences of 
Culture in Germany, 1840-1920 convinced me that the founding figure of 
professional psychology merited a fresh 100k.33 Nowadays, Wundt's ethnic 
psychology receives little serious attention beyond standard histories of the field. 
Yet, at the close of the nineteenth-century Wundt's international standing as the 
world's foremost experimental psychologist seemed secure. I describe how Wundt 
developed a theory of the role of signs in the development of the higher mental 
functions, and I outline the way he tried unsuccessfully to combine experimental and 
anthropological methods into a form of 'cultural' psychology to tell the story of 
Mankind. The research programme which Wundt established in Leipzig in the 
eighteen-eighties, stands at a fork, where two specialising fields, linguistics and 
psychology, parted company. The picture of language that Wundt started out with in 
the eighteen-sixties was compromised by Saussure's structural account of language 
as a system of differences. Additionally, his notion of mental 'contents' was 
superceded by a conception of mental 'acts' stemming from the philosophy of Franz 
Brentano. Yet Wundt's expansive cultural psychology held out a notion mind that 
extends beyond individual consciousness to include human cultural productions (call 
it 'material culture', though Wundt was not a materialist as such) including artifacts. 
By contrast with Wundt' s mental contents, Brentano' s conception of mental 'acts' 
points towards the rigorous analysis of mental behaviour for what it tells us of 
consciousness. The notion of mental acts has been seminal for developments in 
many fields including psychology, philosophy as well as literary theory. Following 
on from this, Brentano's 'phenomenology' was hugely significant for many of 
Vygotsky's contemporaries, especially for researchers working in the field of 
20 
perception. The Berlin Gestalt School was powerfully influenced by such ideas. 
Interestingly, the peculiar methodological difficulties that beset Wundt's reseach 
programme foreshadow the general crisis in psychology to which Vygotsky among 
others responded. 
Finally in Part Two, I show how Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms, especially 
his distinctive phenomenology, figured in contemporary discussions among 
psychologists about the role of signs in mental development and how these 
discussions related to contemporary developments in clinical psychology. I go on to 
suggest why his profoundly ethical vision of language as 'the common ground' of 
humanity continues to have resonance for education today. From the secondary 
literature, two studies of Cassirer have been especially useful to me. D. R. Lipton's 
book, Ernst Cassirer: The Dilemma of a Liberal Intellectual in Germany, 1914-1933 
alerted me to the huge importance of a major study of German culture around the 
turn of the nineteenth century by Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German 
Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933. Lipton also provided 
me with a fascinating political backdrop against which to place a reading of 
Cassirer's major work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In his book, Cassirer, 
Symbolic Forms and History, John Michael Krois' lucid discussion of Cassirer's 
philosophical journey beyond neo-Kantianism makes plain the philosopher's unique 
place in contemporary intellectual developments. 
My decision not to include Vygotsky among the thinkers I discuss in Part Two may 
seem a strange one in the light of the way that I make use of his work in Part Three. 
However, rereading the Soviet psychologist from the historical perspectives that I 
have attempted to recover here is too great an undertaking and it will have to be 
postponed. 
In Part Three, I turn to a Hackney classroom and specifically to the theme of 
learning and development in an urban setting. I tell the story of how a poem, Piece 
of the Past, came to written by a boy from a Caribbean family background who was 
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growing up in the local community. This entails tracing the origins of the poem back 
into personal history and the history of discussions and debates that the class 
conducted with itself over five years. In the course of the narrative, I connect the 
changing social relations among the children to history and to wider social realities. 
And I carry forward problematics from parts One and Two into a reading of 
classrooms. Additionally, I draw on recent work in social memory as well as 
perspectives from Vygotsky's writings on memory and imagination. Thus I aim to 
enrich my analysis of how a student's representation of a childhood memory was 
mediated by the semiotic materials to which he had access. Essentially, I have 
selected just one from many possible narratives to build up depth in the story I shall 
be telling. 
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Chapter 1 
The Locke-Condillac Tradition: The Role of Signs in the 
Development of Mind 
Neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to itself can effect much. It 
is by instruments and helps that the work is done, which are as much wanted 
for the understanding as for the hand. And as the instruments of the hand 
either give motion or guide it, so the instruments of the mind supply either 
suggestions for the understanding or cautions. 
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Book I, 16201 
In order to develop the real cause of the progress of the imagination, 
contemplation and memory, we must inquire what assistance these 
operations derive from the use of signs. 
Abbe de Condillac, An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge: Being a 
Supplement to Mr Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, 1756 2 
Language begins with the need to co-ordinate human activity and ends as the means 
by which we gain mastery over our mental operations - such a picture of the role of 
signs in the development of mind was drawn in the first instance by thinkers of the 
European Enlightenment. It arose chiefly from discussions about the nature of 
knowledge and it has been a focus for debate among philosophers, linguists and 
psychologists ever since. Indeed, it has shaped educational theories about the role of 
signs in the development of human capacities. 
Discussions about scientific method in the seventeenth century turned on 
fundamental epistemological questions: questions over the place of scriptural 
interpretation in understandings of Nature and questions about what might be known 
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about the world with reasonable certainty. In the context of such discussions, the 
English thinker, Francis Bacon drew attention to the mediated nature of mental 
operations and the role of what he called, 'instruments of the mind'. Subsequently, a 
picture of the mediating role of signs in mental development arose when rationalist 
and empiricist thinkers counter-posed 'innatist' accounts of the already given nature 
of ideas and 'sensationalists' explanations of the way that knowledge derives from 
the senses, that is, experience. 
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the English philosopher, John Locke, 
argued against the idea that ideas are given to mind a priori. He claimed that ideas 
have their source in both the senses and in reflection. He also argued that words 
make combination of simple ideas into complex ones possible. Such arguments were 
framed by Descartes' separation of mind and body.3 Indeed, Cartesian thinkers 
divided consciousness from material (temporal and spatial) reality. Essentially, they 
split the world into two mutually independent realms. After Descartes, 
epistemological debates concentrated on the question whether knowledge comes 
from innate ideas given to mind (by God); or whether it derives from the 
impressions that sensations make on consciousness, what we might call experience, 
which is the view that Locke adopted. Centrally at issue was the nature - the 
existence, even - of the soul. What was at stake was a secular, political conception of 
the freedom of individual citizens to act responsibly in the light of what they could 
claim to know. 
In this chapter I aim to show how the problem of signs in development figured in the 
ferment of ideas I have just sketched. Further to this, I want to suggest that a major 
shift occurred during the Enlightenment in the way that the link between signs and 
mind was pictured. With Locke, who set the intellectual scene, and then, later, with 
the French thinker, Etienne Bonnot, the Abbe de Condillac, a theory of the role of 
signs in gaining mastery over mental operations - a theory that linked signification to 
psychological development - was given its first, powerful formulation. 
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Together, Locke and Condillac brought about a new appreciation of the role of signs 
in the development of mind. What was new in their appreciation was an 
understanding of the link between word and thought and the connection between 
signs and the mastery of consciousness. As a consequence to this, the very substance 
of language took on a new psychological aspect, especially once it was suggested 
that language secures the necessary preconditions for discursive thinking. From 
these beginnings a theory about the mediating role of signs in the voluntary control 
and development of the higher mental functions (attention, comparison, imagination, 
contemplation, memory and judgement and so on) was evolved. We shall be 
particularly concerned with the role of signs in the development of memory and 
imagination in adolescents in the final part of this dissertation. 
The Locke-Condillac tradition remains an intrinsically interesting one that 
foreshadows modem theories about signification as mind-constituting activity. 
Indeed, in a way that is not widely appreciated, this tradition has contributed 
substantially to contemporary theories about the role of signs in mastering 
psychological behaviour. One such theory of the role of signification in the 
development of mind issued powerfully in Vygotkian psychology of the 1920's and 
30's. Intriguingly, the Soviet thinker was fond of quoting Bacon on the 
'instrumental' character of words, yet, as far as I know, he never mentions 
Condillac. Vygotsky's psychology linked semiotic mediation to cognition in a socio-
cultural account of mind. Yet the fundamentally social nature of language in human 
development -language's origins in social intercourse - was first truly appreciated 
by Condillac.4 The intellectual history ofVygotkian psychology's antecedents in the 
Enlightenment has rarely been explored and I want to recover something of this 
intellectual history here, especially for what it might contribute to discussions in 
contemporary education.5 I shall start with the picture of language that emerged 
from Locke's epistemology. 
Locke developed a psychological theory to explain how complex ideas are built up 
out of the simple data of sensory experience. He did so without assuming the 
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existence of innate ideas. His starting point was the nature of human rather than 
revealed knowledge. Locke's interest in language arose chiefly from his 
epistemological concern with the origins and the nature of ideas rather than from an 
interest in language as such.6 For the English philosopher and political theorist, the 
question of language was always of secondary importance to the problem of human 
understanding. Essentially, he wanted to establish the boundaries of what we can 
claim to know with reasonable certainty from the perspectives of the new spirit of 
SCIence. 
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Locke tried to get clear abou~way that the imperfections of language and what he 
called the 'cheat and abuse' of words causes serious misunderstandings among 
people. For Locke, words stood for ideas that have their separate existence in 
individuals' minds. Moreover, he grasped how commonly defined terms were 
essential for professionals such as scientists and lawyers who needed to establish and 
maintain shared public discourses across various contexts. Further to this, language-
based misunderstandings also carry serious political implications, where the 
definitions of words like 'liberty', 'equality' and 'justice' have to be commonly 
understood if they are to be of any practical value.7 The business of defining words 
therefore is hugely important. 
Earlier, the Port Royal grammarian, Antoine Arnauld had offered a reasonable 
solution to the problem of defining words. With Pierre Nicole he wrote an influential 
treatise, The Art of Thinking (1662), in which he proposed the creation of a new, 
philosophical language: 
Our best method of avoiding the confusion born of the ambiguity of words in 
ordinary language is to construct a new language with new words to which 
we join only those ideas we want words to express. For our new language we 
need not invent new sounds: those already in existence may be used provided 
that we regard them as mere sounds expressing no meaning. Then, using 
simple unambiguous words we specify the meaning to be joined to each such 
sound. 8 
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For Arnauld, the relation between the sounds of words and the meanings that we 
ascribe to them -'nominal definitions' - is an 'arbitrary' one (as it was for Locke) in 
which more or less ' any sound is capable of expressing any idea we choose the so-
called 'arbitrariness of the sign'). But with what Arnauld called 'real definitions' we 
do not arbitrarily join ideas and words. Rather we operate with a word's common 
definition and try to discover by analysis what other ideas are contained in the way it 
is used. The Art afThinking was based on the principle known as 'linguistic 
rationalism', which remained extremely influential throughout the eighteenth 
century. Essentially it states that the structures of thought determine the structure of 
verbal expression. 
Locke concentrated on the conventional nature of words. According to Locke, word 
definitions were a matter of public and therefore social agreement. Thus they were 
wholly conventional in character. He was not, like Arnauld, concerned with 
grammar as such. Although Arnauld held that the relation between the word (sound) 
and the idea it stands for is conventional one, the Port-Royal grammarians usually 
assumed that the classes of words were given.9 The notion that word meanings were 
made by humans would have seemed strange to them. However, such a notion had 
serious implications because it suggested that God did not provide Adam with names 
and their meanings. Rather, Adam created them himself out of his own resources. 
There was no need then for the Church to hand down authoritative definitions, when 
meanings could be settled by people independently of the Church's authority. On 
this view, signs were in no sense 'natural', which is to say somehow 'derived' or 
'copied' from nature. Rather people invented signs because they needed to 
understand one another. 'Men learn names, and use them in talk with others,' as 
Locke put it, 'only that they may be understood'. Language is predicated on the 
notion of people freely reaching mutual understandings (to co-ordinate their 
activities) about things in the world. This is a key principle, and I shall be returning 
to it. 
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According to Haris and Taylor, the story of the origins of names that is given in 
Genesis both supports and undermines Locke's argument: 
And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and 
every fowl of the air: and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call 
them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name 
thereof 
Genesis II, 19. 
The names of things originate with Adam. He was not charged with finding out the 
names that God had already given to the creatures. Rather, his task was to invent the 
names unaided. In the Genesis story he invents the names in complete isolation: 
And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every 
beast of the field; but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him. 
Genesis II, 20. 
Plainly, the Bible does not support a notion of the social origins of words (,there was 
not found an help meet for him'). But it leaves open the possibility that the language 
that Adam invented was a 'perfect' language, and that the problems with words and 
their meanings came after the Fall. Thus it also leaves open the question of how 
people reach agreement over what the words stand for, what they mean and how 
they get defined. 
Conceptions of the social nature of language and the' arbitrariness' of signs have 
been foundational for modem linguistics and they remain important to linguists 
today. Locke was not a linguist however, he was chiefly an epistemologist and a 
political theorist, and the linguistic aspects of the sign were not his chief concern. 
Rather, his concern was with the nature of knowledge. 
Locke's theory of knowledge was partly a form of philosophical 'sensationalism' in 
that he held that knowledge is derived from sensory experience. Sensationalists' 
arguments were directed against the doctrine of innate ideas, and Locke's 
epistemology was of the same sort. The notion that we are equipped with ideas at 
birth by God seemed to Locke to put questions about the nature and status of what 
we might claim to know beyond the realms of public discussion. By contrast, if what 
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we know comes to us through experience (rather than by revelation) then what we 
may claim to know is open to public discussion. It follows from this that the status 
of what we claim to know is a matter for people to decide for themselves and not a 
matter to be settled by the Church's authority. This principle has been an extremely 
important one for the way that it helped to establish modem scientific culture: 
scientific knowledge is established by publicly shared methods of inquiry and 
debate, not by religious dogma. 
However, Locke's epistemology was only partly, not entirely 'sensationalist' in 
character. The main thing that he had to explain was the manner in which the 
material that comes from sense impressions is turned into ideas, thoughts and 
concepts. He introduced a notion of reflection to explain how the process works. In 
the following famous passage Locke proposes that all ideas can be traced either to 
human sense perceptions, or to reflection: 
All ideas come to us from Sensation or Reflection. Let us then suppose the 
mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all character, without any ideas: 
how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the 
busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it all the materials of reason 
and knowledge? To answer this I answer, in one word experience; in that all 
our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our 
observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about 
internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is 
that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. 
These are the two fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ides we have, 
or can naturally have do spring. 10 
Locke was particularly interested in the ways that ideas that have been built up from 
the data of sensory experience are combined with experien~m reflection. 
Further to this, he made a crucial distinction between simple and complex ideas, and 
he held that complex ideas can be broken down into simple ones. (Analogously, the 
meanings of words can be broken down into their constituent parts). But he also 
argued that although ideas come to us from our sense perceptions, our capacity to 
transform what we receive into ideas, which is our capacity for thinking, is a given 
one. On this view, the faculty of reflection is given to mind a priori. 
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Paradoxically, by assuming that the 'faculty' of reflection was given a priori, Locke 
struck a compromise with the doctrine of innate ideas. It will be important to 
remember this compromise when we come to Condillac, who went further than 
Locke by reducing reflection to sensations. Thus he began to picture the active role 
of signs in thinking itself. Later, with the advent of 'scientific' psychology the focus 
shifted from the question of where language comes from to the source of the 
faculties. In the nineteenth century, psychologists like Wilhelm Wundt took up the 
problem of where the so-called 'higher mental functions' (reasoning, memory and 
imagination) come from. But whereas some psychologists concentrated on the 
workings of individual minds as 'natural' phenomena, others ( a minority) argued 
that the higher mental functions, in contrast to the 'lower' ones, are somehow 
derived from history and culture, and that they depend on signs for their 
development. 1 1 
The chief point here concerns the way that Locke addressed the problem of how 
material that is derived from the senses gets transformed into ideas. To explain the 
process, he described the learning path of a newly born infant. Notice how important 
the business of retaining impressions and distinguishing among them over time is to 
the whole process. 
Follow a child from its birth and observe the alterations that time makes, and 
you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be 
furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more the 
more it has matter to think upon. After some time it begins to know objects, 
which being most familiar with it have made lasting impressions. Thus it 
comes by degrees to know the persons it daily converses with, and 
distinguishes them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its 
coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it. 12 
According to Locke, experience presents us with ideas in two significant ways: first, 
through our sense perceptions; and secondly, through reflection. Further to this, he 
claimed that simple ideas are combined into complex ideas that take two forms. The 
first form consists in ideas of 'substance', that is ideas of things that have real 
existence in the natural world. The second form comprises ideas of 'mixed modes'. 
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By 'mixed modes' Locke means abstract ideas that have mental existence only, like 
'justice' or 'liberty'. 
To shed light on the relations among different kinds of 'mixed-mode' ideas and the 
words that stand for them, Locke invented a sequel to the account of Adam's task of 
naming things given in Genesis. This sequel was never meant to stand as an 
'historical' account oflanguage's origins as such. Rather Locke's story afforded him 
a way of speculating about what makes language possible in the first instance. Here 
is his account of how language arose in full: 
One of Adam's children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering 
substance which pleases his eye. Home he carries it to Adam, who, upon 
consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an 
exceeding great weight. These perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes 
notice of in it: and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance 
having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion 
to its bulk, he gives the name zahab, to denominate and mark all substances 
that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now, that, in this 
case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in forming those 
ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names kinneah and niouph 
[jealousy and adultery]. For there he put ideas together only by his own 
imagination, not taken from the existence of anything: and to them he gave 
names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his 
abstract ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist ot not; 
the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this 
new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard 
made by nature; and therefore, being able to represent that to himself, by the 
idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple idea into his 
complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He 
takes care that his idea be comformable to this archetype, and intends the 
name should stand for an idea so comformable. 13 
According to Locke's story, Adam invented a name for the heavy, bright substance: 
zahab (gold). The name that he invents refers to a category of things in the natural 
world that share the same two striking properties, heaviness and brightness. 
Elsewhere, Locke makes it plain that 'it is impossible for every particular thing to 
have a distinct, peculiar name' 14 (Rather, names refer to ideas of objects). Simply 
attaching sounds to particular things wouldn't work because particular names would 
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not serve the chief purpose of language, which is to communicate thoughts. Locke 
puts it like this: 
Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be 
understood: which is then only done when, by use or consent, the sound I 
make by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind who hears it the 
idea I apply to it in mine when I speak it. IS 
According to Genesis, Adam created names for creatures without God's help and in 
Locke's story, too, he creates the name for gold, without help. First, he perceives 
two distinguishing properties that strike him. (Herder calls such distinguishing 
features 'Merkmale'). In other words, first of all Adam gets sense impressions of 
heaviness and brightness and then he combines them by a process of abstraction into 
a complex idea to which he subsequently attaches a single sound, zaha, which 
becomes the sign for the idea of gold. I6 
However, on Locke's view, individuals' ideas are formed through separate, sense-
derived experience. Thus they constitute the private domains (the mental 'furniture', 
or the mental 'property') of individual minds. Crucially, this view shadows a 
fundamental argument for the political principle of liberty of conscience: 
... and every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what 
Ideas he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the same 
Ideas in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same Words, that he 
does. 17 
But as a consequence of the individual ways that we form ideas we can never be 
absolutely sure that what one person means by his or her words is the same as 
another. We form our ideas separately. And crucially, we have the freedom to 
choose words to convey our ideas to others because the same meaning can be 
expressed, the same idea conveyed, in different ways. 
Later, especially with German thinkers like Herder the emphasis shifted towards a 
notion of choosing words to express - not merely convey - the inner meanings, 
interests and intentions of speakers, and thus the dimension of creativity in the 
production of signs was expanded. But for Locke, the chief concern was with the 
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problem of human misunderstandings. 'One man's complex idea' he says, 'seldom 
agrees with another.' And as soon as we reflect on the significance of complex ideas 
like 'liberty', and 'justice', we can see exactly why his theory oflanguage has 
mattered so much. One person's notions of 'liberty' and 'justice' - and, crucially, 
their whole conception of Man, and hence the politics that flow from it - seldom 
agree with another. 
Locke's account of Adam's task, then, is linked to his political conception of 
individual freedom of thought, as Hans Aarsleff explains: 
As in his political philosophy Locke insisted on Adam's ordinary humanity 
also in regard to language: 'the same necessity of conforming his ideas of 
substances to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature, that 
Adam was under, ifhe would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are 
all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam had of affixing 
any new name to any idea, the same anyone has still. .. 18 
Today, like Adam we have the freedom to attach new names to ideas. But there is an 
important difference. Historically formed languages precede us, as Locke 
recognised: 
[In] places where Men in Society have already established a Language 
amongst them, the signification of Words are very warily and sparingly to be 
altered ... But in Communication with others, it is necessary, that we conform 
the Ideas we make the Vulgar Words of any language stand for, to their 
known proper Significations, (which I have explain'd at large already,) or 
else to make known the that new signification, we apply them to. 19 
We use words that are commonly available to us. 20 As the need arises, we define 
and, when necessary, redefine our terms to establish and to maintain mutual 
understanding. Ironically, it is in the freedom to attach new names to ideas that 
Locke located the chief cause of human misunderstandings. We choose words to 
convey our thoughts. And like Adam, we make creative choices, even when we 
attach old words to new meanings. In this sense, others' words are always of our 
own choosing, because we fill them with our own intentions and interests. But the 
high price we pay for individual sovereignty (in forming our own ideas) is that our 
intended meanings sometimes miscarry. Words don't signify the same ideas to the 
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people who 'share' them. So how do we ever manage to understand one another at 
all? 
Ordinary conversations rely on common usage. But common usage is unreliable in 
professional domains such as science and the law. For technical discourses, 
definitions have to be consistent and relatively context-free. For instance, 'gravity' 
has a special meaning within the' scientific community'. Thus gravity constitutes a 
particular instance of the way that the codification of words, their usage and their 
definition has been important for scientific practices. Indeed, the same is true for all 
professional domains, including the church, the academy, the law, medicine, and so 
on. Indeed, such reasoning lies behind the seventeenth century ideal of perfecting a 
philosophical language. 
The practical need to ensure that words mean the same thing in public discourses has 
shaped language studies in obvious ways. Paradoxically, perhaps, it sharpened 
linguists' awareness of the way that word meanings change over time, where 
different definitions are compared. Typically, where more than one definition is 
possible, scholars have sought to settle the matter by tracing the origins of words, 
their etymologies, their semantic derivations and so on. 
In an effort to track down the original and therefore 'true' meanings of words 
scriptural interpreters have attempted to reconstruct the 'perfect nomenclature' that 
was, according to orthodoxy, perfectly invented by Adam, but subsequently 
corrupted after the Fall. Additionally, antiquarians, etymologists and lexicographers 
gained impetus from Locke's unorthodox picture of how language changes. (It was 
not until the nineteenth century, especially after William Jones discovery of a Indo-
European language, and with the advent of German philology that language change 
was explained in a systematic way. 
Why was Locke's picture oflanguage important at the time? One reason it was 
important was for the way that it challenged the prevailing religious orthodoxy about 
36 
where language comes from and what it was for. This orthodoxy was the so-called 
'Adamic' orthodoxy in which language appears as revelation. On this view, Adam's 
naming of the creatures was inspired by divine knowledge of things. God to Adam 
revealed their very essences. Thus revealed (Divine) knowledge about the nature of 
the world might be recovered by rediscovering the original language. 
Against such an orthodox account of knowledge of the natural world as Divine 
Revelation, Locke set a radical view of knowledge as derived from human 
experience. Crucially, this view accorded with the spirit of the new scientific culture. 
With Locke's story of the naming of things, Adam invents the names for the 
creatures. He doesn't guess their 'true' or 'right' (God-given) ones. Instead - this is 
the vital point - he creates them out of his own resources. And thus Adam's 
linguistic creativity is connected to a fundamental principle of human freedom?l As 
Locke notes: 'What liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of mixed 
modes, by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have all men ever 
since had'. 
In essence, discussions over the status of scientific knowledge framed Locke's 
investigations into language. He wanted to set scientific knowledge of the natural 
world apart from and above dogma that was derived from scriptural interpretation. 
In the seventeenth century, the authorised picture of the origins of language 
proposed that since, according Genesis, the naming of the creatures happened before 
the Fall the original names that Adam gave them must have been their 'true' 
names?2 Thus theologians and Bible scholars searched for the original Adamic 
language because, allegedly, it contained the 'true' essences of things - revealed 
knowledge about the natural world. Hans Aarsleff comments: 
Still retaining the divine nature of their common origin, languages were in 
fundamental accord with nature, indeed they were themselves part of 
creation and nature. They were divine and natural, not human and 
conventional. Even after the fall, Adam was the greatest philosopher, 
etymologist, and naturalist who ever lived on earth. The authority of 
scriptural revelation ensured that languages held a nomenclature, that words 
did name species and essences. This is an essentialist and innatist doctrine, 
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and it agreed with the double conformity expectation of ordinary speakers 
[that words conform to both things and ideas, which seem the same, but 
which Locke insists are not]. Languages were a better avenue to the true 
knowledge of nature than the mere self-help of man's deceiving senses and 
imperfect reason. 23 
In sum, with the orthodox, 'Adamic' picture of language Adam attaches words to 
things according to their revealed natures. Thus, Adam's inventory constitutes a 
'perfect nomenclature' that stands above man's ordinary understandings. And thus 
scriptural interpretation is set above scientific method. But Locke assumed that 
Adam had no special knowledge to guide him. Rather, he relied on the experience 
that was given to him through his sense perceptions and reflection. 
I 
Finally, ther{another aspect of Locke' theory of language that I have not yet 
touched on. This is to do with the role of signs in the development of thinking, and it 
points us in the direction that Condillac' s investigations would take. Locke assumed 
that the main purpose of language was communication. He presupposed that the 
chief function of words was the efficient transference of ideas from the mind of one 
individual to another. Thus, he speaks about language as 'the great conduit' , or 'the 
vehicle' of thought, which was a common metaphor in Locke's day. On this view, 
language is the chief means by which we make our thoughts known to others. 
Without words our ideas would remain private. 
Because language is alleged to enter the picture after the formation of ideas has 
already occurred it might be inferred that signs do not playa constituent role in the 
actual formation of ideas. Recall that in Locke's picture of language, speech is the 
production of articulated sounds that are signs of a speaker's ideas. For Locke, 
words are vocal signs standing for ideas. Ideas come first and words come second. 
But, according to Locke, language has another function besides standing for ideas. 
This is a psychological function. Words, he says, provide the means by which we 
register our thoughts. We can represent ideas of things to our selves with the aid of 
words -'even when they [things] are absent'. Words make it possible to store ideas, 
and what is more they make ideas available for future reference. Signs make 
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recollection possible. They function as mental 'tools' (what Bacon calls 'instruments 
and helps') and without such 'tools' experience itself would be literally 
'unthinkable' . And thus memory itself depends on signification. But Locke stopped 
short of claiming that the mastery of mental operations - and hence all knowledge -
is dependent upon the use of signs. 
Condillac took an additional step. And once this step was taken, thinkers began to 
grasp the constitutive role of signs in the psychological processes of thinking in a 
radically new way. This change, which began in France, later spread to Germany, 
where language and thought were discussed in the light of the critical philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant, though not by Kant himself. Thinkers began to picture the role of 
signification, in the development of the faculties and, at a later stage, what were 
referred to as the 'higher mental functions'. In sum, after Locke, signs took on new 
psychological significance as well as an epistemological one. 
* * * 
Etienne Bonnot, Abbe de Condillac, took up the picture of language where Locke 
left off. He systematised it and he extended it in a strikingly original way. Condillac 
put signification at the very centre of his epistemology and thus language was not, as 
it had been for Locke, a secondary consideration subordinate to epistemological 
questions. Condillac' s treatise, Essai sur I' origine des connaissances humaines 
(Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746», what I shall refer to as the 
EssaP4, was written some forty years after Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. 
In it Condillac argued with breathtaking insight that it is by means of signs that we 
gain conscious control over our mental operations. Crucially, he ceased to think 
about language as merely the vehicle for thought once he conceptualised the 
mediating role of signs in the development of mental activity. 
Condillac, held that knowledge comes to us through sense-perception. Like Locke 
he was a 'sensationalist' thinker, and he was, if anything, more robustly anti-
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Cartesian in his philosophical outlook. Whereas Locke had contended that ideas are 
formed by a combination of sensations and reflection, Condillac reduced reflection 
to sensations. Thus he rejected the doctrine of innate ideas outright, claiming that the 
chief faculties - attention, comparison, imagination, contemplation, memory and 
judgement and so on - were derived from the senses. 
The key difference between Locke and Condillac turns on their different 
understandings of what language is for. This difference stemmed from Condillac's 
innovative conception of the active role of signs in thinking. Locke never developed 
such a conception, for which Condillac took him to task: 
Thus, as the soul does not from the first instant control the exercise of all its 
operations, it was necessary, in order to give a better explanation of our 
knowledge, to show how it acquires that exercise, and what progress it makes 
in it. It does not appear that Locke addressed that question, or that anyone 
has ever blamed him for the omission. 
The picture of language that Condillac gives in the Essai suggests that signs function 
to achieve mastery over mental operations - especially reminiscence, imagination 
and memory. Crucially, without the use of signs, he argues, man could never achieve 
voluntary control over these faculties. Thus language is no longer just the chief 
means of communicating ideas as it remained for Locke. Rather, language is 
fundamentally necessary for the development of thinking itself. 
The process of gaining mastery, Condillac says, begins with the impressions that 
things in the world make on our senses. Essentially, consciousness is our awareness 
of sense impressions and attention refers to the way that we select certain sense 
perceptions from others. Further to this, we become aware of changes in our 
perceptions. We notice things both disappearing and recurring. Reminiscence ('I 
have seen this before') marks the beginnings of experience, 'for without it, every 
moment would appear to be the first in our existence,?5 Imagination is the means by 
which perceptions are linked and with it the entire object fills the mind. With 
memory, however, the representation is only partial. In the early stages imagination 
and memory are beyond voluntary control. However, at a later stage, mind gains 
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mastery of imagination and memory with the help of signs. Thus, Condillac reduces 
Locke's combination of sensations and reflection to a single source in sensations. 
Condillac condenses this extraordinary insight into the process of gaining control 
over mental operations into a single sentence: 'In order to develop the real cause of 
the progress of the imagination, contemplation and memory, we must inquire what 
assistance these operations derive from the use of signs.' 26 
In chapter four of the Essai, Condillac distinguishes among three kinds of sign: 
'accidental' signs, 'natural' signs and 'instituted' signs. The nature of these different 
kinds of signs was unproblematic for the French thinker. (Later, with German 
thinkers, Herder and von Humboldt, the problematic nature of the sign would 
become extremely important from a psychological standpoint). In a closely argued 
passage Condillac claims that 'instituted' signs are necessary for achieving control 
over the operations of memory: 
Memory, as we have seen consists only in the power of reviving the signs of 
our ideas, or the circumstances that attended them; a power which never 
takes place, except when by analogy of the signs we have chosen, and by the 
order we have settled between our ideas, the objects which we want to revive 
are connected with some of our present wants. In short we cannot recall a 
thing to mind, unless it be in some connected with something else that is in 
our power. Now a man who has only accidental and natural signs, has none 
at all at his command. His wants can therefore occasion nothing more than 
the repeated act of his imagination; consequently he must have no memory. 
27 
Thus, voluntary control over 'signs of our own choosing' enables us to recall ideas 
at will. It is voluntary control, says Condillac, which distinguishes humans from all 
other species: 'Hence we may conclude that brutes have no memory; and that they 
have only imagination which they cannot command as they please.' Later, in the 
same chapter, he returns to the question ofthe essential difference between men and 
brutes. Whereas brutes have inferior 'souls', the operations of their souls (minds) are 
'not subject to their command'. Thus he continues, 
So long as we have acquired no habit of the imagination, contemplation, and 
memory; or the habit of the two first, is not subordinate to our command; we 
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cannot dispose of our attention as we please. For how indeed should we 
dispose of it, when the soul has no operations in her power? She passes 
therefore from one object to another, only as she is dragged by the 
impression of the different objects. 
But as soon as a man comes to connect ideas with signs of his own chusing, 
we find his memory formed. When this is done, he begins himself to dispose 
of his imagination, and to give it new habit. For by means of signs which he 
is able to recall at pleasure, he revives, or at least is often capable of reviving 
the ideas which are connected with them. Afterwards he obtains greater 
command over his imagination, in proportion as he invents more signs, 
because he thereby procures more means of employing it?8 
Condillac makes three inter-linked claims. First, he claims that sign use creates the 
necessary preconditions for the emergence of human intelligence. Second, he 
indicates the key role of signs in the development of the faculties -attention, 
memory, imagination and, crucially reflection. Third, he suggests the direction that 
the developmental path of the intellectual capacities must follow from the lower to 
the higher mental functions. Thus, in at least three striking ways, Condillac's ideas 
prefigure nineteenth and twentieth century theories about the role of signs in the 
development of the higher mental functions 
Where did signs come from in the first place? We might expect that Condillac would 
rework the Genesis story in the manner of Locke. Instead, however, he merely 
conjectures that signs arose naturally - from human reflection. Thus, the question of 
'reflection' moved centre stage. But herein lies a fundamental problem for 
Condillac's system. If reflection depends on language, how can he account for the 
degree of reflection that the invention of language itself required? 
What a deal of reflexion, for example, was necessary for the forming of 
languages! And how great is the assistance which these languages afford to 
reflexion! But this is a subject for which I design several chapters ... It seems 
to me that we could never make use of instituted signs unless we were 
capable of sufficient reflexion to chuse those signs, and to affix ideas to 
them: what is the reason then, some perhaps will object, that the habit of 
reflexion is to be only acquired only by the use of these signs? ... My answer 
is that I shall solve this difficulty, when I come to treat the history of 
language. In the mean time it will be sufficient here to observe that it has not 
escaped me. 29 
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Condillac's account of the origin of language comes in the second part of the Essai. 
By contrast with Locke, he does not begin with the story of Adam's task. Rather, he 
imagines two children living in a state of nature. In the first instance, they have no 
language. With only two modes of 'natural' signs (cries and gestures) at their 
disposal, they lack the means of gaining voluntary control over their faculties -
attention, comparison, judgement, memory and imagination. In this story, the 
children's mental activity arises initially from the stimulation they receive from their 
immediate environment. In other words, they respond with their senses. However the 
children have to change over from producing 'natural' signs restricted to two modes 
over which they have no voluntary control to producing artificial (what Condillac 
calls 'instituted' signs) as the need arises. Crucially, it is only by means of artificial 
signs - signs of their own making - that they are able to gain voluntary control over 
their mental operations. The key question is this one: 'How are they able to make 
such signs in the first place?' 
Condillac promises that he will deal with this question when he comes to the history 
oflanguage. Unfortunately, in the event, he failed to come up with an adequate 
explanation. Instead, he merely imagines that the children's growing familiarity with 
'natural' signs over time will eventually, by force of habit, lead on to some kind of 
voluntary articulation that will constitute the production of 'artificial' signs. The 
failure to explain the production of 'artificial' signs constituted a major blind spot in 
Condillc's system. And this was precisely where the German thinker, Herder, 
directed his attack in his Treatise: On the Origin of Language. 30 According to 
Herder, Condillac presupposed exactly what he set out to explain. 
Today, questions about the nature oflanguage and meaning have a central place in 
philosophy. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this was not so. 
Language was not generally thought about then as holding the key to 
epistemological and metaphysical problems in the way that it is now.3 ! That came 
later. It was the nature of mind itself - mind's relation to sensations, the constitution 
of ideas, their combination, the operations of reason and memory, 'the so-called 
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faculties' and the limits of what we can claim to know that chiefly mattered. 
Locke was not an atheist, (he was a Christian), but his ideas reinforced Deism, and 
they contributed substantially to the intellectual climate of humanism in France.32 
Condillac's 'sensationalism', which emerged partly in response to Locke's ideas 
about language and mind became commonly associated with Republican, 
materialist, anti-Royalist and anti-clerical (anti-Catholic) politics. This came about 
partly from the way the philosophes, (especially) formulated a radical versions of 
'sensationalism' that combined Condillac's epistemology with a doctrine of 
universal equality. Helvetius turned Condillac's doctrine like this: 'If all knowledge 
comes through the senses, then what a man knows depends completely on his 
experiences. Thus all men are equal in knowledge at birth and the only differences 
between men in later life are differences created by different experiences. ,33 Ideas 
like these cleared a path for the French Revolution. And later, in its aftermath they 
were at the core of debates around the fledgling French State education system. In 
sum, Condillac's sensationalist epistemology was commonly associated with 
godlessness during and immediately after the Revolution. 
The Condillac tradition has been an extremely productive one. Condillac's theory of 
knowledge stands behind Diderot and the theory that underpins the whole project of 
the Encyclopedie. Later, Condillac's ideas were taken up in the aftermath to the 
Great Terror34 by the French ideologues, who were the chief designers of the French 
State education system. They applied Condillac's sensationalist picture of language 
to the analysis of ideas, and it is a measure of the thinker's importance at the time 
that the first collected edition of Condillac's works was published in 1798. It 
appeared in connection with an unprecedented concentration on language, 
curriculum design and pedagogy, when the ideologues struggled to put the study of 
signs at the very centre of a secular, national, curriculum that aimed to produce a 
new kind of French citizen for the new order. However, it was a German thinker, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, who transformed the problem ofthe sign as 'product' into 
the problem of signification as constitutive, human activity - the notion that we 
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make ourselves through language. And it was von Humboldt who recast the whole 
problem of signification in terms of psychological processes from the perspectives 
of Kant's critical philosophy. 
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'I am ofthe latter opinion ... If! can demonstrate that man is in fact nothing more than the 
product of his education, I shall doubtless reveal an important truth to mankind. They will 
learn that they have in their hands the instrument of their greatness and their felicity, and that 
to be happy and powerful nothing is more requisite than to perfect the science of education' 
Thus, he denies the existence of a 'providential' hierarchy of innate abilities bestowed by birth that 
served to legitimate the highly stratified social orders of the Ancien Regime. Instead, Helvetius holds 
out hopes for education as a means of transforming the whole of society, which was a step beyond 
Diderot, Voltaire and Rousseau, who thought it unwise to provide an education that went beyond 
what social position required. Thus Helvetius contributed powerfully to what is essentially a French 
revolutionary doctrine which was formulated in the following manner: 'Public instruction is first need 
of man in society and the first debt of man to society' 
Arguments from sensationalist epistemology were used by the philosophes and later by their 
inheritors, the ideologues, after the fall of Robespierre, against the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul. Such ideas explicitly challenged the Catholic Church's authority. Moreover, they were 
important for a secular conception of State education, especially one that sought to reduce or abolish 
the church's role in schooling. And they were important too for establishing the fundamental 
principles of universal, secular education 
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Chapter 2 
The Idealist Legacy: German Discussions of the Origins 
and the Nature of Language 
The activity of the senses must combine synthetically with the inner action of 
the mind, and from this combination the presentation is ejected, becomes an 
object vis-avis the subjective power and perceived anew as such, returns 
back to the latter. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Kawi introduction, 1836. 1 
The picture of language and mind that Condillac developed in the first half of the 
eighteenth century was linked to French anti-metaphysical thought. By contrast, the 
picture that emerged in Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century had a 
powerful metaphysical side to it. This chapter concerns German discussions about 
the where language comes from, what it is for and how it relates to mind. 
Essentially, the ground plan for German theories about language and its relation to 
mind was provided by Immanuel Kant, though Kant never developed a picture of 
language as such. Instead, it was Herder and von Humboldt who, above all, 
connected signification to an extraordinary conception of human development in 
history and culture. 
48 
Kant aimed to free humanity from the burden of oppressive authority and to end the 
tyranny of princes, despots and the confinements of the past by overthrowing 
religious dogma and mindless prejudice. What was striking about Kant's critical 
philosophy was his unwavering conception of ethical autonomy and responsibility. 
This conception rested on his theory of knowledge. Kant's epistemology turned on 
the idea that mind can only grasp what it has itself created. Before Kant, rationalists 
and empiricists had disputed the rival claims of mind and sensations in the 
production of knowledge. Kant retained both mind and sensations in his system, 
arguing that our knowledge of the world is gained through the synthesising 
interaction of perceiving subjects (thinking individuals) and perceived objects 
(material reality). For Kant, our intuitions about things in the world are rationalised 
by synthetic a priori categories. With the aid of the categories that are given to mind 
we make human sense of the world. Indeed, without the synthetic a priori categories 
human 'experience' as such would be impossible. Instead, there would be merely an 
undifferentiated flux - a meaningless tumult of sensations. 
According to Kant, our relation to things in the world is never direct. We can never 
know 'the thing in itself', the noumenon. Rather, we (thinking subjects) can know 
objects (material reality) only as they appear in subjective consciousness, that is, as 
phenomena, which are produced by mind operating on nature. In sum, for Kant, the 
world we know is not grasped directly, but rather it is 'apperceived'. 
Since Kant, the problem of subject-object relations has preoccupied many 
philosophers, especially German ones. They have posed such questions as, 'How 
does the thinking subject distinguish itself from the object of its own thoughts?' and, 
'How can reason tum back on itself?' The chief advance after Kant came with 
Hegel, who argued the case that the subject and object belong to the same totality, 
and that reality can only be grasped in a dialectical fashion over time. Such 
metaphysical problems are important as a background to what follows, and 
particularly so for the light they shed on eighteenth century debates around the 
source, the nature and the function language. And the business of capturing the 
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nature of human reflection has been a key problem too. We shall be especially 
concerned with the relations between signs and the human capacity for reflection 
when we look at the pictures of language that were developed by Herder and von 
Humboldt. 
Whereas Descartes had taught that all knowledge could be broken down 
systematically and analysed into common, simple elements. Kant, by contrast, 
emphasised the synthesising activity of mind in the apperception of reality as a 
whole. He stressed 'the unity in the manifold' of representations that are given in our 
intuitions. Mind, he said grasps wholes that cannot be decomposed Cartesian fashion 
into separate, constituent elements. Crucially, he emphasised the contribution of the 
'knower' to what is known. Today, such a notion has become the constitutive feature 
of what has come to be known as 'constructive idealism'. 
In Kant's critical philosophy the thinking individual - what is sometimes referred to 
as 'the transcendental subject of cognition' - occupies centre stage. Abstracted from 
place and time, Kant's 'disembodied' subject stands above objective reality and the 
world of 'things in them selves'. Indeed, one of the problems that thinkers have 
struggled with since Kant has been the bringing together of the 'transcendental 
subject of cognition' with flesh and blood, concrete individuals in history and 
culture. 
Nowadays, it is widely held that the chief difference between rationalist conceptions 
of the subject and those conceptions of subjectivity that derive from critiques of 
rationality lies in their contrasting pictures of language. Indeed, contrasting 
evaluations of the Enlightenment have hinged upon critiques of the Kantian subject. 
Discussions in education - the status of its emancipatory claims, for instance - have 
frequently turned on the question of the constitutive role of signs in the 
'construction' or the 'production' of subjects in discourse. Today, analysis of the 
role of signification and representation in identity formation is commonplace. 
However, in many such analyses the principles of individual psychology are 
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routinely subordinated to accounts of discourse as structure and system. I want to get 
behind the problem in this chapter by returning to the writings of some of the 
German idealist thinkers with a view to recovering historical perspectives that might 
usefully inform contemporary discussions in education. 
Kant's epistemology underpinned both his radical conception of freedom and the 
educational vision it inspired. Crucially, he tied his conception of freedom to three 
things: individual moral development, accountability and responsibility. For Kant, 
an action is moral 'if, and only if' it is performed in accordance with universal moral 
law. He argued that the 'categorical imperative' - human ethical sense - provides the 
universal grounds for all moral judgements everywhere. Indeed, the universality of 
such judgements is crucially important in Kant's system. On this view, all mature, 
rational individuals can be freed from external authority to act according to their 
mature moral convictions because freedom in the Kantian sense is primarily an 
inward condition. But at the same time as individuals win freedom to act they must 
submit to external judgement because they are held accountable for their actions. For 
Kant, learning to take responsibility was the chief aim of education. 
Such ideas have contributed powerfully to our modem sense of the value of 
individual lives. They provide the foundation for concepts such as education as a 
universal entitlement. Kant's radical conception of moral autonomy, tempered by 
duty, carried with it a compelling sense of individual worth and dignity. Thus, since 
the Enlightenment, such a secular sense of individual worth has been the cornerstone 
of liberal democracies.2 
Indeed, generations of thinkers have drawn upon or attacked Kant's notion of the 
rational individual- the 'transcendental subject of cognition'. And what is more, 
they have done so in ways that have held profound implications for many 
intellectual fields including some that were not established as independent 
disciplines in Kant's time - linguistics, literary theory, psychology, the social 
sciences, political economy - as well as for philosophy itself. Contemporary 
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'deconstruction', for instance, insists that coherent subjectivity is a fiction. Yet such 
has been the influence of Kant's philosophy in the field of education that many of its 
fundamental tenets are commonly taken-for-granted in wholly de-historicised 
fashion. Here I want to underscore the foundational character of Kant's 
epistemology and recall something of the criticism it met at the time. 
* * * 
Since the late eighteenth century, Kant's critics have drawn attention to difficulties 
with his system as a rational construct. Johann Georg Hamann, one of Kant's 
contemporaries, flatly denied that there was a necessary connection between a priori 
propositions and true statements about the world. And here, crucially, language -
signification - enters the picture. Reason, Hamann claimed, is language: 
If I were as eloquent as Demosthenes, I would do no more than repeat one 
sentence three times: Reason is language, Logos. On this marrow bone I 
gnaw, and I shall gnaw myself to death on it. There still remains darkness on 
the face of this deep for me: I still wait for an apocalyptic angel with a key to 
this abyss. 3 
Hamann's great insight was that thinking and speaking were not two processes but 
one. For Hamann, language was not a vehicle for transporting pre-existing ideas 
from one mind to another (as it was for Locke). Rather he believed it was the case 
that language constitutes mind itself. 
Hamann's insight held far reaching philosophical implications. It inspired thinkers, 
who were dissatisfied with Kant's emphasis on abstract, transcendental reason, to 
attack his system. Herder, for example, took up and developed Hamann's original 
idea. Hamann had argued vehemently that philosophers had failed to see that when 
they were studying ideas and concepts they were actually studying human 
'expression'. Thus, he writes, 'With me the question is not so much: what is 
reason?' but rather, 'What is language?' 4 Following Hamann, Herder attacked 
Kant's epistemology two polemical pieces: Metacritique of the Critique of Pure 
Reason (1799), and Kaliigone, (1800). The chief line of these attacks was directed 
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against the a priori character of Kant's theory of subjectivity - in particular, the way 
that Kant's abstract 'thinker' (mind) brings knowledge into being with the aid of 
intuitions and the categories that are already given to mind.s Herder, by contrast, 
wanted to put the nature of the thinker first. Essentially, this was an assault on the 
abstract nature of Kant's theory of the rational subject. 'No one can make himself 
independent of himself,' said Herder, 'that is, place himself outside all original inner 
and outer experience, and ... think himself beyond himself. That would be a prius 
anterior to every a priori; thereby human reason would cease before it had begun. ,6 
By rejecting the Kantian transcendental subject of cognition, and by insisting on a 
flesh-and-blood thinking person who has been formed by historical events, Herder 
took a hugely significant step that pointed the direction for German philosophy of 
history as well as philosophical anthropology. 
If Kant's synthetic a priori categories are indeed somehow dependent upon 
language, as several of Kant's contemporaries, (chiefly Hamann) argued; and if the 
origins of language lie in human invention, then claims about the transcendental, 
trans-historical status of the categories run into trouble. If humans invented 
language, then language made its appearance in history and the same goes for the 
categories. It follows from this that ways of seeing the world - outlooks, mentalities, 
norms and values are somehow deposited in the languages of 'historical peoples' . 
According to Hamann' ... every court, every school every profession every 
corporation, every sect has its own language.' 7 Languges have their own historical 
particularities, which relate to the experiences of the people who speak them. (This 
idea re-emerges powerfully in Volosinovl Bakhtin's marxist critique of the 
Saussurean sign as a form of 'abstract idealism'). If languages are cultural artefacts, 
then, the same applies to the categories that depend on them. They are not, as Kant 
had claimed, transcendental, changeless, and somehow outside history. They do not 
rise above place and time. The values and the standards by which we live are, on the 
contrary, peculiar to the societies, cultures and 'spheres of life' - the courts, the 
professions, the academy and corporations - that gave rise to them. And languages 
have been manufactured variously, both in space and time, to reflect or 'refract' the 
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experiences of the peoples who speak them. Interestingly, Kant was aware of this 
problem - it appears in his anthropological writings - but he does not seem to have 
been troubled by it. 8 
Whereas Kant erected the ideal of the autonomous, rational individual - the 
'transcendental subject' - as a bulwark against prejudice, religious dogma and the 
arbitrary authority of princes and despots, Herder put the 'expressive subject' at the 
centre of things. Herder, who was a student of Kant, had always harboured a deep 
suspicion of the philosophers' 'brooding over transcendent, abstract words and 
word-sounds whose direct observation is denied to the human spirit. ,9 Thus, Herder 
followed Hamann, who thought that, 'ideas and things can and must be studied only 
in their concrete, naturally occurring contexts, that is, as they occur in the thought 
that is actually used by human beings, otherwise they will be misunderstood' .10 Not 
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surprising, then, Herder chose to begin in~ifferent place from Kant. 
He rejected Kant's emphasis on the logical, formal conditions for knowing as a 
starting point. Instead, he stressed the role of subjective 'needs' and 'interests' of the 
'knower' in what is known. He also insisted that it is through language that we grasp 
realities. How was this accomplished? According to Herder, humans possess a 
special power that he regarded as a creative capacity of the soul (Kraft der Seele), 
that enables us to seize upon reality as we find it. Crucially, he linked this creative 
'power' of the soul to the production of speech. 
Kraft is a metaphysical expression. Herder first used it to explain the impact of a 
poem on a receptive mind. As one historian of ideas has shown recently, the term 
Kraft was borrowed from contemporary philosophy, where it had already acquired a 
complicated meaning. 'Kraft, is a difficult concept to define,' he writes, 'and though 
it was an essential component of most ontological and psychological theories of the 
German Enlightenment, nearly all of the philosophers who used it also struggled to 
find an adequate determination of its meaning.' 11 Essentially, Kraft suggests 
Herder's notion of the creativity of the Human Spirit 
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Additionally, Herder's picture of speech was linked to a conception of the 
development of peoples and nations. Human difference emerged as a major theme in 
the late Enlightenment and the German reception of Voltaire's Philosophy of History 
(1766) marks an important moment in our context. 12 Voltaire had challenged 
orthodox religious assumptions about the efficacy of divine providence. Hitherto, the 
notion of divine providence had provided the organising principle for what was 
essentially a theistic conception of historical and cultural progress. Voltaire argued 
in the first chapter of his book, 'The Different Races of Men', that the people of the 
earth are divided into entirely separate races. This claim ran counter to Old 
Testament accounts, as Voltaire's German reviewers were quick to show. These 
German reviewers also criticised what they saw as too narrow a definition of peoples 
and cultures. A quarrel ensued and, amidst the controversy, August Schlozer was 
commissioned to write an authoritative 'Universal History Curriculum. This 
curriculum was duly published in 1772, and Herder wrote a short damning review of 
it. 
He devoted three paragraphs only to the key words in Schlozer's piece, accusing him 
of following Voltaire in his 'sweet mistakes of history'. 13 • (Interestingly, Schlozer's 
work contained a strong ethnographic element - he it was that introduced the term). 
But Herder saw plainly that the real weaknesses of the Universal History lay 
elsewhere: it was too schematic, too abstract and, crucially, it lacked an adequate 
principle of historical development. One historian has summed up Herder's 
objections like this: 
Thus Herder asked the question of the decade, namely where is the unifying 
factor in in Schlozer's conception of the history of world cultures, where are 
the organizing principles of direction, or to use Herder's term, where is the 
goal post?14 
The 'question of the decade' was this: 'What is the organising principle of world 
history?' It was an especially powerful one. For Kant the answer was progress 
towards moral maturity. It was in the context of debate about the nature of historical 
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change that Wilhelm von Humboldt began to speculate that the key to discovering 
an organising principle lay in the diversity of human language structure and its 
influence on the mental development of Mankind. 15 
Herder introduced a form of cultural relativism into an emerging picture of human 
development. He sketched an 'intemalist' view of human development in Yet 
Another Philosophy of History for the Furthering of Humanity, (1774). By 
'intemalist' I mean that he argued the case that it is both ethically and historically 
mistaken, to measure cultures in the way he claimed that French thinkers like 
Voltaire had done. They used categories, values and beliefs from outside the 
particular ways of life, customs and traditions of the communities in question. Thus, 
'Herder freed the anthropology of the peoples of the globe from progress ideology, 
just as Voltaire had from divine providence a decade earlier' .16 Where did Herder's 
cultural relativism come from? The answer is that he imported it from the picture of 
language that he had already developed in connection with his work on the origins of 
speech. 
* * * 
I shall tum now specifically to Herder's picture of language and to the particular 
circumstances in which he wrote his famous treatise on the origins of language, An 
Essay on Language. In the late spring of 1769, the Berlin Academy set the prize-
essay question: 'supposing that human beings were left to their natural faculties, are 
they in a position to invent language? And by what means will they achieve this 
invention on their own?' Behind the question lies a complicated history of 
intellectual exchange. I? The essay topic had travelled to Berlin from Paris, and it 
became a long-standing stimulus for debate there. 
By the first quarter of the eighteenth century Berlin Academy had grown provincial. 
It had lost much of the prestige it had once enjoyed in the days of Leibniz. But the 
reputation of the Academy was revived by Frederick the Great in the 1740s by the 
appointment of a Frenchman, Pierre Louis Maupertuis, to the Presidency, on the 
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recommendation of Voltaire, whom Frederick greatly admired. Maupertuis, who 
was a member of the Academie des Sciences in Paris, and the Royal Society in 
London, aimed to improve the international reputation of the Prussian institution. 
In Berlin the influence of the French tastes and manners was everywhere. The 
official language of the Academy was French. Academic papers were occasionally 
accepted in Latin but rarely in German. From Berlin Maupertuis, kept in close touch 
with intellectual and scientific developments in Paris, especially debates around the 
origin of language. The publication of Condillac' s Essai sur l' origine des 
connaissances humaines (Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746)) had 
produced a flood of works written on the same and related topics, including 
Maupertuis' own Reflexions philosophiques sur L'origine des langues et la 
signification des mots, (1748). Maupertuis knew Condillac personally and, naturally, 
he discussed the origin of language question with him when he visited Paris in 1754 
and in his correspondence with the French thinker. 
It is hardly surprising then that, Maupertuis, should have introduced the question of 
the origin of language as a topic for an essay competition. What is surprising, 
though, and what needs explaining, is why Germans discussed the origin of language 
in Berlin for further twenty years. What sparked fresh controversy among them was 
the perception that Condillac had failed somehow to show convincingly how 
language first made its appearance. IS His tale of two children, at a loss for language, 
who by force of habit, gradually acquire voluntary control over signs, failed to 
convince his German critics, especially Herder, who submitted the prize winning 
essay, An Essay on Language in 1772. 
In the seventeen-sixties, it was commonly held that language was providential. 
However, the Berlin Academy framed a prize-essay question in such a way that it 
invited responses putting the case for language as human invention. Herder wrote 
the prize-winning Essay on the Origin of Language -or, The Treatise 
(Abhandlung).19 In doing so, he drew on the work of Condillac, although 
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paradoxically he was highly critical of Condillac' s account of language's first 
appearance. Herder's originality lay in the way that he changed the manner that the 
question was posed. 
He divided his Treatise into three sections. The first section dealt with the roots of 
speech in the outward expression of inner feelings. He argued that humans share 
with animals the ability to make natural cries, but this on its own, is not sufficient to 
explain the origins of speech. And he makes a distinction between natural cries and 
human speech. (This distinction corresponded broadly to Condillac's division 
between 'natural' and 'instituted' or 'conventional' signs). Human speech, Herder 
says, depends on the uniquely human capacity for reflection, (Besonnenheit). It is 
just this 'faculty' that separates humans from animals because it provides the means 
by which humans both order the world and mediate their inward operations, which is 
what Condillac had argued earlier. However, reflection is singled out as the chief 
faculty. It is not as it appears in Condillac's account, one faculty among others. 
Crucially, language is not represented primarily as a system of 'instituted' signs, but 
as an act of reflection. On Herder's view, it is reflective consciousness that enables 
us to grasp a distinguishing mark (Merkmal) from a flood of sensations. This 
provides the conditions of possibility for reminiscence. By such acts of primary 
signification we are able to recognise an object when we see it again. Moreover it is 
just this ability - to recognise and signify within a single mental operation - Herder 
claims, that makes us intrinsically human. Here is the 'epoch-making' passage in 
which Herder describes the whole process. I shall quote it in full: 
Man placed in a state of reflection which is peculiar to him, with this 
reflection for the first time given full freedom of action, did invent language. 
For what is reflection? What is language? This reflection is characteristically 
peculiar to man and essential to his species; and so is language and the 
invention of language. 
Invention of language is therefore as natural to man as it is to him that he is 
man. Let us simply develop these two concepts further: reflection and 
language -
Man manifests reflection when the force of his soul acts in such freedom 
that, in the vast ocean of sensations which permeate it through all channels of 
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the senses, it can, if I might say so, single out one wave, arrest it, concentrate 
its attention on it, and be conscious of being attentive. He manifests attention 
when, confronted with the vast hovering dream of images which pass by his 
senses he can collect himself into a moment of wakefulness and dwell at will 
on one image, can observe it clearly and more calmly, and can select in it 
distinguishing marks for himself so that he will know that this object is this 
and not another. He thus manifests reflection if he if he is able not only to 
recognize and acknowledge to himself one or several of them as 
distinguishing characteristics. The first act of this acknowledgement results 
in a clear concept; it is the first judgement of the soul - and through what did 
this judgement occur? Through a distinguishing mark, which he had to single 
out and which as a distinguishing mark for reflection struck him clearly. 
Well, then! Let us acclaim him with shouts of eureka! This first 
distinguishing mark, as it appeared in his reflection was the work of the soul! 
With it human language was invented! 20 
As Herder claimed later in the Treatise, 'The focal point has been found where 
Prometheus' divine spark ignites in the human soul- with the first characteristic 
mark [Merkmal] there was language,.21 
Condillac had acknowledged the importance of reflection. But he did not give it the 
pivotal role that Herder gave it. As the historian, Kurt Mueller-Vollmer puts it, 
[Reflection] denotes nothing short of the process through which the subject 
qua conscious and thinking subject constitutes itself, and is no longer one 
mental operation among others as Condillac and his followers still believe. 
Reflexion occurs when thinking turns back upon itself by distinguishing 
itself from its thoughts, and that Herder maintained is only possible in and 
through speech. The birth of the subject is also the birth of language. 22 
For Herder, the question is no longer, 'Which came first, language or reflection?' 
(The problem that Condillac promised to resolve, but never did). Rather, with 
Herder, 'every act of semiotic recognition is thus founded upon an instance of 
cognition in which something becomes a sign, in short on upon acts of 
signification ... The question now reads: How is semiotic recognition possible?,23 
Herder never answered this question satisfactorily. But he did succeed in 
transforming the terms of the prize-essay question. If reflective consciousness 
constitutes what is intrinsically human, then it must follow that 'the growth of 
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language is as natural to man as his nature itself' .24 The question is no longer about 
whether humans, left to their own resources -like Condillac's children in their pre-
linguistic state - could invent language. Rather, humans are intrinsically human 
because they possess the common capacity for both reflection and speech at one and 
the same time. 
After Herder, language is no longer thought about as something added. Rather, 
language is there from the start. Indeed, on his view, linguisticality constitutes the 
defining characteristic of the species. It provides the common ground for what is 
generally human. Moreover, language is not thought about as it is in modern 
structural linguistics as a system of differentiated signs. Rather it is seen as human 
activity. 
In the second part of the Treatise, Herder attempted to formulate various linguistic 
'laws' ?5. The first 'law' promulgates a notion of development. It claims that 
people's linguistic capacities increase with language use - a claim that still has 
currency. Thus, linguistic growth at the individual level is explained by linking it to 
the development of thought. In sum, the growth in our capacity for reflection is 
linked directly to our linguistic development - hence the role of language in 
learning. This is arguably already there in Condillac. What Herder introduced was a 
'genetic' account of the history of such development. 
Herder's second 'law' moves beyond the level of the individual to consider language 
development in the family. In this section, he suggests that grammars have grown 
out of the needs arising within the necessary practice of language instruction. His 
third 'law' applies to the formation of national languages. In it he proposes that 
varieties of language derive from a single, common, language stock. Herder 
speculates that varieties of language have arisen from the common stock, as peoples 
have inhabited different environments over the globe. What was once homogeneous 
speech has split variously, first into dialects and then, subsequently, into different 
languages: 'Just as, according to all probability, the human race forms a progressive 
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whole from one origin in one great system: so also all languages and with them the 
whole chain of culture' ?6 Thus, in Herder's eyes, variation, whether it is at the level 
of individuals or at the level of entire peoples offers proof of common humanity. 
Herder's picture of language holds far-reaching implications for both the philosophy 
of language and for a conception human 'emergence' in the way that it focuses on 
the relation between the birth of the speaking subject - the emergence of the 
individual person - and the problematic nature of the sign.27 Along with the English 
language theorist, Monboddo (it was Herder who suggested that his work be 
translated and who wrote the preface to the German edition of 1784/5) 28, Herder 
suggests that the defining human characteristics - rationality, sociality, erect stature, 
language - result from a developmental process. On this view, language is neither 
given to man (by God) nor added to humankind as a 'invention', in the way that it 
appears in Condillac' s account. Herder held out a picture of the role of language in 
the progressive humanisation that constitutes the story of man's self-production.29 
In the aftermath to Herder's original insights, the substance of language - especially 
grammar- remained largely unexplored in connection with the question of the 
language's origins. Indeed, language as such remained a more or less transparent, 
unproblematic medium. It was left to Wilhelm von Humboldt to reformulate 
Herder's basic arguments systematically from the perspectives of a linguist - Von 
Humboldt was especially interested in language's forms and structures - from the 
perspective of a major theorist whose philosophical outlook was shaped by Kant. 
* * * 
Von Humboldt's major work, The Diversity of Human Language Structure and its 
Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind reveals how questions about the 
nature of language and mind were linked to the German philosophy of history.30 
Essentially, Von Humboldt connected language to a picture of human development. 
The Berlin Academy published the Kawi Introduction, (as the work became known) 
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posthumously in 1836, though it was conceived as a theoretical and philosophical 
introduction to a longer, more ambitious project: A Treatise on the Kawi Language. 
Von Humboldt's study of the literary and sacred language of Java aimed to show 
how Indian languages and cultures had penetrated indigenous Malayan linguistic and 
cultural patterns. It was a huge undertaking, and fraught with difficulty, too, as von 
Humboldt himself quickly realised. He writes, 'Such a situation and inter-
relationship of peoples and languages confronts ethnographic and linguistic research 
with problems of the utmost importance, but also of the greatest difficulty' .31 The 
Kawi Introduction, then, was intended to prepare readers for the main work, which 
was to be a detailed, empirical investigation, in three volumes, describing the 
relations between people and languages across the Malayan Archipelago. Thus, the 
Kawi Introduction aimed to clear the philosophical ground for the main work. Von 
Humboldt writes as a philosopher of universal history, 
The division of mankind into peoples and races, and the diversity of their 
languages and dialects, are indeed directly linked with each other, but are 
connected with and dependent upon, a third and higher phenomenon, the 
growth of man's mental powers into ever new and often more elevated 
forms. They find here their valuation, but also their explanation, so far as 
research is able to penetrate into them and grasp their connection. This 
revelation of man's mental powers, diverse in its degree and nature, over the 
course of millennia and throughout the world, is the highest aim of spiritual 
endeavour, the ultimate idea which world history must strive to bring forth 
clearly from itself.32 
Kant wrote, 'We want to see if we can succeed in finding a guiding thread for such a 
history [a universal history of Mankind], and we will leave it to nature to produce a 
man who is in a position to write it.,33 Von Humboldt's linguistic research was 
driven by a quest for just such a universal organising principle of world history - a 
principle of human development. In his study of the Kawi language he intended to 
link the forms and structures of language to the mental development of the peoples 
of Java. Thus, he aimed to uncover (in a way that resembles Goethe's morphology) a 
'higher phenomenon, the growth of man's mental powers into ever new and often 
more elevated forms' . 
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Von Humboldt's intellectual roots were planted deep in the European 
Enlightenment. From the perspective of a concern with the progress of humanity, he 
sought to make language central to a philosophical survey of mankind's capacity for 
self-cultivation. Thus, in a letter to a friend he outlined his plans for the Kawi work: 
My aim is much simpler and also more esoteric, namely a study that treats 
the faculty of speech in its inward aspect, as a human faculty and which uses 
its effects, languages, only as sources of knowledge and examples in 
developing the argument. I wish to show that what makes a particular 
language what it is, is its grammatical structure in all its diversities can only 
follow certain methods that will be listed one by one, so that by the study of 
each language it can be shown which methods are dominant or mixed in it. 
Now, in these methods themselves I consider, of course, the influences of 
each on the mind and feeling, and their explanation in terms of the causes of 
the origins of the languages, in so far as this is possible. Thus,I connect the 
study of language with the philosophical survey of humanities capacity for 
formation [Bildung] and with history. I have for some years been engaged in 
a work of this subject and made good progress. But the stay in Gastein this 
year has brought my ideas on these matters to a certain maturity.34 
What Herder's concept of reflection had failed to explain, eventually became the 
focus for von Humboldt's own seminal theory of language. 
Von Humboldt claimed that the 'inward aspect' of speech is inherently structured. 
He also claimed that grammar is its formative principle. I shall say more about what 
he intended by this presently, but for now I simply need to note two things: first, that 
his theories prefigured psycho-linguistics; secondly, he afforded language a central 
role in the formation of subjectivity. 
For von Humboldt, language amounts to more than communication. It is not, as it 
was for Locke, a conduit or a duct to transport ideas from one mind to another. 
Language stems from an inner, creative drive: 
The bringing forth of language is an inner need of man, not merely an 
external necessity for maintaining communal intercourse, but a thing lying in 
his own nature, indispensable for the development of his mental powers and 
the attainment of a world view, to which man can only bring his thinking to 
clarity and precision through communal thinking with others. 35 
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Von Humboldt's conception of 'inner need' corresponds broadly to Herder's notion 
of exlpression. With Herder, he argues that human development depends on the 
growth of mankind's linguistic capacities. But by contrast with Herder he insisted on 
the intersubjective character of the production of linguistic meaning.36 For von 
Humboldt, intellectual development was not so much individual as fundamentally 
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However, von Humboldt did not subscribe to a principle of linguistic relativity - the 
notion that all languages are adequate for the life-worlds - the 'spheres' - of the 
peoples who speak them as Herder had done. Rather, he subscribed to a notion of the 
perfection of linguistic forms. On this view, Sanscrit is a superior language because 
it is 'one of the languages in which the mental cultivation of mankind has evolved 
most happily in the longest sequence of advances' .38 For von Humboldt, each 
language's potential for development was limited by its original 'design', 'blueprint 
or Bauplan. Thus, he claims, 'the whole progress of language of improved language 
making can only go on within the limits prescribed to it by the original design ... ' 
And nations, he continues, 'cannot remove the inner restrictions which have once 
been deeply embedded therein'. 39 
By this principle, Von Humbolt ranked languages hierarchically according to their 
original design. Intriguingly, the racist implications of his linguistic views were 
challenged almost immediately. In 1822, two North Americans, Pickering and 
Duponceau, objected to the inference that all non-Indo-European languages were 
inherently inferior. Indeed, they objected specifically to the way that Von Humboldt 
used Sanscrit, Greek and Latin as the standards by which other languages were 
measured. For his part, Von Humboldt tried to reassure them by claiming that he 
judged impartially. But he stuck to his original view that the potential for 
development in languages was limited by the structures they were given when they 
were first formed. Unfortunately, he also linked the potential for the development to 
the mental outlooks of nations: 
What I have tried to say and still believe to be true is that the grammatical 
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form of Sanscrit, from which all the European languages derive, is preferable 
for giving the mind the habit of methodical reasoning and for the 
development of all the intellectual forms of man. Civilization adds very little 
to that. 40 
On this account, the capacity for language- human linguisticality - is universal, while 
the forms of language, especially their original forms, vary. However, the significant 
point for von Humboldt was not about the global distribution of various languages. 
Rather, it was to do with the shaping influence of languages on the development of 
the mentalities of various peoples. This influence, von Humboldt believed, held the 
key to understanding the nature of human progress - what he calls, 'the secret 
evolution of mankind'. From this starting point he constructed a grand narrative, 'A 
Story of Mankind', about the emergence of civilizations and cultures: 
The mental power that intrudes, from its inner depth and fullness, into the 
course of world events, is the truly creative principle in the hidden and, as it 
were, secret evolution of mankind ... Thus arose the plastic art of Egypt, 
which was able to build up the human form from out of the organic centre of 
its circumstances, and which thereby first impressed upon its works the 
stamp of true art. In this way, though otherwise closely related, Indian poetry 
and philosophy and classical antiquity possess a character inherently distinct, 
and in the latter case also a Greek and Roman manner and cast of thought. 
So, later, from Romance poetry and the mental life which suddenly 
developed, with the downfall of Latin, in the now independent European 
West, there came the major part of modem culture.41 
Civilizations and cultures enter the picture at a later date than do languages. The 
sequence is critical. As with Herder, human linguisticality was there from the start. 
However, on this view, languages can never transcend their in-built limitations. As 
von Humboldt insisted, 'this whole progress of language-making can only go on 
within the limits prescribed to it by the original design of the language. ,42 In other 
words, the underlying forms and structures of a given language set limits for its 
future development -and, crucially, for the mental development of the people who 
speak it. As a consequence to this, civilizations and cultures can never transcend or 
improve upon the original design. Von Humboldt writes, 'A nation can make a more 
imperfect language into a tool for the production of ideas, but it cannot remove the 
inner restrictions which have once been embedded therein. ,43 Implicitly then, from 
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von Humboldt's standpoint, some languages will be superior to others. And, sadly, 
such notions paved the way for the ranking of languages and indeed entire cultures 
in ways that have been fatally damaging and destructive.44 
Von Humboldt's picture oflanguage as the 'formative organ of thought' may have 
been indebted to Herder, but his picture amounts to more than just a reworking of 
Herder's notion of innately human creative powers (Kraft der Seele) combined with 
reflection (Besonnenheit). And whereas we can trace the antecedents of Herder's 
theory of language back to Condillac, (Herder and von Humboldt shared a common 
influence in the French thinker's writings) the German concentration on the 
creativity of language as an essentially self-formative human activity broke new 
ground. 
In the manner of Herder, Von Humboldt insisted on the importance of creative -
'Promethean' - self-formation through linguistic activity. But in a way that was 
quite unlike Herder, von Humboldt looked closely at language's forms and 
structures. Thus he reconfigured Herder's basic insight - that signification and 
cognition are two sides of the same coin - by investigating the stuff of signification 
itself. Indeed, he set himself the task of comparing the forms and structures of world 
languages from the perspective of diversity> What is more, he set about comparing 
their grammars from a historical standpoint, although his studies were restricted to 
written texts. 
For Locke and Condillac, as for Herder, grammar was an artificial system invented 
by theorists to describe and to regulate language. On this view, prescriptive grammar 
is applied to natural language as it already exists. In its essentials, Herder's picture 
of grammar is no different to that of the Port Royal Grammarians. As he puts it, 
grammar is 'a philosophy about language and a method for its use.' On Herder's 
view, some languages - especially so-called 'primitive languages' - appeared to be 
without grammar altogether. By contrast, von Humboldt realised that grammar 
constitutes the inherent order of any given language. Moreover, he grasped the way 
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that a language's primary forms and structures had to be there from the start. They 
could not have been added over time. Thus, in von Humboldt's picture of language, 
all languages are inherently grammatical (though not 'equal') for the very reason 
that they depend for their existence upon underlying structural principles. Such 
principles or regularities, he claimed, were built into each language's original 
design. And every language, he said, has its own 'blueprint' or Bauplan. Variations 
among languages occur mainly because they were designed differently in the first 
place and consequently they have developed differently. Moreover, linguistic 
variation is not just a matter of different vocabularies - or different words for the 
same ideas. Rather, variation is a matter of historically evolved forms and structures 
as well as historically evolved meanings. Differing world outlooks 
(Weltanschauung) have been shaped by correspondingly different grammatical 
outlooks. 
Since the eighteenth century (at least), many linguists and philosophers tried to show 
the close correlation between world-view and linguistic form. However, for many 
such researchers grammar was not thought about as an artificial system of instituted 
rules imposed on existing 'natural' language as it was with the Port Royal 
Grammarians' picture of language. After von Humboldt, grammar is increasingly 
seen as 'language's formative principle.' The question, 'Where does language come 
from?' was refined so that it became: 'Where do language's forms and structures 
come from?' 
* * * 
In the closing section of this chapter I shall be focusing on von Humboldt's account 
of the origin of language, and I shall be underscoring the Kantian character of his 
ideas. Thinking and Speaking: Sixteen Theses on Language is a tightly compressed, 
aphoristic essay that Von Humboldt probably wrote during the winter of 1795-96 in 
response to Fichte's essay, 'On the Speech Faculty and the Origin of Language 
(1795).45 It is an early piece that is particularly important for the way that it reveals 
the unmistakable influence of Kantian epistemology 46. Von Humboldt was tackling 
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what has been called 'the Sisyphean problem' of eighteenth century semiotic 
thinking, (the origin oflanguage) but he does so from an entirely new standpoint. 
This standpoint was Kant's critical philosophy and the transcendental perspectives 
of the generation of German idealists to which von Humboldt belonged.47 
The essential difference between von Humboldt's and Herder's pictures of semiotic 
activity, as I have already suggested, lies in the different weighting that they give to 
language's underlying forms and structures. For von Humboldt, the forms and 
structures that are given to mind are very much like the Kantian synthetic a priori 
catagories. But they are somehow produced through the sensory medium of 
language. They derive from the natural qualities of sound - specifically, the 
temporal properties of differentiated sounds - in conjunction with the synthesising 
powers of mind. Von Humboldt writes, 
Thesis Six. The sensory designation [Bezeichnung] of those units, into which 
certain portions of thinking are united, in order to be opposed as parts to 
other parts of a greater whole, as objects to the subject, is called in the 
broadest sense of the word: language. 48 
We impose an order on what otherwise would be an undifferentiated flux of sensory 
material - meaningless noise - by distinguishing among sounds. However, such 
ordering is only made possible by the differentiated sounds produced by man 
himself: 
Thesis Twelve. Linguistic signs [Sprachzeichen] are thus necessarily sounds, 
and according to the hidden analogy which exists between all the faculties of 
man, he must as soon as he clearly recognises one object as distinct from 
himself, directly utter the sound which is to distinguish the object.49 
The search for linguistic signs requires that we differentiate among sounds of our 
own making. (I am intrigued by von Humboldt's notion of a 'hidden analogy which 
exists between all the faculties', which is never fully explained). Subsequently, 
options arise for combining small sounds units (phonemes) into larger stretches of 
language, or wholes (texts). Moreover, because linguistic signs refer to ideas rather 
than things in the world, opportunities will arise for handling signs and ideas 
together, even when the referent (the thing itself) is absent. 
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Von Humboldt argues that we reanimate signs creatively in the production of 
meaning. until they are brought to life in use, signs remain 'dry husks'. Further to 
this, large combinations can be broken down into small units and then recombined to 
produce a multiplicity of new combinations and hence new meanings. Thus, too, a 
picture of the organization of language on different levels comes into view. Von 
Humboldt is the precursor of de Saussure in the way that he understood the 
production of meaning from a system of differences, and the fixing of precise 
meanings by the regulation of the relations of difference. He writes, 
Thesis Thirteen . ... As man searched for linguistic signs (Sprachzeichen), his 
understanding had the task of differentiating. Moreover, he formed whole 
units, which were not real objects but rather concepts, therefore allowing for 
free manipulation, for repeated separations and new combinations. 
Accordingly, the tongue, too, selected articulated sounds, consisting of 
elements allowing for multiple new compositions.50 
So far I have been emphasising the Kantian dimension of von Humbldt's picture of 
language. Now I want to say something about von Humboldt's indebtedness to the 
tradition of Condillac as he met in France in the nineties. 
In November 1797 (after writing Thinking and Speaking) von Humboldt visited 
Paris. There he made contact with the French ideologues - Sieyes, Destutt de Tracy, 
Degerando, Garat, Daunou, Cabanis, Roederer, Volney and others who had survived 
the Great Terror and who were presently struggling to write a new constitution in the 
midst of popular insurrections and international crises. Crucially, Condillac was the 
key thinker for many of these ideologues, some of whom had known him personally. 
In Paris, von Humboldt read Condillac's works on language extensively and 
immersed himself thoroughly in the Abbe's ideas. Indeed, this proved a turning 
point for the Prussian aristocrat. In 1799 he wrote to his friend, the great classical 
scholar, F. A. Wolf, 'In future I feel I shall devote myself more exclusively to 
language study, and that thorough and philosophically oriented comparison of 
several languages is the task I can shoulder after some years of serious study. ,51 
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Condillac's seminal insight concerned the role of signs in gaining mastery over 
mental operations. He made a crucial link between words and psychological 
development. But what he understood signs to be was never fully theorised. It was 
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largely German thinkers who carried the theory of the sign to new "level and who 
paved the way for the Saussurean breakthrough at the tum of the nineteenth century. 
For Condillac, as for Locke, signs refer to ideas rather than to things in the world. 
However, on this view, signs themselves remain transparent, rather in the manner of 
Port Royal grammar. They existed for Condillac as a set of entities that already exist 
to which meanings are subsequently attached. However, German thinkers challenged 
this view in a way that forced linguists to reconsider the nature of the sign. 
Von Humboldt agreed with Condillac that signs playa indispensable role in 
achieving voluntary control over mental operations. But crucially he rejected 
Condillac's claim that growing familiarity with 'natural' signs over time - merely by 
force of habit - leads on 'naturally' to the production of 'instituted' signs. (This was 
also a bone of contention for Herder, who complained that Condillac had failed to 
give an adequate account of the production of signs in the first instance). Kurt 
Mueller-Vollmer, summarises this point succinctly: 
[von] Humboldt maintained against this (Condillac's) position that t:l.:l1rrsigns 
do in fact order our thinking, but not because certain objects have naturally 
come to represent certain ideas of things, but because signs, together with 
their corresponding thoughts are shaped and fashioned by the human mind at 
one and the same time and in the very same act. 52 
Von Humboldt took up the fundamental question about language's origins where 
Herder left off. He grasped the notion that the act of signification requires a 
combination of two inherently structured realms: the 'acoustic image' 
(speech/sound) and the thought referred to. To recast this powerful insight in 
Saussurean terms, the signifier and the signified combine to make up the sign. 
Indeed, von Humboldt's insight is the forerunner of de Saussure' s theory of the 
double sidedness of the sign. (Saussure speaks of the two sides of a sheet of paper). 
However, the way that the German thinker gives priority to the shaping activity of 
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mind - the contribution of the knower to what is known - is characteristically 
Kantian. 
However, there is another aspect of von Humboldt's theory of signification that the 
link to de Saussure fails to reveal. Mueller-Vollmer writes: 'For [von] Humboldt the 
act of Artikulation in his terminology, is at one and the same time the constitutive act 
for the consciousness of self of the speaking individual. ,53 As they speak, subjects 
differentiate themselves from the object, which is their own voiced thought. To be 
conscious of the 'object' is also to become conscious of one's self. Thus, the primary 
acts of signification mark the birth of the subject. 
For von Humboldt, the development of selves depends on an interactive dynamic 
between man and his world. The German thinker moved beyond the separation of 
mind and body that philosophers had inherited from Descartes. On von Humboldt's 
view, individuation depends upon 'acts of conjoining (Verbindung) with others' .54 
The concept of self-objectification of speaking subjects is connected directly to von 
Humboldt's theory of self-formation, Bildung, a theory that has been extremely 
important for education theory throughout Europe, and which I shall be discussing in 
the next chapter. 
Chapter nine of the Kawi Introduction, 'Nature and Constitution of Language' 
contains many of the concepts I have just touched on. In it he attempts conceptualise 
'the whole route whereby, proceeding from mind, language reacts back upon mind'. 
Thus 'consciousness comes to recognise itself in its own activity. ,55 He explains the 
process in the following Kantian fashion: 
The activity of the senses must combine synthetically with the inner action of 
the mind, and from this combination the presentation is ejected, becomes an 
object vis-avis the SUbjective power and perceived anew as such, returns 
back to the latter.56 
Von Humbldt took up and expanded a crucial idea (one that Herder merely touched 
on) namely, the so-called 'linearity' of the auditory sign. Speakers not only 
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apprehend their inner thoughts but they also make them available for further 
reflection as ideas expressed outside the self. And in the same way that speakers 
perceive their own articulations -they can hear what they are saying as they speak -
they can shape the objectifications of their subjective ideas transformatively at the 
very point of utterance. The absolute importance of this insight for Von Humboldt's 
whole conception of individual development is made particularly clear in passages 
like this one, where he speaks of subject-object relations: 
But language is indispensable for this [reflection]. For in that mental striving 
breaks out through the lips in language, the product of that striving returns 
back to the speaker's ear. Thus the presentation becomes transformed into 
real objectivity, without being deprived of subjectivity on that account.57 
Without language, claims von Humboldt, the mental process of concept formation 
(indeed, we might add the development of the higher mental functions) would be 
impossible. This leads him to a crucial insight into the nature of the relation between 
language and the development of mind. He continues, 
Only language can do this [transform the representation into 'real 
objectivity']; and without this transformation, occurring constantly with the 
help of language even in silence, into an objectivity that returns to the 
subject, the act of concept-formation, and with it true thinking, is impossible. 
So quite regardless of communication between man and man, speech is a 
necessary condition for the thinking of the individual in solitary seclusion. 58 
Insights such as these provided the foundation stones for subsequent work on inner 
speech and dialogics that was developed in the first half of the twentieth century, 
especially by Russian thinkers like Lev Vygotsky and Mikhail Bakhtin.59 
* * * 
From this point on the story I have been telling opens up along several new avenues. 
I want to mention just three of them. The first avenue takes us towards modem 
linguistics and semiology. I have traced a line of development in the theory of the 
sign that runs from Locke, through Condillac, Herder and von Humboldt to de 
Saussure and on to modern, structural linguistics. The second avenue leads towards 
psychology and to Vygotsky's theories about semiotic mediation linked to cognition 
72 
in a socio-cultural account of mind. Thus Von Humboldt's emphasis on the shaping 
power of language and its transforming role in development prefigures current 
theories about language, learning and development in children. 
The third avenue opens in connection with the writings of a contemporary German 
philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, and it takes us towards an attempt to discover 
rational, normative foundations for critical theory in the universal pragmatic 
conditions that make everyday conversations possible. For Habermas, von Humboldt 
is crucially important because he combined two conceptions of meaning. The first 
conception is to do with speakers' intentions, and the second is to do with the 
regulative principles involved in language as practices. Of course, real speakers in 
the world operate strategically to gain power. They manipulate others by the way 
they use words. But as Habermas says, the category of lying would become 
meaningless and language itself would become meaningless if everyone lied all the 
time. Not everyone could behave in this way at anyone time otherwise socialisation 
or learning from the past would be impossible. Besides, the world disclosing nature 
of language meant that we describe the world for others. And different 
understandings about things among speakers are overcome only when they submit to 
the regulative idea of mutual commitment to getting a better understanding through 
rational argument. We always know claims Habermas, when we honestly want to 
convince each other because we bow to the better argument. The kind of 
idealisations that Habermas has in mind are not produced by solitary thinkers 
(Kant's transcendental subject of cognition) in opposition to reality, rather they are 
the 'normative contents' that are encountered in everyday practice, which we cannot 
do without, since language is constitutive for social forms of life. With Habermas, 
the scale of von Humboldt's ethical project begins to be restored. 
* * * 
I have given an account of how and why the question of the origin of language 
became a focus for discussions, first in France and then, subsequently, in Germany. I 
have also touched on the importance of such questions for developments in 
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philosophy, psychology, anthropology, history, the social sciences, religious studies 
linguistic and literary studies and education. Such discussions issued in a new 
developmental conception of humanity - one that has had profound (though often 
contradictory) political ramifications. Above all, in the work of Herder and von 
Humboldt, there emerged a picture of language as the constitutive human activity by 
which we forge, both individually and collectively, selves in culture and history. 
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... It's really quite simple: whenever we mean what we say, we raise the claim that what we 
said is true or right, or truthful. With this claim a small bit of ideality breaks into our 
everyday lives, because such validity claims can in the end only be resolved with arguments. 
At the same time, we know that the arguments that appear valid to us today, in the light of 
new experiences and new information can prove false tomorrow in the light of new 
experience and new information. (Jurgen (Habermas, J. (1992) The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated from the German by Fredrick Lawrence, Oxford: 
Polity Press, p.l 02) 
On this view, the ordinary business of reaching inter-subjective understandings about things in the 
world - in other words, what makes ordinary conversation possible - is seen to afford the normative 
basis for human co-operation. 
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Chapter 3 
Signs of Enlightenment: 
The Formation of a European Education Ideal 
To offer all individuals of the human race the means of providing for 
their needs, of assuring their well-being, of knowing and exercising their 
rights, of understanding and performing their duties; To assure each of 
them the facility of perfecting his skill, of rendering himself capable of the 
social functions to which he has a right to be summoned, of developing to 
the fullest extent the talents with which nature has endowed him; and 
thereby to establish among citizens an actual equality, and to effect the 
realization of the political equality recognized by law ... Such must be the 
primary aim of national education; and from this point of view it is a task 
of probity for the government. 
Condorcet, 'Report on the General Organization of Education' presented 
to the Convention, 20-21 April, 1792.1 
Even when they [the ideologues] use the same words as we do they 
always give them another meaning ... their imagination is not our 
'Einbildungskraft'· 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Letter to Schiller, 17982 
The plans for Europe's first coherent state education systems were drafted in the 
aftermath to the French Revolution. A striking feature of these plans was the way 
that the principal draftsmen linked language to notions of citizenship and human 
development. Indeed, a link forged between language and development led to the 
formation of a powerful education ideal, which is what this chapter is chiefly 
about. The developments I shall be discussing issued principally from a change to 
the way that language was pictured in the eighteenth century, when the orthodox 
picture of language as the timeless gift of providence gave way to a contrasting 
one of language as human invention. In essence, this new picture reshaped 
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conceptions of what it is to be a human being.3 
Eighteenth-century discussions about language - where language comes from and 
what it is for - constituted a sustained critique of humanity. And the follow-on 
from such discussions was at the heart of moves to set up state systems of 
education: first, in post-revolutionary France and then, a decade later, in Prussia. 
A strong presupposition emerged among those who were chiefly instrumental in 
designing these systems, that public education was essential for the political and 
social development of nations and, further to this, that language somehow held 
the key to the understanding and advancement of Mankind. 
However, such presuppositions were inflected differently in different national 
circumstances. In France, where Condillac's anti-metaphysical, 'sensationalist' 
epistemology prevailed, advocates for language studies insisted upon the material 
origins and the social nature of ideas.4 In Germany, where the influence of Kant 
was strong, and where a conception of the synthesising capacities of mind had 
furnished the foundation of German idealism, a conception of the role of 
language in self-cultivation emerged. In what follows, I shall be concentrating 
chiefly on the second of these inflections, the German educational ideal of self-
cultivation, or Bildung 
Bildung is hard to define.5 It is a larger in scope than the notion of education as 
the 'training' of character, which is its closest English equivalent.6 Whereas the 
English understanding of 'mental cultivation' means something like 'the 
refinement of the faculties', in Germany Bildung suggests something larger and 
more comprehensive: the autonomous production of individual and collective 
selves.7 The differences between English and German conceptions of education 
as a form of 'self-cultivation' stem from Bildung's philosophical roots in German 
idealism. Moreover, they also reflect the way the original German ideal was 
associated with Liberal politics. Later, with the failure of the Liberal revolutions 
of 1848, Bildung, much reduced in scope, was appropriated by a social elite. 
Here, I am taking Bildung to refer to the original, generous humanistic 
79 
conception of individual and collective cultivation, which emerged in Germany 
during the late Enlightenment. 
The Bildung ideal embodied a powerful view of human development. 
Specifically, it was concerned with the 'humanising' process of enculturation. 
We become fully 'human' by interacting with a world that is replete with 
meaning and, as Von Humboldt put it in a fragment on the theme of Bildung: ' ... 
by combining our individual selves with the world in a process of most general, 
animated and free interaction' we achieve a state of humanity 8 
In part, Bildung consciously imitated the Greek educational ideal of linguistic 
and literary education as 'the gymnastic of the soul' . By developing the virtues of 
memory, diligence and discipline the student eventually attained a superior form 
of life. However, it was also linked to a heroic conception of human agency in 
the improvement of Mankind. Indeed, such a conception fed powerfully into 
Marx's thought, especially where he insists that men make themselves in history 
- never in isolation, but rather in definite social relations among constituent 
members of communities engaged in the material processes of production. 
Crucially, the original Bildung ideal combined Kant's picture of the autonomous, 
rational subject with his precept that the guiding thread of world history is the 
story of Mankind's progress towards moral maturity. For Kant, this was the very 
meaning of Enlightenment. On this view individual moral development was 
framed by a notion of the purpose of world history. Indeed, values implicit in 
present-day notions like 'fulfilling one's potential' and 'world citizenship' owe 
much to Kantian ethics, with the overarching 'grand narrative' of the moral 
purpose of world history stripped away.9 
And Bildung was connected to a picture of language. In the Bildung fragment, 
Von Humboldt also notes: 
What man really needs is simply an object which makes interaction 
possible between receptivity and self-activity. If it is to succeed in 
occupying his whole being in its entire strength and unity, then this object 
must be of the world itself ... or at least considered as such. lO 
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In the previous chapter, I discussed the way that Von Humboldt attempted to 
conceptualise 'the whole route whereby, proceeding from mind, language reacts 
back upon mind' so that 'consciousness comes to recognise itself in its own 
activity.' Thus, the objectification of consciousness makes reflection possible -
we can examine our own thoughts. He explains this complicated process in a 
highly compressed, but unmistakably Kantian fashion: 'the activity of the senses 
must combine synthetically with the inner action of the mind, and from this 
combination the presentation is ejected, becomes an object vis-avis the subjective 
power and perceived anew as such, returns back to the latter. On this view, 
signification makes an objective representation of the world possible. Without it 
conceptual thinking would be impossible. Moreover, the way that signification 
works, mind acts in partnership with the senses to produce a world outlook. 
During the Enlightenment, discussions around the nature and origins of language 
had had their roots in divisions over fundamental questions. These questions 
arose out of the competing claims of religious authorities and the proponents of 
the new science over what people might claim to know. Such divisions coincided 
with the emergence of what has been called 'the public sphere' .11 With advent of 
an emergent public sphere, matters of general importance, policy, ideas and 
values were publicly discussed. In this context, the change to the way that 
language was pictured had at least two serious consequences. First, the field of 
language study (more than oratory, or rhetoric) became a matter for serious 
political concern. Secondly, language was seen both as something produced by 
and something producing the world outlooks of people who speak them. 
Languages were linked to the particular historical experiences - and hence the 
'outlooks' or 'mentalities' - the Weltanschauung - of the various peoples who 
had evolved them. Such links have shaped modem conceptions of national 
consciousness, as well as forms of nationalism. 
In Germany, under the influence of Kantian idealism, language came to be 
thought about as having a powerful role in the production of collective and 
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individual selves. And where the diversity of language structure was taken as 
evidence of universal human creativity (what Herder called 'Kraft'), the history 
of languages was linked to the mental development of particular nations as well 
as the whole of Mankind. Subsequently, historical-comparative language studies 
(particularly German philology) fostered ideas about the origins of national 
mentalities at the very moment when the foundations of modem nation states 
were being established. In sum, language issues became central to German ideas 
about education and the production of national citizens. 
In Germany especially thinkers concentrated on the notion that cultures embody 
the historical experiences of peoples and nations. Languages, they claimed, 
reflect historically evolved ways of life. 12 Herder was a major source of such 
ideas. He pictured cultures not so much as the accumulated 'contents' of past 
civilizations but rather, in an active sense, as forms of life that have been 
established over time, that reflect particular, concrete circumstances and interests 
and that will continue to evolve. Thus, languages were linked to individual and 
collective development in history and culture. Further to this, thinkers like Herder 
began to suggest that the languages we inherit not only make us what we are they 
also prefigure what we become. Thus they wedded a picture of language to a 
dynamic, agentive conception of individual and collective self-realisation. In 
doing so they also contributed to the German conception of the 'culture state', in 
which the essence of nationhood - the so-called 'national spirit' or the 'spirit of 
the people' - was seen as grounded in and emerging from a collective sense of a 
shared past that constitutes national consciousness. Such conceptions have 
figured powerfully in educational discussions ever since, especially discussions 
around the teaching of national heritages in the liberal arts and humanities. 
Crucially, they have supplied a powerful rationale for studying language and 
literature in state curricula. 
In this chapter I shall be concentrating mainly on German thinkers: Kant, Herder 
and von Humboldt. But I shall need to recover some of the themes and ideas that 
they inherited from the French Enlightenment. The German thinkers I shall be 
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discussing were the inheritors of the French Enlightenment, but their inheritance 
was a problematic one. During the second half of the eighteenth-century, German 
intellectuals began resisting the hegemonic power of France. They contrasted 
'French civilization' with German 'culture' at a time when French ideas and 
tastes dominated the whole of Europe. These thinkers welcomed the Revolution 
of 1789. But resistance to French culture intensified after the humiliating 
Prussian defeat at Jena (1806) and the French military occupation of Berlin. 
Notwithstanding resistance to French ideas, the reform of Prussian education was 
heavily indebted to the designers of the French system. I shall be describing how 
von Humboldt, the chief architect of the Prussian system, gained hugely from the 
time he spent in Paris, when he was in daily contact with thinkers like Abbe 
Sieyes and Destutt de Tracy. As one cultural historian has put it, 'Standing on the 
shoulders of French and English Enlightenment predecessors, German thinkers 
developed the ideas of the Enlightenment to a higher level.' 13 
During the eighteenth-century, the ideas that circulated among the philosophes, 
paved the way for the French Revolution. Typically, French discussions about 
progress concentrated on rational frameworks - institutional arrangements, the 
codification of rights and so on. French thinkers saw the prospects of 
Enlightenment chiefly in terms of external states of affairs. And they assumed 
that human nature was given a priori. Their conception of Man was more or less 
fixed as a static abstraction as the locus of universal rights. Human nature was 
not thought about especially as a dynamic entity and it was not talked about 
generally as growing, constantly changing, or as something to be radically 
transformed by education. 14 
A contrasting picture of human nature grew out of quasi-biological accounts of 
change over time. Such a picture of development came, a fortiori, from Germany 
where it was fostered by rapid advances in the natural sciences, especially 
biology. I will show how genetic-historical explanations of human development 
emerged in the writings of German thinkers like Herder and Goethe. And what is 
more, they contributed powerfully to the German education ideal of self-
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cultivation as an inwardly transformative process: in a word, Bildung. 
For the most part, the French philosophes didn't think about progress (or indeed 
about Enlightenment itself) as primarily a psychological or an inward condition. 
Nor did they bother overmuch about transforming human nature as such for the 
better. Rather, they discussed human nature as something that was essentially 
given, that had been corrupted and disfigured by corrupt, oppressive social 
arrangements, and that needed to be restored to 'health' by changing the social 
order. Such discussions issued in the philosophers' critiques of the oppressive 
burden of 'existing society on humanity, and a call for a return to an integral and 
pure form of human nature. This is major theme in Rousseau's writings on 
education, which he saw chiefly as a 'healing' process that would restore 
mankind to itself. 15 
The philosophes, then, were not especially interested in Enlightenment as an 
inward, developmental process advancing towards 'moral maturity', though they 
were concerned with the business of human advancement. For the thinkers of the 
French Enlightenment, the emancipatory promise of education was that it would 
free mankind from the irrational, benighted burden of oppressive social 
arrangements, mindless dogma and ignorance. Their aim was to release the 
human spirit, not to create the conditions for its further development. Indeed, the 
French Enlightenment's picture of Man, as the locus of universal human rights 
was carried forward into the twentieth century, where it has continued to shape 
modem liberal conceptions of citizenship. 
The recruitment of the past was essential for radical political ideologies. In 
Revolutionary France, Roman Republican principles were freely appropriated. 16 
What is more, a fashionable taste for Roman civilization was self-consciously 
cultivated and displayed everywhere in post-Revolutionary society. For a while in 
France (as in Germany), the study of classical texts was linked powerfully to 
Republicanism. To give just one important instance, French revolutionaries tried 
to justify the redistribution of land by invoking the Roman loi agraire. 17 Thus 
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ancient history was put to political use. Crucially, such overtly 'ideological' 
appropriations of history foreshadowed a moment when secular states would 
'sanction' history - especially national history - as 'official knowledge' .18 
Language, too, became 'official'. In the aftermath to the Revolution, when 
standard French became the language of the middle classes, speaking French was 
bound up with a notion of citizenship. Post-Revolutionary France assimilated 
different language groups, different ethnic groups and different races within 
boundaries that were not based on geography, history or an existing language 
community, but rather on a system of civic rights and obligations. Since the 
Revolution, as one historian has put it, in France 'political inclusion has entailed 
cultural assimilation, for regional cultural minorities and immigrants alike,19. 
Consequently, it is sometimes claimed that the Revolution abolished ethnicity 
and race in its definition of French citizenship. But, notwithstanding the broad 
assimilation of differences, there were periodic outbreaks of xenophobic 
nationalism such as in the crises of the seventeen-nineties, when neighbouring 
nations posed a real external threat to the Revolution. 
In 1789, of the twenty-five million French nationals, five million did not speak 
French. Instead, they spoke regional languages such as Breton or Basque. 
Thereafter, French became the official 'language of liberty' and strenuous efforts 
were made by central government, chiefly through education, to establish 
standard French as the first language within all French territories. Indeed, the 
business of learning standard French was linked at a very basic level to the 
widespread political need for the new citizenry to understand and exercise their 
rights and responsibilities. The majority (though, significantly, not all) non-
French speakers supported such moves. They did so to keep up with the 
unprecedented political and social changes that were transforming their lives and 
the lives of those around them. Speaking French was part and parcel of the post-
Revolutionary conception of what it was to be a 'citizen'. What is more, the 
standardisation of languages as 'official' national languages elsewhere in Europe 
followed the French pattern?O 
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However, the speaking of regional languages was bound up with the political and 
cultural autonomy of the people who spoke them. There were those who wished 
to retain their ways of speaking and to maintain their heritage cultures and 
customs. In the nineties, scholarly attention became focused on regional 
languages and dialects in relation to standard French, when, partly as a 
consequence of the moves towards standardisation, 'minority' languages became 
interesting to linguists. To give an salient example, the nature of Euskara (Basque 
language) was discussed among linguists in Paris in the seventeen-nineties and, 
indeed, these discussions prompted von Humboldt, who was resident there at the 
time, to visit pays Basque and to make a systematic study of the language. In 
point of fact, the principle of defending languages as the carriers of heritage 
cultures - that is as the bearers of historically evolved traditions, values, customs 
and practices - was worked out chiefly by Gennan thinkers. Arguably, the notion 
of Basque 'culture' today is partly the product of nineteenth century Gennan 
philology, and it is to such developments in Gennany that I want to tum now. 
* * * 
The 'universalistic' values of the French First Republic - liberte, egalite, and 
Jraternite - were shadowed in Gennany by particularistic national ones. After the 
Prussian defeat at Jena and the military occupation of Berlin (1806-1809), 
universal revolutionary ideals looked oppressively French to those Gennan 
intellectuals who committed themselves to the project of national renewal. 
In Gennany, education and scholarship were wedded to national renewal when a 
link was forged between jurisprudence, classical scholarship and comparative 
and historical approaches to language studies. The great Gennan legal scholar, 
Savigny who later founded the Historical School of Jurisprudence in Berlin 
(1815) took his student, Jacob Grimm, a founding figure of Gennan philology, to 
Paris in 1805. Earlier, I mentioned that Roman law (the loi agraire) was 
important for Revolutionary theorists who wished to redistribute land. Such 
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developments encouraged scholarly work on ancient texts. But the study of 
ancient German manuscripts by German philologists in Paris took on an 
altogether different importance. German scholars like Savigny as well as the 
great historian Niebhur set exacting new standards of scholarly rigour. They 
deplored the way that classical texts, particularly those concerning Roman Law, 
were poorly interpreted by French scholars, who wanted to make political use of 
them. By contrast with French scholars who discovered universal principles in 
ancient laws, Savigny's methodologically sophisticated approach to interpreting 
ancient German texts uncovered legal traditions that were deeply rooted in 
historical experience and custom. Paradoxically, such work provided von 
Humboldt, who supported the idea of a new social order, with critical, 
perspectives on French attempts to create a new political order from 'a utopian 
blueprint of pure reason' .21 From von Humboldt's perspective, a new order, if it 
were to flourish, must somehow be grown from the seeds of the past. 
German",intellectuals, following Savgny, pictured national identity not so much 
as formalised rights and duties, but rather as being to do with 'belonging' to the 
historical, 'organic' (cultural, linguistic and 'racial') community. (This concept of 
community, which is in some ways deeply problematic, is usually referred to as 
the Volksgemeinschaft). Moreover, questions about the origins of this community 
were heavily politicised precisely because they were articulated with the keenly 
sensed need to establish the basis for a unified nation. Thus, the political quest 
for national origins supplied the engine that drove academic philology in the 
German universities. 22 
Since the French Revolution, national identity in continental Europe has been 
defined chiefly in secular terms. With the advent of the Enlightenment's sense of 
modernity, citizens have related to 'tradition' and to the idea of a 'national past' 
differently than before. Previously, institutions, (mainly the Church and the 
Judiciary) had mediated history. Now individuals were more reflexive and more 
self-directing in their approach to the past. At the same time, with the rise of 
modern nation-state, and with the concentration of political power in its central 
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institutions, the state itself began to claim an increasingly powerful role in 
'mediating' the past, as well as in selecting and codifying 'official' cultural 
knowledge. One of the effects of this process was to subordinate regional, class 
and ethnic traditions in relation to official, dominant ones. 
The state also began to picture itself as having the chief responsibility (and the 
capability through its education system) for forging a unifying national spirit. 
From the outset, compulsory education was charged with the responsibility for 
binding individual citizens' allegiance to the nation by selecting, codifying and 
interpreting an 'official' tradition that was meant to stand for the shared national 
consciousness. And thus the systematic study of indigenous languages, laws, 
customs, folklore and so on was organised within a fundamentally conservative 
project of national restoration. In Germany this took place exclusively in the 
universities, whereas the pattern in France and England was strikingly different. 
Whereas in France the notion of being French was tied to a notion of citizenship 
within jurisdictional boundaries, in Germany cultural and community boundaries 
were difficult to establish for historical and geographical reasons. Consequently, 
German policy makers, in partnership with academics and scholars - chiefly 
historians and philologists, but later, biologists - were keen to discover 'scientific 
principles' that would enable them to distinguish among 'true nationals' and 
'aliens'. And thus nationalism permeated the institutions of the German nation 
state - especially educational ones - from the early nineteenth-century on. 
However, in the early nineteenth-century, there were two powerful countervailing 
humanist ideals in Germany that acted as a bulwark against unfettered 
nationalism. They both reflected seminal principles of the original Bildung ideal. 
The first principle was embodied in the educational emphasis on inward, moral 
development as a preparation for world citizenship guided by the thread of the 
history of Mankind. The second principle was a striking, cosmopolitan emphasis 
on the role of diversity in the processes of human development. Unfortunately 
these countervailing ideals were weakened and debased, after their initial 
formulation. 
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The conception of Enlightenment that emerged in Germany, then, was different 
in certain key respects from the one that evolved in France. Like the French 
philosophes, German thinkers asked about progress. But they placed greater 
emphasis than their French counterparts on developmental processes, and 
. 
especially on processes of inner development (Innerl~hkeit). They became 
A 
especially interested in Enlightenment as a psychological condition. 
Consequently, they concentrated on the history of the cultivation of the inner-self 
from 'genetic' developmental perspectives. 'Genetic' histories of developmental 
growth were essentially narratives of self-cultivation (hence the emergence of the 
Bildungsroman genre). I shall be explaining how the notion of 'genesis' was 
borrowed from contemporary work in eighteenth-century biology, and how it was 
used as a principle of historical change later when I discuss Herder's notion of 
development. I want to establish that German thinkers were interested in the 
cultivation of the inner-self from the perspective of the development of moral 
sense- in a word, conscience - over time. They discussed the inward processes of 
individual cultivation, subjectivity and identity at greater length than the French 
and they were preoccupied with shaping persons and fostering their moral 
'growth'. Not surprising, then, they were especially interested in the 
psychological mechanisms by which inner states of consciousness are 
qualitatively transformed, and this transformation was linked to human 
rati onali ty. 23 
Kant put human reason, not faith or religious dogma, at the centre of his 
philosophy. His notion of the rational, autonomous individual emerged from a 
fundamentally Protestant outlook. Kant emphasised the world constituting 
powers of mind and, further to this, his conception of the rational autonomous 
subject as the seat of all knowledge implied a radical conception of freedom. 
According to Kant, the history of Mankind is the story of Man's emergence from 
domination by nature and self-imposed tutelage. Self-mastery and an awareness 
of freedom and rationality have brought about a transition, as Kant puts it, from 
'the raw state of merely animal creature to humanity, from the harness of 
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instincts to the guidance of reason - in a word, from the guardianship of nature to 
the state of freedom.24 On this view, self-mastery - taking responsibility for one's 
own actions - provides the key to human development. We have no option, says 
Kant, but to regard ourselves as beings bound by constraints of morality and 
purpose. Moral growth, he claims, is Man's essential purpose and it is the telos of 
history. And such has been the appeal of Kant's vision of Enlightenment that 
generations of thinkers have been attracted by its promise of human autonomy, 
worth and dignity. 
Although Kant's conception of freedom was indebted to thinkers of the French 
Enlightenment, (especially to Rousseau), it was significantly different in its scope 
and emphasis. Whereas key French thinkers were resolutely anti-metaphysical in 
their philosophical outlook, German thinkers were typically concerned with 
metaphysical problems: the fate of the soul; the transformation of the inner-life; 
and, above all, the attainment of spiritual autonomy. They were especially 
concerned with the growth of the individual's ethical sense.25 The Bildung 
pedagogical ideal of individual, self-activated, self-directed cultivation was 
erected on the foundations of Kant's epistemology. Its cornerstone was the 
Kantian precept that Man's essential purpose is moral development. The Bildung 
ideal deserves our attention here, not just because it has helped to shape our 
modem sense of the status and worth of the individual, but also because it has 
contributed powerfully to the normative foundations of a vision of education as 
human development. 
The sources of Kant's notion of self-development were not intrinsically German, 
of course. Rousseau's writings on education, for instance, especially Emile, 
(1762) helped to shape his thinking. In the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality 
(1754), Rousseau had claimed that history had failed to bring about 
Enlightenment. Thus he declares: 'The development of his faculties and the 
progress of his mind has made man civilized, but unhappy and immoral. ,26 Later, 
in Emile, he attempted to 'reconcile nature with history, man's selfish nature with 
the demands of civil society, inclination with duty. Man requires a healing 
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education [he says] which returns him self to himself. ,27 With Rousseau, Kant 
claimed that Enlightenment is fundamentally an emancipatory project. But, 
crucially, he also claimed, characteristically, that Enlightenment's chief goal was 
to release man from, 'self-incurred tutelage' [immaturity] and to restore him to 
his rightful self. If freedom were to be granted, and if individuals were to take 
full responsibility for their thoughts and actions, he argued, then an 'enlightened' 
society would surely follow?8 
Kant's ascetic notion of self-mastery, responsibility and the strict adherence to 
duty, which is grounded in the laws of reason, was the cornerstone of his 
conception of the ideal state. Thus he writes, 'The Idea of a constitution in 
harmony with the natural rights of man, one namely in which citizens obedient to 
the law, besides being united, ought also to be the legislative, lies at the basis of 
all political reforms.,29 And, having posed the question, 'In what order alone can 
progress toward the better be expected?' Kant answers unswervingly, 'not by the 
movement of things from the bottom to top, butfrom top to bottom.,3o In sum, 
Kant taught that the education of the inner-self, the formation of individual moral 
character and the development of a sense of duty would lead to Enlightenment. 
And transcendental consciousness, (or mind, which is what he means by the 
'top ') would direct the whole operation. 
The counterweight to Kant's radical notion of freedom is his exacting sense of 
responsibility. Kant's 'categorical imperative' tells us how to act. Our given 
sense of right and wrong directs our actions when they are correct. Kant puts 
authority firmly into an internal condition. But at the same time, he abstracts the 
'categorical imperative from history and the specificities of social 
determinations. Thus he closes down the possibility of asking where the 'duties' 
and 'responsibilities' - the normative foundations of human social interactions -
come from. Rather, he says, they are given a priori.31 
The responsibilities of the state in furthering the project of Enlightenment 
seemed clear to Kant. He believed that progress towards 'enlightened' society 
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will occur when, and only when, the state puts an appropriate education system in 
place. But as Kant himself recognised, the likelihood of such a project ever 
succeeding depends ultimately on a wider programme of political reforms.32 
Yet the instant we reflect on the realities of the modem nation state (the amassing 
of centralized power; the weight of administrative bureaucracy; the regulation of 
highly stratified populations and the reproduction of patterns of material and 
social inequalities), the Kantian ideal of emancipation from 'self-incurred 
tutelage' seems an impossible abstraction. But Kant himself can hardly be 
expected to have foreseen how nation states would develop. Besides, this misses 
the point. The priority for Kant's generation was to break free of slavish 
adherence to custom, superstition and the dogma of established religion on the 
one hand; and to defend individuals from the arbitrary powers of princes and 
despots on the other. 
For Kant the intuitions and the universal categories and structures that are given 
to mind stand above particular circumstances. They lie outside the historical 
experiences of peoples, nations and the material processes of change and in this 
sense they are truly 'transhistorical'. Thus, from its soaring critical vantage-point 
reason challenges mindless custom and blind prejudice. Kant appealed to reason 
above religious dogma and the arbitrary power, and he put reason at the center of 
his system because he wanted to get beyond things that are a matter of chance 
and contingency. In essence, he wanted to establish the limits of what we can 
claim to know with the same degree of certainty that Newton gave the law of 
gravity. 
From an ethical standpoint, the notion of the Kantian subject of cognition is tied 
to a powerful conception of the sovereign individual reason operating within a 
teleological framework. We live purposefully. And the essential purpose of 
human existence, Kant claimed, is to free oneself from 'self-incurred immaturity' 
in order to attain moral autonomy. Thus, the tacit goal of each individual is to 
take responsibility for his or her actions and decisions. 
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On Kant's view, the individual thinking subject is ultimately the source of all 
knowledge. But as we noted earlier, he or she always bears the burden of ethical 
accountability - the judgements of others. What is at stake is the sovereign 
autonomy of the individual citizen. Moreover, the picture of Humanity that 
emerges from such a powerful conception of individual responsibility has been 
the foundation stone of modem European liberal humanism, and this is why 
liberal humanism and social democracy have put the highest premium on the 
development of individual conscience. For liberals, conscience provides the 
crucial site where individual interests can be reconciled with the common good. 
Thus, a concern with the internal workings of the individual consciences -
psychology, cognition, affect and the formation and the development of moral 
sense - assumes paramount importance. That is why liberals have made 
education, especially moral education, centrally important, not just for 
individuals, but for the whole of society. 
This is also why the ideal of the sovereign autonomy of the individual conscience 
has been enshrined in the key institutions of modem liberal democracies, 
especially education. What is more, the humanist ideal of education as the 
formation of ethical sensibility has provided a powerful rationale for literary 
education, where exposure to the 'humanising' qualities of 'great works' has 
been thought about as necessary for the moral growth of the 'good citizen'. On 
this view, the training of conscience is not some kind of epiphenomenon of the 
'real' historical processes.33 Rather, it constitutes a precondition of genuine 
political reform. And it is precisely such a developmental concern with the 
training of ethical- and critical - consciousness that has been the mainspring of 
claims about the humanising potentials of literary studies. 
Yet critics of liberal humanism, from the nineteenth-century on have argued 
strenuously that the structural problems in society, like poverty and widespread 
social injustice that determine the material conditions of existence - cannot be 
solved at the level of the individual conscience. (Indeed, this has been one of the 
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chief criticisms of the Bildung educational ideal). Such critics have cast suspicion 
on liberalism's a-social emphasis on self-cultivation, arguing that this has been 
pursued at the expense of more fundamental social values like solidarity. Instead, 
they have wanted prioritize 'the social' above the individual. As a consequence, 
philosophical idealism's critics have wanted to reformulate the problem of 
subjectivity (as it has appeared within the idealist tradition) in terms of the social 
constitution of consciousness. 
Some of Kant's contemporaries, as well as many philosophers and thinkers that 
came after Kant, were profoundly unhappy with the 'disembodied', abstract 
character of the transcendental thinking subject. And as soon as we try to think 
about the Kantian trans-historical subject at the same time as a flesh and blood, 
'embodied' thinking human being we can see Why. By contrast with the abstract 
thinking subject, 'actual' people, living in historically developed societies with 
their particular cultural norms will have their own distinctive views of the world, 
their own standards of judgement, their own criteria of truth and value. Such is 
human diversity. In a theoretically important sense, this is how they recognise 
themselves, both as individuals and as peoples. It is what makes them who they 
are. Indeed, it is frequently argued that people's outlooks are so tied to their ways 
of life, to their concrete circumstances, to their particular 'spheres', as Herder 
puts it, that what they claim to know can never be properly separated from who 
they are and where they come from. 34 
The concept of the rational individual thinking subject - the transcendental 
subject of cognition - is the foundation for Kant's epistemology. Yet 
individuation - what it is that distinguishes one flesh-and-blood person from 
another, in a word, difference - is hard to come at in purely Kantian terms. 
Concrete individualizing attributes, such as gender, ethnicity or social class are, 
strictly speaking, not relevant, where the chief goal is to uncover the formal 
conditions that make knowledge possible. Particular, concrete attributes belong 
to the domain of empirical, not purely logical, enquiry. 35 
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However, a profound change occurred around the turn of the nineteenth into the 
twentieth-century, when the focus shifted dramatically from the problem of how 
knowledge is possible to the problem of 'being in the world'. Essentially, this 
marked a shift from epistemology to ontology. Intriguingly, this ontological shift 
was reflected in further changes to pictures of language. A powerful notion of the 
role of language (signification) in the processes of existential self-understanding 
emerged when German thinkers especially began to suggest that both individual 
and collective subjectivities were somehow constituted both 'in' and 'through' 
linguistic (semiotic) activity. I shall return to the notion of self-constitution in 
language later. But first, I want to look at linguistic theories of self-cultivation, 
and particularly at Herder's theory of the subject. 
* * * 
Much of Herder's thinking developed out of his opposition to Kant's approach. 
Therefore, I should make at least one broad difference between the two thinkers 
clear. The way in which Herder sought to take into account human 'drives', 
feelings and emotions of flesh-and-blood people contrasts strikingly with the 
Kantian emphasis on disembodied reason. 
By contrast with Kant, Herder pictured the development of the 'whole person' in 
history and culture. He conceptualised human emergence in historical time and, 
further to this, he claimed that human development occurs on two distinct planes: 
first, on the individual plane; and second, on the plane of the community. With 
his conception of the cultural development of the whole community he called 
attention to the seminal significance of human 'collectivity'. Further to this, what 
I am calling Herder's 'two-plane' theory takes us back to a paradox at the core of 
the Bildungs ideal. For many German thinkers, self-cultivation was never 
envisaged as something separate from the development of the larger community. 
The Bildung pedagogical ideal tied the processes of self-directed, individual 
cultivation to the supra-individual processes of collective development. Two 
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lines of development, two trajectories, one individual and the other collective, are 
thought about as being shaped and guided by the same animating principle - for 
Herder, it was a notion of a creative life-force, or Kraft. Later, for Hegel, it was a 
guiding world-spirit, or Geist. The difficulty is this: when the emphasis falls on 
collective development, what gets diminished is the Kantian sense of individual 
responsibility and accountability, especially where there is a tendency to project 
individual, subjective development onto collective development, as if there were 
no differences between the two processes. 
The original Bildung notion of self-cultivation as 'development' differs 
significantly from contemporary 'individualism' and it is especially important to 
get the difference clear. Bildung is not like present notions such as 'the pursuit of 
personal goals' or 'self-fulfilment' or 'realising one's own potential', where 
individual development is thought about as somehow independent of - in some 
ways in spite of - the larger community. Since the end of the eighteenth century, 
as one contemporary German philosopher has recently suggested, terms like 
'enlightenment' and 'emancipation' have referred to experiences in which an 
individual undergoes changes at a personal level that are linked with learning to 
act rationally and achieving new levels of self-understanding. In this sense, 
'emancipation' is a special experience for the way that self-understanding is 
associated with an increase in personal autonomy. 
The link between personal development and political autonomy demands 
particularly careful scrutiny. Experientially, where ethical questions are 
connected with getting clear about who we are and who we want to be, and where 
such questions also involve wanting to know what is equally good for all, we 
learn to see ourselves differently not in isolation but rather both in and through 
our relations with others. With such processes moral and ethical insights depend 
upon new forms of self-understanding. Such personal transformations are often 
traced back to adolescence, when they are felt especially keenly. Here the notion 
of emancipation is located in the domain of the subject's relation with itself.36 
Therefore there is a crucial distinction to be made between modest, ordinary, 
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biographical experiences of emancipation in the sense that I have just described 
it, and large socio-political events, such as the French Revolution or the ending 
of slavery. This distinction is particularly important in connection with 
competing claims over what education can and cannot achieve. 
Herder's notion of self-expression is much larger in its scope than contemporary 
individualistic notions of 'self-expression' and 'personal growth'. More often 
than not, such contemporary notions are embedded in what we might call 
'progressive education discourse' (for instance discourses about children's 
'creativity') with the consequence that somehow the larger implications get 
forgotten. Behind the word 'expression' as Herder uses it is a 'grand theory' 
about the purpose and direction of world history. Moreover, Herder framed his 
theory in such a way that it was linked to large presuppositions about the ways 
that nations develop, especially where he suggests that national civilizations 
move through various stages towards some sort of end-state, some sort of 
completeness. Nationalists have appropriated such ideas, of course. But with this 
picture of human development Herder also holds out a strikingly cosmopolitan 
picture of human diversity as well as one of common humanity forming a unity -
a 'progressive whole'. In sum, for Herder, the 'purpose' of world history is the 
advancement of the whole of humanity. 
Kant had assumed that there was an underlying causal unity in nature of which 
the appearances of things were only one aspect. For Kant, Newton had 
demonstrated that the whole of nature could be understood in terms of 
mathematical laws. With his phenomenology, Kant aimed to derive the essence 
of things from their appearances by relying on the instrument of reason. He was 
especially critical of existing methods of classifying the natural world because 
they had failed to capture the underlying unifying processes at work - the sense 
of the whole out of which the manifold character of things derives. Indeed, the 
notion of unifying processes in nature appealed strongly to Goethe. And it was 
Goethe, through his contact with Herder, who developed his conception of the 
'formation and transformation of organic natures, and who coined the term 
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morphology.37 The idea of genetic development - a series of transformations 
(Metamorphosen) - that shaped the picture of how individual human growth 
occurs emerged somewhat earlier. 38 
Up until around the middle of the eighteenth-century, it was widely held that 
human development unfolds from some kind of 'core entity'. This 'core entity' 
was thought about as something like a miniature version of what was to come. 
The important point is that the core is already in existence in its essential form 
from the start. This notion of human development, which is part of a general 
biological theory, is usually referred to as prefonnation.39 However, the theory of 
prefonnation fell apart when German embryologists set current wisdom aside 
and began using microscopes to observe and record changes to animal organs on 
a day-to-day basis. They began to document with meticulous precision, stage by 
stage, minute transformations over time. What is more, the manner in which they 
recorded their findings had at least four major ramifications that extended far 
beyond biology. First, the genre of the scientific report was transformed when 
biologists began to write histories of physiological transformations. In short, they 
wrote 'genetic' descriptions of transformations over time to represent growth as a 
historical process. Further to this, biologists were led to seek the 'laws' 
governing changes whereby biological potentialities become actualities. Second, 
the principles of genetic analysis were imported into what was emerging as 
psychological science. Third, biologists began to relate the patterns of individual 
development, (ontegenenesis) to a larger picture of the development of the 
species (phylogenesis).4o In a short space, detailed, systematic recording began to 
alter fundamentally the way that human development was pictured. It led directly 
to the construction of a genetic picture of human development- not only physical 
development, but also psychological development too. 
The fourth major ramification concerns the philosophy of history. For Herder, 
humanity came from a single origin that constituted part of a unified great 
system. This corresponded in some ways to Kant's picture of things, but for 
Herder, who believed that humanity was animated by primal 'life-forces' there is 
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both a striking picture of human diversity as well as a powerful conception of the 
'life-cycle' of different peoples, which he discusses in quasi-biological terms. 
Crucially, Herder's terms mirror the terms used by biologists to describe the 
process of epigenesis. What happened was that Herder took over a biological 
picture of development directly from contemporary German biology and blended 
it into a 'purposive' vision of world history. On Herder's view, story of the earth 
is the emergence of higher forms of life from lower ones. The creation of higher 
forms, whether he speaks of biological or cultural forms, is pictured as the work 
of genetic forces. 41 Characteristically, he applied a notion of animating life forces 
- much as he did with the notion of human 'creativity' (Genesis/Kraft) - across 
the board, irrespective of whether he was talking about organisms, languages, 
natural species or nations because he thought of them as part of the unified, great 
system.42 
The advances in embriology had a profound impact on pictures of world history, 
when the methods and insights borrowed from 'historicising biology' were 
imported into 'truly' historical thinking. Herder was quick to take up the theory 
of epigenesis, (as was his pupil, Goethe) and to apply it to the history of 
Mankind. In his essay of 1774, Yet Another Philosophy of History for the 
Furthering of Humanity, Herder made both implicit and explicit links between 
historical and biological processes. Moreover, he drew striking parallels between 
the development of biological species, the growth of national civilizations and 
the universal progress of humanity.43 For Herder, the idea of a fundamental life 
force, an essential creative energy, which, significantly, he called genesis (which 
is the semantic equivalent of the German Bildung), provided the footings for his 
theory of the individual self-formation in a way that was strikingly new. What is 
more, it enabled him to encompass the particular developments of individuals 
and nations within an organic picture of the emergence of the whole of 
humanity.44 
Later, for Hegel human emergence was pictured as a dialectical process that 
depends on contact with difference. His starting point was his insight that our 
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whole understanding of the world is bounded by the horizons of our historical 
situation. Thus he maintained that it is only by conducting an interpretative 
dialogue with the past, as well as with cultures that are radically different from 
our own, that we are led to reflect on our own historical situatedness. It is only 
when we come into contact with ancient or foreign languages and the 
civilizations that gave rise to them, that we begin to push beyond the boundaries 
of our own parochial understandings to reach new stages of self-understanding. 
Thus cultures develop over time. 
The idea of an interpretative dialogue with the past to reach self-understanding 
has attracted generations of humanists and educators. Crucially, for key thinkers 
of the Enlightenment, the past was no longer mediated exclusively by religious 
institutions, rather it was something that individuals might confront and 
interrogate for themselves. As a consequence of this, the notion of finding human 
significance and meaning in the present through a dialogue with the past, where 
individual and collective experience has been sedimented in historically evolved 
cultures, became centrally important for secular philology as well as for linguistic 
and literary studies that grew out of it. Such ideas remained centrally important in 
Europe and in the United States for two centuries, right up to the nineteen 
twenties, when a new generation of thinkers appeared to break the spell of 
German philosophy of history. Today, language, not history, is sovereign. 
* * * 
When Herder was appointed General Superintendent, Head of the Protestant 
Clergy in Weimar, he proved himself to be an energetic and capable 
administrator. Yet despite his efforts he had little lasting impact on the education 
system. Herder brought to the business of school reform his practical experiences 
as a teacher. He grasped the way that the possibilities for reform depend upon 
resources. His proposals for the reform of the Gymnasium were accepted in 
principle by the authorities, but hampered in the event by a lack of funds. 
Moreover, where only a small minority of students went on from secondary 
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education to university, Herder struggled to provide an appropriate education for 
all. In Weimar, where the majority of children received their education in the 
same school, (the children of the aristocracy received tuition from private tutors), 
the syllabus had to provide for varying needs and it also had to meet different 
expectations in a highly stratified society. Moreover, Herder never saw education 
as a means for transforming society in the name of equality (in the way that 
Robespierre did). He presupposed, rather than challenged, the existing social 
hierarchy. We might suppose, therefore that Herder would see education as 
training for a specific station in life. But actually, he advocated a common 
foundational curriculum in the lower school that aimed to offer a general 
preparation for adulthood. Herder's curriculum included history, geography and 
mathematics for all students. 
The curricular principle of a common foundation for all - a common educational 
offer - is a fundamental one. It was linked to the educational goal of producing 
independent, 'useful citizens'. Thus Herder writes, 'It is not for his precious 
studies that a man should educate himself, but for life, for the use and the 
application of his knowledge in all human situations and callings'. Chiefly, 
Herder saw education as a practical preparation for life beyond school. Indeed, he 
always maintained a strong sense of useful knowledge and advocated 'the 
application of knowledge in all human situations', as the following passage 
makes plain, 
We are men before we become members of a particular profession, and 
woe-betide us if we do not remain men when exercising this calling. The 
best of our culture and usefulness in our person comes from what we 
know as men and have learned as boys, without too anxious thought of 
what the state wants to make of us. If the knife is once sharpened, all 
kinds of things can be cut with it, and not every household has a different 
piece of cutlery to deal with bread and with meat. So it is too with the 
sharpness and polish of the intelligence. Sharpen and polish it on what 
and for what you will, so long as it is sharpened and polished, and use it 
afterwards to your heart's content and according to the needs of you 
station .. .it is not for precious studies alone that a man should educate 
himself, but for life, for the use and application of his knowledge in all 
human situations and callings. What I learn as a theologian I try more and 
more to forget, and my office compels me to do so. Just because of that I 
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am becoming a better tested man and a more useful citizen. 45 
Behind Herder's generous, liberal conception of a humane education for all lay 
his powerful sense of the 'creativity' of the people. And this sense of popular 
creativity was linked to his concept of 'expression' as mark of common 
humanity. 
Herder's detractors have criticised his lack of realism. As one of them put it, 
'Herder's ideal of all-round humanity is in practice reduced to one of universal 
receptivity ... It is an ideal of culture for scholars, not for men of action, who need 
clearly defined motives and models.'46 Crucially, Herder never doubted the 
possibility of development for all pupils, regardless of their 'natural' abilities and 
their different starting points. The fact was that existing social arrangements 
imposed heavy restrictions on the syllabus. The upper school, which was geared 
to university entrance, concentrated heavily on the classics, especially Latin. (The 
emphasis shifted to Greek later, with von Humboldt's reforms), so Latin was 
taught regardless of students' aptitudes and interests, and so there was little that 
Herder could do. 
* * * 
Herder was professionally concerned with education throughout his life, both as a 
teacher and as an administrator. But his reforms, as I just mentioned, had little 
lasting impact. By contrast, Von Humboldt, the chief architect of Prussian 
education reform after 1809, was concerned with education for only a short time. 
Yet he transformed the Prussian education system in a way that influenced the 
whole of Europe. 
Von Humboldt was a Prussian aristocrat. His wealth came from his extensive 
estates in Poland (he was an absentee landlord), as well as the family estate at 
Tegel near Berlin. (Tegel was looted during the French military occupation). His 
patrician education enlivened and enriched by travel and through contact with 
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various languages and cultures, contrasted strikingly with the harsh realities of 
ordinary people who lived and worked on his estates. Their unvarying lives were 
tied to the land and to the seasonal cycle of labour. 
And yet, von Humboldt's educational policies were shaped powerfully by an 
'enlightened' conception of human development. His outlook was fundamentally 
Kantian. He aimed to 'improve' people's lives, and to make common, general 
education available to all, regardless of the individual's station in life. Much as 
Herder had done, he saw education as a general preparation for life rather than 
for a particular occupation or a position in society. Thus he advocated the 
universal development of individual capabilities (allgemeine menschenbildung), 
and the awakening of students' minds to equip them for the various situations 
that life presented.47 In the aftermath to the French Revolution, such ideas 
appeared dangerously radical to members of his class, who feared the 
consequences of educating people beyond the needs of their station. 48 
Von Humboldt was appointed as the head of the newly created Section for 
Educational and Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Prussian Interior Ministry in 
February 1809. Unusually, his was a secular appointment. Up to 1808, 
educational institutions, such as primary and secondary schools, had remained 
under Church control. Indeed, Von Humboldt's appointment was a controversial 
one precisely because his ant-religious views were well known. But there had 
been a marked change in the Prussian cultural climate, following the humiliating 
defeat by the French. German education reformers (especially Fichte) sought a 
basis for a new relationship between the state and schools and the task of 
establishing the new relationship fell to von Humboldt. 
Von Humboldt was chiefly responsible for broad section of state sponsored 
cultural activity: the supervision of schools, universities, the art and science 
academies, cultural associations and the Royal Theatre.49 Paradoxically, in an 
early treatise, On the Limits of State Action, he had advocated the imposition of 
strict limits on state powers. Notwithstanding his views on limiting the state's 
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reach, he did not hesitate to consolidate his powers and to direct reform 
energetically from the centre. His first move was to centralise authority by swiftly 
transferring financial control of education from local communities to central 
government. Subsequently, he made it a requirement that university applicants 
pass the Atbitur examination. (This now involved translation from Greek, as well 
as oral and written tests in Latin). The Afbitur could only be taken by pupils at 
the classical schools designated officially as Gymnasien. He also introduced 
mandatory tests for candidates for secondary teaching posts, restricting the local 
council's choice of candidates to those with a Gymnasium education. 
Additionally, he grasped the need for clear and logical progression through 
various stages for education to work as a system. 
On the face of it, nothing had prepared von Humboldt for the practical task of 
educational reform. Where did von Humboldt's practical knowledge of education 
policy making come from? To account for his grasp of institutional realities we 
have to look back to the time he spent in Paris in the 1790s, and to his contact 
with the French ideologues there. 
* * * 
The ideologues were a small circle of thinkers who had survived the Great Terror 
(1793-1794), and who were chiefly responsible for drawing up the ground plan 
for the first coherent, modem national state education system in Europe. In the 
aftermath to the Terror, and in the wake of the reactionary 'White Terror' that 
followed it, the ideologues pictured a central role for free, secular, public 
education in the name of the social and political advancement of Mankind. In 
doing so they built upon the proposals of earlier thinkers, especially Condorcet, 
whose ideas on education one historian has claimed 'lie at the very heart of the 
political and intellectual processes from which the modem French school 
originates. ,50 
When von Humboldt went to Paris in 1797, the Republic was sunk deep in crisis. 
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He followed political events closely and studied the problems of the 
Thennidorean government at first hand. Also he kept in close contact with the 
ideologues, especially, Abbe Sieyes and Destutt de Tracy, on a daily basis. But 
before I describe von Humboldt's contact with this group, I shall need to 
backtrack and give a rapid sketch of developments in post-revolutionary France. 
* * * 
During the fragile Thermidorean Republic (1794-99), when the ideologues were 
chiefly active, there was a powerful rekindling of humane values -l' esprit 
humaine - in public life. Institutions for deaf and dumb persons were established; 
measures against vandalism were instituted; measures to preserve works of art 
were brought in; and plans for a new National Library were proposed. Such 
initiatives reflected a renewal of Enlightenment values and the Enlightenment's 
belief in the improvement of the human condition. Moreover, liberal proposals 
for a national system of education which had been conceived and proposed in the 
period immediately after the Revolution, but never implemented, were revived 
after Robespierre's execution. 
In the immediate aftennath to the Revolution of 1789, the Constituent Assembly 
(1791) had aimed to replace the old education system with one that would 
represent the secular spirit of the new order. First Talleyrand (1791), then 
Condorcet (1792), the so-called 'last of the philosophes' , proposed new systems 
of education comprising elementary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Thus they 
drew up the ground-plans for the first national, state education system in Europe. 
Condorcet's proposal (20-21 April, 1791) was especially far-sighted. He 
advocated co-education, physical training, and a balanced curriculum that 
included science. His vision of secular, non-compulsory education was conceived 
as a basic, universal right for all citizens and it was linked closely to his theory of 
democratic refonn. However, in the best spirit of the Enlightenment's love of 
rational enquiry and its hatred of prejudice and dogma, Condorcet promulgated 
freedom of teaching. Thus he wrote: 'Niether the French Constitution nor even 
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the Declaration of Rights will be presented to any class of citizens as tables 
which are handed down from Heaven and must be worshipped and believed. 
Enthusiasm will not be founded on prejudice or the habits of childhood' .51 But 
Condorcet perished in the Terror before his proposals could be implemented. 
The universities were closed in 1792. Further to this, Robespierre attacked the 
very spirit of the Enlightenment when he denounced the encyclopedie and 
inaugurated the Cult of the Supreme Being. To the future ideologues - especially 
Madme de Helvetius, Volney, Chenier, Danou, and de Tracy - Robespierre's 
actions amounted to a counter-Enlightenment. Whereas Condorcet had 
encouraged freedom of teaching and a critical spirit in education, Robespierre 
aimed to use education reform to secure a radical transformation of the whole of 
French society. In sum, for Robespierre, the chief purpose of public instruction 
was to produce a new kind of citizen.52 
Robespierre advocated a compulsory system of public institutions, each housing 
four hundred to six hundred pupils. Boys between the ages of five and twelve, 
and girls between the ages of five and eleven would be educated away from their 
families. Schooling was to be equality in practice. Each child would receive the 
same food and clothing and the same teaching and care as every other one: 
There, all treated equally, fed equally, clothed equally, taught equally, 
equality will be for the young pupils not a specious theory but a 
continually effective practice, In this way a new race will be formed, 
strong, hard-working, disciplined, and separated by an inseparable barrier 
from all impure contact with prejudices of our antiquated species.53 
Robespierre's proposal states clearly his intention to transform society by 
producing a new kind of citizenry through the establishment of a 'complete and 
austere' pedagogic regime. This regime was pledged to abolish all existing 
inequalities; to inscribe 'official' values (hard work and discipline); and to effect 
a complete and irrevocable break with the old order. However, Robespierre was 
arrested and executed in 1794, and his plans were never implemented. 
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Abbe Sieyes survived the Terror to join the ideologues. Crucially, he linked the 
prospects for social and political advancement to the establishment of a universal, 
free, secular state education system. Sieyes had been the chief designer of the 
1791 Constitution. In it he made the following proposal: 
A system of Public Instruction will be created and organised, which will 
be common to all citizens, free as regards the education that is 
indispensable for everyone, and ordered in a hierarchy of establishments 
that will be related to the division of the kingdom. National fetes will be 
established to preserve the memory of the French Revolution, sustain 
fraternity between the citizens. And attach them to the constitution, the 
fatherland and the laws.54 
Indeed, Sieyes was the major political theorist of the 1789 Revolution.55 His 
advocacy for a representational system of government, his conception of rights, 
his drafting of constitutions, his plans for the division of French territories; his 
scheme for the organisation of central government and his conception of a 
national education system were comprehensive and hugely influential. But Sieyes 
was not a democrat. Essentially, he believed that men of property and education 
both would and should be elected to power in a representative system.56 
Immediately after the Revolution, Sieyes was preoccupied with drafting the 
Constitution (1791). Later, however, he turned his attention to education because, 
like Condorcet before him, he linked universal education to the rights and the 
responsibilities of citizenship for the new social order. 
In June 1793, Sieyes' plan for the establishment of a coherent system of national 
instruction comprising primary, secondary and tertiary institutions was presented 
to the National Convention. (It built upon earlier proposals by Tallyrand and 
Condorcet). The backbone of his plan was a scheme to provide free schooling for 
all children - boys and girls - between the ages of six and thirteen. Tellingly, 
Sieyes was more concerned with establishing a framework for public instruction 
than he was with specifying the actual content of the curriculum, which he was 
content to leave to the National Institute that had replaced the French Academy. 
Sieyes conception of education was an unusually broad one. He believed in 
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educating 'the whole person' for the responsibilities of citizenship. Whereas the 
traditional curriculum had been predominantly literary, Sieyes wanted to expand 
the syllabus to include physical, moral and 'industrial' teaching. Additionally, he 
developed an unusually far-sighted conception of 'life-long learning' whereby 
men and women of all ages might receive public instruction over the course of a 
lifetime. Thus, incrementally, people would understand their civic rights and 
responsibilities. 
The return to humane 'enlightened' values of the 1789 Revolution after 
Robespierre's execution is understandable as a reaction to the extreme violence 
of the preceding years. What needs explaining further is the significance of 
intense discussions about language in education that were conducted among the 
ideologues and their associates over the next four years. Intriguingly, it was 
during his stay in Paris, which began in 1797, that von Humboldt began to evolve 
a realistic picture of how a state education system might be made to work in 
Germany. It was in Paris, through daily contact with the discussants, that he 
resolved to undertake a comprehensive study of the various languages of 
Mankind. And crucially, his proposals for Prussian educational reforms sought to 
avoid the mistakes of the French system that he had seen at first hand. 
Chiefly among those with whom von Humboldt discussed the nature of language 
was Destutt de Tracy. Tracy was a leading figure among the ideologues, who was 
directly concerned with plans for education afterl796. Tracy promulgated a new 
'super-science' of ideas. This involved the study of Man from the perspective of 
the rigorous study of the formation of ideas - 'ideologie' as it was called. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the new science drew heavily on Condillac's ideas 
about the origins of language and on his sensationist epistemology, which he 
wrote about in two key works: Essai sur l' origine des connaissances humaines, 
(1746, and Traite des sensations, (1754). 
'Ideology' stemmed from a perception shared among those who had survived the 
Terror that human nature had to be fully explored and explained to prepare and to 
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equip future citizens for the responsibilities of self-government. In various 
programmatic papers and memoranda de Tracy called for a theory of moral and 
political knowledge resting on the secure foundation of a science of the formation 
of ideas. Tallyrand duly called it 'ideology'. Further to this, he claimed that the 
reform of science must entail the complete overhaul of scientific terminology. 
The aim was to purge science of its metaphysical residue. Ideology then was to 
be a rigorous first science, and de Tracy demanded a 'Newton of the science of 
thought'. The methods of the new science would be to progress from the 
'decomposition'(the rigorous analysis into constituent parts)offirst the elements 
of ideas and then on, systematically, to the whole. 
Central to de Tracy's project was his non-metaphysical account of mind. In June 
1796 he presented his paper, Analysis ojthe Faculty oj Thinking, in which he 
formulated sensationalism pithily in the precept 'to think is to sense'. He was 
especially careful to show that the science of ideas was not a branch of 
metaphysics. Eighteenth-century psychology had presupposed the existence of 
the 'soul', whereas the new 'sensationalists', after Condillac, aimed to explain 
Man's means of knowing by analysing the faculties and sensations. De Tracy 
drew heavily on the tradition of Condillac, but not withstanding his admiration 
for the thinker, he wrote to the materialist thinker, Cabanis, about problems that 
Condillac had left unresolved. The notion of mind that they inherited from 
Condillac and from the Enlightenment generally seemed to Tracy to reintroduce 
metaphysical considerations. His goal was to reform the scientific study of ideas 
by replacing the old terminology, which contained metaphysical residues, with 
non metaphysical terms. Tracy rejected 'psychology' because of its metaphysical 
associations as in 'the study of the 'soul' or the 'psyche'. The name of the new 
discipline is especially telling. 'Ideology', was a term derived from the Greek 
eidos (visual image). Intriguingly, the object of study was broadened beyond 
language to include all forms of signification., and thus Tracy attempted to make 
semiotics centrally important for the French national curriculum. 
Tracy claimed that the study of signs - 'sensations and ideas' - held the key to the 
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understanding and advancement of human culture. Thus, he made the study of 
signs a foundational discipline of a national curriculum that was designed 
specifically to produce the new 'French citizen' for the post-revolutionary order. 
Further to this, the systematic analysis of signs and sensations, Tracy argued, 
would clarify the 'confusing legacy' of 'enlightened' thought. Crucially, the 
rigorous analysis of 'sensations and ideas' aimed to establish the boundaries of 
what could be said and known by purging education of religious dogma. And so 
from a secular, vigorously anti-clerical standpoint de Tracy aimed to settle 
fundamental questions that had divided thinkers before the Revolution. 
Grammar, or the 'science of communicating ideas' was to provide the 
foundational element for ideological studies. Tracy believed that by building on 
rational foundations, by combining ideas along scientific lines and thus attaining 
to new truths 'ideology' would create a new morality for the new social order. 
And thus Tracy attempted to establish the centrality of semiotics for modem state 
education. Moreover, he linked ideological studies to the critical study of 
political economy, as well as to the formation of a new kind of citizenry. But 
later, as a direct consequence of the politics that linked Condillac to 
Republicanism and anti-clericalism, Condillac's doctrine was officially banned 
during the Restoration that followed the fall of Napoleon. 
Condillac's ideas on the nature and purpose of language (as von Humboldt met 
them when he visited Paris in1797) kindled the German's interest in the role of 
signs in human development. From this point on, signs and particularly language 
seemed to him to hold the key to understanding the various outlooks and 
mentalities that make up mankind. Moreover, the study of the outlooks and 
mentalities of nations from a standpoint of language structure constituted a first 
step towards pinpointing their origins and tracing their developmental histories. 
In the aftermath to the Restoration, the Condillac tradition was officially 
repressed for overtly political (ideological) reasons. (Condillac's ideas were 
associated with materialism and anti-clericalism). In Germany, too, Condillac's 
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work was shunned, but for different reasons. German thinkers underestimated the 
importance of the French philosopher largely because of the way that ideologues 
had elevated Condillac above contemporary German philosophers, at a moment 
when thinkers like von Humboldt were keenly aware of Kant's immense stature. 
Von Humboldt had much difficulty in explaining Kant to Tracy. He complained 
to Schiller in a letter that 'even when they [the ideologues] use the same words as 
we do they always give them another meaning ... their imagination is not our 
Einbildungskrajt,.57 He met Sieyes in May 1798. They took long walks together 
in the Champs Elysee and discussed the political situation. He also met de Tracy, 
who had recently written series of influential memoires in which he set out his 
account of the relation between ideas and sensations. Sieyes and de Tracy 
organised a seminar in Paris where von Humboldt was invited to lead a 
discussion on contemporary German philosophy. The major theorists of 
'ideologie were present. But the seminar, which lasted for five hours, ended 'in 
something of a shambles' and Von Humboldt came away regretting the way that 
Sieyes put Condillac among the first rank of 'metaphysicians'. 58 He also 
regretted that Sieyes had not constructed a philosophical system in the German 
manner. 
Von Humboldt arrived in Paris from the intellectual circles of Jena and Weimar 
that included Goethe, Fichte and Schiller and he refused to rank the French 
thinkers as highly as contemporary German ones.59 This had important 
consequences later on when historians of German philology generally, and Von 
Humboldt's biographers in particular, confidently ignored the tradition of 
Condillac. In reality, of course, Condillac's ideas had stimulated German 
discussions about the origins and the nature of language throughout the second 
half of the eighteenth century. It is especially ironic therefore that the Condillac 
tradition was neglected in both France and Germany during for over a century. 
Von Humboldt gained invaluable insights into the practical workings of the 
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Republican constitution directly from his contact with the ideologues. He 
expressed his misgivings about the French attempt 'to create a new society and 
political order from the utopian blueprint of pure reason alone' .60 But his 
misgivings did not arise like Burke's from a conservative reaction to the 
Revolution. Rather they sprang from his powerful insight that abstract reason 
alone was an insubstantial basis for radical government, where abrupt 
discontinuity with the progressive tendencies already present in the previous 
order forced government to legislate from abstractions that were not embedded in 
a pre-existing lifeworld. Intriguingly, the historical school of jurisprudence that I 
mentioned in connection with Savigny stemmed largely from the insight that 
effective legislation is rooted in culture rather than abstract principles. Typically, 
Sieyes once remarked, 'If the revolution that is taking place bears no resemblance 
to any other, it is because it has as its first and true cause the progress of 
reason. ,61 But the ideologues were unable to resolve a crucial paradox. On the 
one hand, they saw that ideas and values were tied to history; on the other hand 
they wanted to advance universal principles that were 'true' for all time.62 
Von Humboldt regularly attended the sessions of the various classes of the 
National Institute of France and he learned much that would be of practical value 
to him as an education reformer. The structure of the Institute reflected the 
restructuring of academic knowledge in France after the revolution of 1789. Yet 
in many ways it retained much of the old Academy's elitist character. Members 
were elected to the various 'classes' and knowledge was divided into three 
domains or 'classes'. The first class included France's most prestigious scientists, 
(La Grange, Laplace, Fourcroy, Cuvier and Jussieu, among others); the second 
class concerned the moral and political sciences; and the third class concentrated 
on Literature and the fine arts. The group of thinkers who gathered in the second 
class, which was the most significant as far as education reforms were concerned, 
comprised key political figures, regicides, Jacobins, theists and atheists. It was 
here, and not in the class of literature and fine arts that de Tracy concentrated his 
energies when he was elected to the second class in 1796 as an associate member. 
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However, the practical difficulties facing Tracy in establishing the new education 
system proved insurmountable. The scale of the problems facing him is reflected 
in the way that compromises with the old system had to be reached. All too 
frequently these compromises created both confusion and overlap. One of the 
chief difficulties arose from the shortage of teachers and the need to reemploy 
clergy as teachers. Flawed arrangements for the supply of teachers exposed the 
gap that existed among the Institute, the designers of the new system and the 
institutional structures that were established. The system relied upon Normal 
schools for teacher training, which were directed by the Institute from the centre. 
Additionally, problems arose over the central control of teaching methods as well 
as the content of the syllabus. 
De Tracy's role was to accelerate the programme of The Council of Public 
Instruction by supervising and approving textbooks and instructional materials as 
well as inspecting teachers' cahiers - the planning and record books - to ensure 
that they conformed to the state's policies. But crucially, he lacked the necessary 
powers to drive his initiatives through, a point that von Humboldt duly noted. 
Indeed, the speed with which the German minister secured central powers 
directly reflected his appreciation of de Tracy's difficulties during his time in 
Paris. 
The foundational character of language studies became a key issue in the battle 
for control over the new curriculum. De Tracy issued several circulars outlining 
objectives for courses stressing the central importance of 'ideology' . General 
grammar was to be preceded by an extensive course in 'ideology' and history was 
to be taught from Enlightenment texts. 
In reality, Tracy's efforts were in some ways continuous with ongoing attempts to 
centralise and standardise French education that began in 1764. Interestingly, the 
teaching of philosophy was a particular priority and the works of Locke and 
Condillac were singled out for special attention. Interestingly, however, in the 
Rhenish departments professors insisted on teaching Kant, Fichte and Herder 
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instead of Condillac. 
De Tracy was an energetic and efficient administrator who took measures to 
ensure that teaching in the ecoles centrales (secondary schools) was adequately 
supervised by instituting a system of surveillance by correspondence and by 
reviewing the cahiers. He strove to establish the ideologues' educational values 
in secondary schools throughout France. But his work was severely impeded 
when the Council of Public Instruction was dissolved 1800 under Napoleon's 
influence.63 
Meanwhile, Von Humboldt had attended closely to the details of the French 
system and his first-hand observations provided him with the practical 
knowledge that he would need for reforming the Prussian education system a 
decade later. Crucially, he took account of pupils' development and progression. 
He based the division between primary, secondary and tertiary education in 
Prussia on the French model but, by contrast with theirs, his framework was 
simple and clear and there were no overlaps. Whereas elementary education 
provided instruction in literacy, calculation and moral principles, secondary 
education aimed to develop mental functions through a tightly constructed yet 
broadly based curriculum around three domains: language, history and 
mathematics. In sum, Von Humboldt gave serious thought to the way that 
students learn. He worked with a conception of pupil development, moving from 
dependency on instruction at the early stages towards autonomous learning later 
on. The chief goal of elementary education was to produce autonomous learners. 
Additionally, Von Humboldt established 'progressive' pedagogy in the Prussian 
system. His thinking about teaching and learning was influenced by the 
progressive educational ideas, which Pestalozzi had developed in Switzerland. In 
the context of Prussian reforms, progressive pedagogy aimed to develop 
children's individual potentials. In the eighteen seventies, von Humboldt had 
criticised Pestalozzi's methods in a letter to Goethe, but after 1806 several 
education reformers in Germany, including Fichte (who actually visited the Swiss 
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reformer), began to advocate Pestalozzian methods. Humboldt was receptive to 
the focus on the individual child as well as the goal of developing the whole 
personality. Characteristically, he gave priority to general education over 
vocational training, and, crucially, he grasped the cardinal importance of 
providing appropriate professional training for teachers. 
The contrast between the French and Prussian arrangements for teacher training 
are especially revealing. In France, normal schools provided training under the 
direction of the French Institute. But whereas the French intelligentsia dominated 
the Institute in Paris, the new University in Berlin was open to all suitably 
qualified applicants from the Gymnasien. No matter what their backgrounds, the 
new University of Berlin would provide suitably qualified teachers for the 
Prussian system. 
Von Humboldt was chiefly instrumental in founding the University of Berlin. 
This was his greatest achievement as an administrator.64 He succeeded in 
attracting many eminent academics, among them the great classical scholar, 
Friedrich August Wolf. The young legal scholar,Savigny was also appointed. 
Language studies, broadly conceived, were central to von Humboldt's project. As 
I have mentioned, he served in the Ministry for a short space (between February 
1809 and July 1810), during which time he made it possible for philology to lay 
claim to being the central humanising discipline of the state education system. 
Crucially, it was von Humboldt who established the principle that there was a 
need for such a thing as a central humanising discipline for the nation in the first 
place. Over time, he ensured that historical and comparative language scholarship 
had a secure base in at least a dozen German universities, which was an 
astonishing achievement in such a short space.65 Thus he made the 'science' of 
philology, central to the German ideal of the university as the state-designated 
spiritual centre of national life. 
On the one hand, von Humboldt wanted to affirm the 'autonomy' of academic 
studies. On the other, he wanted to orient the university towards the spiritual and 
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moral training of the nation'. The Bildung ideal allowed von Humboldt to 
subsume two potentially conflicting principles - one oriented towards the 
individual, the other towards the state - beneath a higher principle: human 
emergence and the cultural development of the Mankind.66 
Or such was the grand design. But von Humbl~t was also faced with the practical 
problem of how to secure the independence of the University of Berlin from 
political pressures and State power. Once more his contact with the ideologues 
proved useful. In 1798 Sieyes had complained to von Humboldt that his attempt 
to persuade the National Assembly to convert church property into a permanent 
endowment for public education had failed to find support. Von Humboldt duly 
proposed to endow the university with landed property from which to derive its 
revenue, but this attempt proved unsuccessful. 
After the fashion of Sieyes, Von Humboldt was reluctant to prescribe the content 
of the Prussian State curriculum. Instead, he argued that the critique of Man 
should form the core of studies. Thus he made language central to a 
comprehensive, historico-philosophical critical project.6~ As a direct result of 
von Humbolt's reforms the Classics, especially Greek, came to dominate the 
secondary school curriculum. Such developments reflect the rise of German 
philhellenism. In the second half of the eighteenth century, there was a major 
rediscovery of the importance of Classical Greece in Germany. This rediscovery 
was significantly different in character from the 'Augustan' taste for neo-classical 
imitation, and different again from the enthusiasm for Republican Rome in post-
revolutionary France. German philhellenism related to widespread fears of 
political, social and cultural fragmentation. And such fears were not groundless. 
They constituted a genuine response to the social and political realities of the 
times. As a consequence of the new emphasis on the classics, however, most of 
the school day was taken up one way or another with the teaching and learning of 
Greek, especially Greek grammar. 
The German enthusiasm for Classical Greece also reflected another mood. It was 
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symptomatic of a nationalist aversion to the attributed superficiality of French 
tastes and courtly manners. This was an instance of the famous opposition 
between French 'civilization' and German 'culture'. Typically, around the tum of 
the eighteenth century, German enthusiasm for antiquity was Republican and 
anti-aristocratic; but it was also a counter-hegemonic patriotic expression of 
disgust for just about everything French.68 
During the Revolutionary wars, and the Wars of Liberation that followed, 
German philhellenes discovered a special affinity for the Athenian State. They 
imagined the polis as a community united by a common language and a shared 
spirit. But then, as Marchand notes, after 1806, 'German philhellenism underwent 
a profound change; its anti-aristocratic aspects were translated into pro-national 
sentiments, and a new form of pedagogy, built on the notion of Bildung, made its 
peace with the state and the status quo.' 69 What is particularly striking, however, 
is the way that German philhellenism was both institutionalised and 
'professionalised' so rapidly and so completely in Germany, where, by contrast 
with France and England, the study of ancient civilizations took place almost 
entirely within the universities. 
Attacks on teaching the Classics had begun in the eighteenth century, but they 
intensified from around the middle of the nineteenth. In Germany, as elsewhere 
in Europe, school reformers and modernisers sought to make the curriculum 
more responsive to the populations they served, as well as to meet perceived 
national needs. The perception shared among a new generation of reformers was 
that too much effort has been 'wasted' on useless knowledge. They attacked the 
emphasis on Greek grammar and they gained ammunition from the fact that, all 
too frequently, what classical studies meant in reality was an austere, classroom-
bound regime of mind-numbing routines. Lessons entailed the laborious 
translation of 'pedagogic' texts' - that is, texts chosen to facilitate the teaching of 
items of the language, grammatical features, models of style, and so on, rather 
than whole works. 
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, the social reality was that classical 
education actually functioned to further stratify an already divided society. It 
marked off an elite social group from the rest. Knowledge of Greek was one of 
the ways that members of a social elite commonly identified themselves to one 
another and thus the syllabus served to exclude outsiders. Not surprisingly, this 
caused resentment among those who associated an education in Greek with class 
privilege and illegitimate social power. Over time, such perceptions fuelled 
further attacks on the place of classics in the curriculum. 
The Bildung ideal has been has been criticised on both social and political 
grounds for the way that in practice it diverted a highly educated section of 
German society from participating fully in 'ordinary' politics. As far as many of 
them were concerned, the only politics worth considering was accessible only by 
means of the superior education afforded by the classics. And as one historian 
puts it was Von Humboldt who 'infused the school system with his generation's 
commitment to nonpurposiveness, inwardness and scholarliness.' 70 
Von Humboldt was an aristocrat of the Mark Brandenburg as well as a state 
official. Temperamentally, he was predisposed to a life of unworldly inwardness 
that he combined with a 'nonpurposive' (anti-utilitarian) intellectual inquiry. He 
also possessed an unswerving sense of selflessness and disinterested service. He 
was an outstanding administrator as well as a skilful diplomat. In office, one of 
his aims was to create an autonomous class of classically educated, disinterested 
state functionaries who would be independent of aristocratic patronage. This he 
achieved, and more. 
Von Humboldt never lost touch with the European Enlightenment. He was, 
according to one biographer, 'a child of the eighteenth century, a gentleman of 
the Mark Brandenburg, who characteristically wore a pigtail down to 1809, when 
such a sight was rare' .71 Largely due to his intellectual force and administrative 
capability the German universities became the wonder of Europe and the envy of 
English thinkers like Matthew Arnold.72 To von Humbolt goes the credit for 
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evolving the Gennan conception of the University as a cultural site, where new 
knowledge is produced, not just passed on. The core of his project was his 
profound cosmopolitan vision of the role of language studies and the humanities 
in the fonnation of world citizens. Such a profound ethical vision gave 
coherence to the study oflanguage, literature and culture as a critique of Man. 
The European educational ideal of Der Forschung, Der Lehre, Der Bildung -
hJ research,1eaching and ?elf-cultivation - is his. 
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20-21 April, 1792. 
2 Cited in Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt,(1989) 'The Abstractness of Reason and the Real Life of 
Individuals and Institutions: Humboldt's Educational Politics and the French Revolution', in The 
French Revolution and the Age of Goethe, edited by Gerhart Hoffmeister, Gerg Olm Verlag, 
Santa Barbara CA, 1989. 
3 As Raymond Williams has put it, 'A defInition of language is always, implicitly or explicitly, a 
defmition of human beings in the world.' (Williams, R. (1977) Marxism and Literature, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 21). Behind William's assertion lies Marx's dictum: 'Language is 
practical consciousness, as it exists for other men and thus as it really exists for me myself as well. 
Language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other 
men ... Consciousness is from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men 
exist at all.' Marx, K. (1961) German Ideology, fITst published in 1846, in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings in Sociology and Social philosophy, edited by T B Bottomore and M Reubel, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, , pp. 85-86. 
4 To grasp the connection between the 'sensationalist' tradition and materialism, compare Marx's 
assertion that 'sense experience must be the basis of all science' and 'The whole of history is a 
preparation for man to become an object of sense perception, and for the development of human 
needs'. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 1844, in Marx, K. (1961) p. 85. 
5 The Bildungs ideal is usually associated with a constellation of writers in Classical Weimar, 
including Goethe Schiller and von Humboldt. I shall be concentrating on the last of the three 
thinkers because I want to show how the Bildungs ideal fIgured in the design of the Prussian 
education system. Additionally, I want to link Bildung to developments in language studies, 
especially the rise to dominance of German philology, and to suggest the continuing relevance of 
von Humboldt's ideas for education in language and literature. 
The nineteenth-century English public school ideal of education as the formation of character, 
borrowed from the German notion of Bildung, but it was not its equivalent. (I am speaking here 
particularly about the ideal associated with the reforms that Dr Thomas Arnold introduced at 
Rugby, which were partly inspired by contact with German educators and thinkers.) Dr Arnold 
was a key fIgure in shaping the ideal of education as the formation character. Although he was a 
religious man, Dr Arnold disliked religious dogma. As Headmaster of Rugby (1828-1842) he held 
non-liturgical services in the school chapel based on weekly sermons. The lofty moral tone of 
these sermons aimed to mould the character of the pupils with a view to producing 'Christian 
gentlemen'. Dr Arnold was especially keen on contemporary German thinkers. He knew the great 
German historian, Barthold Niebuhr, who was a leading proponent of the new historicism. Indeed, 
Niebuhr visited Rugby school. Dr Arnold was educated at Winchester and Corpus Christi, 
Oxford. He became a Fellow of Oriel college, (1815-1816). Oriel had the reputation then of being 
the most intellectually distinguished of the Oxford colleges. Although he was ordained as a 
clergyman, Dr Arnold's chief interest was in the ethical content of Christianity and particularly in 
the teaching of Christian values. His ideas on education,( especially those which stressed 
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individual moral responsibility, contrasted significantly with those of John Henry Newman and 
the followers of the Oxford movement. 
Newman became a fellow of Oriel, six years after Arnold. As the leading figure of the Oxford 
Movement, Newman sought to restore the intellectual and spiritual authority of the Church. 
Eventually he would convert to Catholicism. Even a superficial glance at the two thinkers 
suggests the opposing forces and tendencies that have shaped much of English educational 
thinking. For instance, the whole story English Education politics in the eighteen-thirties and 
forties might be told as the story of the struggle of the Anglicans for control over state education. 
This development is quite different in character from the stories of French and Gennan education 
provision. Gennan ideas appeared powerfully in Cambridge before they did at Oxford. While 
Oxford was in the middle of the Anglo-Catholic revival, the Cambridge Apostles, particularly at 
Trinity College, were reading Niebuhr, Savigny and Vico. Oxford turned towards Gennan 
thinkers later, some time after the Oxford Movement had been defeated. Newman left Oxford in 
1845. As one of his contemporaries remarked, 'How different the fortunes of the Church of 
England might have been if Newman had been able to read Gennan'. (Momigliano, A. D. (1994) 
Studies on Modern Scholarship, Edited by G W Bowersock and T J Conrne11, with new 
translations by T J Cornell, Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.112). After the defeat 
of the Oxford movement, the leading disseminator of German ideas in Oxford was Mark 
Pattisson, a contemporary of Dr Arnold's son, Matthew Arnold. Pattison tried valiantly to 
introduce the Gennan idea of the university to Oxford. He made frequent visits to German 
universities and, as the head of a college, he frequently urged Oxford dons to study in Germany. 
Crucially, Pattison's conception of the University was much closer to Von Humboldt's vision than 
the one that Newman outlined in his famous lecture series of 1852, The Idea of the University. 
But Pattison's attempts to introduce the Gennan idea of the university at Oxford met with 
stubborn resistance. (See Sparrow, J. (1967) Mark Pattison and the Idea of the University, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
A key issue in 1 debates about the curriculum was the so-called 'non-purposive' (anti-utilitarian) 
character of liberal education. Essentially, this refers to the notion that education should be more 
than a preparation for a particular station in life. Herder and von Humboldt had made similar 
arguments. Contributors to the national education debate such as Whewell, Faraday, Farrar and 
Jowett supported liberalisation of the curriculum. The debate over liberal education took place 
against the backdrop of the perceived crisis in Christian faith which dominated the nineteenth-
century intellectual landscape. At stake was the structure of higher education. There was a general 
feeling that the existing curriculum was too narrow, and that it needed to be broadened in a liberal 
fashion. What happened in the universities determined what happened lower down in the system. 
The grammar school syllabus was shaped by the university entrance examinations, and the 
grammar school syllabus in turn affected the elementary schools. However, there was no coherent 
system of progression as there was in Germany, largely due to von Humboldts vision. Yet the 
State was showing its interest in continental educational ideas by setting up a series of 
commissions. Pattison and Arnold were sent to look at European schools by the Newcastle 
Commission (1859). In 1859 Pattison was appointed as an Inspector by the Education Committee 
of the Privy Council to report on elementary education in Prussia. In the same year, Matthew 
Arnold was sent to France (and later to Gennany, Switzerland and Italy) to report on schooling 
there. Early on, resistance to change in the universities came from the professors. Pattison sought 
to increase the influence of the tutors, believing that they were the potential scholars along the 
lines of German researchers. Later, however, when he realised that the Commission had 
encouraged tutors and students to put too much emphasis on examinations, he aimed to reverse 
the trend by championing the professors against the tutors in the name of liberal culture - German 
Kultur, that is. Thus, implicitly, he invoked the Bildungs ideal. Matthew Arnold also invoked it. 
His conception of 'culture' was heavily indebted to Herder, especially his conception of Zeiten 
fortgang - 'time progress' in which the human cultural tradition is constantly growing to fullness 
and being made available to the individual. Arnold resisted - indeed, deprecated, the 
utilitarianism that was associated with the dissenting tradition. 
And thus German ideas had a shaping influence on the development of English studies. It would 
be quite wrong, however, to suggest that German ideas were assimilated into English intellectual 
circles in an unproblematic way. To see what was problematic, we have to appreciate the 
120 
significance of Pattison's break with the Oxford movement. Earlier, he had turned away from 
researching in the lives of the Saints along the lines that Newman had advocated. Instead he 
concentrated on English literary texts (Milton and Pope) as well as intellectual history. Pattison's 
vision of the university, like von Humboldt's, was primarily a secular one. Indeed, Pattison was in 
close touch with German scholarship. He befriended two German thinkers, who were in England 
at the time, Chevalier Bunsen, and the Jewish scholar, Jacob Bernays. Bernays had developed 
highly sophisticated methods for studying Classical history, and it might easily be assumed that 
Bernays' scholarship represented the advanced German philological research. However, Bunsen 
and Berneys' methods were not typical of German philological scholarship generally, though 
Pattison seems to have thought that they were. It is a commonplace that, for most of the 
nineteenth-century, German philology was far superior to English lingiuistic scholarship. German 
philology more or less defined the field. The Philological Society of London (1842), unlike its 
German counterparts, lacked an institutional base in the universities. At Cambridge, the Apostles -
Trinity College was especially strongly represented - supplied powerful contributors to the liberal 
education debate. Many of them were passionately interested in the English language. At Trinity, 
students read Niebuhr and Savigny and they immersed themselves in German Kultur. As 
Momigliano (1994) has put it, 'They traveled in Germany, they read its literature and - unusually 
- they mastered its language. ' 
During the time when state education systems were being established in France and Germany, 
there were strong currents of opposition to continental ideas in England. This opposition reflected 
the climate of reaction to the French Revolution. The climate changed, of course, and by the 
middle of the nineteenth-century, German ideas began to influence education reform. However, 
largely as a consequence of the climate of resistance to radical social ideas, the English public 
school notion of 'building' or 'training' character remained chiefly concerned with 'cultivating' 
individual sensibility and fostering Christian moral values as a preparation for leadership. This 
was not primarily an aesthetic education. The English public schools concentrated above all on 
producing 'English Christian gentlemen'. For a full discussion of the English notion of 
'gentlemanly education', see George C. Brauer Jr. (1959) The Education of a Gentleman: 
Theories of Gentlemanly Education in England, 1660 -1775, New York, Bookman Associates. 
One of the issues that Brauer touches on is the English upper class's 'deep-rooted' anti-
intellectualism. Evidently there was no shortage of writers on the theme of an appropriate 
curriculum for gentlemen in the eighteenth century, and Brauer gives an outline of the curriculum 
followed through private tuition as well as in the public schools. The emphasis was upon the 
classics. 'An ability to write English correctly and elegantly and an appreciation for English 
literature were apparently sometimes neglected' (Brauer, (1959) p.75). Interestingly, history was 
chiefly valued for its 'moral examples'. The concentration in English public schools was on 
shaping the individual conscience - an amalgam of Christian values and good manners rather than 
upon intellectual attainments. And thus, the English notion of education as the 'shaping' of 
character' - educating the 'whole' person - was also part and parcel of the business of 
reproducing an elite social elite. The Bildungs ideal by contrast had the weight of Kant's 
philosophy of moral development behind it, and the notion that the purpose of human existrnce -
the guiding thread of world history - was to achieve moral maturity. 
8 Cited by Peter Menck in 'Didactics as the Construction of Content' in Learners and Pedagogy, 
edited by Jenny Leach and Bob Moon, London: Open University Press in association with paul 
Chapman Publishing, 1999, p. 116. 
9 For a brief sophisticated discussion of the Bildungs ideal see Lichtheim, George, (1970) 
Lukacs, Collins, London pp.74-75. Lichtheim has described Bildung as 'untranslatable'. He 
claims that 'Bildung does not signify 'education', but rather something like intellectual and moral 
maturation'. For the thinkers that I am discussing, chiefly, Kant, Herder and von Humboldt, the 
nature of history was a central problem. German idealists held out a picture of history as 
something that unfolded teleologically according to a guiding principle. For Kant that guiding 
principle was the rational progress towards moral maturity. For Herder history was driven by 
quasi-biological creative 'life-forces' striving for perfection. And von Humboldt thought that it 
was possible to discover the fundamental principle of world history - the guiding thread - by 
studying Language. In the background of my discussion is the view of history that Marx 
developed. Marx wrote in critique of the idealist tradition, of course, especially Kant's 
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'moralism'. Dialectical materialism opposes the (Hegelian) notion that history is guided by an 
abstract or absolute spirit that cannot be grasped in its totality from within the currents of 
historical change. For Marx, 'the fIrst historical act is ... the production of material life itself.' 
(Karl Marx, German Ideology, 1845-6) On this view, history is not itself a force or a principle. 
Rather, says Marx, 'It is men, real, living men who do all this, who posee things and fIght battles. 
It is not history, which uses men as a means of achieving - as if it were an individual person - its 
own ends. History is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends.' (Karl Marx, Die 
Heilige Familie: quotations from T B Bottomore and Maxemilien Reubel, (1963) Karl Marx: 
Selected writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, Penguin Books, Harmonsworth). 
10 Peter Menck, 1999, p. 116. 
8 See Habermas, J. (1992) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Enquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger with assistance by Frederick 
Lawrence, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
12 The idea that languages reflect national mentalities was prefIgured in the writings of Locke and 
Condillac. However, it was developed substantially by German thinkers, especially Herder and 
von Humboldt in the context of the German quest for origins. Interestingly, this is a point that 
Raymond Williams discusses in Marxism and Literature (Williams, 1977, p.31). 
\3 As Lukacs puts it, 'For everything that was produced in the small German courts in the way of 
culture and particularly the in the way of pseudo culture was nothing more than the slavish 
imitation of the Fench and a hindrance to the development ofa culture stemming from the needs 
of a German middle-class life. The German form of the Enlightenment engages in sharp polemic 
with this French culture; and it preserves this note of revolutionary patriotism even where the real 
content of the ideological battle is simply the conflict between different stages in the development 
of the Enlightenment ... ' ( Lukacs, Georg (1968) Goethe and his Age, London: Merlin Press, p. 
14). 
14French inheritors of the Cartesian tradition, analysed society atomistically. That is to say, they 
aimed to break society down into its constituent parts with a view to reconstructing it along 
rational lines. More often than not, along with such aims went an'atomistic' picture of Man. But 
such a picture was not welcomed everywhere. To many German thinkers of the Storm and Stress 
decade (1770s) they appeared too fragmented, too lifeless, too incomplete and, above all, too 
narrowly rationalistic. By contrast, German thinkers sought to construct a contrasting picture of 
Man as a 'unifIed totality' in which the sum was greater than the parts. They were the inheritors of 
Leibniz. Yet, paradoxically, Germans like Herder were also hugely indebted to the very 
constellations of French ideas they were criticising. Indeed, this tendency is nowhere more 
evident than in Herder's critique ofCondillac's account of the origin oflanguage. 
15 Such projects rely on recovering what has been lost. As Vygotsky once remarked about the 
great Russian novelist, 'According to Tolstoy our ideal is not ahead of us but behind us'. The 
inference is that the real challenge is not to 'restore' humanity but to master and develop it for the 
future. See, Vygotsky, L. S. (1994) 'The Socialist Alteration of Man' fIrst published in 1930, in 
The Vygotsky Reader, edited by Rene van der Veer and Jan Valsiner, Blackwell, Oxford, p.179. 
16 When the philosophes looked at the foundations of the Ancien Regime, of course, they were 
implicitly questioning contemporary political arrangements. Additionally, they were seeking 
alternative principles for government. Ancient history was crucially important to their project. 
The evocation of Republican Rome furnished them with a legitimising backdrop for their political 
activities. And this was a matter of both style and substance, where ancient history was somehow 
'there' for those seeking to make political use of it. Yet the notion of deriving principles and 
values from ancient civilizations presented thinkers with a bewildering array of philosophical 
problems. French attempts to derive values from the past, (from classical Greece and Rome) set in 
motion protracted debates around the historicity of ethical and political standards. Such debates 
engendered various forms of relativism. Intriguingly, in the hazardous climate of punitive 
censorship, the terms of these debates and discussions were set, not by political circles, but by 
'quarrels' in the (safer) domain of aesthetics. La querelle des anciens et des modernes raised 
fundamental issues about the historicity of aesthetic values and standards. 
17 By contrast, the great classical historian, Niebhur, supported the emancipation of the peasants 
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in Prussia. However, he insisted that the Romans had never used agrarian law to undermine the 
principle of private property. 
18 The establishment of the Louvre as a national collection of art treasures immediately after the 
French Revolution foreshadowed the setting up of the 'patron' state. It was symbolically and 
strategically important that what had been fonnerly a Royal collection became a common national 
patrimony. The establishment of a national collection made concrete the notion of a sovereign 
people, who shared not only the collection, but also a common identity. Moreover, the idea of a 
collective past, concretised by the national patrimony, implied a collective future. Additionally, 
after 1789, the French nation defIned itself chiefly in terms of Revolutionary and Republican 
ideology, rather than in terms oflanguage, religion or ethnic origins. Interestingly, such a political 
defInition of national membership was in some ways a continuation of the notion of a political 
unity that already existed for the Ancien Regime, which was generally cosmopolitan in its outlook. 
19 Brubaker, Rogers (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
2°Although the conception ofa national standard language that emerged in post-revolutionary 
France was essentially a progressive one in so far as it helped to broaden participation in political 
processes, paradoxically, its origins lay in the old order. The establishment of French as the 
language of the 'people' actually continued policies of the Ancien Regime through the agency of 
some of its most powerful institutions, especially the Academie Franr;aise. Such institutional 
arrangements belonged to the French tradition of centralised political decision-making - the 
dirigisme that was a defIning feature of absolutist monarchy. 
The French Revolution established a coherent, free education system. Popular education existed 
under the Ancien Regime, but it was only with the Third Republic that conditions were established 
that made public education viable - facilities, roads and a sense of meaningfulness. See especially 
Weber, Eugene (1979) Peasants into Frenchmen: The Moderniszation of Rural France, 1870-
1914, London, Chatto and Windus. 
21 This phrase comes from an excellent discussion of von Humboldt's reservations about the 
likelihood of the French Revolution succeeding, when he visited Paris in 1789. The point the 
writer makes is that von Humboldt's reservations were not the same as Edmund Burke's 
conservative reaction to events in Paris. (Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1791). 
Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt,(1989) 'The Abstractness of Reason and the Real Life of ofIndividuals 
and Institutions: Humboldt's Educational Politics and the French revolution' ,in The French 
revolution and the Age of Goethe, edited by Gerhart Hoffmeister, Santa Barbara CA Gerg Olm 
Verlag, 1989, p.160. 
22Gennans pictured themselves representing a fragmented people struggling to resist French 
cultural hegemony on the one hand, while attempting to forge a collective Gennan identity - a 
national 'spirit' - on the other. In these diffIcult circumstances they attributed intense signifIcance 
to the historical nature of the national culture - its language, literature, myths, folklore judiciary, 
local habits, customs, religious traditions and (fatally) so-called 'racial characteristics'. For such 
thinkers, Gennan nationhood meant, above all, belonging to a community that shared a 
historically developed culture. 
The Gennan notion of the self-cultivation of national citizens through contact with historically 
evolved languages, customs and settled ways of doing and valuing things issued in a distinctive 
picture of national identity that contrasts strikingly with the one that emerged in France. As a 
consequence of this, there is an telling distinction to be made between the French post-
revolutionary conception of the 'political' state, with its rational legal frameworks and its 
constitutions, and the Gennan picture of the 'cultural' state, where nationality was given a 
markedly cultural, linguistic and ethnic basis. A sense of belonging to the national collective has 
been fundamental for the development of the modem, secular sense of nationhood during periods 
of rapid economic and social change. Such a sense was not confIned to Gennany, but emerged 
elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, nineteenth-century European nationalism has actually been defIned 
as 'a modem fonn of collective identity' (Habennas, J. (1992) pp.252-256). Plainly, in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries a sense of belonging to a collective - a people or a nation-
satisfIed a felt need for new forms of identifIcation when old forms were being dismantled or 
destroyed by emergent economic and societal forces. A new conception of nationhood evolved as 
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a mode of self-understanding, especially in Prussia. Military defeat and national humiliation made 
Prussia the main focus for National renewal after the Wars of Liberation. In Berlin, the sense of 
nationhood (defmed as 'a shared way oflife' that has been forged out of common past) permeated 
and energised the scholarly quest for national origins. Out of just this quest historical comparative 
language studies emerged. 
23 There are complicated reasons why this was so, that go back to German religious traditions: to 
Lutheran doctrine, to the Protestant Reformation and to the dynamics of German Pietism. At the 
heart of such religious traditions lies the drama of the soul's progress towards salvation. With 
German Protestantism it was never enough to act well: actions have to come from the right 
motives. (Thus, for Kant a moral action is one that goes against one's natural inclinations - even 
when the inclination is to act for the good). In the Protestant tradition conscience must always be 
open to inspection and rigorous self-examination, as a kind of spiritual book keeping. Essentially, 
Lutheran Protestants believe that individuals are responsible for the care of their own souls. No 
individual or institution, no mass or confessional, can intercede on another's behalf. 
24 Kant I Immanuel (1983) Speculative Beginning of Human History, fIrst published in 1786, in 
Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals, translated from the German 
by Ted Humphrey, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, p53. 
25 The notion of 'personal growth', which has provided a rationale for post-war English studies, 
derives from broadly similar intellectual sources, especially with certain conceptions of 
development that emerged largely in the eighteenth-century. The entry of German theory into 
British literaryl theory has been described at length by M. H. Abrams in his classic study in the 
history of Romantic ideas, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical 
Tradition, New York Norton, 1958. Abrams describes the shift from France to Germany as the 
chief 'exporter' of continental theory around the turn of the eighteenth century. However, an 
adequate account of the shaping influence of such ideas on British education theory is beyond the 
scope of this study. For a seminal account of English as 'personal growth', see Dixon, John 
(1972) Growth Through English: Report based on the Dartmouth Seminar, 1966, London, 
Reading and Fakenham, Cox and Wyman for N.A.T. E. 
26 Cited in Rousseau, J.J. (1991), Emile or On Education, introduction, translation and notes by 
Allan Bloom, ,Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, p.3. 
27Rousseau. J. (1991) p3. 
28 Kant, 1. (1963) p.4. 
29 Kant, 1. (1963) p.50. 
30 Kant, 1. (1963) p.52. By 'top' Kant means the mind, or reason. 
31 Kant looked to uncover the conditions under which things can be said to be necessarily, not 
merely contingently true. Thus he bracketed out actual contexts and 'real' settings because he 
wanted to isolate and abstract the logical conditions, under which something can be said to be 
true, free from all local, empirical circumstances. He was interested in logical 'conditions of 
possibility' of knowledge, rather than the empirical contents of knowledge as such. Kant's 
synthetic a priori demarcates what must be taken as 'given' - that is, what cannot be investigated 
further by strictly rational methods of enquiry. Of course, this does not rule out further lines of 
empirical investigation. Rather, the synthetic a priori indicates the limits and boundaries of purely 
logical inquiry. It speaks of the conditions of possibility for what we can rationally claim to know, 
a form of inquiry best represented by Kant's famous question: 'How is mathematics possible?' 
We should not infer from his rational approach to knowledge that Kant was unaware of, or 
indifferent to, concrete realities. Rather, he was concerned with systematically clarifying the limits 
of secure knowledge. For Kant, the 'person-who-knows' - the 'transcendental knowing subject'- is 
a rational construct, and as such it constitutes a 'disembodied' abstraction because of the nature of 
Kant's philosophical task. He was seeking the transcendental foundations of knowledge. As one 
contemporary philosopher puts it, as with Descartes, often, the 'I' that appears in the text does not 
specifically represent the writer, it marks the position of the thinker - 'the I who is having the 
thoughts may be yourself.' (Williams, B. (1986) 'Introduction' to Rene Descartes, Meditations on 
First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies, edited by John Cottingham, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. vii.). 
32 How can an education that aims to free men from 'self-incurred tutelage' be put in place by the 
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state? Simply, how can state institutions (like schooling, for instance), hope to foster autonomous 
self-development? Doesn't the so-called 'patron state' perpetuate immaturity? Are the interests of 
the individual and the state the same? Obviously they are not, least ways, not for much of the 
time. Besides, compulsory state schooling necessarily entails some degree of coercion (in the 
sense that if something is compulsory then, by defInition, freedom to choose has been removed), 
so when is coercion 'legitimate'? Does the state have a legitimate right to 'improve' and 
'enlighten' its citizenry, in the way that Robespierre assumed it did? It might be judged to have 
such a right if it could be shown that it was acting in accordance with a higher principle, for 
instance reason, progress or the telos of human history. 
33 See Lichtheim, G (1970) Lukilcs, London: Fontana Collins, , p.43. 
34 People's outlooks cannot be easily separated from the ways that they represent and imagine the 
world, to themselves and for others. (Such a view issues powerfully from the picture oflanguage 
held by Hamann, but it goes back at least as far as Locke.) If we accept this picture of the 
'always-embodied' subject - that is, a flesh and blood person in time and place rather than an 
abstraction - we have to concede at some point that peoples' world-views change over time and 
that they alter from context to context. It follows, then, that what an individual or, indeed an entire 
people may claim to know, what they identify as a standard of behaviour, or what they believe to 
be true at a given moment is contingently, not necessarily true. It cannot be known with absolute 
certainty because the circumstances change. And this, of course, appears to defeat Kant's aim, 
which was to provide a secure, rational foundation for knowledge. Fichte tried to fmd a solution 
to just this problem by developing a distinction (which was already there in Kant's work) between 
the empirical subject and the transcendental subject, in other words, between the embodied 
individual of flesh and blood thinking person and the rational abstraction of 'the person who 
thinks'. But he was unable to fmd a satisfactory solution. He treated thought and concrete reality 
as integral elements of a whole structure. That is, he did not treat them, as Kant had done, as 
logically separate - subject and object. From Hegel's perspective, Kant tells only half the story. 
He offers a theory of consciousness that dwells on the problem of how objects appear to subjects: 
their phenomenal existence. But he never gets beyond the 'thing in mind' to the noumenon, the 
'thing in itself'. Hegel formulated his theory of the subject in The Phenomenology o/Spirit 
(1806). 
Interestingly, the Phenomenology 0/ Spirit, became a focus for idiosyncratic (and influential) 
interpretations of Hegel's thought in Paris in the thirties. (See, Kojeve, Alexandre,(1969) 
Introduction to the reading o/Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology o/spirit, assembled by 
Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, translated from the French by James H Nichols, Jr. 
first published in French under the title Introduction a la Lecture de Hegel, Paris, 1947, Basic 
Books, Inc. New York. These interpretations were seminal for many French post-structuralist 
accounts of subjectivity, as well as for critiques of Reason and the Enlightenment. What is 
particularly striking about the interpretations of Hegel in Paris in the thirties was the extraordinary 
concentration on the master-slave dialectic in which identities are forged out of a life-or-death 
struggle for domination that is the human condition. Between 1933 and 1939 Alexander Kojeve, a 
Russian exile in Paris, gave a series of lectures at the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes on 
Hegel's Phenomenologie des Geistes. Kojeve's reading (some might say 'reinvention' ) of 
Hegel's text concentrates on the master slave relationship in which each comes to know himself 
through the activity and recognition of the other. Only the violent overthrow of the master's 
oppression brings self-understanding to the slave. On Kojeve's reading, the master-slave relation 
becomes a paradigm for human existence. Essentially, he combined his version of Hegel with 
insights from Heidegger and Marx in which violence emerges as a 'concommitant of reason' . See, 
Judt, Tony, (1994) Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956, University of California 
Press, Berkley; Kelly, Michael (1992) Hegel in France, Birmingham Modem Languages 
Publications, Birmingham; Niethammer, Lutz,(1992) Posthistoire: Has History Come to an 
End?translated from the German original by Patrick Carniller, London: Verso, Those attending 
the lecture included Raymond Aron, Merleau-Ponty, Jaques Lacan, Georges Bataille, Raymond 
Queneau, Andre Breton, Alexandre Koyre and Hannah Arendt. The influence ofKojeve's lectures 
on the post-war generation of French thinkers (especially post-structuralists) has been very 
considerable. However, the picture of German philosophy - particularly Hegel - that has emerged 
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is actually a somewhat distorted one. 
In The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel argues there that the structures that are constitutive of 
consciousness enter all forms of human life. Elsewhere, too, he proposes that spirit (Geist) is the 
guiding principle by which all individuals and peoples (especially nations) actively constitute 
themselves. He puts it like this: 
The very essence of spirit is activity; it realises its own potentiality - makes itself its own 
deed; its own work - and thus it becomes an object to itself; contemplates itself as an 
objective existence. Thus it is with the Spirit of a people; it is a Spirit having strictly 
defmed characteristics, which erects itself into an objective world, that exists and persists 
in a particular religious form of worship, customs, constitution and political laws -in the 
whole complex of its institutions - in the events and transactions that make up its history. 
That is its work - that is what this particular nation is. Nations are what their deeds are. 
(Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 1832) 
For Hegel, spirit (Geist), is (dialectically) both what is prefigured and what is self-determined. 
Crucially, spirit is a form of self-productive activity shared among individuals and nations alike. 
Moreover, it is essentially an expressive process whereby what was previously internalised by 
subjects is subsequently externalised through human action. 
Habermas, has posed the problem like this: 'In Kantian philosophy the individuated ego falls 
through the cracks, as it were, between the transcendental ego, which stands over and against the 
world as a whole, and the empirical ego, which fmds itself already in the world as one among 
many. (Habermas, J. (1995) Postmetaphysical Thinking, translated from the German by William 
Hihengarten, Cambridge Polity Press, p.158). 
36 See Habermas, Jiirgen (1994) The Past as Future, interviews with Michael Haller, translated 
and edited by Max Pensky, with Foreword by Peter Hohendahl, Cambridge: Polity Press, , 
pp.l03-104. 
37 Cassirer, has claimed that, 'Goethe completed the transformation from the previous generic 
view to the modern genetic view of organic nature' .. See Cassirer, Ernst (Rousseau, Kant, Goethe 
, translated from the German by James Guttmann, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman 
Randall, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 69. 
38 See especially, Glass, B., Temkin, Owsei and Straus, William, L (1968) The Forerunners of 
Darwin, 1745-1859, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. This collection of essays concentrates on 
views of the evolutionary nature of the species that were held by eighteenth century authors such 
as Maupertuis, Buffon, Diderot, Kant, Herder, and Lamark. 
39 The theory of preformation went unchallenged until a path-breaking account of developmental 
patterns in chicken embryos appeared in 1759, when Caspar Friedrich Wolff published his 
seminal treatise, Theoria generationis. He followed it quickly with the publication of a study of 
the formation of the animal intestines. These two studies established the biological fact that the 
growth of separate organs in animals follows their own growth patterns. Crucially, Wolff 
demonstrated that animal organs are not there in miniature form at conception waiting to get 
bigger. Additionally, he insisted that changes to organs need to be described independently of one 
another, since their developmental paths differed significantly over time. Thus, a new picture 
emerged of organic transformations along separate paths that were related to the overall 
development of the larger organism. The development of the larger organism is never reducible to 
its separate parts. Thus, the theory of preformation was superseded by the theory of 'growth along 
separate paths' a process that was called epigenesis. 
40 This move issued in a theory of 'biogenetic parallelism' the central premise of which is that 
ontegeny recapitulates phylogeny. 
41 Such a picture contained damaging implications, however. Unfortunately, the notion of the 
passage from lower to higher life-forms implied ranking them according to their various stages of 
development. Thus, the notion of stages of human development fostered potentially racist notions 
of 'primitive' peoples, and what is more it appeared to give such notions a 'scientific' basis. 
42Temkin, O. (1950) 
43Temkin, O. (1950) p. 224. 
44 Notions about the special role oflanguage and literature in the development of national citizens 
of the kind that circulated in Germany around the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
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were not especially new. Nor were they especially German. To give one important instance of an 
earlier formulation, the Neapolitan thinker, Gianbattista Vico, believed that language and 
literature were centrally part of education. He also believed that that training in rational analysis 
on its own would never produce the 'good' citizen. Simply, 'intellect' could not provide guidance 
in those areas ofhurnan experience that are most important to us, especially those that require 
keen ethical sense. Moral judgements, he believed, depend on the formation of character, a 
combination of common sense, imagination and (surprisingly, perhaps), memory. And, crucially, 
for Vico a moral education meant learning the languages, traditions and exemplary ideals of past 
civilizations. 
Herder's views about the importance of an education in languages and literatures were broadly 
similar to Vico's. But significantly, they were articulated in different historical circumstances. 
Herder stood at the threshold of German national cultural reconstruction. Germany was really no 
more than a patchwork of principalities with small courts, each struggling to 'imagine' its own 
coherence in relation to the others. (Anderson, Benedict, (1983) Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso,). 
The German nation was barely more than an idea, a folk memory, as it were, of the Carolingian 
Empire. In the aftermath to the French military occupation of Berlin and the Wars of Liberation, 
as we noted earlier, German intellectuals strove to reconstruct a 'shared national past', to revive 
their folk customs and traditions and to establish a common standard language as the language of 
education and government. Indeed, the German nation state made its emergence at a point 
somewhere between past and future glories and present crisis.(see Gumbrecht, H. U.(1986 ) 'Un 
Souffle d' Allemagne ayant passe: Friedrich Diez, Gaston Paris, and the Genesis of National 
Philologies, Romance Philology, 15: 1. 
45 Bruford, W. H. (1962) Culture and Society in Classical Weimar, Cambridge University Press 
46 Bruford, W. H. (1962) p.315. 
47 Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt,' (1989) The Abstractness of Reason and the Real Life of ofIndividuals 
and Institutions: Humboldt's Educational Politics and the French revolution',in The French 
revolution and the Age of Goethe, edited by Gerhart Hoffmeister, Santa Barbara CA Gerg Olm 
Verlag, 1989 p. 159-179. 
48 Later, the notion that diversity is necessary for human development was taken up and 
incorporated into liberal educational ideology generally in the rest of Europe. 
49 Marchand, Suzanne L. (1996) Downfrom Olympus: Archeology and Philhellenism in 
Germany, 1750-1970, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.27. 
50 Albertone, M. (1984) 'Enlightenment and Revolution: The Evolution ofCondorcet's Ideas on 
Education' in Condorcet Studies, edited by Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, Atlantic Heights, New 
Jersey: Humanities Press, p. 131. 
51 Stewart, J. H. (1951) A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, New York, p.350. 
52 It is interesting both to compare and contrast Soviet attempts to create a new 'Man' - hommo 
Sovieticus 
53Cited in Forsyth, M. (1987) Reason and Revolution: The Political thought of the Abbe Sieyes, 
Leicester, Leicester University Press, . 
54 Forsyth, M. (1987) p204. 
55 Sieyes influenced Karl Marx, who was especially interested in the Abe's treatise on the Third 
Estate. For a balanced, comprehensive account ofSieyes' position in the history of political 
thought, see the concluding chapter of Forsyth, M (1987). 
56 Forsyth, M (1987), p.218. 
57 For an account of von Humboldt's time in Paris during the 1790s and for a description of the 
Kant seminar see Sweet, P. (1978 ) Wilhelm von Humboldt: A Biography, Ohio State University 
Press, Columbus, p.220. 
58 Sweet, P. (1978) p.221. 
59 There has been a fierce, protracted debate among historiographers of language studies about 
von Humboldt's indebtedness to Condillac. Hans Aarsleffhas claimed that von Humboldt's debt 
to the French thinkers was substantial. In making this claim Aarsleffhas consciously challenged 
orthodox (nationalistic and conservative) nineteenth-century German claims about von 
Humboldt's originality. Chiefly, Aarsleffwants to restore Condillac's reputation as a major 
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thinker among contemporary linguists and historians of ideas. Thus he has contested what he sees 
as the overestimation of the originality of nineteenth-century German philologists and linguists at 
the expense of their French antecedents. Moreover, the links between Condillac's ideas and 
Republican politics as well as philosophical materialism have damaged his reputation in France. 
Cassirer, in rediscovering Herder and von Humboldt in the dangerous climate of German cultural 
nationalism in the twenties and thirties, overlooked the Germans' debt to Condillac. Aarsleff is 
quite correct when he suggests that Cassirer carried forward uncritically the conservative picture 
of von Humboldt's achievements - what he calls a 'moth-balled' picture of Von Humboldt's ideas 
- that he inherited from his nineteenth century German biographers. 
Recently, however, Ulrich Ricken.(1994) has broadened the discussion profitably by setting the 
Condillac legacy against the backdrop of the French Enlightenment. The chief inheritors of the 
Enlightenment, the ideologues' debt to Condillac is foregrounded. For Ricken, 'Like Condillac, 
Destutt de Tracy (the chief thinker of the group) saw in 'sensations' the single source ofhurnan 
knowledge. (Ricken, 1994 p.208) Ricken also discusses Von Humboldt's indebtedness to the 
French thinkers, and particularly his indebtedness to Condillac's 'sensualistic' philosophy 
(Ricken, 1994, pp.2l8-2l9). Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, however, argues persuasively that von 
Humboldt's primary indebtedness was to Kant. It is plain too that von Humboldt read Condillac 
extensively, and as a consequence of his discussions with the idealogues about the nature and 
purposes oflanguage, he was influenced to devote his energies to the study oflanguage, Mueller-
Vollmer (Mueller-Vollmer, K. (1989)) also stresses the importance of von Humboldt's interest in 
radical proposals for education and his critical evaluation of the French plans. (He thought such 
plans unworkable). Elsewhere, Mueller-Vollmer (Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt, (1989a) 'Thinking and 
Speaking: Herder, Humboldt and Saussurean Semiotics: A Translation and Commentary on 
Wilhelm von Humboldt's Sixteen Theses on Language', in Comparative Criticism, edited by E.S. 
Schaffer, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 193-2l4)gives a painstaking, subtle account of von Humboldt's 
indebtedness to Kantian philosophy which shaped his linguistic theories. Von Humboldt's 
practical interest in establishing an education system coupled with his idealist radicalism invite a 
fresh reappraisal of orthodox accounts of the von Humbolt legacy. 
On a different point, there are some intriguing parallels to be drawn between the debates that 
went on around the turn of the nineteenth century and contemporary debates surrounding 
Habermas' critique of post structuralist thinkers - the so-called 'neo-conservatives' - and the 
theorists ofPost-modemtity. It is therefore especially intesresting to note in particular Habermas' 
tracing the roots of contemporary so-called 'critical theory' back to German idealism. 
60 Mueller-Vollmer, K. (1989) p. 164. 
61 Cited in Mueller-Vollmer, K. (1989) p.l66. 
62 See Hall, Stuart ( ) 'The Hinterland of Science: ideology and the 'Sociology of Knowledge , 
in Ideology, au Press. 
63 For a full account of the Tracy's educational work see Kennedy, E (1978) Destutt de Tracy 
and the Origins of Ideology, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. 
64 See for example, Hofstetter, M. J. (2001) The Romantic Idea of the University: England and 
Germany, 1770-1850, Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
65 Aarsleff, H. (1982) p.293. 
66 For a full length discussion of this issue see Lyotard, F. (1986) The Post Modern Condition: a 
Report on Knowledge, translated from the French by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, with 
a Foreword by Fredrick Jameson, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp31-34. 
67 Marchand, Suzanne L. (1996) Downfrom Olympus: Archaeology and Ph ilh ellen ism in 
Germany, 1750-1970, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp.28-29. 
68 See Marchand, S. L. (1996). 
69 Marchand, S. L. (1996) p.25. 
70 Marchand, S. L. (1996) p.30. 
71 Bruford, W. H. (1975) p.ll. 
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Chapter 4 
The Nineteenth-Century Legacy: The Role of Signs in the 
Development of the Higher Mental Functions 
The psychophysics of Fechner and Wundt sets out on its journey with 
proud sails, trustful in the newly discovered methodology of 
experimentation with impressions and expressions. But today the sea has 
become calm around them. The results of the investigations on pulse and 
breathing by experimenters in Wundt's laboratory are commonly 
rejected .. and it is precisely with this ... that Wundt's theory of expression 
begins. Why should we concern ourselves seriously with something that 
causes the reader to shake his head after the first few pages and which 
offers no new insights? 
Karl BUhler, 1933 1 
The problem of the origins of the higher mental functions dominated psychology 
in the late nineteenth century in much the same way that the problem of the 
origins of language had dominated language studies in the eighteenth. For many 
socio-cultural psychologists nowadays the two problems are closely linked. 
However, the nature of such a link first began to be explored systematically in the 
eighteen eighties from the perspectives of 'cultural' psychology in the research 
programme that Wilhelm Wundt established at Leipzig. Today, Wundt's project 
is largely forgotten, yet it has continuing relevance for the way that it holds out a 
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picture of the role of culturally evolved signs in the development of the 'higher 
mental functions' . 
Contemporary socio-cultural psychology stems chiefly from the theoretical 
perspectives that Lev Vygotsky established with colleagues in the Soviet Union 
in twenties and thirties. The breathtaking scale of Vygoysky's project has become 
clear from the large and expanding literature that has appeared in recent years. 
Indeed, this literature has been hugely added to since the mid-eighties by 
translated work previously unavailable in the West? But discussions of 
Vygotsky's ideas often take for granted knowledge of the history of European 
psychology on the part of the reader. Consequently, the rich, though in some 
ways problematic nature of the nineteenth-century legacy has been insufficiently 
appreciated. 
Wundt dominated German psychology in the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century in a way that no other psychologist had done before. His lectures at 
Leipzig attracted huge international audiences. Indeed, the research laboratory 
that he established there for experimental psychology became the model for the 
rest of the world.3 But Wundt's reputation as the world's foremost psychologist 
declined steeply at the start of the twentieth century. When Vygotsky mentions 
Wundt, it is often in a critical vein. Thus the Soviet psychologist characterises 
Wundt's work as an example of the 'naiVe empiricism' typical of the 'old 
idealism'. However, to grasp why Wundt's reputation declined so steeply we 
have to appreciate not so much the force of the Soviet critique of Western 
psychology as a combination of several factors that changed the face of 
psychological research. Chiefly among these factors was the impact of the work 
of another seminal thinker, Wundt's contemporary and the founding figure of 
modem phenomenology, Franz Brentano. 
Brentano clarified the philosophical foundations of modem psychology in a way 
that Wundt was unable to do. As a philosopher, he sought to break with German 
idealism, which he considered irredeemably decadent. What is more he aimed to 
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make psychology the foundation of philosophy in the future. From the standpoint 
of a revitalised interest in Aristotelian philosophy, he introduced a seminal 
distinction between what he called 'genetic' and 'descriptive' approaches to 
mind. Whereas 'genetic' psychology follows the methods of the natural sciences 
by tracing the 'causes' of mental events, he argued, 'descriptive' psychology' 
aims to provide 'phenomenological' accounts of mental acts from the perspective 
of the perceiving subject. On this view, 'descriptive' psychology affords a fine-
grained, rigorous, analysis of individual 'mental acts'. The importance of the 
distinction between 'mental contents' and 'mental acts' will become clear when 
we come to examine some of the chief differences between Wundt and Brentano. 
Nowadays, Wundt's work is rarely discussed beyond respectful references in 
undergraduate introductions to the field. 4 Yet Wundt was the founding figure of 
experimental psychology; he pioneered research into so-called 'cultural 
psychology' , and he broke new ground in the way in which he explored the 
problem of the higher mental functions' dependency on culturally evolved signs. 
Thus, in significant ways Wundt's project foreshadowed Soviet historical and 
socio-cultural psychology. But there is more. Historians of linguistic science have 
linked Wundt's name to those of W,lhelm von Humboldt and Heyman Steinthal 
when they have wanted to characterise key phases in the history of nineteenth 
century language studies. The complicated relations between two emergent 
domains, specialising psychology and linguistics, will be important in what 
follows.5 
In this chapter I shall be revisiting the history of early moves in cultural 
psychology. Partly, I want to get clear about the intellectual legacy that Vygotsky 
h 
inherited.6 But also I wan)[ecover fundamental perspectives with a view to 
enriching contem~rary discussions in education. My focus is the nineteenth-
century picture 0ttole of signs in the development of the higher mental 
functions. 
* * * 
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Wundt's cultural psychology straddled two disciplines, psychology and 
linguistics, at a moment when they were both seeking their institutional 
independence from the parent discipline, philosophy. The story of their gaining 
their independence cannot be told properly without appreciating the impact of the 
natural sciences on philosophy during the nineteenth-century. Essentially, the 
standing that philosophy had attained in the German Universities around the tum 
of the eighteenth-century was reduced as a consequence to the rise of the physical 
sciences in the nineteenth. And though German idealism remained the dominant 
philosophical tradition in the academy, the critical philosophy that Kant 
established in the late eighteenth-century was subsequently transformed into neo-
Kantianism chiefly in response to the rise of the natural sciences. Neo-Kantians 
read Kant primarily as an epistemologist. For the most part, they concentrated 
narrowly on theories of scientific and mathematical knowledge. Their aims were 
to re-establish the foundational status of philosophy in the universities and to put 
science in its place. 
Crucially, Wundt employed the 'normal' methods of the natural sciences because 
he wanted to distinguish 'scientific' psychology from speculative and 
metaphysical conceptions of mind. Similarly, contemporary linguists wanted to 
break with the 'old idealism' that underpinned historical and comparative 
approaches to language studies (philology) because they wanted to establish 
linguistics as a science in its own right. Thus, for instance, they aimed free 
language studies from the principles of individual psychology and expression. 
Western psychology has tended to concentrate on the individual. By contrast, 
Wundt claimed that the structures of the individual mind belong somehow to the 
larger culture. What is more, his stress on mind in relation to mediating signs, 
symbols and complex cultural environments ran counter to the assumptions of 
mainstream Western psychology just at the moment when the field was being 
defined. Wundt reached for cultural materials, such as folktales, customs and 
language - the stuff of 'ethnology', or anthropology - in order to tell the story of 
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human development, because he was convinced that the true nature of the higher 
mental functions could not be investigated adequately using experimental 
methods. This was a view that Vygotsky and his generation of psychologists 
explicitly challenged. To grasp why Wundt adopted this stance we shall have to 
look back to the project of psychophysics that preceded his own investigations. 
Wundt was clear that the higher mental functions could not be investigated 
adequately in the laboratory. By contrast, as I suggested a moment ago, a new 
generation of psychologists began to design experimental methods for 
researching into complex mental processes - the formation of concepts, memory 
and so on - in research centres such as those in Berlin, Wtirzburg and Moscow. 
Wundt was concerned with the basic elements or the contents of consciousness 
from the standpoint of their organisation into the higher mental functions. On his 
view, the structures of culturally evolved contents of consciousness held the key 
to understanding the organising principles of the higher mental functions. 
Subsequently, Vygotsky and his associates took a different approach when they 
began to investigate experimentally the way that concepts are developed with the 
aid of historically evolved psychological tools and artefacts from a 'genetic' 
perspective. Thus the Soviet psychologist wrote genetic-developmental accounts 
of the role of signs in higher mental functions. For Vygotsky, the appearance of 
new historical-psychological formations, along with the primitive strata of 
behaviour in the process of child's growing mastery of mental 'tools' and 
'symbols' (material culture), held the key to investigating the genesis of higher 
mental functions such as memory and imagination from the standpoint of 'acts' 
of consciousness. In this, Vygotsky benefited from work in psychology that was 
shaped by Brentano's philosophy. 
And yet, despite important differences between them, Wundt and Brentano were 
engaged in a common enterprise in so far as they aimed to study consciousness 
by employing the objective methods of normal science - observation, experiment 
and so on. To appreciate this, I shall have to backtrack to characterise the kind of 
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psychology that preceded their work. 
Discussions around the physical basis of mental life dominated psychology 
around the turn of the eighteenth century. The impetus for such approaches came 
largely from France. Subsequently, however, psycho-physiology emerged in 
Germany in the eighteen-fifties, when German physiologists set out to investigate 
the 'soul' or the 'psyche' using natural scientific methods.7 At the University of 
Leipzig, which already had a growing international reputation for medical 
research, Gustav Fechner set about the task of quantifying mental responses. He 
aimed to refute the view, handed down from Kant, that psychology could never 
become a science like physics because you can't measure mental phenomena in 
the way that you measure things in the natural world. Consequently, he tried to 
quantify the strength of mental responses linked to physical sensations.8 As a 
physiologist, he set out to prove mathematically the laws of relations between 
stimuli and sensations - what he called 'outer psycho-physics'. Thus he aimed to 
separate out the spiritual endowment of humanity -Fechner was a religious man 
- from the material determinations of consciousness. 
Crucially, Fechner assumed that it was possible to study the higher mental 
functions in the same manner as the lower ones. This was an assumption that 
Wundt implicitly rejected. Wundt argued against the notion that consciousness 
was reducible to physiological chains of causation. (In a similar way, he argued 
against the 'associationism' that was characteristic of British empiricism). 
Essentially, he refused to separate the processes of bodily life from the conscious 
processes. With hindsight, we can see that Fechner's experimental research was 
significant not so much for what it established but for what it set in motion.9 As a 
consequence of Fechner's pioneering work there, Leipzig, which will be hugely 
important in the next part of our story, emerged as a major centre of psycho-
physiological research. And it is to Wundt's work at Leipzig, that we now turn. 
Wundt was a 'giant' of nineteenth century German 'cultural science,.10 His 
experimental work on perception and cognition helped lay the foundations of 
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'specialising', professional psychology, and today, when he is remembered, it is 
usually as the first professional experimental psychologist. After starting out as a 
physiologist, he had turned towards psycho-physiology. Indeed, the publication 
of his book, Principles of Physiological Psychology, (1872) is universally 
regarded as a landmark in the history of psychology as an independent discipline. 
Thus, in a remarkably short space, Wundt became Germany's foremost 
experimental psychologist, the father of Sprachpsychologie, (an early form of 
psycho-linguistics) and the founding figure of the short-lived 'science' of so-
called 'Volkerpsychologie', 'ethno-psychology', or what I have been calling 
'cultural psychology'. 
Volkerpsychologie, aimed to study comparatively the mental development of 
Mankind. Thus a 'grand narrative' of human history framed Wundt's 
Volkerpsychologie. The sheer scale of Wundt's project is astonishing. His 
monumental (but deeply flawed) project illuminates the very beginnings of socio-
cultural psychology. What follows, however, mostly concerns Wundt's failure to 
create a unified science. 
Such was Wundt's standing in the eighteen-nineties that his lectures on the 
psychology of language were the most heavily attended in the world. 1 1 But, as I 
have mentioned already, his reputation declined around the turn of the century.I2 
Wundt retired at the age of eighty-five (1917), since when he has been widely 
recognised for his administrative capabilities in setting up the laboratory and the 
research programme at Leipzig. But his theoretical writings (such as his multi-
volume work, Volkerpsychologie, 1900) are seldom read. 13 Wundt never 
established a school, and his 'ethno-psychology' was abandoned soon after his 
death. 14 
The reasons for this turnabout in Wundt's fortunes are complex. Three 
complicated factors led to the decline in his standing. First, the model of psycho-
physics on which much of Wundt's early experimental research was based, lost 
currency. Secondly, the pre-Saussurean view of language that Wundt started out 
with appeared outmoded by the time the first of his two volumes of 
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Vol~Psychologie (the volumes dealing specifically with language) were 
published. IS Thirdly, competing philosophical approaches to the problem of mind 
emerged. The most important among these competing approaches, were those 
influenced by the Brentano's philosophy, and I shall be discussing them in the 
closing section of this chapter. 
The historical circumstances in which Wundt worked cannot be ignored. In the 
late nineteenth-century, much hinged politically on pictures of mind. I6 Wundt 
was a neo-Liberal and a nationalist. His interest in psychology grew out of his 
involvement in workers' education, and his belief in education as the remedy for 
all social ills was typical of neo-Liberal thinking at the time. The prevailing neo-
Liberal picture of mind presupposed that the elementary mental structures are 
pretty much the same everywhere. Neo-Liberals typically saw human variation as 
caused by particular circumstances, local geography, climate, history and so on. 
Indeed the capacity to develop variously in different settings, they claimed, is a 
defining human characteristic. Surface differences among peoples and cultures, 
they asserted, were essentially the products of different external contexts or 
environments. Crucially, they presupposed that it was possible, in principle, to 
separate out the super-structural or 'cultural' aspects of mind from what was 
innately or 'naturally' given. Thus, they hoped to distinguish what constitutes the 
universal rational endowment of Mankind from its particular cultural 'overlays'. 
Where did the so-called 'higher mental functions' - imagination, and memory 
and so on - figure in the neo-Liberal scheme of things? The question came down 
to whether they belonged to the biologically evolved, universal 'endowment', or 
whether they were part of the 'cultural superstructure'. Indeed, some 'advanced' 
neo-Liberal thinkers suggested that by combining evolutionary biology together 
with historical anthropology scientists might demonstrate that what was taken to 
be biologically 'given' has not only evolved (and would continue evolving), but 
that 'human nature' itself was open to change. 
Thus discussions hinged on what is 'fixed' and what is changeable in the 'human 
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psyche'. Crucially, different answers to this highly politicised question shaped 
contrasting estimations of the power and efficacy of human agency and 
citizenship.17 Characteristically, German neo-Liberals claimed that the critical 
aspect of the human psyche - the part that is open to change - could be shaped by 
education. Typically, however, they thought about change as something occurring 
within the individual, a view that reflected Kantian principles of rational, moral 
autonomy, but which also reflected the bourgeois dichotomy between the 
'individual' and 'society'. Neo-Liberals did not usually think about the 
development of mind as a socio-historical process that has evolved outside 
individuals on the plane of collective development. 
Wundt, however, became increasingly sceptical about the adequacy of the 
abstract neo-Liberal model of the rational autonomous individual, in the 
aftermath to the failure of the Liberal revolutions of 1848. He grasped the notion 
that thought occurs and, indeed, human minds are formed in particular cultural 
circumstances. In other words, he came to believe that the cultural environments 
they inhabit shape individual's minds. Thus, at a stage beyond what is 
biologically evolved (and thus, in a sense, 'fixed'), mind is open to modification. 
Consequently, the experimental psychologist became especially eager to extend 
his investigations into the relations between the formation of the individual 
consciousness and its cultural environments. I8 
Wundt painted a striking picture of the way that culture gets inside the individual. 
Intriguingly, he pictured cultural environments as more than merely the external 
contexts in which mental development occurs. His was not a picture of an 
individual mind unfolding in a nurturing culture. Rather, he argued, we 
appropriate, take in (,internalize' would be Vygotskian way of putting it) the 
'cultural environments' - cultural milieux -that we inhabit. Further to this, we do 
-/t.M'" 
so in such away ,fultural environments become part of our psychological make 
up. Such processes, he claimed, are fundamental to the development of higher 
mental functions. And thus elements of Wundt's Volkerpsychologie prefigure 
strands in contemporary sociocultural theory, especially strands in neo-
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Vygotskian work. But at the same time - and this is both suggestive and 
problematic - they also hark back to the philosophical anthropology of the 
German Enlightenment, and I shall be coming back to this point later. 
Wundt's Volkerpsychologie aimed to construct a comprehensive historical 
account of the psychological development of 'cultural peoples' .19 Thus it 
combined a picture of how individual minds are formed with a view of the 
collective development of peoples and their cultures. Hugely ambitious, it 
claimed to offer a comprehensive psychological history of Mankind. The account 
of mind it gave is one of a series of qualitative transformations which occur on 
different planes. On this view, new mental capacities are not simply layered over 
existing ones, building block fashion: rather, the addition of new capabilities 
entails the restructuring of the old ones. Indeed, it offered more of a dialectical 
account of development than might appear at first glance. (Wundt, of course, was 
not a Marxist thinker). The mental transformations Wundt sought to 
conceptualise were pictured as occurring on two levels: at the level of the 
individual and at the level of the psychological 'collective', the nation or Volk in 
a way that is reminiscent of Herder's thought.2o 
Where did Volkerpsychologie come from? Wundt did not 'invent it. Rather, 
ethno-psychology emerged in Germany in the middle of the nineteenth-century, 
around the same time as psycho-physics. By Wundt's account, Volkerpsychologie 
was established by two thinkers, a philosopher and a philologist, Heyman 
Steinthal and Moritz Lazarus. They established ethno-psychology through the 
journal they edited together in the eighteen-sixties. Interestingly, Wunt 
complained that the editors of the journal had failed to give precise definition to 
the new field. Therefore, he took pains to distinguish his own project from earlier 
versions of it. What distinguished his approach, he claimed, was that it was 
constructed upon rigorous principles of 'scientific' psychology. It was not 
speculative and it contained no metaphysical residues. What Wundt meant by 
'scientific' was fairly straightforward with his experimental work in the 
laboratory, indeed the great French sociologist, Emile Durkheim was impressed 
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by this aspect of his research. But it was unclear as to how the principles of 
scientific psychology were to be applied rigorously to the philological and 
anthropological data - folktales, customs and symbols - that his cohorts of field 
workers painstakingly gathered and classified, where a large amount of 
interpretative work had to be done. 
Essentially, Wundt failed to construct a synthesising theoretical overview into a 
unified science that was capable of bridging the 'natural' and 'human' science 
divide. Instead, he built a massive edifice comprising a vast corpus of cultural 
'data' that he assembled from disparate sources (psycho-physics; philology; 
anthropology; mythology; archaeology and more) in an attempt to picture the 
history of human development. Looking back, he wrote, 'The idea gradually 
arose of combining the mental development of man as severally viewed by 
language, religion and custom. ,21 It was an unwieldy, grandiose project, 
(historico-psycho-anthropology) and in the end it proved beyond him. Wundt's 
legacy is a rich but problematic one. The cultural dimensions of his work were 
not well understood at the time, and they have not been widely appreciated since. 
Therefore, I want to say more about what lay behind it. 
Moreover, science cannot be sealed off from ideology. The distinction between 
individual and collective psychology became an increasingly politicised one in 
the climate of national rivalry around the tum of the nineteenth-century. Notions 
of ethnic and national mentalities - the 'German mind', 'the European mind' , as 
well as the world outlooks of 'primitive' and 'cultural peoples ('Naturvolker', 
and 'Kulturvolker') and so on - were freely appropriated by nationalists and 
imperialists who made political capital out of ranking peoples' attributed mental 
traits?2 Further to this, notions borrowed from ethno-psychology gave pseudo-
scientific credence to the business of drawing up ethnic and racial hierarchies. 
Later, disastrously, they figured in National Socialist ethnic politics. Such notions 
have been unspeakably damaging and we cannot ignore them, but their negative 
aspects should not distract us either. Wundt's prioritisation of collective over 
individual psychology remains an intrinsically interesting one. 
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In reality, Wundt drew on a stock of anthropological ideas about peoples and 
their world outlooks that belonged to the legacy of German idealism. Herder and 
von Humboldt were major contributors to this stock. Yet, curiously, the 
experimental psychologist does not seem to have appreciated the dynamic 
conception of the role of signs that lay at the heart of earlier pictures of language 
and mind. In the mid-nineteen-hundreds, it was a commonplace among German 
philologists that signs were collective, historical productions. Thus Wundt writes, 
'all phenomena with which mental sciences deal (language, art, mythology, 
religion) are, indeed, creations of the social community,?3 Essentially, 
Volkerpsychologie involved studying 'those mental products which are created 
by a community of human life.' Mental products, Wundt argued, 'are, therefore, 
inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness, since they presuppose 
the reciprocal action of many. ,24 (On this view, the higher mental functions 
represent a cultural achievement, where the 'mentalities' or psychological 
structures peculiar to particular peoples are pictured as the 'objectifications' of 
the 'spirit' of this or that group). In sum, so-called 'ethnic mentalities' were 
reified as historical productions that might be studied comparatively. 
Today, readers will be rightly suspicious of 'scientific' projects proposing to 
investigate the mental characteristics of peoples and races comparatively.25 The 
damaging legacy of the work of racial 'classifiers' should ring deafening alarm 
bells. It is somewhat paradoxical, then, that Wundt was taken to task by his 
contemporaries for devoting the same painstaking analysis to the languages of 
'primitive' peoples (Naturvolker), in an age when the distinction between 
'cultured peoples' (Kulturvolker) and 'primitive peoples' caused no stir among 
scientists. Ironically, the painstaking attention that Wundt afforded 'primitive' 
peoples' language was usually only given to the Indo-European and Semitic 
languages. Interestingly, Wundt's contemporary, Franz Boas was the first linguist 
to show that there is no scientific basis for the correlation of race and culture.26 
He demonstrated convincingly that language 'families' cannot be mapped onto 
racial groups without distorting reality. What is frequently overlooked, however, 
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is that Boas' path-breaking work on Native American languages grew directly out 
of German cultural science. Early on, Boas's research was linked closely to 
developments in Berlin. Similarly, another contemporary figure, Rudolf Virchow 
produced a crucial study of the racial characteristics of Prussian school children, 
which concluded Prussians, as a racial type, did not exist. 
Wundt took particular care to draw a clear line separating his project from earlier, 
cruder versions of 'ethno-psychology' . And he also took pains to distinguish his 
own definition of 'primitive man' from definitions that he inherited from the 
French Enlightenment. French Enlightenment conceptions of 'primitive man', 
Wundt claimed, were the product of an abstract opposition between 'culture' and 
'nature' that was common among philosophers and anthropologists of the 
eighteenth century. In this respect Wundt, who in some ways followed in the 
spirit of the Sturm und Drang anthropologists, was highly critical of the French 
Enlightenment and he deprecated what he described as 'its conceited estimate of 
[its own] cultural achievements'. For Enlightenment thinkers, he said, 'The 
endeavour was not to find or observe, but to invent him [primitive man].,27 
In essence, Wundt's Volkerpsychologie was constructed around a powerful 
conception of the cultural nature of mind. He claimed that all cultural 
productions, especially languages and symbol systems, depend fundamentally on 
social interaction - 'the reciprocal interaction of many', as he phrases it - in 
historical time. On Wundt's view, mind is a collective phenomenon, hence his 
assertion: 'All phenomena with which mental phenomena deal are, indeed, 
creations of the social community,?8 Language, he emphasised, also arises out of 
the history of collectivity. For Wundt, language existed on the supra-individual, 
sociocultural plane. From this perspective, language (unlike utterance) does not 
spring 'expressively' from the needs and interests of individual speakers and 
cannot be studied as such. Indeed, Wundt underscores this very point. 'A 
language can never be created by an individual'?9 Intriguingly, his picture of 
language as a collective phenomenon became the very cornerstone of his theory 
of human psychological development. 
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Wundt reached two fundamental conclusions. First, that the structures of mind 
shape every stage of human social and cultural development. Secondly, that the 
higher mental functions are governed by their own developmentallaws.3o Thus, 
Wundt refused to reduce the higher mental functions to the determinations of the 
lower ones. On this view the lower ones do not prefigure the higher mental 
functions. Rather, they follow independent developmental trajectories. What is 
more, because they follow their own course, they cannot be reduced to chains of 
physical causation because culturally evolved materials continually mediate 
them. Both of these conclusions tum on notions about the role of culture - and 
especially the role of signs and symbols - in the formation of mind. In essence, 
Wundt put human signification at the centre of his picture of the psychological 
history of Mankind. Yet, in the last instance, his notion of the mediatiing role of 
signs lacked an adequate conceptualisation of human activity, and thus it 
remained curiously lifeless. 
* * * 
I want to come back now to the relations between Wundt's psychology and late 
nineteenth-century developments in language studies. Wundt was called to a 
"half-chair" in philosophy at Leipzig in 1874. The division of a professorial 
chair, though not unusual at the time, is telling. It suggests two things. The first I 
have already touched on. It suggests the way that two emergent academic 
disciplines, linguistics and psychology splintered away from philosophy at the 
close of the nineteenth-century. Un surprisingly, this was an uneven business. 
With psychology the case is especially complicated. Usually, it remained in the 
shadow of philosophy right up to the 1920's. Professional specialisation led to 
fragmentation among several disciplines (philology, 'scientific' psychology, 
'philosophical' psychology, anthropology, and linguistics and so on) before the 
Great War, not after it, as accounts usually suggest. 
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Secondly, although it is as a psychologist rather than as a linguist that Wundt is 
chiefly remembered, his picture of signification (language, signs and symbols) 
was central for much of his work. Indeed, the first two volumes of his 
monumental work, Volkerpsychologie took language (die Sprache) as their chief 
focus. (Subsequent volumes dealt with a broader range of anthropological topics 
and themes: mythology, religion, art forms, social structures, legal systems, 
culture and the philosophy of history.31 But whereas, recently, historians of 
psychology have begun to recognise the extent to which Wundt's work on the 
role of signs in the development of higher mental functions foreshadows the 
"cognitive revolution" of the 1950's, serious recognition ofWundt's theoretical 
work has been confined to cognitive psychology. Contemporary linguists have 
paid little serious attention to Wundt's work. 
The fact that Wundt's picture of language has failed to interest contemporary 
linguists is telling. For Wundt, psychology was a propadeutic science.32 On this 
view, linguistics was to be derived from psychological principles rather than 
from principles of its own making. Yet, for much of his career, Wundt was at the 
storm centre of debates that were transforming language studies into a modem, 
specialist science. 
At Leipzig during the 1870's and 80's, when Wundt' reputation as the world's 
leading professional psychologist was being made, and when experimental 
psychology was advancing full-sail ahead, the ]unggrammatiker (neo-
grammarians) were laying the foundations of modem structural linguistics. It is 
hardly coincidental that the young de Saussure began his doctoral studies there in 
the mid-seventies. I need to say more about these developments, and especially 
about the way that the picture of language changed in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The key change as far as our story is concerned was that the 
new picture of how language works - language as system of differences - no 
longer needed principles of individual psychology. 
The ]ungrammatiker were a group of 'militant' linguists who gathered at 
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Leipzig in the eighteen-seventies. They spearheaded the drive that was to 
transform language studies into a full-blown science. Indeed, their chief objective 
was to establish linguistics as an exact science on a par with the other natural 
sciences. To achieve their objective they developed a more rigorous methodology 
than any other school of linguistics had done before. 
The first generation of comparative and historical philologists had discovered 
law-like patterns of regularity among sound shifts that held true in a large number 
of cases. For instance, where English words begin with 'f', the Latin is likely to 
begin with 'p', and so on. They did not, however, claim to discover laws that 
apply in every single case. Herein lies a crucial difference. The ]ungrammatiker, 
by contrast to the philologists, claimed that sound changes are governed by laws 
that hold without exception. Further to this, they held that such laws could be 
formulated in exact ways, just as they were in the natural sciences. Thus, they 
sought to break with the unscientific tradition of historical and comparative 
philology. 
The significant shift in the way that language was pictured came about when the 
explanation for regUlarity in sound change was located in the differentiated 
system of sounds that go to make language up. Henceforth, explanations of 
change were no longer sought in the historical determinations of separate items 
of language (etymologies). From a systemic point of view, sound changes have 
little to do with the expressive needs or intentions of individual speakers. Rather, 
changes occur systematically over long periods of time spanning many 
generations. Moreover, once it is accepted that language change occurs at the 
level of the self-regulating system, then change can no longer be explained 
adequately in terms of individual psychology or, indeed, of historically unique -
and therefore unrepeatable - instances of speech. Crucially, such a picture of 
language is incompatible with Wundt's view of psychology as the propadeutic 
science according to which linguistics is to be derived from psychological 
. . I 33 pnnclp es. 
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The advent of structural linguistics marks the point where the picture of 
language as individual 'expression' met its limit. By concentrating on language 
as a system of differences, de Saussure showed that it was possible to describe 
linguistic change as a phenomenon that is 'independent of the expressive needs, 
desires or interests of the speakers. Crucially, the way that language works can be 
explained separately from the laws of mind - Of, indeed, any other principles of 
individual psychology. Thus the rug was pulled smartly from under the feet of 
'expressivist' theorists of the origins of language, going back at least as far as 
Herder. And thus, modem structural linguistics appeared to free itself from the 
idealist abstraction of the originating individual speaker that it inherited from the 
idealist philosophy of consciousness. 
De Saussure arrived at Leipzig to start his doctoral studies around the same time 
that Wundt was 'called' to the half-chair in philosophy (1874/5) and it is 
therefore important to get clear about the relations between linguists and 
psychologists at the time. De Saussure was among those who attended Wundt's 
packed lectures on the psychology of language, and it is interesting to conjecture 
about what he made of them. 34 But where did Wundt stand in relation to the other 
linguists at Leipzig? How did he perceive the developments in language studies 
that were going on around him? What impact did they have on his 
Sprachpsychologie? Intriguingly, Wundt once remarked that if he had received 
better training earlier he would have become a linguist.35 What he meant by this 
exactly it is hard to tell, but his remark raises intriguing questions. Could 
experimental psychology and linguistics be drawn together in a unified theory of 
the role of signs in the development of the higher mental functions? 
Battles raged at Leipzig on several fronts. There were clashes among 
experimental psychologists and metaphysical philosophers. And there were 
skirmishes among positivistic philologists and scientific linguists. The history of 
this intellectual warfare is especially revealing. In 1860, some fourteen years 
before Wundt was called to Leipzig, Steinthal and Lazarus had launched a 
journal devoted to the psychology of language: Zeitschriftfur Volkerpsychologie 
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und SprachwissenschaJt (Social Psychology and Linguistics). Wundt was an 
early contributor. 
Trained in Humboldtian philology, Steinthal had published an influential study 
on the origins of language, Der Ursprung der Sprache, which appeared in 1856.36 
He started out from the assumption that innate laws of language govern mind, 
and subsequently he became convinced that a science of psychology was 
impossible without a complementary science of signs. Unfortunately, his ideas 
emerged around same time as psycho-physiology was getting under way and 
inevitably his views led him directly into conflict with the psycho-physiologists. 
They argued that physiology - muscle, reflexes, the nervous system, 
'localisations' in the brain, and so on - held the key to the laws of consciousness. 
By contrast, Steinthal insisted on the importance of signs, especially linguistic 
signs, in the constitution of mind. However, it was a double misfortune for 
Steinthal, when he also came under fire from 'scientific' linguists, particularly 
the lunggrammatiker, who quarrelled with his picture of language. Push came to 
shove when Steinthal produced a psychology textbook that began with a chapter 
on linguistics. Several of the lunggrammatiker objected that the new, empirically 
based mathematical psychology - the tradition that psychologists like Fechner 
had started - offered a more scientifically secure foundation. A fierce battle 
ensued, and Wundt's psychology issued in the aftermath to it. 
Wundt inherited from German idealism the notion of apperception. Recall that in 
idealist philosophical traditions apperception usually refers to idea that things 
can never be known in themselves. Rather, says Kant, they can only be grasped 
as they are perceived, that is, as they are presented to consciousness by the 
synthesising powers of mind. Wundt's conception of the formation of the higher 
mental functions turned on his picture of the apperceptive mental processes 
organising - synthesising - the elementary contents of consciousness. 
Additionally, he made a distinction between the 'inward' system of apperception 
and judgements, and the 'outward' system of events and associations. Such 
distinctions preserved von Humboldt's division between inner and outer forms of 
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speech. (Von Humboldt's thinking, of course, was shaped powerfully by Kant). 
In Wundtian theory, apperception involved the selection and 'structuring' of 
mental contents. By contrast, perception is always externally oriented, for 
instance, with sensing and detecting. On this view, apperception involves making 
sense of raw sensory data. Crucially, Wundt claimed that the structures produced 
by the internal cognitive system are quite different from those produced 
externally.37 As far as the internal structures of mind are concerned, the relations 
between the various elements of the system appear to be the most important ones. 
The full significance of the difference between inner and outer structures emerges 
when we look at one of the key higher mental functions, memory. Memory, 
Wundt argued, is not so dependent on patterns of association (which is how the 
British empiricists saw things) as it is on internal structural principles. Crucially, 
we do not recover past experience as the isolated traces of events that are 'stored' 
separately in memory. Rather, we learn to regenerate experiences within whole 
structures. For Wundt, mind grasps meaningful wholes. What is more, 
experimental evidence appeared to support just such a view. Subjects working on 
memorisation tasks were able to recall lists of words grouped into meaningful 
phrases, whereas discrete nonsense items were largely forgotten. 
Wundt applied these and similar insights successfully in his experimental 
investigations of language performance in the laboratory. To give just one 
important example, when he tried to capture mental processes at work in the 
production of speech, he became intrigued by the phenomenon of rapid 
conversation. He observed that speakers in rapid conversation constantly adjust 
what they say in the light of the listener's anticipated responses. He observed, 
too, that the same speakers sometimes find themselves suddenly at a loss for 
words. They are conscious of what they want to say, but unaccountably unable to 
say it. With instances like these, the pre-structuring mechanism for the whole 
utterance seems to break down. At the very moment we speak, at the point of 
utterance, the next word is, moment by moment, at the forefront of our attention. 
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But, at the same time, somewhere in the background, the whole of the utterance 
is being formulated and reformulated -mentally drafted and redrafted, as it were -
on the wing. Words only take shape within a broader span of attention.38 Wundt 
puts it like this: 
From a psychological point of view, the sentence is both a simultaneous 
and a sequential structure. it is simultaneous because at each moment it is 
present in consciousness as a totality even though individual elements 
may occasionally disappear from it. It is sequential because the 
configuration changes from moment to moment in its cognitive condition 
as individual constituents move into the focus of attention and out again 
one after the other. The claim that the sentence is a chain of word 
concepts is as untenable as it is merely a chain of words. On the contrary 
it is the dissection of a totality present as a whole in consciousness. 39 
Against the associationists (who presuppose that chains of words and concepts 
are linked in a linear sequence), Wundt claimed that a multiplicity of processes 
come into in play whenever we speak. The ordering of words in the sentences we 
utter couldn't be organised by a single chain of associations. In sum, he argued 
the case that there is no linear sequence. Rather, the internal processes require 
that several functions be performed at one and the same time. Words, he 
concedes, are indeed spoken one after another. But crucially, they require that the 
whole utterance be worked upon simultaneously, in its totality, according to some 
kind of plan or schema. In other words, we formulate, revise - and, crucially, 
reformulate - our entire speech plan as we speak, shaping our words at the point 
of utterance.40 
Wundt established an astonishing programme of experimental research at Leipzig 
in the 80s. His goal, as we have said, was essentially a neo-Liberal one of which 
was to discover universal properties common to all minds. And to this end he 
attempted to survey the mental characteristics of different peoples. Thus, he set 
about gathering anthropological evidence of their 'mentalities' as they were 
'objectified' in their 'spiritual' productions, especially language, symbols, 
artefacts, myths, customs, art, religion and so on. The various lines of 
investigation were supposed to culminate the serial publication of his multi-
volume work, Volkerpsychologie. But in reality he was following two radically 
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different modes of enquiry - experimental psychology, and historico-ethno-
psychology. He did so plainly because no single approach afforded him a 
complete enough picture of human mental and cultural life, but his quest for the 
total picture threw up unforeseen, seemingly intractable methodological problems 
and he was unable to resolve them. How could experimental psychology and 
cultural anthropology be blended into a unitary research programme? 
Wundt's methodological difficulties arose, as I have already mentioned, just at 
the moment when experimental psychology was trying to establish its footings in 
the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft). At the same time, ethno-psychology 
was trying to break with philology and to set itself up as an autonomous 'cultural 
science' (Geisteswissenschaft).41 Each domain developed distinct philosophical 
foundations and methodologies of the kind that Wundt's contemporaries, Rickert 
and Dilthey, were concurrently struggling to clarify. 
Wundt stuck to the distinction, which he made early on, between the lower and 
higher mental functions. Whereas he thought that the lower mental functions 
have their basis in human physiology, and can be traced to the nervous system, 
respiration, heart rate, reflexes, muscle tissue and so on. With the higher mental 
functions, culture has to be taken into account. Crucially, Wundt presupposed 
that complex mental processes (the higher mental functions) depend on the use of 
signs. And, because signs - especially languages - have arisen historically in 
different cultural circumstances, peoples' mentalities vary in time and space. 
Thus, as far as research into the higher mental functions are concerned, the 
individual 'organism' cannot be taken as the sole unit of analysis. Instead, the 
products of the cultural collective have to taken into account for the way they 
provide additional, objective data: 
We may add that, fortunately for science, there are other sources of 
objective psychological knowledge, which become accessible at the very 
point where the experimental method fails us. These are certain products 
of the common mental life, in which we may trace the operations of 
determinate psychical motives: chief among these are language, myth and 
custom. In part determined by historical conditions, they are also in part, 
dependent on psychological laws; and the phenomena that are referable to 
these laws form the subject-matter of a special psychological discipline, 
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ethnic psychology. The results of ethnic psychology constitute at the same 
time, our chief source of information regarding the general psychology of 
the complex mental processes. In this way, experimental psychology and 
ethnic psychology form the two principle departments of scientific 
psychology at large.42 
Wundt claimed that, unlike physiological functions, social and cultural functions 
cannot be investigated in a way that abstracts them from their social and cultural 
embeddings. Thus the higher mental functions cannot be investigated on an 
individual basis or in isolation. Rather they have to be seen in relation to the 
culture that gave rise to them. In a manner that foreshadows contemporary 
sociocultural theory, Wundt implied that, 'Thinking on the higher plane means 
that individuals are participating in the culture. ,43 
Wundt sought a model of mind that was reliable, objective and positively 
grounded in empirical reality. In the manner of a natural scientist, he sought to 
discover the laws governing all mental processes everywhere without exception. 
But whereas the lower mental processes were amenable to investigation in the 
laboratory, he could see plainly that higher ones could not be captured by the 
same methods. He needed 'hard' historical-cultural psychological as well as 
experimental data. But what kind of 'hard' historical data would fit the bill?44 
Wundt assumed that mental phenomena are never directly available to the 
researchers. He assiduously avoided methods that relied on introspective data 
because they lacked 'scientific objectivity'. He also grasped the way that there are 
serious problems over the 'status' of psychological 'facts'. And yet he remained 
adamant that he could build a scientifically objective picture of mental operations 
by 'natural scientific' methods. That is, he believed that by making inferences, by 
constructing hypotheses, and by testing such hypotheses empirically, the laws 
governing higher mental functions were, in principle, discoverable. In sum, he 
believed that psychological research had to rely on the general principles of 
inductive empirical science. The major challenge came with his ethnological 
investigations, where a high degree of interpretative work was required to 
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discover meaning and significance. In essence, he was unable to evolve a unitary, 
synthesising theory that combined the different methodologies. 
* * * 
Before I draw my discussion of Wundt to a close, I want to say a word more 
about Wundt's changing picture of culture in relation to neo-Liberal ideology. He 
started out with a neo-Liberal picture of culture as an aggregate of the values, 
customs and beliefs. Later, however, he arrived at a radically different picture 
from the one he set out with. Early on, Wundt worked with a notion of culture 
that accorded well with prevailing neo-Liberal assumptions. Neo-Liberals 
assumed that people are fundamentally rational and more or less the same 
everywhere, and that peoples are the products of different environments, histories 
and so on. Over time, Wundt shifted away from such a view. According to one 
historian, 'For the later Wundt, culture was no longer a consensus among 
individuals, an aggregation of ideas, words, artifacts and so on, that were passed 
on by persons of one generation to those of another. Instead, the mental structures 
of individuals were literally part of the larger culture' .45 Culture appears in 
Wundt's later work as a supra-individual entity, 'an active force' with 
'coherence in itself.' Paradoxically, for the experimental psychologist 'culture' 
came to resemble what it had been for Herder and the German anthropologists of 
the Sturm und Drang - a 'shaping principle' - that is, something that prefigures' 
the development of individuals. 
This shift in the notion of culture marks a change in Wundt's thinking. As a 
consequence to it, the central focus of his research ceased to be the individual 
consciousness and became instead the cultural totality. The key difference 
between the orthodox neo-Liberal model of culture and Wundt's radical 
reformulation of it is that, with the new model, culture ceases to be thought about 
as the setting for individual development - it is no longer the external context, or 
the set of historical circumstances within which the individual's psychology 
unfolds - rather, culture plays an internally constitutive, shaping role in collective 
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as well as individual development. For this reason Wundt made the supra-
individual, cultural 'laws' of psychological development became the chief object 
of his investigations. 
To many of Wundt' s critics (especially German ones) the picture of development 
that he painted must have recalled the epoch of German Romanticism. Moreover, 
to many psychologists from overseas, (especially Americans), who had been 
attracted initially by Wundt's experimental psychology, such a radical shifting of 
perspectives made little sense. Indeed, this reformulation of the neo-Liberal 
model of culture by which the development of the individual is subordinated to 
the development of the collective, goes some way towards explaining why 
Wundt's ethno-psychology, (Volkpsychologie), made little impact in America, 
where individualistic psychology was strong. Consequently, only Wundt's 
experimental psychology was taken up there, and the cultural dimensions of his 
work were ignored.46 
Wundt claimed that the relations between lower and higher mental functions 
could only be studied by investigating the role of cultural materials, chiefly signs 
in the formation of mind. Further to this he thought that such investigations must 
be undertaken from genetic perspectives. In other words, he claimed that the 
study of the higher mental functions entailed giving a prehistory of their 
development. He was of the opinion that child psychology and animal 
psychology merely afforded the potential for complementary lines of 
investigation, whereas he was convinced that experimental psychology and 
ethno-psychology, in combination, would yield the key to the history of the 
development of Mankind. Thus, he attempted to trace the evolutionary stages in 
the development of mind, ascending from lower to higher mental functions.47 
* * * 
Essentially, Wundt's picture of 'mind' depended on whether mental 'contents' 
can be broken down for analysis into their 'component elements' such as 
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sensations and feelings. He assumed they could. But for a new generation of 
psychologists - especially BUhler, KUlpe, Katz, Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka and 
Vygotsky among others- mental acts, not mental contents provided the key to the 
development of the higher mental functions. In one blunt sentence Karl BUhler 
summed up what he took to be Wundt's outmodedness. He wrote, 'The key word 
in Wundt's theory is 'experience', the key word in the modem model, by 
contrast, is 'action'. Wundt's view of mind, BUhler implies, is fatally limited 
because it is wedded to a static notion of mental contents. Wundt, he writes, has 
no real conception of mental 'acts'. How did BUhler reach such a conclusion? 
The answer is that he was immersed in the 'act psychology' that stemmed from 
the philosophy of Franz Brentano. 
1874 saw the publication of Franz Brentano's best-known book, Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint.48 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint grew out of 
Brentano's deep dissatisfaction with the state of philosophy. He believed that he 
had been 'born into a period of the worst sort of intellectual decadence' .49 He 
rejected outright the philosophical idealism that still dominated the German 
universities, and turned instead to the philosophy of Aristotle, and this marked a 
sharp break with Kantian thought. 
In his habilitation thesis (1866) Brentano had defended the claim that 'the true 
method of philosophy is none other than natural science' . In the light of the 
general trend away from Hegelian metaphysics and the spectacular rise of the 
natural sciences, this claim may appear merely to reflect the times. In fact it was 
anything but a reflection of the times, as Linda McAlister explains: 
Here [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint] he [Brentano] argues 
that philosophy appears to differ from the natural sciences in the 
following four ways: it lacks universally accepted doctrines; it undergoes, 
in tum, one complete revolutions after another; the ends it seeks to 
achieve seem totally unattainable by empirical means; and it is impossible 
that it should have any practical uses. But, he argues, these differences are 
only apparent and are due to the fact that philosophy is still at a very 
immature state of development: he contends that when it develops further 
these apparent differences will disappear. 50 
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McAlister describes Brentano's conclusions as 'extraordinary'. Moreover the 
position that he affords psychology in the history of philosophy seemed to her 
extraordinary too, especially where he argues that psychology is one of several 
branches of philosophy, but it is the branch on which all the others depend. 
According to Brentano, psychology depends on physiology. Thus he concludes 
that 'psychology is a natural science at a very early stage of development and so, 
therefore, is philosophy' .51 On the face of it this may seem a very strange 
conclusion to have reached. He appears to be claiming both that philosophy is in 
its infancy, and that it is parasitic on the 'young' science of psychology. But the 
strangeness is quickly dispelled when we grasp the distinctions that Brentano is 
making between an empirical science, experimental psychology, and a 
philosophical psychology, the philosophy of mind. 
Against the background of these fundamental distinctions, a further seminal 
distinction between 'genetic' and 'descriptive' psychology makes striking sense. 
'Genetic' psychology, Brentano claims, follows the methods of natural science 
and it is analogous to physiology, physics or chemistry. From 'genetic' 
perspectives, mental events can be traced back to physical causes. Indeed, 
psychological investigations depend typically for their success on a prior 
knowledge of physiology, especially neuro-physiology. (Wundt's experimental 
psychology falls into this category.)52 By contrast, 'descriptive' psychology sets 
out to delineate and to classify mental phenomena. Thus it concerns itself chiefly 
with the analysis of mental experiences that it seeks to break down into their 
constituent parts. 'Descriptive' psychology, then, is chiefly concerned with the 
analysis of concepts. It aims to show how concepts are derived from 
experience.53 Moreover, in contrast to 'genetic' psychology, descriptive 
psychology does not attempt to explain the causes of mental phenomena. Rather, 
it gathers its data from inner-perception, which Brentano carefully distinguishes 
from introspection upon which psychological idealism typically relies. We cannot 
observe our own mental acts, he says, but we can perceive them - for instance, by 
reconstructing them in memory. 
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'Descriptive' psychology does not attempt to make inductive generalizations in 
the manner of the natural sciences. Instead, it takes as its standard 
phenomenological description - things as they appear to the perceiver. However, 
'phenomenology' is not a term that Brentano used. It comes from Brentano's 
student, Husserl.54 For Husserl, phenomenology was primarily a way of studying 
consciousness. Like Brentano, he was at pains to distinguish psychic from 
physical phenomena and thus to delimit the object of psychology. Husserl's debt 
to Brentano was substantial. He attended a series of seminal lectures in Vienna, 
where he came under the spell of Brentano's thought. Indeed, he once remarked 
that without Brentano, 'I should have written not a single word of philosophy.' 
Subsequent to this, he transformed Brentano's descriptive psychology into a 
'phenomenology' . 
So far I have been discussing Brentano's distinction between 'genetic' and 
'descriptive' psychology without stopping to say what he meant by 'mental 
phenomena'. McAlister offers the following helpful further distinction: 'It 
appears' she writes, 'that [for Brentano] mental phenomena are all mental acts, in 
a broad sense, while physical phenomena are, strictly speaking, all instances of 
sensible qualities' .55 Much turns on this distinction. As I have mentioned already, 
the contrast between psychology based on mental 'contents' and psychology 
based on mental 'acts' is according to BUhler, precisely what distinguishes 
Wundt's project from the work of a new generation of researchers. 
Brentano's notion of 'intentionality' has been discussed extensively. I can only 
offer a short summary of some of the key points here. 'Intentionality' 
(intentionale) is the term Brentano used to suggest that all mental phenomena are 
'relational'. 'Intentionality' here does not mean 'having a purpose': rather 
Brentano borrowed it from the Scholastics' reworking of Aristotelian philosophy. 
He gives the following definition of mental phenomena: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the 
middle-ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, 
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
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content, direction towards an object (by which you should not take me to 
mean a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something in itself as an object, though they do not all do so in 
the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired and so on. 56 
On this view, a mental act is the way that mind relates to the object before it. 
Thus the simplest mental act consists in having an object in consciousness - what 
Brentano calls 'representation'. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that 
that Brentano is saying that we can only know representations of things as 
opposed to 'things in themselves', in the manner of the Kantian apperception. 
The point that he is making is that the object of consciousness need not actually 
exist to be the object of an 'intentional act'. A literary work of art, to give just 
one important illustration, 'exists' as an object of 'pure intentionality'. Plainly, 
objects that only have existence in consciousness can be distinguished from 
objects that mind contemplates, which also have actual existence. Essentially, the 
question turns on the relation of the subject to the object. For example, the 
difference between a judgement and a representation does not lie in the object 
itself, but rather in our manner of conceiving it, that is in the nature of the mental 
act. 
Brentano's notion of intentionality has had huge implications for literary theory. 
The roots of 'reader response' theory lie in the interpretations of intentionality 
that were elaborated by his students and their associates. The founding figure of 
'reader response' theory, Roman Ingarden, was a student of HusserI. He took up 
the problem of the literary work of art from the standpoint of 'pure 
intentionality'. (Wolfgang Iser developed this tradition in the direction of literary 
theory with his notion of the 'implied reader'). For Ingarden, who was interested 
in the work of art primarily as a philosophical problem, the literary work was the 
perfect instance of an 'object whose pure intentionality was beyond any doubt' .57 
Art, he wrote in 1930, presents an opportunity to investigate 'the essential 
structures of the mode of existence of the purely intentional object without being 
subject to suggestions stemming from real objectivities'. By 'real objectivities' 
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he means things in the world that have actual existence rather than objects that 
have existence in consciousness.58 
The implications of Brentano's philosophy for psychology were huge. From its 
very inception, 'modem' psychology had struggled with Cartesian 'mind-body 
dualism'. Out of this struggle there emerged the two major contrasting 
orientations. Whereas some psychologists looked toward the natural sciences for 
their methods, others preferred the 'interpretative methods of the so-called 
'human sciences' (Geisteswissenschaften). The second of these two orientations 
drew heavily on philosophical hermeneutics - the 'science' of the interpretation 
of texts. Crucially, he history of modem hermeneutics can be traced back through 
the works of Gadamer, Heidegger and Husserl to the seminal ideas of Brentano. 
Intriguingly, Freud was also a student of Brentano. 
Hermeneutic approaches to the interpretation of the psyche seemed especially 
promising to those psychologists who were seeking to grasp the complexities of 
the higher mental processes from the perspective of meaning. But it was not until 
the 1920' s that the full significance of this dual legacy began to emerge. 
Experimental research, which took its orientation from the natural sciences, was 
more positivistic than psychological hermeneutics. The former assumed that 
there were psychological facts that were open to 'objective' observation and 
verification. Its overriding aim was to make psychology into an exact science. By 
contrast, hermeneutic approaches wrestled with the problems that arise from the 
way that the observer or the 'informant' enters the picture. Indeed, a central issue 
for hermeneutic approaches has been the way that the researcher 'selects' and 
'constructs' the object of inquiry and the way that a person's prejudices and 
undisclosed assumptions shape the analysis. Every act of interpretation is also a 
'rewriting' because interpreters make sense of things from within the horizon of 
their 'prejudices' in the positive sense that Gadamer gives the word. From the 
perspective of positivist science, hermeneutic approaches appear lacking in 
scientific objectivity, but from the perspectives of hermeneutics, science cannot 
escape the very problems that hermeneutics sought to clarify. 
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More than any other psychologist (or linguist) at the time, Karl BUhler 
appreciated the significance of the differences among competing traditions in the 
fields of language studies and psychology.59 BUhler belonged to the new 
generation of psychologists. And he held before him a clear picture of the merits 
and shortfalls of at least three major traditions of research. These traditions were 
first, the comparative-historical philology of Herman Paul; second, the 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl; and third, the structural linguistics of 
Ferdinand de Saussure. BUhler's appreciation is all the more impressive because 
it came at a moment when the future of relations among these traditions (indeed, 
the future of relations among the academic disciplines: philosophy, psychology 
and linguistics), was impossible to foresee. Along with many of his generation of 
psychologists, BUhler was highly critical of Wundt' s research programme. 
Chiefly, he was critical of Wundt' s inability to give modem psychology adequate 
methodological foundations of the kind that Brentano had sought to clarify. The 
story of the quest for an adequate methodology leads us forwards to the research 
programme that Vygotsky and his and associates established in the Soviet Union. 
They took up once more the problem of the role of signs in the human 
development from a philosophically engaged socio-cultural standpoint. 
Wundt has rarely been recognised as a theoretician. Rather, he has been 
dismissed as a 'positivist compiler' and a 'classifier' of mental phenomena. He 
has been criticised - sometimes even derided - for ponderously amassing (and 
taxonomising) a mass of quasi-anthropological data.6o Perhaps such criticisms 
miss the mark. Wundt's research is vulnerable to criticism. But this vulnerability 
stems from his inability to design a unified research programme. At the finish, he 
failed to bring the findings from his laboratory together with the bulk of 'cultural' 
evidence that he and his cohorts of researchers painstakingly assembled.61 
Although a unified theory psychology eluded him, the socio-culturalist 
perspectives that he developed at Leipzig contributed substantially to socio-
cultural theory as it was developed in the twentieth century. 
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Brentano's ideas influenced generations of philosophers, psychologists and 
literary theorists. For psychologists, especially, there was a need to establish a 
theoretically coherent picture of the field. In 1928, Vygotsky, speaking about the 
crisis in psychology, remarked that psychologists had aspired to a [single] science 
and created several of them. They had failed, he said, to overcome the crisis that 
Franz Brentano had called attention to in 1874.62 (Vygotsky was referring to the 
Preface to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, where Brentano declares, 
'In place of psychologies we must seek to create a psychology. ,)63 Brentano was 
the precursor of modem phenomenology. The model of mind that he proposed 
was an active, 'intentional' one in which consciousness is pictured as a process 
involving mental acts. For Vygotsky, a notion of mental acts, mediated by 
culturally evolved signs, held the key to the problem of the higher mental 
functions. Phenomenology will be important in the next chapter, which 
concentrates on the work of Ernst Cassirer and the relationship of his philosophy 
of symbolic forms to a picture of psychological development. 
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Chapter 5 
On Common Ground: Cassirer's Work on Symbolization 
I start from the objectivity of symbolic form because here the 
inconceivable has been done. Language is the clearest example. We 
assert here that we tread on common ground ... 
Ernst Cassirer, 19291 
For the German-Jewish philosopher, Ernst Cassirer symbolising provided the 
common ground upon which human development depends? On Cassirer's view, 
symbolising makes human development possible, because symbols constitute the 
very medium by which our 'humanity' comes into being. It is by means of 
symbols alone that human experience is transmitted from one generation to the 
next. My aim is to recover some of Cassirer' s ideas, which were rooted in the 
European Enlightenment, to suggest how his work on symbolization might 
contribute fundamental perspectives for a unified educational theory of language, 
learning and development. 3 
To appreciate something of the resonance of Cassirer' s ideas, consider the theory 
of the novel that the Russian literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin developed in the 
twenties and thirties. Bakhtin's writes about the ways that languages are always 
'dialogically implicated' in one another. Intriguingly, his path-breaking insight 
into the nature of the multi-voiced text (what he calls 'heteroglossia') stemmed 
partly from his reading in Cassirer.4 
For Bakhtin, novels are material artefacts. They have currency, they circulate, 
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have a certain distribution, a fundamentally social character and a particular 
history. Crucially, they continually refer back to their previous existences outside 
the immediate contexts of their production. Novels as 'composite symbols' 
transcend the 'finitude' of individual authorship in the way they have effects 
beyond the lives and intentions of their creators. Such a conception of the 
'afterlife' of the work of art lies at the very core Cassirer's conception of a 
common humanity. I have been speaking about the highly specialised work of 
novelists, but in point of fact everybody is engaged in fundamentally similar 
processes all of the time. The processes of recreation and adaptation are common 
to all symbolising, whether we are speaking about 'great works' of art or ordinary 
conversation. According to Cassirer, it is precisely through countless acts of 
symbolization that the commonality on which development depends - the 
common ground of humanity - is achieved. On such a view, 'Humanity' is not 
some sort of spiritual essence: rather, it is the very medium in which human life 
attains symbolic form. For Cassirer, Man - 'humanity' - is essentially a 
historically evolved sign. 
Cassirer was the inheritor of the values of classical German humanism - the 
tradition of Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Herder, and von Humboldt. What is more and 
to the to the point here, he defended these values in the paralysing climate of 
anti-humanism, despair and disillusionment that gripped Germany in the years 
following the Great War. Cassirer believed in human progress, but with 'no 
guarantee of irreversibility': on this view, past achievements do not prevent 
cultures from going into terminal decline. From the standpoint of the history of 
ideas, his philosophy of symbolic forms emerged from a sustained attempt to 
shift the focus of neo-Kantian philosophy from the epistemology of natural 
scientific knowledge toward a broad theory of culture. This at the moment when 
German society was descending into the politics of National Socialism.5 
Cassirer was a bourgeois neo-Liberal. In the midst of the collapsing Weimar 
Republic and during the violent rise of National Socialism he kept faith with a 
notion of the unbroken continuity of ideas coming down from the European 
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Enlightenment. Thus, he spoke pointedly of the Gennan humanist tradition to 
those academics and intellectuals who gave their support readily to National 
Socialism. He spoke too of 'a feeling for the individual, for their peculiar 
individual development and for the common basis of life which brings all these 
together. .. [these] were won through the efforts of the Gennan mind during the 
eighteenth century'. What is more, he considered all of this to have been a 
cosmopolitan achievement, one that transcended national boundaries. 'All 
Europe helped' , he said. 
Cassirer started out as an orthodox neo-Kantian philosopher of science of the 
Marburg school. However, his revaluation of the works of Herder and Von 
Humboldt marked a crucial turning point in his intellectual development. 
According to Cassirer, it was these thinkers above all, writing about the origins 
and the nature of language that first grasped the 'world constituting power' and 
'world disclosing nature' of symbols. 
However, we need to look critically at Cassirer's claims about the originality of 
Herder and von Humboldt in the field of language studies. He sometimes fails to 
appreciate the indebtedness of classical Gennan thinkers to the the French 
Enlightenment, especially to Condillac. (I have touched on Gennan 
underestimation of Condillac's stature earlier). It was in the writings of Gennan 
thinkers that Cassirer rediscovered the seminal notion that language enters and 
shapes our ways of seeing the world.6 From Herder he took a conception of the 
'constitutive function' of language.7 And from Von Humboldt he gained a 
profound understanding of the way that, 'Man not only thinks the world and 
understands it through the medium of language; his whole intuition of it and the 
way in which he lives in this intuition are conditioned by the very medium'. 
Remarkably, Cassirer found confinnation for such ideas in contemporary 
research into speech pathology in the field of clinical psychology after the Great 
War. 
Von Humboldt pictured language as constitutive, human activity. On his view, 
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language, which is constantly created and recreated in speech, makes us what we 
are. Further to this, he reflected on the way that language can only grow - that is 
transform itself into something new - in a given, historically evolved, 
community. But there is more. For Cassirer, following on from von Humboldt, 
the nature of language embodies an important ethical principle. As one 
contemporary philosopher puts it, ' the language I speak, the web I can never 
fully dominate and oversee, can never be just my language: it is always our 
language.,8 On this view, language implies an ideal social order in which no 
single individual can settle meaning once and for all; rather, language is the chief 
medium whereby human activity is co-ordinated and through which 
understanding between people, however imperfect, becomes possible. Human co-
operation depends on it. 
Cassirer carried such notions forward into his philosophy of symbolization. 
Whereas he recognised the empirical fact of human variation, like many neo-
Liberals, he sought a universal principle of individual worth and dignity in a 
common humanity. He found just such a principle in the notion of symbolization. 
Furthermore, he made symbolization not only the foundation of his conception of 
moral agency, but also the cornerstone of his defence of human rights. In sum, he 
tied symbolization to a powerful conception of universal freedom. 
Moreover, throughout the recurring constitutional crises of the crumbling 
Weimar Repuplic, during its degradation and the National Socialists seizure of 
power, Cassirer held fast to neo-Liberal values of individual freedom individual 
rights. Thus he resisted the intimidating mood of anti-Republicanism, anti-
humanism that swept in with the flood tide of political and cultural nationalism. 
Against Fascism he invoked the cosmopolitanism of the German Enlightenment 
and the European Humanist tradition. 
Tellingly, Cassirer's philosophical outlook contrasted strikingly with that of his 
contemporary, Martin Heidegger, whose radically anti-humanist ideas had the 
greater impact at the time. The difference between these two thinkers comes out 
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clearly in their contrasting pictures of language, as I hope to show later in this 
chapter. In the twenties and thirties, the field of the history of philosophy in 
Gennany was a political battleground. Social disintegration gave rise to strong 
demands for the legitimation of political choices. In this climate, philosophers 
like Heidegger had a powerful appeal. By comparison, Cassirer's ideas seemed 
removed from immediate realities. Besides, Cassirer's writings on history, the 
epistemology of science, semiotics, experimental psychology and jurisprudence 
made huge demands on his readers. As one commentator puts it, 'Probably no 
other twentieth century philosopher has been so steeped in the history and theory 
of as many different fields of study' .9 
Cassirer's conception of universal humanity (Humanitiit) was the foundation of 
his conception of human rights. Its source was the European Enlightenment and, 
in particular, the extraordinary achievements of classical Weimar. The 
educational ideal of self-cultivation, (Bildung), was especially important to him. 
For Cassirer, the achievements of thinkers like Kant, Herder, Goethe and von 
Humboldt established a universal human entitlement that was not there before. 
On this view every individual has the right to self-development, freedom from 
arbitrary violence, freedom from arbitrary arrest or torture, and to freedom of 
movement and expression. 
Cassirer was preoccupied with the problem of setting the limits of political 
power. In this context, the notion of 'personality' - what makes an individual 
person uniquely important - became an extremely important one for him. Though 
he allowed that the 'person' is in a certain sense 'given' (biologically), he 
thought that the individual 'personality' is open to the influence of reflection and 
moral training. Cassirer held fast to the Bildung educational ideal. With Bildung, 
each individual has a creative contribution to make towards the development of 
the whole of humanity. And thus, for Cassirer, 'the capacity to affect humanity is 
a source of ethical responsibility'lO In sum, he made self-cultivation a 
foundational principle of universal human rights. 
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In the writings of von Humboldt Cassirer discovered a picture of language (and, 
by extension, symbolization) in which human beings transcend their insularity. 
This accorded well with the cosmopolitan vision of Humankind that he (von 
Humboldt) got from Kant. For von Humboldt, language offers the chief 
indication of the unity of Humankind. Cassirer puts it like this, 
For him, [von Humboldt] language is 'the clearest evidence and surest 
proof that the human being does not possess a self-enclosed individuality; 
that the words 'I' and 'You' not only mutually support eachother; that, as 
concepts, they are identical; and that, in this sense, there is a sphere of 
individuality, including the weak, needy, and perishing and extending 
back to the remotest beginnings of mankind' According to von Humboldt, 
without such rudimentary universality all understandings of others, 
human life within the medium of speech would be impossible. 11 
Cassirer grasped the way that language - symbolising - enables man to 'conceive 
actions in ways that transcend expediency'. In this manner language makes 
possible highly self-regulated forms of behaviour. For Cassirer, 'giving oneself 
commands ... is the essence of ethical personality' .12 Moreover, on this view, the 
development of individuality - the self - is fundamentally dependent upon 
symbolic processes that issue from complex social interactions in ways that have 
been established historically. Such an expansive, synthesising notion of 
symbolization marked the point of intersection among several domains: ethics, 
jurisprudence (natural and human rights theory), and experimental psychology. I 
want to look now at the question of how such a synthesis was possible. 
* * * 
Cassirer's major work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (192311929) has its 
origins in the philosophical investigations that he conducted in Marburg around 
the tum of the century under the direction of Herman Cohen. Cohen was widely 
regarded as the leading neo-Kantian philosopher of his day. The form of neo-
Kantianism that dominated Marburg stressed the role of mind in the constitution 
of.knowledge. Indeed, the Marburg rallying cry was, 'The world is not given, but 
j\ve,...(.(sa-lttfi< 13 
@e'9t;eil>e'd - Die Welt ist nicht gegeben, aber aufgegeben '. Cassirer went to 
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Marburg in 1896. Earlier, while he was studying jurisprudence in Berlin (1894), 
he had attended a course of lectures on Kant given by Georg Simmel. On one 
occasion, Simmel dropped the remark, 'Undoubtedly the best books on Kant are 
written by Herman Cohen; but I must confess that I do not understand them!' 14 
This, it seems, inspired Cassirer to go to Marburg at the first opportunity to study 
under Cohen's supervision. Following Cohen, he studied the underlying 
structures of mathematical and scientific thought. However, at a point where he 
attempted to apply the findings to problems in the cultural sciences, it quickly 
became apparent to him that the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge, developed by 
Cohen to study the basis of mathematics and science, could not provide an 
adequate methodology for the human sciences. IS 
Over time, Cassirer found the Marburg emphasis on pure reason and the 
mathematical and logical foundations of scientific knowledge altogether too 
narrow. He wanted to provide an adequate basis for a methodology of the human 
sciences. But he had no wish to break with Cohen. I6 Friendship, intellectual 
indebtedness and loyalty made Cassirer unwilling to criticise Cohen's system 
publicly. Such criticism would, perhaps, have made the points of difference 
between them clearer. But Cohen's critics often associated themselves with anti-
semitic elements in German academic circles, and for obvious reasons, Cassirer 
refused to strengthen their position. 
My concern here is with the development of Cassirer's thought, but institutional 
politics, particularly anti-semitism, cannot be left out of the story. When Cohen 
retired from the Chair of Philosophy in 1912, along with Paul Nathorp, another 
leading neo-Kantian, he attempted to secure Cassirer's appointment at Marburg as 
his successor. By this time Cassirer was widely regarded both as an outstanding 
epistemologist of science and as the philosopher best qualified to succeed Cohen. 
In the event, however, against the wishes of both Cohen and Nathorp an 
experimental psychologist, Erich Jaensch, was appointed instead. Subsequently, 
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Jaensch's work on eidictic memory won international acclaim. Indeed, his 
research impressed Vygotsky, who took up some of Jaensch's ideas in his own 
work on memory. (We shall return to Vygotsky's indebtedness later in 
connection with imaginationan creativity). Later, Jaensch became an ardent 
National Socialist. He wrote zealously about the role of 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' 
elements in psychological research in the Germany and worked enthusiastically 
to establish the foundations of a National Socialist psychological science. I7 Such 
was the political climate in Marburg in the thirties. 
Cohen's failure to secure Cassirer's appointment can be explained partly by the 
fact that he, Cohen, had made enemies. His socialist politics and the fact that he 
always insisted upon the Jewish contribution to German culture had not endeared 
him to the academic establishment. I8 
Cassirer studied with Cohen in Marburg for only three formative years (1896-
1899). During his time there he concentrated on the philosophy of Descartes and, 
naturally, his work centred mainly on the foundations of mathematical and 
scientific knowledge. After leaving Marburg, Cassirer went first to Munich, 
where he worked on Leibnitz. Then, in 1903, he moved to Berlin, probably to 
escape the anti-semitic climate in Bavaria. Once in Berlin, where there was a 
vibrant cosmopolitan intellectual culture, he made contact with the world of 
publishing through his cousins Bruno and Paul. 19 Bruno Cassirer published 
Cohen and, later, Ernst himself. Meanwhile, Ernst refereed philosophical 
manuscripts for the publishing house. 
There were other important family contacts in Berlin besides Paul and Bruno. As 
a child Cassirer had often visited another of his cousins, Kurt Goldstein. 
Goldstein was a neurologist, a practising physician, and, crucially, he was a 
member of the emergent Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology. (Goldstein helped 
to edit a journal, Psychologsche Forschung, which was established in 1922 and 
which was especially important for Vygotsky and his associates in the Soviet 
Union). The cousins renewed their friendship and there began a fruitful period of 
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collaboration. Empirical research from the Gestalt School was to provide 
Cassirer with fundamental perspectives for his major work, the third volume of 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, The Phenomenology of Knowledge. 
To appreciate what is truly distinctive about Cassirer's phenomenology of 
knowledge we have to go back at the way he sought to transform neo-
Kantianism. In part he was responding to the times. Before the First World War, 
thinkers like Franz Brentano had challenged neo-Kantianism's dominant position 
in German philosophy. (There is a clear line of connection that runs from 
Brentano, through Husserl to Martin Heidegger, though the differences among 
them are also important.) For reasons I explained in chapter four, Brentano 
sought to break with German idealism. 
By contrast, Cassirer never proposed such break. Rather he sought to transform 
neo-Kantianism from the inside. His extraordinary achievement is best 
understood as a broadening of his early interests as he moved beyond a neo-
Kantian epistemology of the natural sciences, towards a new theory of meaning. 
This led him away from Cohen's system, but unfortunately he died before he 
made their differences explicit. It has often been assumed that no real differences 
existed between them, and that Cassirer was an orthodox neo-Kantian. 
Consequently, criticisms levelled at Cohen and the Marburg School were thought 
to apply equally to Cassirer's own work. 
With The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer carried his work far beyond 
the boundaries of an epistemology of the natural sciences. His own philosophy 
begins to emerge at the point where he moves away from Cohen's philosophy. 
Cohen's radical idealism reduced all reality to a single form of logic. In the 
Marburg tradition, scientific knowledge was made to stand for all forms of 
knowledge, whereas The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms seeks to include all 
forms of knowledge, some of which cannot be grasped as 'natural' scientific 
knowledge, such as myth. 
Cassirer continued to write on Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. Indeed, mathematics, 
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science and logic continued to occupy him throughout his career. And thus he 
maintained continuity with his earlier work. But in the light of investigations by 
contemporary English philosophers like Russell and Whitehead, he began to see 
that the traditional logic that had been available to Kant (which was based on 
classes and the syllogism) was less 'reliable' than the new logic of 'relations'. 
This new logic of relations was developed in the context of mathematics, where 
mathematical laws were expressed as functions. Such afunctional approach led 
Cassirer to re-examine the nature of scientific concepts, and to consider the role 
of representation as the constitutive condition of all experience. 
Thus Cassirer's new project began to take shape. According to his own 
account the idea of symbolic form dates from 1910. 20 The first volume of 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923) dealt specifically with 
language. It surveyed the history of language studies, with special 
concentrations on Herder and von Humboldt. In the second volume, The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume II, Mythic Thought, (1927) 
Cassirer turned towards anthropological studies of myth. Then, finally, 
with the third volume, he returned to the problem of knowledge. The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume III: The Phenomenology of 
Knowledge (1929) constitutes the central achievement of Cassirer's 
mature work, and yet, paradoxically it is the least well known. Like much 
of his writing before the Second World War, it has been respected, but 
not explored. As one critic has observed, since it was published in 1944, 
An Essay on Man has received more attention from American readers 
than The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms has ever received in Germany. 21 
When Martin Heidegger reviewed the second volume of The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, Mythical Thought in 1928, he naturally assumed that Cassirer 
was an orthodox Marburg neo-Kantian. Heidegger himself had developed a 
radically unorthodox reading of Kant in which, crucially, he pictured Kant as an 
ontologist rather than an epistemologist. For Heidegger, Kant offered a theory of 
existence. He sought a more 'drastic' approach to the problem of 'being in the 
175 
world' than Cassirer offered, which was one of the major differences between 
them. In 1928, Heidegger decided to postpone writing a full critical discussion of 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms until the foundational principles had been 
fully worked out. These foundational principles were subsequently presented 
The Phenomenology of Knowledge (1929). 
To grasp how Cassirer arrived at these principles we have to go back to his 
critique of the Kantian subject. Cassirer saw a fundamental ambiguity in Kant's 
theory of the subject that he thought, quite rightly, had arisen from the limitations 
of eighteenth century psychology. Kant had argued against sensationalist thinkers 
(who thought that the senses not only provide us with impressions of things in the 
world, they also compose them and produce images of objects) that there has to 
be something more to perception than mere receptivity. Something else is needed 
to form sensations. There has to be some kind of a psychological mechanism - a 
way of making judgements - to achieve a regular synthesis. For Kant, the 
'something else' is supplied by mind operating with the synthetic a priori 
categories. Thus, Kant established the self-subsistent, transcendental subject of 
cognition as the 'author' who organises bare sensations and gives them 
intelligible form. 
Cassirer's chief criticism of the Kantian subject was that Kant attacked the 
presuppositions of the old sensationalist psychology, while 'continuing to speak 
its language'. In sum, he relied on the eighteenth century 'faculty' psychology in 
which given faculties give meaning to sensory data. Meaning was the key issue. 
On Cassirer's view, there are no bare sensations separate from meaning. 
Meaning, he argues, is already present in sense experience. Essentially, Cassirer 
raised the same objection to the influential notion of 'intentionality' that Husserl 
had adapted from Brentano. (He touches upon Brentano' s seminal work, 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in The Phenomenology of Knowledge 
where he notes an ambiguity in Brentano's notion of 'intentional inexistence' .)22 
According to Cassirer, Husserl introduced a distinction between consciousness 
and meaning where, from a phenomenological point of view, no such distinction 
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exists. Rather, there is a 'total experience' where perception, representation and 
meaning are facets of the same mental operation. 
Before Kant, no one had taken self-conscious reflection as the starting point for 
the analysis of the formal properties of knowledge. Kant made self-conscious 
reflection the foremost principle in the constitution of knowledge. Ambitiously, 
Cassirer aimed to take the investigation to a more fundamental level by 
introducing the notion of 'symbolic pregnance,?3 This is a difficult notion to 
hold on to, but what he means by the term, Michael Krois suggests, is this: 
Symbolic pregnance ... is the condition of the possibility of a 
consciousness and of the symbolic forms of culture. Unlike an 
idealism of consciousness, Cassirer's notion of symbolic 
pregnance required a conception of subjectivity that begins with 
the phenomenon of the body. 24 
Thus, the central problem ceased to be the nature of reflective self-consciousness 
and its relation to the formal constitution of knowledge. Instead, the central 
problem became the possibility of self-consciousness itself. 
On Cassirer's view, symbolic 'pregnance' occurs at the earliest stage of 
perception. Crucially, it is tied to bodily awareness. As Krois puts it, 'The 
feeling of the body, our basic self-awareness, is an understanding of meaning. 
This is the prototype of all symbolic relations. ,25 Meaning at this most 
elementary level, then, is located in bodily action, 'in the doing and feeling that 
accompanies one's physical confrontation with the world.,26 For Cassirer, 
reflection 'enters as thinking about intelligent action in a bodily sense, not 
thinking about thought.,27 Perception is grasped as a whole. It cannot be broken 
down analytically into separate components such as sensory impressions. Nor is 
meaning something that is superimposed on raw perceptual data. Rather 
meaning originates with perception itself?s Cassirer formulates the notion of 
symbolic 'pregnance' like this, 
By symbolic pregnance we mean the way in which a perception as 
sensory experience contains at the same time a certain non-
intuitive meaning which is immediately and concretely represents. 
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Here we are not dealing with bare preceptive data, on which some 
sort of apperceptive acts are later grafted, through which they are 
interpreted, judged, transformed. Rather it is perception itself 
which by virtue of its own immanent organisation, takes on a kind 
of spiritual articulation - which, being ordered in itself, also 
belongs to a determinate order of meaning. In its full actuality its 
living totality, it is at the same time a life 'in' meaning. It is not 
only subsequently received into this sphere but is, one might say, 
born into it. 29 
Where does the 'immanent organisation' come from? What does Cassirer intend 
by 'a life in meaning'? His reading of Leibniz offers some clues. 
Cassirer speaks of Leibniz' s notion of the 'now', as something 'filled and 
saturated with the future: praegnans futuri" , and 'the future presents itself as a 
wholly distinctive mode of vision: it is anticipated from the standpoint of the 
present.,30 Consciousness never leads back to absolute elements. 'No 
consciousness', Cassirer says, 'is merely given, mere datum ... [rather] every 
perception embraces a definite character of direction by which it points beyond 
the here and now.' On this view, perception is already saturated with human 
intentions and filled with symbolic form 
There is a sense in which whole edifice of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
rests on the foundations of the picture of language that Cassirer discovered in the 
works of Herder and von Humboldt. Von Humboldt had reformulated the old 
problem of the relations between words and ideas from the perspective of the 
critical philosophy of Kant. Cassirer writes, 
Perhaps nothing is so remarkable about William von Humboldt's 
contribution to the philosophy of language as the circumstance that from 
the start he directed his inquiry not solely towards the world of concepts 
but also towards the world of perception and intuition' The passage 
about. .. Man not only thinks the world and understands it through the 
medium of language, his whole intuition of it and the way in which he 
lives in this intuition are conditioned by this very medium. His grasp of 
an objective reality -the way in which he sets it before himself as a whole 
and forms, divides and articulates it in particular - non of this would be 
possible without the living energy of language. 31 
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Cassirer was an outstanding historian of the thought of the European 
Enlightenment. In revisiting debates about language that had preoccupied some 
of its keenest minds, he reanimated the old questions: 'Where does language 
come from and what is it for?' 
Recall that Herder had complained that Condillac had failed to come up with an 
adequate account of the production of signs in the first instance. In the account 
that Condillac gave, 'natural' signs are somehow transformed into 'instituted' 
ones. Essentially, for Condillac (as for Locke) signs existed as a given class of 
objects to which meanings become attached, but no proper explanation is given. 
But then Herder also failed to give an account of the appearance if signs beyond 
some notion of a cry that corresponds to the defining attribute of the thing in 
question by which it can be recognised and recalled to mind - the 'merkmal' as 
Herder called it.. 
Von Humboldt took up the problem where Herder left off. He cut through the 
seemingly intractable question, (which came first, words or ideas?) by proposing 
that signs, together with perceptions were produced at one and the same time in a 
single flash of 'Artikulation ,.32 
The problem of the relations between language and perception surfaced slowly in 
mainstream psychology.33 By contrast, it appeared from the very outset in studies 
of the pathology of speech, particularly aphasia, as Cassirer notes: 
The question of the relation between the formation of language and the 
structure of the world of perception was asked only late in the psychology 
of language; but from the very first it forced itself on the study of speech 
pathology ... [where] Not the intelligence alone, but the total behaviour 
and mental state of the affected person proved to be modified by the 
change in language consciousness and in the use of language.34 
In the clinical research of his cousin, Kurt Goldstein and his colleague, Ernst 
Gelb, Cassirer discovered the theory that, 'the true aphasic disturbances never 
merely affect speech as an isolated act, but rather that every change in a patient's 
language world always brings about a characteristic change in his behaviour as a 
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whole - in his perception as well as in his practical, active attitude towards 
reality. ,35 Intriguingly, Cassirer saw a link between clinical psychology and Von 
Humboldt's theory of language: 'Thus from an entirely new angle, we find 
confirmation of the words with which Humboldt headed his philosophy of 
language. ,36 
Cassirer was regarded by most of his contemporaries, including Martin 
Heidegger, as an orthodox neo-Kantian although he had moved away from Cohen 
and the Marburg school as his own philosophy of symbolic forms emerged. An 
orthodox neo-Kantian would be expected to take reflective self-consciousness as 
his or her starting point for an analysis of the constitution of knowledge. 
However, Cassirer took an unorthodox approach to the problem 
He assiduously avoided locating meaning in individual acts of consciousness 
because he was less concerned with an idealism of individual consciousness than 
he was with the question: 'How is consciousness possible in the first place?' 
From this angle his distance from Cohen seems clear. Idealists assume that 
individual consciousness is pre-given and Cohen had wanted to give mind 
absolute priority. Cassirer objected that idealists had been led 'to the paradoxical 
view that everything that is apprehended seems to be placed within the sphere of 
one's own self 37 By contrast, he proposed a 'radically new' approach to the 
problem, 
The pre-supposition that the epistemology of psychological 
idealism has so often set forth as self evident - the assumption that 
only our own states of consciousness can be given, that it is only 
through them, by inference, that the reality of the other worlds of 
experience and of a physical nature can be acquired - is shown to 
be thoroughly problematic as soon as we glance at mythical 
phenomena. 38 
For Cassirer, the structure of myth reveals the manner in which consciousness 
evolves from the group and not, as psychological idealism would have it, from 
subjective self-consciousness. 
We can see how, from life as a whole, from its undifferentiated 
totality, which along with the human world also contains the 
world of animals and plants, one's own being and also a form of 
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what in human rises up and separates out only very slowly - and 
how within this being the reality of the genes and the species 
always precedes that of the individual. From such formations of 
the cultural consciousness we gain a clearer view of the individual 
consciousness. 39 
The essential point is that Cassirer thought about perception as something that 
has been culturally evolved. On such a view, the consciousness of the group 
always precedes that of the individual.4o Further to this, he thought that cultural 
symbol systems (including language) have played a transforming role in the 
evolutionary development of new forms of human behaviour. Such new forms of 
behaviour constituted the higher mental functions, especially those functions that 
are related closely to perception.41 Thus Cassirer began to resolve problems, 
which Wundt had addressed, from a philosophical standpoint that engaged with 
legacy of Brentano. 
It was only after the publication of the first two volumes of The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, however, that the full significance speech pathology became 
clear. Gelb and Goldstein worked with patients at the Frankfurt Neurological 
Institute who had suffered cerebral injuries during the First World War. They 
studied the effects of lesions in the breakdown of categorical cognition and, more 
generally, the role of concepts in the organization of patients' psychological 
processes. Cassirer noted particularly that Gelb and Goldstein's findings showed 
that aphasic disturbances affected patients' manner of perceiving. He writes: 'The 
true aphasic disturbances never merely affect speech as an isolated act, but rather 
that every change in a patient's language world always brings about a 
characteristic change in his behaviour as a whole - in his perceptions as well as 
his practical active attitude toward reality.'42 
Thus Cassirer found striking evidence in Gelb and Goldstein's case studies to 
show how closely language and cognition, symbolization and perception, are 
intertwined. These case studies revealed how patients suffering from aphasia had 
difficulty sorting colours. When patients who had lost the ability to recall the 
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names of colours were invited to perform a sorting task with coloured strands of 
wool, they proved unable to do so, even though there was evidence to show that 
they saw the colours correctly. However, when the colours were present as 
concrete objects the patients were able to choose 'with great certainty and 
precision': the colour of a ripe strawberry, a mailbox, a billiard table, chalk, 
violets, forget-me-nots etc. Intriguingly, patients succeeded when the concrete 
object was in front of them and they were able to point to colour of the named 
object, but they were unable to use colours as categories and to collect the 
I · 43 samp es mto sets. 
However, some patients were able to accomplish tasks by taking an indirect 
route. When, for example, a patient was asked to choose a 'blue' he was at first -
in line with his basic disturbance - unable to connect a definite meaning with it; 
but sometimes he solved the problem by translating it, so to speak, into another 
problem that he could understand more readily. Since he could recite the verse: 
'Blue is the little flower called forget-me-not' he provided himself with the 
means of passing from the realm of general colour names to that of concrete-
thing names. And so also with other rhymes, which he knew purely by rote. 
Then he could point out a forget-me-not blue, provided it was among the 
samples, but he never selected any other shade of blue, however close to it, for no 
other shade exactly corresponded to the remembered colour of the forget-me-not 
that determined his choice. 44 
From their detailed clinical observations of such cases, Gelb and Goldstein 
concluded that the normal psychological connections that enable us to classify 
colours were disturbed in ways that caused aphasics to revert to an earlier 
developmental stage. This stage was not only more elementary, it was also less 
'rationa1'45 Normal individuals were able to use colours as representative 
instances of a category: redness, blueness, yellowness and so on. By contrast 
aphasics suffered from an impeded 'categorical attitude'. That is, they were 
unable to move from a particular instance to representative instance of a 
category. Gelb and Goldstein took this to be significant because it seemed to 
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suggest an important difference between immediate and mediated perceptions. 
Such cases suggested that colour phenomenon had ceased to function as a means 
of representation for aphasics. 
On this view, perception is liberated from being tied to immediate, concrete 
instances by 'progressively filling itself with symbolic meaning'. (This notion 
carried huge implications for the way that Vygotsky conceptualised imagination 
and creativity in the adolescent child). Moreover, it indicates the way that growth 
in our capacities to handle symbolic meaning makes possible new forms of 
psychological behaviour that in turn generate new modes of acting in the world. 
Cassirer takes the argument a stage further: 
Here it seems pertinent to ask once again whether the new degree 
of freedom which perception gains in the purely representative 
achievement is due to language, or whether it does not first make 
language possible? 46 
Gelb and Goldstein had posed essentially the same question from the 
perspectives of psychopathology. They concluded that it is not at all the case that 
perception and language are in a relation where one depends upon the other, or 
that one is primary and the other secondary. Rather it seemed to them that they 
exist in a reciprocal relation to one another in what they call 'the same basic 
attitude': 
The categorical attitude and the possessions of language in its 
significatory function are expressions of one and the same basic 
attitude. 47 
Cassirer gained, first hand, knowledge of many of Goldstein's patients, and in the 
chapter, The Pathology of Symbolic Consciousness, which is the longest by far in 
The Phenomenology of Knowledge he makes detailed reference to Gelb and 
Goldstein's research. Thus he writes, 
For such mediated operations are always symbolic: one must tear 
oneself away from the presence of the real object and freely 
actualise an ideal aim that exists only in thought. Here lies the 
same reflective attitude that characterises language and is 
indispensable for its development. An impairment of this attitude 
impedes and inhibits the use not only of language but also of every 
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other activity which - like reading or writing deals with the 'signs' 
for objects and their meaning rather than with objects themselves. 
48 
It follows that we may begin to think about symbolic functions as transforming 
and reconfiguring our psychological processes. However, says Cassirer, this 
thought should not send us off searching for some general 'faculty of 
symbolization' - some Kantianfacultas signatrix, or given capacity of mind- any 
more than we should search for some general faculty of walking or eating. And 
crucially, this line of enquiry does not lead us deeper into the recesses of 
individual consciousness. Rather, it points instead in the opposite direction, 
which is toward human culture. Kant redefined the 'faculties' or fixed capacities 
of mind - understanding, reason, judgement and so on - as mechanisms affecting 
perception. Thus mind shapes what is sensed. However, the Kantian model of 
mind is essentially a-cultural. Cassirer, by contrast, sought a model of mind in 
culture, and therefore within the processes of historical time. The break with 
eighteenth century 'faculty' psychology couldn't be clearer. 
Vygotsky read The Phenomenology of Knowledge in Moscow almost as soon as 
it was published. We know this because he discusses Cassirer's account of 
patients exhibiting complex disorders of the higher mental functions that the 
German philosopher observed first hand in the Frankfurt Neurological Institute in 
the opening section of his chapter in 'Imagination and Creativity of the 
Adolescent' which was published in 1931.49 (I shall be returning to this chapter 
in the third part of this dissertation). Vygotsky discovered in Cassirer's 
description of Gelb and Goldstein's research into aphasia a clue to understanding 
imagination and creativity in the adolescent child. He was especially interested in 
Cassirer's description of the behaviour of one particular patient who was 
incapable of pouring himself a glass of water when asked to do so, but who was 
able to perform this operation without the slightest difficulty when he was thirsty. 
Vygotsky's connected this description to the way that children gradually break 
away from the support they find in concrete, tangible objects through fantasy. 
The patient is completely unable to do something that is not motivated by the 
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actual situation. The patient exemplifies a complete absence of imagination. He 
can't free himself from his actual circumstances, which is precisely what 
imagination enables us to do. 
Cassirer posed the following question: 'What can pathological changes in speech 
and in the related symbolic achievements mean for the structure and general form 
of culture?50 From a methodological point of view, the analysis of the structure 
and general form of culture - what we might call today a 'general semiotics' -
offers a more reliable approach than introspection, which cannot meet rigorous 
standards of scientific enquiry. 
What did Goldstein take from Cassirer? It is clear from Goldstein's later writings 
that he especially valued Cassirer's insight into the role of symbolising in the self-
regulation of behaviour, without which human development would be 
inconceivable. He holds out a picture of mind operating to form images and to 
focus and direct behaviour - a mechanism that he describes as, 'giving ourselves 
commands'. Without such direction we would merely follow our instinctual 
drives. Crucially, Cassirer envisages psychological transformations, mediated by 
symbolization, without which moral behaviour, indeed ordinary co-operation and 
daily social intercourse would be impossible. 
Finally, I want to set these ideas in their historical and political context. The 
Phenomenology of Knowledge, emerged at a critical moment, when two hostile 
and contrary movements, phenomenology and logical positivism (three, if we 
include Marxist-Leninism) were besieging the citadel that neo-Kantianism 
occupied in the German universities. To some, Cassirer's ideas seemed out of 
key with the times. In 1929, when Cassirer debated publicly with Martin 
Heidegger at Davos, in Switzerland. Essentially, this debate was viewed as a 
struggle between two epochs. The painstakingly formal and conciliatory way that 
it was conducted masked the true nature of a confrontation between two radically 
opposed political outlooks. 
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The debate took place against a backdrop of social and political instability. At the 
time, Cassirer's way of philosophising seemed strangely old fashioned in the 
oppressive climate of crisis. His approach appeared rooted in the nineteenth-
century. His manner of posing questions seemed too abstract, too remote, and too 
'wooden'. Martin Heidegger, by contrast, seemed to offer a dynamic new way 
forward for German philosophy. His charismatic intensity - and his fatalism -
seemed more in key with the times.51 
Beneath the surface of the formal academic debate about Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason lay fundamentally contrasting conceptions of what it is to be human. 
From such conceptions issued contrasting political beliefs. and tendencies. At 
one level there was mutual incomprehension. As one observer remarked tellingly 
at the time, 'both men speak completely different language.'52 Cassirer took up 
this theme in his response to Heidegger's challenging insistence that they must 
try to find a common centre from which to understand each other: 
[Heidegger's position is that] we must search again for the common 
centre precisely in the disagreement. And I say we do not need to search. 
For we have this centre and, what is more, this is so because we have a 
common objective world in which differences between individuals have 
by no means been superseded, but with the stipulation that the bridge here 
from individual to individual has now been knocked down. This occurs 
repeatedly for me in the primal phenomenon of language. Each of us 
speaks his own Language, and it is unthinkable that the language of one 
of us is carried over into the language of the other. And yet, we 
understand ourselves through the medium of language. Hence there is 
something like the language. And hence there is something like a unity 
which is higher than the infinitude of the various ways of speaking. 
Therein lies the decisive point. And it is for that reason that I start from 
the objectivity of symbolic form because here the inconceivable has been 
done. Language is the clearest example. We assert here that we tread on 
common ground ... 53 
Cassirer's optimistic notion that language asserts the common ground stands 
modestly against Heidegger's overwhelming phenomenology of being.54 
Heidegger, by contrast, broods on the isolation of the individual, on personal 
destiny and human finitude. 55 
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In the spring of 1929 Cassirer was elected Rector of the University of Hamburg. 
Thus, he became the first German-Jewish academic to hold such an eminent 
position in the University system. Shortly after, Heidegger was appointed Rector 
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at Frieburg in 1933, only months before the National Socialists came to power. 
That same year, Cassirer was notified of his dismissal. After teaching in England 
and Sweden, the Cassirers crossed the Atlantic in 1940 on board a Swedish 
freighter. By chance, the Russian linguist and literary theorist, Roman Jacobson 
was also a passenger. At Yale, where he took a teaching post, Cassirer's work, 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Fonns was virtually unknown. 
Looking back to the twenties and thirties, Cassirer refused to make a direct link 
between Heidegger's philosophy and National Socialist politics. Nevertheless, he 
showed precisely how it had contributed to the intellectual climate of fatalism 
and irrationalism that was symptomatic of German intellectual and political life 
in the widespread demoralisation following First World War. About the collapse 
of the Weimar Republic and the National socialists seizure of power, Cassirer 
asked, 'What did philosophy do to avert the danger?' Certainly, in the face of the 
deepening crisis, philosophy seemed paralysed. 
* * * 
Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms connects developments in contemporary 
semiotics and psychology to the pictures of language that come down to us from 
Herder and von Humboldt. It also stands as a bulwark against contemporary Post-
modernist and anti-Enlightenment thinkers. Cassirer continued a tradition of 
theorising the expressive-constitutive role of symbolising in human development 
as an ethical project that modem structural linguistics has wanted to abandon 
along with the individual psychology of speakers. Yet I have to admit that 
Cassirer's conception of symbolic form lacks substantial historical and social 
dimensions. Like theories of general grammar, it remains fundamentally an a-
historical account of symbolising that says little about actual contexts and 
particular circumstances in which cultures are transmitted and transformed. 
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Cassirer's work has more than merely historical importance. Today, it offers 
perspectives for a broad, synthesising, view of education. It extends and deepens 
our understanding of the role of symbolic meaning in children's development. 
Cassirer's close links with Gestalt psychology are especially revealing. They 
show the profound influence of phenomenological thought - essentially, the 
legacy of the philosophy of Franz Brentano - on relations among various 
disciplines: philosophy, language studies, literary theory and psychology. 
Revisiting Cassirer's work affords opportunities to clarify what is at stake with 
ideas and problems that remain unresolved. 
Cassirer never developed a dialogical picture of language and symbolization in 
the manner of Bakhtin, though he noted the collective, inter-subjective character 
of meaning making that comes down from von Humboldt. The educational 
significance of the dialogical nature of language is still being worked out. Current 
work stemming largely from the writings of Bakhtin springs immediately to 
mind). As yet, as far as I am aware there has been no substantial study of the 
history of the intellectual links between Cassirer and Russian thinkers like 
Vygotsky and Bakhtin - or indeed many of the thinkers I have been discussing 
here. 
Finally, there is an ethical dimension to Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms 
that might provide a fundamental educational rationale for studying 
symbolization in the very broadest sense. In essence, we understand ourselves as 
well as others through medium of signs. Human co-operation depends upon it 
and without culturally evolved symbols human experience could never be shared. 
Cassirer's enduring insight was that with symbolising something extraordinary is 
achieved: 'here the inconceivable has been done ... we assert here that we tread on 
common ground.' 
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1 Cited in Heidegger, Martin, (1997), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Translated by 
Richard Taft Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, p.205 
2'Symbols' and 'symbolization' are the terms Cassirer uses. 'Signs' and 'signification' would be 
possible alternatives. Symbolization refers to a 'wider' process than language or speech, though 
language is the principle mode of symbolising. For Cassirer, as Umberto Eco has noticed, 
symbolic and semiotic are essentially the same, which is problematic for some semioticians for 
whom the term 'symbolising' may lack precision. Eco makes an important point when he 
recognises that for Cassirer who was emerging from neoKantian epistemologies of science, the 
symbolic order of science does not mirror the structure of' being' (the unobtainable Kantian 
'thing in itself') rather it is the creation of mind. In other words, Cassirer was interested in the 
Kantian theory of knowledge as if it were a semiotic theory in which the synthetic a priori is a 
cultural entity - not the transcendental structure of the human mind. For Cassirer, signs and 
symbols are not the accidental 'cloak of the idea' but rather its 'necessary and essential organ'. 
Signs do not merely serve to communicate a complete and given thought content, but a sign is 'an 
instrument, by means of which this content develops and fully defines itself.' Unfortunately Eco 
offers no account of where such ideas were elaborated in their modern forms, that is in the 
European Enlightenment. The line of indebtedness that extends from John Locke to Condillac, 
and from there to the encyclopedie and the ideologues, who theorised just such issues are not 
mentioned in this context. The origins of Cassirer' s interest in symbolization lie in the German 
Enlightenment and in the writings of Herder, von Humboldt and Goethe. In Goethe's work for 
instance he discovered a active, transformative conception of symbolisation: 'Symbols transform 
the experience into an idea, and an idea into an image, so that the idea expressed by the image 
always remains active and unattainable and even though expressed in all languages remains 
inexpressible'. (Quoted in Eco, U Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p.142.) 
3 Chapter Four of The Bullock Report (1975) sets out a fundamental argument about the relations 
between language and learning which, for all its depth and complexity, remains a breathtakingly 
clear and concise formulation. It argues that language plays a mediating role in intellectual 
developmentWhen I first read Chapter Four, its themes and arguments were already familiar to 
me. I had met them in James Britton's Language and Learning: The Importance of Speech: 
Children's Development (1970). Chapter Four presents, in a highly condensed form, the theory 
on which Britton's book is based: "the theory that we use language as a means of organising a 
representation of the world - each for himself - and that the representation of the world - each for 
himself - and that the representation so created constitutes the world we operate in, and the basis 
of all our predictions by which we set the course of our lives".(p.78)"These current theories," we 
are told in "Chapter Four", stem from a powerful movement of ideas developed over the past fifty 
years." (p.47) Re-reading "Bullock", it is the relation between them that I want to examine. The 
first stems from the Cassirer; the second from the Soviet psychologist, Lev Semenovitch 
Vygotsky. Their ideas have been developed unevenly over the years. It has tended to be the case 
that, whereas interest in Vygotsky has grown, Cassirer has fared less well. In what follows, I will 
try to show something of the connection between Cassirer's philosphy and Britton's theory and, in 
addition, why Cassirer's thought deserves to be explored 
4 Bakhtin speaks of language as a 'treasure house of images', and he links the idea to his theory of 
'chronotope' -'time space'. The word 'chronotope' refers to the process of assimilating real 
historical time and space in literature. Two points seem relevant here. The first is the essentially 
neo-Kantian origin of the ideas, which, though they differ from Kant's, take up the notion that 
'the image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic', that is,located in time and space The 
second point is to do with Bakhtin's reading of Cassirer, and especially the way that the German 
philosopher gives an analysis of the ways time is reflected in language. See especially Bakhtin's 
essay, 'Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel', in Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) The Dialogic 
Imagination: Four Essays By M.M. Bakhtin, Edited by Michael Holquist and translated by Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist, University of Texas Press, p. 251. According to Craig Brandist 
writing in Radical Philosophy, 85, September/october, 1997 Bakhtin's insight about 
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heteraglossia in the novel was actually based on Cassirer's ammendment to Hegel's system in 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Vol. I, p.117(1923) where Cassirer claims that: 'philosophical 
awareness arises only in and through language'. 
5 As John Michael Krois argues, 'With his theory of symbolic forms, Cassirer transform [Kantian] 
transcendental philosophy from a critique of knowledge into a critique of meaning' (Krois, 1987, 
p. 44). Krois also suggests that Cassirer's philosophy of symbols and meanings resembles the 
semeotic theories of Charles Sanders Peirce, the point being that the modern term 'semiotics' 
covers both thinkers' works. 
6 The claim that Von Humboldt was the first to recognize the 'world disclosing powers of 
language needs to be viewed cautiously, especially in the light of Hans Aarsleff's acerbic 
criticism of Cassirer's account of von Humboldt's ideas on language. Aarsleff rightly shows how 
much of the thinking that was subsequently accredited to Herder and von Humboldt is to be found 
in Condillac. Neglect of the French contribution can be traced back to the prestige of German 
philology in the nine-tenth century and to the climate of academic nationalist rivalry. Condillac's 
striking conception of the role of signs in gaining conscious mastery over mental operations is, 
obviously, crucially important here. As Ulrick Ricken shows convincinly, Condillac's ideas were 
carried forward by the idea loges. Von Humboldt met them during his time in Paris, after the 
revolution. Aarsleff is probably right when he claims that Cassirer underestimates Condillac's 
contribution, and that he ovrlooks the idealogues. Aarleff claims that Cassirer relies too 
uncritically on Rudolf Haym's 1857 biography and as a consequence he produces whatAarsleff 
calls 'his tinpot history.' (Humboldt, (1988) p.xxxiv). But see also Mueller-Vollmer's argument 
that critics like Aarsleff and Ricken, who have wanted to downplay the claim that Herder and von 
Humboldt made a truly innovative contribution to language studies fail to recognize what is 
genuinely new. One new element in von Humboldt's work concerns the inter-subjective basis of 
linguistic understanding .. 
7 Charles Taylor contrasts the picture of language that comes to us from a tradition that runs from 
Hobbes, though Locke to Condillac, - what he calls an 'enframing theory' - in which language can 
be seen as arising within a framework of human life and fulfilling a certain function within it. The 
'framework', on this view, precedes language. By contrast, what Taylor calls a 'constitutive' 
theory gives us a new picture of language as somehow making possible new purposes, new levels 
of behaviour, new meanings and hence it is not explicable within a framework of human life 
conceived without language. See especially Taylor's two chapters, 'The Importance of Herder' 
and 'Heidegger, Language and Ecology', in Philosophical Arguments, Harvard University Press, 
1995 
8 Taylor, C. (1995) p.99. Taylor makes another crucial point that speech also expresses the 
different social relations in which we stand to one another - 'husbands and wives, parents and 
children, equal citizens in a republic, subjects of the same monarch' From this standpoint, he says 
'we can see that it is not only the speech community that shapes and creates language, but 
language that constitutes and sustains the speech community.' 
9 See especially John Michael Krois' exceptionally clear study of Cassirer's philosophy, Krois, 
John Michael (1987) Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
p.ix, 
10 Krois, M. (1987) p167 
11 Krois, M. (1987) p167 
12 Krois, M. (1987) p167 
13 Neo-Kantianism challenged the positivist climate of the late nineteenth century in German 
culture, and the return to Kant re-established epistemology, especially the epistemology of natural 
science, as the dominant concern of German philosophy. Neo-Kantianianism spread rapidly 
through Europe. Significantly, in the Russian universities, from 1870 right up to the twenties, neo-
Kantianiam was the chief point of reference. Moreover, it was common for Russian philosophers 
to be educated in Germany. (The German educated aristocrat figures in Russian Literature. In 
Eugene Onegin, Lensky is described by Pushkin thus, 'A poet and a Kantian sage. He'd brought 
back all the fruits of learning! from German realms of mist and steam! freedom's enthusiastic 
dream')Boris Pasternak, actually went to Marburg to study under Cohen. In fact Marburg was so 
well known in Moscow, that the novelist Andrei Biely remarkd that at the time, 'without even 
comming to Moscow, Cohen and Rickert reigned within the walls of the university for their 
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disciples sent them young people for the full treatment.' (quoted in Fleischman, 1990) and the 
terminology of neo-Kantianism was current among Russian thinkers. 
In 1914, Herman Cohen visited Russia, where he gave a series oflectures at the invitation of 
Jewish philosophical circles in April and May. Neo-Kantians were also well established at Saint 
Petersburg University when Mikhail Bakhtin studied there. A key member of the Nevel and 
Vitebsk Circles, M. 1. Kagan studied with Cohen in Marburg. When he was interned as an enemy 
alien in 1914,Cohen intervened on his behalf. Kagan's writings reveal two important features: the 
first is the extent to which he was immersed in neo-Kantian thinking; the second is his closeness 
to Bakhtin's ideas. During the 1920's Bakhtin grew increasingly critical of Cohen's system, but his 
own efforts to conceptualise consciousness have their origins in his efforts to push beyond 
Cohen's philosophy. 
Lenin attacked neo-Kantianism in his polemic, Materialism and Empirocriticism (1909). The 
chief target of that work, however is the positivism of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. Lenin's 
polemic is usually regarded as a 'strategic' work that sought to establish his philosophical 
leadership of the Party. It was not an especially 'profound text. Yet the book is a significant one. 
It contributed to a climate in the twenties and thirties in which it became difficult, indeed 
dangerous for Soviet thinkers to find anything positive in 'idealist' works at all. Vygotsky, for 
instance, makes few references to Cassirer's philosophy in Russian versions of his published 
work, though there are references in English versions of his texts, intended for publication in the 
West. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, especially Volume 3: The phenomenology of symbolic 
forms, (1929). 
In the early thirties, neo-Kantianism was attacked as an especially 'dangerous' form of 
'menshevising idealism' during Stalin's campaign for ideological discipline. (see 
Backhurst,1991). In the period ofNEP 1921-1929 was one in which Soviet thinkers and writers 
were in contact with Western intellectuals and artists and frequently published their work 
privately in Berlin. (See, for instance Katerina Clark, The Quiet Revolution in Soviet Intellectual 
Life, in, Russia in the Era 0 NEP: Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture, edited by Sheila 
Fitzpatrick et aI., Indiana University Press). After 1929, however, the climate changed. The stage 
was set for the Great purges. With the onset of Zhandovism.,Soviet intellectual culture narrowed, 
became more parochial and expressed open hostility towards the cosmopolitanism, humanism and 
individual rights that Cassirer identified with the ideals of the European Enlightenment. 
Traditionally, then Marxists have deprecated Cassirer's work as an instance of neo-Kantianism 
and German idealism. As a consequence, the real connections among Soviet and European 
thinkers has been obscured. Nowadays, what was held in common has to be established before 
what is especially distinctive can be appreciated. 
14 Gawronsky D. (1958) p. 6. 
15 The neo-Kantian thinking that revitalised German philosophy in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century was born of a treble dissatisfaction. First, there was a strong desire to 
challenge the prevailing cultural climate of positivism. Second, there was an ambition to restore 
philosophy to the centre of German intellectual life, a position that it had not occupied since the 
decline of Hegelian thinking after 1848. Third, there was a deep disquiet, shared among many 
German thinkers, about the kind of philosophy that was being done. A new generation of 
philosophers thought that philosophy had taken a wrong turning after Kant. They wanted to 
return to Kant, but in a different spirit. Otto Liebman, Cohen's predecessor at Marburg, gave the 
movement its rallying cry: 'Back to Kant!' (Kant zuruck!) Thus, for a while, neo-Kantianism set a 
new course for German philosophy. 
Marburg and Heidelberg were the chief centres of neo-Kantian thought. Whereas the main 
orientation in Heidelberg was toward the historical and social sciences, Marburg concentrated on 
the foundations of natural scientific knowledge. At Heidelberg, Heinrich Rickert was the first to 
attempt to grasp systematically the distinction between natural scientific and social scientific 
methods, while at Marburg, Herman Cohen shared Rickert's interest in scientific methods, but in 
a way that sought to give them a basis in mathematics and logic. Cassirer's early work 
concentrated on the nature of mathematics and natural science. Later, however, his interests 
broadened to include the domains of the humanities, as we shall see. Kant's 'Copernican 
revolution' stemmed partly from his dissatisfaction with ideas about the nature of knowledge 
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inherited from Rationalism and Empiricism. His critical philosophy established the importance of 
synthetic judgements. Before Kant, it was generally assumed that all a priori knowledge must be 
analytic in nature, that is it could be broken down into its constituent parts. Rationalists thought 
that concepts arise from the workings of pure reason. But they could not explain how such 
concepts get back into sense experience. By contrast, Empiricists thought that concepts arise as a 
result of sensory experience, but they could not account for the way sense experience is 
intelligible in the first place. Niether Rationalists nor Empiricists appreciated that sense 
experience is already permeated with order. And it is precisely the nature of this order that 
Cassirer aimed to clarify in his philosophy of symbolic forms. Kant held that we can never arrive 
at direct knowledge of things as they 'really are', that is as 'things in themselves'. Rather, he 
believed that we only know things as they are 'phenomenally' given to us. In other words, we can 
only know things in the world as they are present in consciousness, not as things in themselves. 
Our knowledge of phenomenal objects comes about through the relations between the perceiving 
subject and the perceived object. Subjective mind supplies synthetic a priori categories - the 
ordering principles - which make our sensory experience of objects possible. Kant's critical 
investigation of pure reason is predicated on the notion that thought can only grasp what it has 
itself 'created'. Thus, he emphasises the contribution of the knower to what is known. A balance 
was struck between the world of perceiving subjects (mind), and objects (things in the world), and 
this balance was maintained until the late nineteenth century, when Herman Cohen's upset it. 
Cohen set out to eliminate all the static 'givens' by means of a radical idealism in which he gave 
mind absolute priority. By extending the notion that we can grasp only what is phenomenally 
given to mind, he attempted to do away with the Kantian 'thing in itself altogether. In Cohen's 
system, philosophy concentrates exclusively on pure cognition. And the foundations of pure 
cognition, Cohen claimed, were only to be discovered solely in the propositions of pure 
mathematics and 10gic.Philosophical realists claim that just the opposite is the case. They are 
committed to a notion of an objective reality existing prior to, and independently of, thinking 
SUbjects. For realists the external world is the 'reality' of 'things-in-themselves' that do not 
depend on perceiving subjects for their existence. In a post-Darwinian age, and a world in which 
such ideas had political ramifications, idealists were challenged (especially by 'materialists') to 
give an adequate account of the world before humans evolved. Indeed, such discussions have 
carried huge political significance in the twentieth century. 
Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1909) was a polemical book written at a moment 
when he was challenging rivals for the intellectual leadership of the Bolshevik party. It constituted 
a defence of dialectical materialism and a polemic against idealism from a Marxist viewpoint. 
Empiriocriticism, helped to set the stage for discussions in Soviet psychology in the twenties .. 
Lenin especially singled out for criticism the neo-Kantian idealism of the Marburg school that had 
been pervasively influential among Liberals in Russia before the October Revolution. Later, after 
1929, and subsequently under Stalin, Lenin's critique ofneo-Kantianism was codified into the 
official philosophical position of the Party that claimed to represent the authentic tradition 
inherited from Marx. Such political developments made it difficult, indeed positively dangerous 
for Soviet thinkers like Vygotsky to discuss the work of a leading Marburg neo-Kantian such as 
Cassirer approvingly. 
16 The reasons for this are both complicated and revealing. When Cassirer first arrived in Marburg 
in 1894 there had been a degree of reserve between the two men. Cohen took Cassirer to be a 
converted Jew, a group for whom he had little time. (The issue of conversion was essential for 
German Jews from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of the Great War, where it 
was a matter, not so much of belief in Christianity, as a willingness to demonstrate loyalty to 
German institutions). When Cassirer got wind of this, he approached Cohen and the 
misunderstanding was cleared up. Subsequently, they became close friends. 
17 Vygotstsky discusses Jaensch's work in connection with the function of eidetic images in the 
development of imagination in adolescents in an important paper published in 1931. Later, 
however, in the light of Jaensch's enthusiastic links to National Socialism, Vygotsky fiercely 
criticised his pro-fascist views in a blistering polemical pamphlet, Fascism in Psychoneurology, 
1934. Hans Gadamer remembers Marburg in the twenties. He recalls that he was puzzled by an 
eminent philosopher's interest in experimental psychology: 'What kind of philosophical interest 
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could experimental psychology possibly have? We did have a fellow student who had prepared a 
dissertation with Jaensch on the learning capacity of chickens, and we certainly questioned this 
student whenever we ran into him ... about Jaensch himself I obviously knew nothing -he seemed 
to me to be not at all philosophically interesting.' (Gadamer, 1900, p15-16) 
But there is more to be said. Erich Jaench continued at Marburg until his death in 1940. His work 
on 'eidetic images' - the traces of impressions of material by the after effect of actual experiences 
(,photographic memory'), where memory is close to perception itself - secured his international 
reputation. (Vygotsky, 1994c, p.143). In the thirties, however, he immersed himself in National 
Socialist politics. Here is the German -Jewish philosopher, Karl Lowith's description of Marburg 
at the time: 
Marburg University has shrunk at the same rate as the building of barracks progressed, 
and the number of theology students has been reduced from 700 to around 120. The 
dominant figure in the fore ground of all this bustling activity is E. Jaensch, a bachelor 
of about fifty with strong psychopathic tendencies. He has thrown himself into the 
movement [National Socialism] to experience his rejuvenation in the 'awakening of 
youth'. All his innumerable lectures were about 'the German human being'. The so 
called Marburg school (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer), being a Jewish-liberal affair, is no 
longer listed under the philosophical faculty in the last Guide to Marburg University' for 
1939-1940 (Karl Lowith,1994, p.105) 
Lowith emigrated in 1933. In his autobiography he describes the changes that were made to the 
classification system of the philosophical libraries in line with a 'species specific' concept of 
science. He explains that there were four areas in all, the fourth being 'the schools of Jewish-
Liberal dissolution'. This area was sub-divided into two sections: liberalist philosophy and Jewish 
dominated schools. The second section included Marburg neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, 
Lebensphilosophie, Jewish legal thought Jewish cultural philosophy, Jewish aestheticism, Jewish 
mathematics and the relativity theory. (Lowith, K 1994, p153) 
18 Gershem Scholem once remarked that 'among Cohen's critics there was a nationalistic and mild 
but unmistakable anti-semitic orientation' 18 Such remarks remind us that the events and ideas 
under discussion issued from the lethal entanglements of cultural (and racial) politics that criss-
crossed twentieth century European science. 
19 Paul Cassirer published Hemich Mann, Wedekind, Rosa Luxemburg and Ernst Bloch. 
2°Cassirer writes, 'In my book Sustanzbegrijfund Funktionsbegrijf(191O) I started from the 
assumption that the basic and constitutive law of knowledge can most clearly be demonstrated 
where knowledge has reached its highest level of necessity and universality. This law was 
therefore sought in the field of mathematics and the exact sciences in the foundations of 
mathematical-physical objectivity. Accordingly the form of knowledge as these defined 
coincided essentially with the form of exact science. Both in content and in method The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms has gone beyond this initial formulation of the problem. It has 
broadened the concept of theory itself by striving to show that there are formative factors of a 
truly theoretical kind which govern the shaping not only of the natural world view implicit in 
perception and intuition. And finally, the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms was driven even beyond 
the natural world view of experience and observation when the mythical world disclosed 
relationships which, though not [amenable] to the laws of empirical thinking, are by no means 
without their laws and reveal a structural form of specific and independent character'. The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,the Phenomenology of Knowledge(1929) , Vol.III, p.xiii 
21 The story of Cassirer' s work in translation need not detain us here, but it should be recognised 
that it has affected the way in which Anglo-American readers have come to view him. In England 
and the USA Cassirer has been regarded primarily as a philosopher of science, or as an historian 
of European Enlightenment thought. In Germany and on the continent more widely, he has been 
seen as a neo-Kantian epistemologist of the Marburg School, with the exception of France where 
he has been recognised as an expert on Descartes. When Cassirer went to Yale in 1941 he was 
welcomed as a philosopher of science due to the fact hat an early chapter on Einstein's theory of 
relativity happened to be available in translation. His major work The Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms was unknown outside a small circle of Germanist philosophers who studied texts in the 
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original. Hardly anyone realised that Cassirer had developed a distinctive philosophy of his own, 
and it was against this background that friends encouraged him to publish in order to gain wider 
recognition. What started out as an attempt to introduce The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms to an 
Anglo-American readership actually prompted him to develop a fresh set of perspectives on 
themes that had occupied him throughout his life. It was in this context that Susanne Langer 
discovered Cassirer's work, and he remained for her primarily a theorist of art. 
22 The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol.III, p.196. 
23Where did Cassirer's foundational concept of symbolic pregnance come from? The answer is 
that it came chiefly through Cassirirer's contact with Gestalt psychologists. Indeed, the term, 
symbolic pregnance was first used by Max Wertheimer in the context of the psychology of 
perception. The Berlin School, Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka and Lewin thought that 
understanding the nature of perceptual fields is the key to understanding perception. Perception, 
they argued, cannot be captured as a combination of bare sensations that can be used to explain 
more complex entities, in the way that Cartesian psychology had attempted to do. Behind the 
Gestalt School lies the philosophy of Franz Brentano. In Chapter 4 I argued the case that 
Brentano clarified the fundamental methodological issues of psychology in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. He taught principally in Wiirzburg and Vienna. Christian Von Ehrenfels, 
along with Husserl, attended a series of seminal lectures in Vienna where he came under the spell 
of Brentano's ideas. Von Ehrenfels formulated the concept of gestalt to describe psychological 
events whose characteristics could not be captured adequately by the mechanical aggregation of 
separate elements. Thus he stood the Cartesian precept, that complex structures must be 
explained in terms of simple ones, on its head. He showed how, for instance, a melody depends 
upon a certain kind of order - a set of relations between elements rather than the elements 
themselves. Wertheimer, one of his students, along with Kohler and Koffka extended the 
application of the concept of gestaltqualitiit to investigations in the psychology of perception. 
They argued that perception has to be explained in terms of psychological wholes, and not, in an 
atomistic fashion, as bundles of bare sensations. Husserl was also deeply impressed by Brentano's 
lectures in Vienna. He once remarked that without him, 'I should have written not a single word 
of philosophy.' Husserl it was who transformed Brentano's, descriptive psychology into 
phenomenological philosophy. Karl Stumpf was another philosopher who came under Brentano's 
influence. When he was appointed to a chair of philosophy in Berlin in 1895, he was given the 
task of establishing an institute of psychology. He gathered together a group of researchers that 
included Werthemier (who had previously studied with Ehrenfels), Kohler, Koffka and Lewin. 
Stumpf established a strict research methods programme that aimed to give psychology secure 
philosophical foundations. Far from constraining the development of psychology as discipline 
within philosophy, this rigorous grounding contributed to the success of the Berlin School, and, 
especially to the development of experimental-descriptive research methods. The publication of 
Psychologishe Forshung in 1922 marked the beginning of an extraordinary productive decade 
and the emergence of Berlin Gestalt psychology. Kohler succeeded Stumpf as Director at the 
Institute in 1922, and the journal continued up until 1938, when it was suppressed by the National 
Socialists23 Subsequently,Gestalt research became an important influence on Cassirer's 
philosophy of symbolic forms and, in particular, his use of the theory of symbolic pregnance. 
24 Krois, M. (1987) p.56. 
25 Krois, M. (1987) p.57. 
26 Krois, M. (1987) p.56-57. 
27 Krois, M. (1987) p.57-58. 
28 A great deal turns on just this insight. See, for instance, Mearleau-Ponty's work The Body as 
Expression, (1945) where he develops his theory of word-meaning and of the relation of thought 
to speech. Mearleau-Ponty draws extensively on The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, and the 
empirical psychological research to which Cassirer refers in the third volume, The 
Phenomenology of Knowledge. 
29 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.202 
30 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.202. 
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31 Cassirer, E. (1929) pp.206-207. 
32 See Chapter 2 for my discussion of this theme. 
33 During the second half of the nineteenth century, both psychologically oriented linguists and 
linguistically oriented psychologists had produced competing accounts of the relations between 
mind and the natural world. Von Humboldt's original insight into the 'world-disclosing' power of 
language was taken up by several language oriented psychologists, (especially Herbart, Lazarus, 
Steinthal and Wundt), but progress was slow because they failed to grasp the foundational 
character of language analysis for psychology .. Rather they were trying to establish psychology as 
a propadeutic science. 
Wundt began with physiology. He thought that signification was an important dimension of 
psychological inquiry, but he saw no reason to revise his methodology. Rather, he expected that 
ethno-psychological research (data drawn from languages, myth, religion jurisprudence and art 
and so on) would complement the findings of experimental psychology. Wundt was left stranded 
by developments in philosophy, where the influence of Brentano on psychology spread, and in 
language studies, where de Saussure's account of language as a self-regulating system 
reconfigured linguistics. With the advent of structural linguistics, individual psychology was no 
longer necessary to account for linguistic change. 
34 Cassirer, E. (1929) p. 208. 
35 Cassirer, E. (1929) p. 208. 
36 Cassirer, E. (1929) p. 210. 
37 Cassirer, E. (1929) p. 88 
38 Cassirer, E. (1929) p. 89-90 
39 Cassirer, E. (1929) pp.89-90 
40 As von Humboldt phrases it, 'The individual man is always connected with the whole ... From 
whatever aspect one may look at it his life is necessarily tied to sociality ... every individual bears 
within him the collective essence of man, though only on a single line of development.' 
(Humboldt, W. von (1989a) Kawi Introduction, pAl) 
41 Here is a sidelight that helps to clarify the significance and the scope of the ideas I have been 
discussing. The Soviet psychologists, Vygotsky and Luria wrote a seminal article, Tool and 
Symbol in Child Development, shortly after the publication of The Phenomenology of 
Knowledge. 41 They take up the philosophical problem that Cassirer addressed: 
We discussed the indirect nature of psychological operations as a specific feature of the 
structure of higher psychological functions. It would be a great mistake however to 
believe that this process appears in a purely logical way, that it is invented and 
discovered by the child in the form of a lightening quick guess (a so-called 'aha' 
reaction), thanks to which the child once and for all comes to realise the relation between 
the sign and the method of using it, resulting in this entire operation's further 
development along purely deductive lines. It would be equally wrong to believe that the 
symbolic attitude to some stimuli is reached intuitively by the child, derived as it were 
from the depths of the child's own spirit, or that symbolization is the primary and further 
irreducible Kantianfacultas signatrix, from the beginning part of human consciousness 
capable of creating and comprehending symbols. Both these points of view - the 
intellectual and the intuitive - in essence metaphysically dispose of the question of the 
genesis of symbolic activity, since for one of them the higher psychological functions are 
given previous to any experience, as if they were inherent to consciousness and only 
waiting an opportunity to manifest themselves upon meeting with the empiric perception 
of things. This point of view leads inevitably to an a priori conception of the higher 
psychological functions (see Cassirer-my emphasis). For the other point of view, the 
question concerning the higher mental functions poses no problem at all, since it 
postulates that signs are invented and after that all corresponding forms of behaviour are 
deduced from them as conclusions from logical premises.(Valsiner and Van der Veer, 
1994, p.147) 
The fact that Vygotsky knew Cassirer's work is incontrovertible. However, we cannot take it for 
granted because there are so few direct references. As I suggested earlier this is chiefly owing to 
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ideological battles after Lenin's death in 1925, when neo-Kantian idealism was damned. Yet 
throughout the twenties, some Soviet psychologist remained in close touch with the work of 
contemporary Western (especially German) researchers in a way that became dangerous during 
the Stalinist era. Indeed, Vygotsky's writings are full of references to 'Western' psychologists 
such as Stern, who was a close friend of the Cassirer's in Hamburg. He also kept in touch with the 
Gestalt school in Berlin, whose members included Wertheimer - whom Vygotsky once described 
as one of the most outstanding contemporary psychologists of the day - Koffka, Lewin (who was a 
personal acquaintance) and Kohler, whose work on primates is described in unusual detail in the 
book Vygotsky wrote with Luria, published in 1930. Additionally, Vygotky followed the research 
of Karl and Charlotte Buhler, whose work on child development, language and methodology in 
Vienna Vygotsky frequently discusses. It is helpful to see that Vygotsky, far from being an 
'isolated genius' who was 'ahead of his time' and who 'fell foul' of hostile conditions in the 
Soviet Union (though it is true that Vygotsky lost support under Stalin) belonged to a 
constellation of Central and East European thinkers of extraordinary philosophical sophistication 
and rigour. This constellation also included Ernst Cassirer. 
Besides, Vygotsky knew some of these people personally. For instance, Kurt Lewin visited 
Vygotsky in November 1931, and there exists an extensive correspondence between them. In 
1933, when Lewin was returning from a congress in the USA, he learned that the National 
Socialists had seized power. He waited in Moscow, from where he could contact Berlin. During 
this difficult time, he visited Vygotsky's home. Shortly afterwards, after consulting colleagues 
including Kohler, he decided to emigrate. (He wrote to Kohler, 'I now know that there is no other 
choice for me but to emigrate, even though it will tear my life apart'. Lewin's mother and sister 
died later in the camps). Psychologische Forschung was the journal that Luria,and other Soviet 
psychologists chose to publish their work in the West. Clearly, it was an important source for 
Vygotsky, who translated and edited a great deal of the Gestalt research himself. His concept of 
inner-speech owes much to the work of Kurt Goldstein, (although it goes back to von Humboldt), 
and I am keen to know more, for instance, about Vygotsky's reading of the great nineteenth 
century Ukranian von Humboldt scholar, Alexander Poebnja. 
The links among the intellectual traditions that both Vygotsky and Cassirer worked in deserve 
fuller investigation if only because Vygotsky shared a German philosophical outlook for all the 
important differences between them. (Vygotsky was not an idealist!) Explaining the role of signs 
- not just speech - in the development of the higher mental functions was one of Vygotsky' s 
greatest achievements. With Luria, he formulates the crucial insight like this: ' ... a broader study 
of other forms of symbolic activity of the child shows that not only speech but all operations 
related to the use of signs, their different concrete forms notwithstanding, are governed by the 
same laws of development, structuring and functioning as ... speech' , and he goes on to make the 
connection between the elementary forms of psychological behaviour, and 'second order' 
symbolic processes that constitute the higher mental functions. 
42 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.2IO. 
43 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.224. 
44 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.224. 
45 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.224. 
46 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.227. 
47 Cassirer, E. (1929) p.228. 
48 Cassirer, E. (1929) pp.273-274) 
49 Vygotsky, L. S. (1994b) 'Imagination and Creativity of the Adolescent' first published in the 
original Russian 1931, in The Vygotsky Reader, edited by Jaan Val siner and Rene Van Der Veer, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, pp.266-289. 
50 Cassirer, E. (1929) p. 275. 
51 Hans Georg Gadamer's recalls Heidegger's striking manner oflecturing at in the twenties like 
this: 
It is impossible to exaggerate the drama of Heiddegger's appearance in Marburg. Not 
that he was out for sensation. His appearance in the lecture hall certainly had something 
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of a guaranteed effectiveness to it, but the unique thing about his person and his teaching 
lay in the fact that he identified himself fully with his work and radiated from that work. 
Because of him the lecture format became something totally new. It was no longer the 
'lesson presentation' of a professor who put his energy into research and 
publication ... Who can forget the acerbic polemics with which he characatured the 
cultural and educational goings-on of those times ... who can forget the sarcasm with 
which he characterised colleagues and contemporaries? Who among those who then 
followed him can forget the breathtaking swirl of questions that he developed in the 
introductory hours of the semester for the sake of entangling himself in the second or 
third of these questions and then, in the final hours of the semester, rolling up the deep-
dark clouds of sentences from which the lightening flashed to leave us stunned. 
(Gadamer, H. G.Philosophical Apprenticeships, 1985, pA8) 
52 Heidegger, M. (1997) p.203. 
53 Heiddeger, M. (1997) p.205. 
54 Just as Cassirer attempted to take the theory of knowledge to a fundamental level, Heidegger 
sought a theory of being, a fundamental ontology that would take him beyond the limits of 
Western rationality. The key feature of this fundamental ontology is his notion of the 
prestructuring of understanding. Whereas the thinkers of the Enlightenment consciously opposed 
and systematically criticised ways that prejudices and preconceptions distort rational 
understanding, Heidegger, by contrast, contends that, unavoidably, presuppositions and prejudices 
are what make understandings possible in the first place. In a Hermeneutic sense, they constitute 
our 'being-in-the-world' (Dasein) at the very deepest levels. For Heidegger, the interpretation of 
meaning is always a matter of clarifying what we have already grasped. Our involvement in the 
world, he says, is always pre-disclosed in the language we inhabit. (Later, Foucault would 
elaborate a similar theory of selves constituted - and regulated - by historically produced 
discourses). On this view, meaning is inevitably and always a projection of our prior 
understandings. It is a 'way' of experiencing in which, whether we are reflexively aware of it or 
not, our whole understanding of existence is, as Heidegger taught, - 'fatally - committed' 
55 Hans Georg Gadamer, who studied with Heidegger in the twenties, has carried forward many of 
Heidegger's original insights into his own 'philosophical hermeneutics'. (Here is proof, if proof 
were needed, of the continuing power of some of Heidegger' s ideas, especially in the humanities). 
Gadamer returns to the problem of reaching understanding between people speaking different 
languages: 
Where reaching an understanding sees to be impossible because we 'speak different 
languages,' hermeneutics is not at an end. Here the hermeneutic task poses itself in its 
full seriousness, namely as the task of finding a common language. (Gadamer, (1985) 
pI80.) 
Gadamer clarifies what 'finding a common language' entails. On his view, learning a new 
language is more than just the 'appropriation' of another tongue. He speaks of 'growing into 
language' (my emphasis) and 'language as a mode of gaining knowledge of the world'. 
'Experience realises itself' he says, 'in ongoing communicative improvement of our knowledge of 
the world'. Characteristically, Gadamer insists that experience is always 'knowledge of the 
known'. On this view, the preconditions of our experiencing the world are given to us by 
'tradition'. In other words, the world as it is linguistically disclosed precedes us: 
[the world] is communicatively experienced and constantly given over to us as an 
infinitely open task. It is not a world of the first day but one that is already handed down 
to us ... Philosophising does not begin at some zero point but must think and speak with 
the language we already possess. (Gadamer,(1985), p18l. 
The picture of language as 'world-constituting' comes largely from von Humboldt. On his view, 
world-outlooks are linguistically inscribed. This insight emerged in the light of Von Humboldt's 
preoccupation with the evolution of languages and their relation to the mentalities of the peoples 
and nations who speak them. It may appear that linguistically inscribed world-views are always 
self-enclosed, and that reality is always already absorbed into one's own linguistic 'horizon' 
(Gadamer). But such a picture of language ignores the basic fact that people want to reach 
agreement about things in a shared world and the states of affaires that surround them. Everyday 
social intercourse depends on reaching common understandings about things around us. This may 
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appear too obvious to mention, but around the turn of the last century, many theories of language 
- or, more accurately, speech - did not appear to take it into account. 
Indeed, von Humboldt was the first person to grasp the world-forming character of speech 
together with the role of the second person, the interlocutor, in relation to things and states of 
affairs in the world. Philosophical hermeneutics developed the former insight but neglected the 
latter. Thus, it lost sight of the universal dimensions of speech that enable us to reach 
intersubjective agreement about things that have an independent existence in the world. Cassirer, 
discovered in Von Humboldt's picture of language such a universal dimension. He writes in the 
passage I quoted already (see p.9) 'without such rudimentary universality all understanding of 
others, human life within the medium of speech would be impossible.' Crucially, he understands 
this as a fundamental ethical principle as well as a feature of language. Again, his source is Von 
Humboldt, who writes: 
'The individual man is always connected with the whole ... from whatever aspect one 
may look at it, his life is necessarily tied to sociality ... Mental cultivation, even in the 
loneliest seclusion of temperament is equally possible only through language and the 
latter requires to be directed to another being that understands it.' 
For Cassirer, this was 'the clearest evidence and sure proof' that common humanity stands above 
self-enclosed individuality. 
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Chapter 6 
'Grinding the Wind': 
Excavating Memory and Imagination in a London 
Classroom 
Slave. The little boy had heard the word for the first time and when the 
teacher explained the meaning he had a strange feeling. The feeling you get 
when someone relates a murder. Thank God he wasn't ever a slave. He or 
his father or his father's father. Thank God nobody in Barbados was ever a 
slave. 
George Lamming, In the Castle of My Skin, l 
Piece of the Past was a poem written by Kevin, a Black pupil, in a London 
secondary school in the early eighties. It tells of a party of schoolchildren in 
Montserrat who set off for a walk one chilly morning, led by the village 
schoolteacher, Teacher Lincoln. Along the way they stop to rest and some of the 
children begin to explore some ruins nearby. Teacher Lincoln, a stern disciplinarian, 
calls the children back, but not before one child, the poet, manages to peer inside a 
disused windmill. The windmill is a reminder of plantation slavery, but the fact 
passes unnoticed because no mention of it is forthcoming. It is only later, in a 
London classroom, when the boy is much older, that the windmill's true significance 
is grasped. 'I never knew at the time,' he reflects, 'I had an idea with no real 
meaning.' 
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This chapter is about the relationship between history, memory and imagination 
from the standpoint of a child's learning and development. The story I shall be 
telling will concern the way that a childhood memory was shaped by an adolescent's 
emergent understanding of the history of plantation slavery. In the West Indies 
windmills are reminders of the fields of cane that had once 'crept like an open 
secret' across the sugar estates of the islands. For those who reflect on their 
significance, they are unofficial loci memoriae, places of remembrance for the way 
they call to mind the fate of enslaved Africans in the New World. (By contrast, 
commercial representations of windmills that are frequently reproduced on posters 
and postcards to evoke the 'romance' of the past seem eerily removed from 
historical realities). By his account, Kevin barely glimpsed the windmill's 
significance at the time, yet it made a powerful impression on the nine-year-old's 
imagination. 
Today, both the landscape and the way of life that he remembered have been utterly 
transformed. Montserrat was recently devastated by volcanic eruptions and now 
much of the island is uninhabitable. When the wind blows, fresh layers of volcanic 
dust cover the landscape and its once familiar features are eerily transformed. The 
human cost has been immense. Since the eruption, more than half the population has 
left the island to work in the United Kingdom. Kevin went to Montserrat when he 
was nine, before the disaster. He was there for only a short time, but the nine-year-
old carried an image of the landscape back to London, where he was reunited with 
his mother. Six years later, when he was fifteen, the image flashed up unexpectedly 
during a heated argument about teaching slavery and the place of Black history in 
the syllabus. 
Children learn how to remember. Their memories develop over time. Indeed, the 
nature of memory among infants and small children differs strikingly from that 
among adolescents and adults. I shall be saying more about these differences, which 
has a lot to do with imagination, in the closing section of this piece. 
'When you are nine years old what you remember seems forever,' wrote Robert 
Penn Warren, 'You remember everything, and everything is important and stands 
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big, whole and fills up time and is so solid that you could walk around and around it 
like a tree and look at it'. A very young child can reproduce perceptions in the 
fullness of the original experience, the richness of concrete tangible details and with 
the vividness of a hallucination? Later, in adolescence, conceptual thinking begins 
to rework concrete sensory images, which in tum start to playa significant role in 
the development of imagination. It has been aptly suggested that, 'adolescence is the 
rapprochement between fantasy and the imagination,.3 
I shall say more about the relations between concrete and abstract thinking in 
relation to memory later, but first I need to distinguish among different kinds of 
memory. We develop our capacities for both the kind of remembering we do when 
we are by ourselves ('autonomous memory'), as well as the kind of remembering we 
do with others ('social' and 'collective' memory). Memory development is a socio-
cultural process as well as a maturational one, though the balance between the two 
processes continues to be a matter for debate among psychologists. Here we shall be 
chiefly concerned with the way that young children and adolescents learn to 
remember by mastering what I am calling here 'technologies of memory' . 
Anthropologists of memory have studied the way that memory has been evolved 
differently among various peoples. In the late nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century, researchers, notably among them, Levy Bruhl, attempted to 
compare memory among so-called 'primitive' and 'developed' peoples.4 Levy Bruhl 
was particularly interested in the way that the character of memory changes over 
time. He claimed that the function of memory alters when an experience is 
condensed into concepts that free individuals from the need to retain quantities of 
sense impressions. Paradoxically, on this view, the development of conceptual 
thinking actually leads to a reduced capacity for recalling concrete particulars, 
especially where these can be stored by other technological means such as pictorial 
and written records. Thus qualitative as well as quantitative differences in memory 
can be traced to differentiated mental functions, which have developed as a 
consequence of technological evolution. Indeed, such a principle was used to explain 
anthropologists' reports of outstanding memory among 'primitive' peoples, where 
the commonest form of memory was 'topographical memory' - the capacity to recall 
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a landscape. Topographical memory in 'primitive' man, it was claimed, involves 
retaining a concrete visual image of a place down to the smallest details. 
In the twenties, the Soviet psychologist, Alexander Luria, stressed the primacy of the 
socio-cultural processes of memory development. Luria was polemicising against 
theorists of 'bio-genetic laws', according to which the development of the 
individual child merely recapitulates in compressed form the developmental path of 
the species. For Luria it was axiomatic that human activity has transformed the 
world as we experience it. 'We are born in a ready cultural and productive 
environment,' he insisted. (And thus we find the world already replete with 
meaning.) Moreover, Luria put culture at the centre of human development. Against 
a bio-genetic picture of development Luria argued that as well as growing and 
maturing, the child is also continually ore-armed' with new skills and new forms of 
behaviour' . In the process of evolution, says Luria, man invented tools (including 
psychological tools) and created culturally productive environments that have 
transformed man himself.5 Through processes of enculturation, Children come into 
possession of an enormous stock of psychological mechanisms enable them to 
master mental operations and to develop higher mental functions. What I shall be 
calling 'technologies of memory' constitute a set of such mechanisms. 
'Technologies of memory' typically include social practices like the 'memory talk', 
which is essentially a culturally evolved way of talking about one's past. 'Memory 
talk' goes on with varying degrees of intensity more or less continually over a 
lifetime. Indeed, family histories are usually passed on from one generation to the 
next by means of 'memory talk' . Memory talk is often organised socially around 
material objects, such as photographs, which help us to recall something of the past. 
In some cases, the power of material objects to evoke the past depends upon their 
personal significance, but there are also publicly shared objects of reference, which 
have been intentionally produced for the purpose of collective recollection. 
And memory is linked to our sense of who we are. From a psychological standpoint, 
in learning to master 'memory talk' children also learn to distinguish between their 
present selves and the younger person, who is also somehow the 'I' that is the 
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'objectified' first person of their stories. Without such a distinction there could be no 
sense of personal continuity or development. Thus, memory and a sense of one's 
own identity are inseparably connected. 
The notion that recollection is a form of active perception and that it is essentially 
context bound is an especially interesting one for us to consider here. Such a notion 
rests on the idea that mind contributes to what is recalled. It does so variously, and 
according to particular circumstance. On this view, contingent needs, past 
experience and present interests govern acts of perceiving. It follows from this 
(phenomenological) point of view that memory cannot be thought about as the 
bedrock of autobiographical truth because memories are actively perceived - re-
imagined and re-interpreted, re-read, if you like - in new situations. What is more, 
context becomes not so much the external setting for recollection, but rather 
something that enters into the process in a fundamentally constitutive way. On this 
view, there is no such thing as 'invariant memory' - memory that holds past 
experiences once and for all. Rather it is the case that the past is continually remade. 
Today, it is a commonplace that identity cannot be described accurately as the 
'cumulative register of past experience'. Such common sense descriptions 
underestimate the contribution of mind to the processes of constructing experience 
and investing it with meaning. They underestimate, that is, the way the past is 
remade in new contexts. Further to this, on a 'constructionist' view of experience, 
we are prompted to reflect on the problem of the mediated nature of memory, and 
the fact that the mediational 'technologies' - the means by which we remember - are 
socially distributed. Such reflections point us towards a fully social picture of 
memory. 
Identity, then, cannot be described adequately as something that is uniquely 
individual. Rather, it is something that is socially and, in a certain sense, collectively 
produced. Yet we are conscious of individual 'selves'. Intuitively, my sense of the 
person I am seems somehow bound up with (and indeed dependent upon) my 
recollections of all that has happened to me - the totality of which no one else could 
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possibly know - right up to the moment that I do the recalling. So what is it that I 
recall, then, if it is not what actually happened? 
One psychologist has recently formulated the question for memory researchers like 
this: 'Can past experience be repeated, or is it necessarily - psychologically and 
neurologically - constructed anew in each memory event or act of recall?' 6 The 
argument is that body changes and alterations in consciousness make the recovery of 
the past, psychologically and neurologically impossible. The implication is that 
identity, very much like the past, is continually reinvented. And, crucially, such 're-
inventions' depend on symbolisation - symbolisation, that is, in the sense that 
Cassirer envisioned it. Moreover, there is an ethical side to autobiography, which is 
to do with the sharing of human experience by which common humanity is achieved. 
The sociality of autobiographical fiction is crucial here precisely for the way that it 
suggest~owerful ethical dimension to symbolising that might otherwise be missed. 
Charles Taylor has identified a serious difficulty with theories of the self where the 
production of autobiographical 'fictions' is pictured as a wholly individual business. 
Intriguingly, his identification of such a difficulty has led him back to the picture of 
language that comes down to us from Herder and von Humboldt. An individualistic 
picture may capture something of the constructive and the creative nature of 
expressive language, and it may capture, too, something of the power of self-
discovery, but significantly it misses the 'dialogical setting', that binds each of us to 
one another.7 About the importance of the 'dialogic relations' in the shaping of 
'selves', Taylor says this, 
The general feature of human life that I want to evoke is its fundamentally 
dialogic character. We become fully human agents, capable of understanding 
ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich 
human languages of expression. For purposes of this discussion, I want to 
take 'language' in a broad sense, covering not only the words we speak but 
also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the 
languages of art, of gesture, of love and the like. But we are inducted into 
these exchanges by others. No one acquires the languages need for self-
definition on their own. We are introduced to them through exchanges with 
others who matter to us - what George Herbert Mead called' significant 
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others'. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not 'monolo~ical, ' 
not something each accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical. 
According to Taylor, we learn to tell stories about ourselves, not in isolation, but 
rather in dialogue with others. And the life-stories we tell and retell are always 
addressed to others, even when we are alone, because we have already internalised 
'others who matter to us'. We each of us have many voices in our heads besides the 
one we think of as our own. 
I find Taylor's argument a compelling one. First, he broadens his conception of 
language (because the picture of language which structural linguistics holds out is 
too narrow for what he wants to explore) to include a wide range of human 
'expressivity', an idea that he traces back to Herder and von Humboldt. Secondly, 
Taylor explicitly links a broad conception of dialogic relations and expressivity to 
Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. 9 Thirdly, he shows precisely how 
Cassirer's contemporary, Martin Heidegger and his views of language stood 
squarely in the Herder tradition of picturing language as a 'world disclosing' 
medium. Indeed, with Heidegger, especially in his later work, it is not humans who 
speak but language itself that discloses the conditions of 'being' .10 
Contemporary psychologists frequently underscore the central role of narrative in 
the development of memory. Typically, they draw on the nineteenth-century 
American pragmatist, William James, as well as the American cognitive 
psychologist, Jerome Bruner. Bruner argues that our sense of continuous identity is 
produced through acts of self-narration. Indeed, our whole sense of ourselves, our 
life histories, are to a great extent dependent on memory, while memory itself, of 
course, is organised by the already established narrative forms - the distinctive 
genres - that that make up, or, indeed, make possible, life-histories. 
Further to this, autobiographical memory emerges on the socio-cultural plane 
because narration relies upon culturally evolved forms and social practices - what I 
have been calling the 'technologies of remembrance'. The stories we tell about 
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ourselves borrow from the forms and structures that we encounter culturally as well 
as those that we're-invent' for ourselves with others in mind. Thus what has 
traditionally been thought about as the private realm of individual experience turns 
out to be to be something that has been socially and culturally constructed. 
Children meet public as well as domestic 'technologies of remembrance'. They are 
shown, and they discover for themselves officially designated 'sites of memory' , 
'lieux de memoire'. Official 'sites of memory' typically include the monumental 
architecture we meet everywhere in cities. Such sites serve to remind people of large 
narratives, the story of the nation for instance, into which personal, family and 
community narratives are typically woven. Metropolitan 'sites of memory', which 
often echo the styles classical antiquity (for the way they suggest enduring values), 
are coeval with the emergence of the modem state. They consciously aim to evoke 
collective memories of ancient (imperial) civilizations to evoke the grand narrative 
of the history of humankind. 
In the modem era, self-conscious attempts to memorialise national politics began on 
a large scale with the French Revolution, when the lacobins attempted to create a 
new kind of citizen and to perpetuate the radical ideals of the new revolutionary and 
order by commissioning buildings, monuments and statues. This was part of a grand 
plan to redesign Paris, though the plan was never realised. And 'Lieux de memo ire ' 
have conservative effects as well as radical ones. Monumental architecture -
particularly the neo-classical architecture of the imperial metropolis - conveys an 
aura of solidity, coherence and continuity to citizens of cosmopolitan capitals who 
might otherwise experience cities as impermanent, fragmented, dislocated 
environments - and thus open to change. 
Modem states then have invested specific 'patrimonial sites' with enduring and 
emotive symbolic significance by associating designated buildings and monuments 
with events of national historical importance. The years immediately following the 
Great War were especially good ones for sculptors (usually seconded to the Ministry 
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of Information), who received commissions for designing war memorials. The 
Cenotaph in Whitehall is an obvious example. 'Sites of remembrance' have been 
important for the state's project of 'nation building' and national consolidation, 
particularly where they have attempted to create a sense of a shared national 
'experience' - a memory of collective sacrifice that is both real and imagined. 11 
States organise public acts of collective mourning in connection with its loci 
memoriae. Despite the fact that grief is usually thought of as a private emotion, 
observing a minute's silence was instituted by the State to organise and to structure 
public expressions of grief. Citizens are meant to share -collectively - exactly the 
same thoughts and emotions, together, at one and the same time. Additionally, 
officially designated moments of commemoration provide large structures of 
national memory, just as national 'feelings' are organised through and regulated by 
collective acts of remembrance. What has been called the 'memory nation' (the 
image of the nation's past in the memories of its citizens) has been a compelling 
principle of social identity and cohesion ever since modem states began. Indeed, 
sites of memory encode sets of 'enduring' civic values (especially the public virtues 
of service and self-sacrifice) that together figure the ideal of the nation - what the 
nation 'stands for', what it 'means'. 
As a consequence to all of this, the way that children learn that official 'loci 
memoriae' carry potent public meanings not only marks an important stage in their 
mastering cultural 'technologies' of remembrance, it is also one of the chief ways 
that they learn about and imagine their place in society. 
Official, public 'sites of memory' then both organise and frame private memories by 
providing common structures and by establishing common points of reference for 
the citizenry of an 'imagined' people, what we might call a 'memory nation' . 
Historical sites and landmarks that have been invested with public significance 
supply the 'master narratives' of an official national past into which individual's 
unofficial stories are inserted. Thus they shape, but never wholly prefigure the 
historically evolved, taken-for-granted national life-worlds that citizens habitually 
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inhabit, and which give their ordinary actions meaning. Seen from this perspective, 
social memory is a maj or constitutive dimension of everyday life. 
However, the meanings of 'lieux de memoire' are never wholly fixed. Rather, they 
mediate social meanings and as a consequence, there is always a degree of 
indeterminacy. Despite official efforts to stabilise their meanings, they frequently 
provoke public discussion and dispute whenever questions of national identity is a 
subject of debate. 'Lieux de memoire' therefore are also sites of public contestation, 
especially during moments of national crisis. 
* * * 
A recent, large-scale French study of 'lieux de memoire' took as its starting point 
the alleged erosion of the so-called 'memory nation' that it is claimed has taken 
place over the past twenty years. 12 In its place there has been a proliferation of 
'patrimonial' sites of memory that reflects the multiplication of conflictual social 
identities, many of which are to do with the multi-ethnic, multi-racial character of 
contemporary French society. 13 At the outset, the study of national memory 
promised a redefinition of French national identity at a critical moment when racism 
was resurfacing on the national political scene. The study, which was begun at a 
moment in post-war politics marked by the resurgence of nationalism, has stressed 
the French revolutionary heritage that, it is often claimed, abolished ethnicity and 
race in its definition of French citizenship. I mentioned this earlier in connection 
with the circumstances surrounding the setting up of the French education system 
after the Revolution. 
At least one reviewer has noticed that what is missing from the French study is what 
he calls 'a national memory of immigration'. The notion of a 'memory of 
immigration' is an intriguing one, but in some ways it is deeply ambiguous. 
Ambiguity arises partly from the absence of concrete 'lieux de memo ire , in the daily 
lives of recent immigrants, which is in one sense what this chapter is about. For the 
first generation, so-called 'memory of immigration' is linked chiefly to sites that are 
usually geographically as well as temporally distant. Indeed, the ways that 
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immigrants relate to 'lieux de memoire' that they meet in new settings on a daily 
basis constitutes one the mechanisms that engender a sense of 'foreignness' and 
dislocation. As a consequence of the absence of concrete 'lieux de memoire' 
immigrants rely chiefly on representations. 
It is a curious consequence of the way that we are apt to speak about national 
memory that immigrants may 'learn' the significance of sites of remembrance 
without being able to 'remember' them. Memory is often spoken about in this 
context as a kind of patrimony that is somehow passed on from one generation to the 
next. Indeed, local memory can be jealously guarded as the 'shared patrimony' of a 
particular community. Indeed, it may be said to define certain communities. This is 
especially the case where memories of past injustices and collective sacrifices have 
been concerned. From time to time, serious difficulties arise from liberal notions of a 
plural 'national' tradition, because memories of conflict, which relate directly to 
historical relations of domination and subordination, sometimes resurface with 
surprising ferocity. 
Thus collective memories can also divide people. They can engender a powerful 
sense of 'natural' entitlement and constitute people as members or as non-members 
of particular social groups, each with its own particular history of relation to the 
'host' nation as well as a stake in the shared, national patrimony. Where the 
historical relation has been one of coloniser and colonised, collective memory will 
recall histories of domination and subordination. Indeed, common sites of 
remembrance (and their representations) frequently evoke memories of past conflicts 
and sacrifices among the various communities that make up the nation as a whole. 
And for the second and third generations of immigrants, things become especially 
problematic. Kevin's story is a case in point. When he set about making sense of 
slavery in a context where there was only a feint trace of shared remembrance, we 
should not underestimate the difficulty he was facing. This is how one contemporary 
historian has formulated the problem: 'the experience of millions of individuals who 
were the victims of slavery is not collectable; it is unrecoverable as a set of relics. 
There can be no archaeology of the memory of slavery that corresponds to an 
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emotional identification with a lost reality' .14 And yet, as one of Kevin's classmates 
put it, 'it's actually history ... we can't just skip history. And skip the whole matter 
of slavery' . 
With slavery, 'lieux de memoire' are curiously problematic. It is a measure of the 
continuing importance of sites of memory to the state that recent legislation (2002) 
has made it possible to 'rescue' and 'protect' English Heritage sites abroad. There is 
talk of restoring Georgian and Victorian edifices in Barbados, Jamaica and Antigua. 
For instance, there are plans to restore Barrett House. Built in 1799, Barrett House 
was the opulent sugar planters' home of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's ancestors. 
Today it has fallen into disrepair and the aim is to restore it. Paradoxically, today, 
such buildings are now thought worthy of preservation chiefly for their architectural 
merit and their literary associations. But how should the descendants of the slaves 
who worked on the sugar plantations relate to them? 
Derek WaJ1;ott wrestles with just this problem in his quasi-metaphysical poem, 
Ruins of a Great House. Ruins constitutes a particularly searching, though not 
entirely successful exploration of the kind of difficulty I have been describing. 
Moreover, it sheds a revealing light on Kevin's own poem, Piece of the Past. Where 
there was an absence of an official 'lieux de memo ire , commemorating slavery, in 
Montserrat as well as in London - something that might provide a common focus 
for 'an emotional identification with the lost reality of slavery' - Kevin fashioned an 
'unofficial' one in a poem. He did so partly from 'personal' memory, (it is an 
poignant irony that the features of the landscape he remembered had been buried 
beneath the accumulated layers of volcanic dust), partly from the history syllabus, 
partly with the help of his teachers and his peers in school, and partly - this is crucial 
- from his imagination. 
* * * 
What lay behind the, large-scale study of 'lieux de memoire'? French thinkers have 
been especially concerned with the mechanisms of social memory, and I want to 
recover something of the intellectual history of such concerns to give depth to my 
discussion of memory and imagination. The French tradition of researching into 
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links among memory, citizenship and nationhood goes back directly to the sociology 
of Emile Durkheim, and to work on social memory by his younger associate 
Maurice Halbwachs. Durkheim's sociology took shape in the aftermath of the 
Prussian war, at a time when the fabric of French national culture and society 
seemed to be disintegrating. It was shaped by an intense desire to delineate precisely 
what binds societies - especially nations - together. 
Today, political interest in such themes has been powerfully rekindled. The presence 
of immigrants and asylum seekers in Western Europe has sparked national debates 
over immigration policies, much as it has in the United Kingdom. Definitions of 
national citizenship are presently being contested in culturally plural societies 
wherever the question of assimilation into the 'national culture' comes to the fore. In 
the aftermath to the Franco-Prussian war, Durkheim was particularly interested in 
the role of education as a source of social (and national) cohesion. From the 
perspectives of Republican nationalism, he wanted to establish a secular foundation 
for national solidarity. 
Halbwachs' work on the nature of collective memory stemmed from the tradition of 
sociological enquiry that Durkheim established. However, sociology was not 
Halbwachs' starting point. He started out as a student of the philosopher, Henri 
Bergson. It was only later that he turned from philosophy towards sociology. The 
two thinkers' contrasting pictures of memory are highly relevant to discussions of 
the social nature of remembrance. 
Bergson made individual intuitions of time the very foundation of his distinctive 
philosophy. On the one hand, for Bergson, the whole of past experience is actually 
present, and forgetting is due to obstacles in the path of recollection. For 
Halb;{wachs on the other hand, memory is always fragmentary and incomplete. 
Crucially, for him, recollection involved piecing together the fragments when we are 
prompted to do so by some external stimulus. 
Eventually, HalbJWachs turned away from Bergson's subjectivist philosophy 
towards the objective sociology of Durkheim. Whereas Bergson claimed that 
individual identity lies in our intuitive grasp of 'inner' time, Durkheim emphasised 
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the social nature of identity, and therefore he investigated the social factors that 
sustain individual consciousness. Halbwach took up the problem of the social nature 
of identity and role of memory in the nineteen twenties, arguing that there are no 
such things as 'individual' memories. Rather, he argued, 'individual' memories are 
always supported by the memories of others. They are both public and shareable, 
and therefore memory always inhabits the domains of the social. On this view, 
memory, indeed mind, extends beyond the confines of the individual's 
consciousness. 
What is more, Halbwachs held out a powerful account of how societies go about 
their acts of remembering. He focused on social contexts (cadres sociaux) within 
which recollection is framed. And he showed the way that individual memory never 
functions independently of words and ideas that the individual has appropriated from 
his or her milieu. On this view memory is always semiotically mediated. And as a 
consequence of this, the business of appropriating semiotic materials from the 
concrete social milieu and learning how to use them is intrinsically part of learning 
to remember. For Halbwachs, therefore, the meaning of individual memories has to 
be sought not only in the recesses of consciousness, but also in the social milieu into 
which a child's life is already immersed. The notion of the concrete social milieu 
will be centrally important when we come to look at how Kevin's poem emerged. 
For the contemporary French historian, Pierre Nora, who directed the large-scale 
study of national memory the pervasiveness of the subject of memory in discourse is 
symptomatic of the diminution of memory as a constitutive dimension of everyday 
life. He claims that modem societies have separated memory off from customs, 
rituals and traditions that memory had 'quietly inhabited' in the pre-modem world. 
According to Nora's, 'lieux de memoire' are the impoverished substitutes of the 
milieux de memoire - the vanishing' environments' of memory - in which pre-
modern societies lived. It is therefore all the more important to grasp the nature of 
memory for those individuals and communities that have made the transition 
suddenly from pre-modem to modem societies, and to envisage what such a 
transition entails. 
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As Halbwach's work suggests, the meanings of individual memories - even the most 
private recollections - cannot be explained apart from the social and cultural 
circumstances of the person who remembers. Kevin's poem, Piece of the Past, 
didn't arrive out of the blue. Rather, it grew out of protracted discussions, debates, 
disputes and, quarrels that the class conducted among themselves and with their 
teachers, over four years. Telling how Piece of the Past came to be written will 
entail recounting events that occurred over a long cycle, that is, reconstructing a 
retrospect of the class's history. 
Through such a retrospect, I want to connect the memory and imagination of a 
young writer to his social milieu. I am not seeking to picture an ideal child, 
abstracted from the concrete circumstances that shaped his life. Rather, I want to 
portray a particular child in history and culture. It was from a definite, culturally 
evolved, socially organised activity, (chiefly, a protracted sequence of Humanities 
lessons), in a concrete social setting (a London comprehensive school), and at a 
given moment in the lives of a group of students that Piece of the Past emerged. 
* * * 
The intersection between learning and instruction and development is at the heart of 
what will follow. It has been claimed that development and instruction have 
different 'rhythms': 'The two processes are interconnected but each of them has its 
own measure' .15 'Instruction' here is meant broadly. It refers to the teaching of 
school knowledge - specifically knowledge framed by the school's Humanities 
syllabus. 'Instruction' typically includes 'instructional resources' - textbooks, 
worksheets and other 'pedagogical apparatus' - the 'artefacts of schooling' -
selected or designed for specific 'instructional purposes' . 
For all that there is a need to describe and explain the social dimensions of 
psychological processes there is also a need to retain a picture of individual 
development. I aim to show how 'instruction' awakened one child's developmental 
processes, and I shall be describing how his psychological processes followed their 
distinctive developmental trajectories. Such trajectories are never continuous. They 
cannot be plotted confidently in advance. Kevin's teacher could not have predicted 
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accurately what Kevin would make of things because he couldn't say for sure what 
would capture this thirteen-year-old 's imagination. Neither could he estimate 
confidently beforehand what Kevin's 'investments' in lessons might be. 
Piece of the Past was an unforeseen outcome of an extended series of lessons in 
which the pupils had a large measure of control over the pace and direction of their 
work. Kevin's poem was not typical of the written work that the class produced. But 
this was no individual, heuristic 'voyage discovery'. Kevin was not like Goethe's 
Wilhelm Meister who learned from experience directly, with no tutor guiding him. 
He did not encounter experiences 'freely'. Rather experiences were organised for 
him. The syllabus provided a common starting point and a framework for study. And 
the teachers' planning process was not at all haphazard. While the work was going 
on, he intervened, kept order, issued instructions, gave detailed advice, supplied 
resources, read, consulted, joked, cajoled, threatened, suggested fresh lines of 
inquiry and struggled to monitor each pupil's progress. 
I shall be touching on themes and topics that appeared on the distant horizon as well 
as mapping the ground the class actually covered. The larger picture is important and 
it must be kept in view. I shall be showing where the pupils' knowledge remained 
undeveloped, as well as suggesting where their future learning might have taken 
them. 
The notion of progress here is a broad, flexible one that seeks to incorporate the 
dynamic of pupils' emergent motives and interests. Learning outcomes could not be 
wholly prefigured because they hinged on too many complicated, intersecting lines 
of development. Sometimes individuals, and at other times the whole group made 
the running. 
'Internal' developmental processes are generally hidden from direct observation, and 
this presents researchers with well-known difficulties. Notwithstanding such 
difficulties my assumption is that development might be reconstructed from 
appropriate evidence. The evidence presented here will typically include 
descriptions of episodes and incidents from lessons (drawn from a teacher's 
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narrative of pupils' practical activity); instances of pupils' writings; transcriptions of 
taped conversations; textbooks, novels, poems, posters, wall displays and more. 
The work of reconstruction here chief! y resembles the historian's task. Around the 
tum of the eighteenth century, von Humboldt described such a task like this: '[AJ 
network of events lies before him in apparent confusion ... he must separate the 
necessary from the accidental, uncover the inner succession, and make visible the 
trul y effective forces' . 16 The kind of historical account of Kevin's development that 
I am after will be a genetic one. I shall be describing a series of transformations in a 
pupil's understandings. But in order to picture a 'learner in history' and not merely a 
trans-historical, ideal one, abstracted from time and place, I shall need to trace 
Kevin's development as it occurred in concrete circumstances. By circumstances I 
mean the social realities that defined his life at the time. 
Kevin was an adolescent Black male, growing up in Hackney in the early years of 
the Thatcher Government. In 1981, the Tory Government, fearing large-scale 
immigration from Hong Kong before the 'handover' to China, redefined citizenship 
for 'peoples of British Dependencies', including the then British citizens of 
Montserrat. They were given 'British Dependency', which amounted to second-class 
citizenship, with no rights to stay in Britain. Naturally, such political developments, 
as well as the national debates around immigration, national identity and citizenship 
that they sparked off affected Kevin's family, just as they affected the lives and 
outlooks of many of his classmates' families. 
I must admit that a comprehensive account of the circumstances that shaped Kevin's 
development over four years remains a practical impossibility. Much of the detail is 
unrecoverable. I shall therefore be concentrating on selected episodes and critical 
incidents from Kevin's 'life' in Humanities lessons. Von Humboldt was 
characteristically sceptical about ever obtaining the historical truth of events. He was 
referring specifically to the tumultuous events of the French Revolution. Rather than 
trying to give a comprehensive, unified account of the past, he aimed 'to give a 
number of facts and observations to create a network of 'semiotic points of 
orientation. Such a network would enable the reader to visualise various 'strands' of 
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social reality, and the 'effective forces at work'. By selecting key episodes and 
incidents I aim to trace a single 'thread' that constitutes the developmental trajectory 
of a 'transitory learner' in history and culture, not an eternal one. 17 
This was an urban, racially and ethnically mixed, all-boys class, where differences in 
identity, culture and language figured largely. There is a peculiar dynamic, born of 
diversity, at work in classrooms like these ones, where boys from various 
backgrounds, with different starting points, work in close proximity. More often than 
not, they settle ways of working together over time. I want to suggest a way of 
thinking about such classrooms as sites of 'cultural making' .18 
I use the term 'site' in two senses. First, I use it as a metaphor borrowed from 
archaeology. 19 I have in mind a notion of classroom excavation - salvaging archives, 
disinterring artefacts, recovering their histories, and generally sifting through the 
material 'remains' that made up the instructional detritus - fragments and shards, 
scattered across a 'pedagogic settlement'. I am interested in what such sites and 
artefacts can tell us of the psychological and social life that went on there. Secondly, 
I use 'site' as a metaphor borrowed from architecture to suggest that something new 
was being constructed too, something that was historically 'new in time', as Walter 
Benjamin puts it, 'not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled with the presence of 
the now - 'Jetztzeit'. 
Typically, contemporary urban classrooms like the one that I shall be describing are 
places where individual and community histories intersect in complicated ways. 
They are places where cultures meet, merge, intermingle and sometimes 
interpenetrate - there is always a degree of permeability. But there is imperviousness 
too. Sometimes cultures grate against one another. Sometimes they clash so that 
sudden, fierce conflicts erupt almost without warning. Individuals and groups battle 
over local hegemonies. There are protracted campaigns too, with long sieges during 
which communities eye one another suspiciously. Such developments cause friction 
in schools. Community-based cultures can interact in discomforting ways. And 
where tensions and conflicts upset established social relations, they frequently 
unsettle or destabilise taken-for-granted assumptions and expectations in ways that 
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challenge teachers. For such reasons, social relations among the pupils - always 
unequal, sometimes disturbingly volatile - will be centrally important here. 
Name-calling - the exchange of ritual insults that goes on furiously every day in 
urban schools - is symptomatic of the kind of continual, inward-facing struggles 
over local status (as well as boredom) that I have in mind. However, the history of 
such practices needs to be appreciated more widely than it is at present. What is 
needed is something like an historically informed ethnography of communications, 
and I shall come back to this later. 
Paradoxically, I want to claim that urban classrooms of the kind I have just 
characterised can also be thought about as infinitely creative places. New ways of 
doing things and new ways of seeing things are continually generated, as I hope to 
show with Kevin's poem. By telling the story of how one boy's poem came to be 
written, and by tracing his writing back to the cardres sociaux, to concrete social 
milieux, I aim to offer a way of reading such classrooms and a way of grasping the 
development that goes on there. Thus, by drawing one thread I hope to show how 
the whole piece was woven. 
* * * 
In the first term of their third year (November 1980) the class studied the movement 
of peoples as a topic in their humanities lessons.2o The majority of the boys were 
from 'West Indian' backgrounds. Two came from Nigerian homes and two from 
Pakistani families. The others were mainly white Londoners, although, typically, 
many of these 'white Londoners' came from Irish and Jewish families. The topic, 
'Why People Moved' (00.11. 80), was approached from a 'world' perspective. 
Instances of migration were chosen from various geographical regions and from 
different historical periods. For instance, the boys looked at the colonisation of 
North America, the Highland clearances, the Atlantic Slave Trade and so on. 
Additionally, they touched on 'internal' migrations, such as the move from the 
countryside to the town during the industrial revolution. No single example was 
studied in depth because there were planned opportunities for further study later in 
the course. Behind such lessons lay an assumption that history, geography, social 
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science and literature could illuminate aspects of contemporary experience of 
migration, and could be taught effectively together in ways that were 
complementary.21 
At the end of a sequence of lessons, lasting about three weeks in all, the class was 
given choices for written assignments. (04.12.80) They could, if they chose to, write 
a factually based historical account, looking at the reason why certain populations 
have migrated. Or, alternatively, they could write a story about people leaving their 
homeland to make a new start in a new country. 
For the first couple of lessons, the boys wrote individually. Then, later, at the 
redrafting stage, they formed writer-editor partnerships. Up to this point, most of the 
class had regarded redrafting as an imposition. Usually it involved producing little 
more than a 'fair copy'. But on this occasion, the activity of editing each other's 
drafts proved a successful new departure. The strengths of redrafting from the 
perspective of 'process writing' with this class have been described elsewhere.22 
Here I need a broader canvas than the analysis of 'process writing' affords. 
I shall be concentrating first on a writer-editor partnership between two boys, Kevin 
and Sunday. As I have mentioned already, Kevin's family came from Monserrat in 
the Eastern Caribbean, though Kevin was actually born in London. He left Hackney 
when he was nine (1976) and went to live in a village in Monserrat with his 
grandmother. He didn't stay there long, only eight months in all, but while he was 
there, he attended the local school. His poem, Piece of the Past recalls his time there. 
Back in London, Kevin quickly acquired a reputation at his secondary school for 
being a 'difficult' pupil. Eleven, rising twelve, he was often at the storm centre of 
the class, where he reigned supreme at trading insults: 'runnin" or 'cussin", as it 
was called then - 'dissin" as it's sometimes called now.23 He was generally popular 
with his classmates, though not universally so with all of his teachers. 
Characteristically, Kevin was quick to challenge authority whenever he detected 
inconsistency or unfairness in the way he or the rest of the class were treated. The 
way that he challenged teachers' authority ( as well as the 'mnnin") would lead him 
and, all too frequently, the whole class, into trouble. 
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In the aftermath to one particularly destructive episode, David, one of Kevin's 
classmates, wrote candidly to his teacher, complaining about a string of discouraging 
lessons. In his piece, 'What Goes Wrong' he objects indignantly to Kevin's bullying. 
All in all, David paints an unattractive, but fairly accurate, picture of the way things 
often went. He writes: 
French lessons in general is being spoiled day after day buy real trouble 
makers. Namely Kevin. Kevin can never seem to mind his own business, 
several times he has to be sent out because of this, and his argumentative 
spirit. .. when Robert comes in late or says something kevin comes out with a 
reply like 'your early' or 'dig up up [clear off] you silly tramp can't even 
afford school uniform' ... then Ejeovi gets involved and tries to stop things 
from going wrong and ends up in an argument and kick ups rJights]. 
Then again Kevin would come out with sudenly 'what you get for christmas 
L [David's surname] or when was jesus born? Your cousin said october the 
first?' Also the sarcastic comments by Kevin in particular about answers, 
ones way of speech, ones clothes or physical apearence and ones wearing of 
full school uniform including ties should be stopped ... (The original 
grammar and spelling has been retained). (06. 10. 80) 
David was a Jehovah's Witness. As a matter of religious observance, his family did 
not give or receive gifts at Christmas, and this became a source of jibes directed at 
him chiefly by Kevin. Kevin was not the only one to bully David about his religion 
(as we shall see), but David resented Kevin's jibes and taunts especially. 
Another form that the taunting took among a section of the Black pupils -
significantly, it was a form of taunting that was not open to white pupils to join in -
was 'runnin" and 'cussin" based on skin colour. This particular form of 'runnin" 
operated against a background of an assumed correlation between skin colour and 
social status, and what is more it has a telling history. The novelist, George 
Lamming, describes how it worked in the Barbados when he was growing up there 
in the thirties: 
No one was as black as Boy Blue. Trumper was what we called fair skin, or 
light skin, or best of all clear skin. Boy blue was simply black. His blackness 
made us laugh. Every child in the village had a stock response for the colour, 
black. We had taken in like our daily bread a kind of infectious amusement 
about the colour black. There was no extreme comparison. No black boy 
wanted to be white, but it was true that no black boy liked the idea of being 
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black. Brown skin was a satisfactory compromise, and brown skin meant a 
mixture of white and black.24 
Colour, says Lamming, could be used as a weapon. But it was more complicated 
than that: 'No black boy wanted to be white, but it was true that no black boy liked 
the idea of being black' 
Historically, the practice of name-calling based on skin colour among Black people 
is part of the legacy of slavery, and it needs to be understood as such. And it goes 
beyond the Caribbean. Such practices are widespread among Afro-Americans in the 
USA as well as among West Indians. However, it is also a way of speaking about 
your own kind, and it can be used creatively to mark membership. Name-calling can 
be an expression of intimacy or of solidarity as well as contempt. 
The origins of demeaning social judgements based on skin colour lie in the harsh 
realities of plantation society and its aftermath, where the differentiated strata of the 
social 'pyramid' ascended, from darker at the base (field slaves) to lighter 
complexion (house slaves and people of mixed race) at the apex. 
One callously inventive instance of this practice among Kevin's friends was directed 
at Audley, whose family background was Jamaican. Audley was a weak student with 
low status among his peers. He was graphically nicknamed 'Pirelli' by the others, as 
in the following expression: "1m face fava [resembles] Pirelli [tyre]'. I shall come 
back to Audley, and to the name-calling, later. 
Kevin's editing-partner was Sunday. Sunday's parents came from Nigeria to 
London, where he was born (1967). He spoke Yoruba, though English was his 
'stronger' language. Sunday's family intended to return to Nigeria as soon as he and 
his younger brother, Babatunde, who was also at the school, had completed their 
education. Sunday shared Kevin's reputation for mischief, though if anything he was 
the more reckless of the two. Whereas Kevin might lead the whole class into trouble, 
Sunday's exploits were usually regarded as individual 'bravura' performances - a 
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one-man show rather than an ensemble piece. I should make it plain, too, that they 
chose each other as writer-editor partners, not because they were friends - in point of 
fact, they were not - but rather because they both wanted to make slavery the focus 
of their writing. 
At the end of the first lesson (December, 1980) the boys' first drafts were collected 
and then photocopied. A week later they got their writing back (unmarked) plus a 
photocopy of their partner's writing. They were then asked to do an editing job on 
the photocopy, in consultation with their partner. Later, photocopies were swapped 
back, and the original writer could incorporate such suggestions, corrections, 
improvements as he agreed with into a second draft. 
Kevin and Sunday made steady progress as writers. Together they gradually 
increased their knowledge of the forms and structures of the writing system 
(Richmond, 1982; Hardcastle et aI., 1984). However, my focus here is not so much 
the writers' developing mastery of the conventions of the writing system as progress 
of a broader kind. Over the weeks they worked together, the two boys arrived at a 
remarkable understanding of their topic, plantation slavery. They might have arrived 
at the same level of understanding individually, we cannot say, but as it was their 
understanding was a collaborative achievement. Moreover, it was driven partly by 
the conversations and arguments that went on continuously among their classmates 
up to and beyond the time of writing. 
Here's a paragraph from Sunday's first draft. The original spellings, punctuation and 
syntax have been retained. No title was given: 
The earliet people to go to America in the 1600 were the British some were 
Quakers or Roman catholics there thought that in america they would be free 
to practise their religion 
Other people hoped to become rich in America. There was plenty of space 
and the calmate was good for growing sugar cotton and tobacca. In america 
were irish, Dutch, French protestants and swedish 
In the 1700's Scoltish and Irish people were driven off their land sometimes 
the British took the land I mean the government. Between 1610 and 1810 
there was a steady stream of Africans coming to America by force as slaves 
working on plantations. The plantations were owend by English absentee 
landlords who were making an enormouse profit. some plantation owners 
wanted to work they slaves to death. 
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Why did people move because of better prospects and job opport and good 
money. The Jews moved because the Germans took them out so the had to 
new place some of them went to America and brought wealth to the counry 
(04. 12.80) 
Plainly, there were difficulties with Sunday's writing. He needed help and that duly 
came. (Hardcastle et al. 1984) But without pausing over these difficulties I shall 
move on quickly to a moment when second drafts have been exchanged and the 
editing partnership is in full swing. 
So far, Kevin has been attending to fairly minor features of Sunday's writing. And 
Sunday has already incorporated many of his suggestions into his piece. 'Scoltish' 
was amended to 'Scottish', 'work they slaves to death' was changed to 'work their 
slaves to death', and so on. And Kevin attempted to strengthen Sunday's expression. 
For instance, he changed 'the british took the land I mean the government' to 
'sometimes the lord chucked them off the land'. Importantly, though, he included 
closely parallel sentences in his own final version, and it is fair to claim that they 
became joint authors as well as co-editors of their texts. Intriguingly, the term, 
'absentee landlords' appears in both boys' second drafts. Where did it come from? 
The short answer is that it came from a school textbook that Kevin used to gather 
information, The People Who Came. 25 
The People Who Came was a key resource for Humanities lessons. The class 
continually referred to it. Thirty or so copies were stacked in piles on a window 
ledge whenever the books were not in use. So they were readily available for the 
class to borrow or to browse. The People Who Came was written by West Indian 
academics and teachers for use in schools in the West Indies. The historian and poet, 
Edward Brathwaite was the series editor. The series aimed to provide an historical 
overview of the Caribbean, with a detailed picture of histories of the various peoples 
and cultures that made up the region. The story of The People Who Came was told 
from a West Indian perspective, but it fitted well with the London syllabus that 
aimed to study the complicated movements of the various peoples who make up 
British society. 
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The term that Kevin and Sunday picked up on, 'absent landlords', was used 
particularly in the chapters dealing with slavery. It is introduced in the section about 
'Plantation Slavery': 'The 'whites (European planters and settlers) consisted usually 
of the plantation-owner and his family (though sometimes he was 'absent', 
preferring to live in Europe), the overseer (whose job it was to look after the estate) 
and the book keeper.,26 The term occurs again shortly after: 
The wealthiest planters also preferred to live in Europe ... They usually left an 
attorney behind to look after their estates; returning from time to time to 
inspect their property for themselves. The practice of absenteeism was most 
common in the British islands because during the period of slavery these 
were the most prosperous places.,27 
And later: 'But life was not all disease, brutality and absenteeism. 28 I need to 
establish that 'instructional materials' , (the history textbook) provided Kevin and 
Sunday with terms like 'absentee landlord', and to register the fact that they 
sometimes read the chapters concerning plantation slavery independently as well as 
with the rest of the class at other times. Up to now, I have been concentrating on the 
written text. The special significance of drawings and illustrations will be 
particularly important in the story of Kevin's development.29 
The concept of 'absentee landlords' is a difficult one for twelve, rising thirteen-year-
olds to grasp. The class had met the concept of feudal landlords early on in their 
humanities lessons (January, 1980) while they were studying England in the Middle 
Ages. The teacher had explained (04.01.80) that feudal landowners sometimes 
owned land in different parts of the country and sometimes they held estates in 
France. He also explained that during the Middle Ages peasants were legally tied to 
the land and that their produce belonged to the landlord. 
I want to revisit one of these earlier lessons briefly, not especially because the term 
'absentee landlord' is mentioned (it isn't), but rather to suggest how it related to the 
kinds of issues that interested the class. Additionally I want to show how the boys' 
understanding of the concept had bearing on their work together later on. 
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Here is a moment from a lesson on the Middle Ages that took place in February 
1980 (06.02.80). The whole class took part in a role-play exercise in which 
representatives from four factions (lords and merchants, guildsmen, churchmen and 
peasants) are met to discuss problems that face them all. During the exercise Kevin, 
in role as a guildsman, sided with the 'starving peasants' against their 'feudal lords. 
The interaction among these eleven, rising twelve year-old boys, which was taped, 
was fairly 'robust' and consequently not always easy to follow. 
The discussion leading up to the particular interaction I want to look at has been 
around the price of food. Simon (a white Londoner), in role as a lord, argues that it is 
up to the tradesmen to fix the prices fairly. 
SIMON (lord): I think it's up to the tradesmen who get the goods to say how 
much they cost for them. The peasants can't worry too much 'cause they're 
working in the fields, they must take some produce from the fields, and sell it 
to the tradesmen, and eat some of the ... whatever they ... Some of the 
crops ... whatever they get themselves, so they can live. It's just up to the 
tradesmen, what they want to do. Know what I mean? 
KEVIN (guildsman): We could sell ... these foreign foods at fair prices, but 
the merchants here, they're selling it to us at such a rocketing price, we have 
to sell it back to you at the same price. So really we can't do anything about 
it, or we're going to have a great loss, and they're the ones who are going to 
get richer everyday from the goods they bring back from other countries. 
(The debate continues at a furious pace for about a quarter of an hour. Then 
Kevin comes back to the topic of prices) 
KEVIN: From what I see here ... the peasants are working too hard and these 
lords here ... coming back to prices, how can this fat lord here just drop prices 
just like that? It's the merchants here what are buying it [food] ... buying 
it. .. or getting it from foreign countries [and] selling it at high prices, so we 
can sell it to you, we can't do no different about high prices, so we have to 
sell it on to you, we can't do no different about it. How can he drop? And if 
he drop the price, his friends her won't agree with it. And if the merchant do, 
then the taxes of the peasants and us will go up. And why do we have to pay 
taxes? We've got our own house, and yet we still have to pay taxes. 
(Pause while Kevin's comments are taken on board) 
PAUL(churchman) : Let me put it this way. The lord made ... God made 
lords and churches and made rich people and peasants, and things which is 
tough for the peasants is just tough luck. God made it that way. (06.02.80) 
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Kevin struggles to formulate the systematic nature of pricing - the economic 
principles, if you like. To this he brings concerns over social inequalities and 
exploitation. From the perspectives of the history teacher, his concerns appear 
worryingly anachronistic. He hasn't yet built up a historically convincing view of 
the relations among landowners, merchants and peasants in the middle-ages. Rather 
he is trying desperately to visualise a picture of how the market works. ('It's the 
merchants here what are buying it [food] ... buying it...or getting it from foreign 
countries [and] selling it at high prices, so we can sell it to you, we can't do no 
different about high prices, so we have to sell it on to you, we can't do no different 
about it. .. ') The important point here is that later, he approached slavery in a similar 
manner - as an economic system. Crucially, Kevin's emergent interest in economic 
considerations is what distinguishes his grasp of the master-slave relation from 
Sunday's. This interest became extremely important for the way his understanding 
of the roots of racism developed. 
The class met the concept of 'absentee landlords' again during their work on the 
Highland clearances, and yet again in the context of the Irish potato famine, where 
the teacher explained that the owners of Irish estates often lived in England. Kevin 
saw parallels among various instances of the unjust treatment of tenants by 
landowners whose lives were remote from the people on their estates, yet whose 
destinies the estate owners controlled. Independently, (the teacher didn't dwell on it) 
Kevin linked the brutality and exploitation associated with such instances of the 
arbitrary power of feudal lords over peasants' lives, with the 'absentee' plantation 
owners in the West Indies.3o 
Let's go back to the writer-editor partnership between Kevin and Sunday that took 
place in December (11.12.80), ten months after the role-play exercise. Here is a 
moment where Kevin focuses on the economic 'logic' of slavery. They have just 
exchanged second drafts and are busily engaged in making suggestions for 
alterations and improvements to one another's writing. They move back and forth 
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between the conventions of the writing system and the substance of their topic. But 
above all they concentrate on meaning, which, from time to time, they pause to 
clarify. All the while, the routine business of trading insults ('runnin') and rivalry 
plays across the surface of their exchanges. (Kevin invariably gains the upper hand). 
But what grips them, and what focuses their concentration, is the account of 
exploitation, injustice, greed and brutality that is unfolding at the core of their topic. 
I shall quote the sequence in full. (Where the boys vocalise written text the words 
are printed in bold.): 
SUNDAY: (scornfully) S - -! (Kevin's surname) What did you put here? 
KEVIN: (with mock politeness) Pardon? 
SUNDAY: Didn't you thinkit...? 
KEVIN: (takes up Sunday's paper) What? (reading) plantation owners 
worked ... worked their ... cross off ... Slaves to death because it was cheaper 
to work them .. You know? (Returns to his own draft muttering) 'twenty four 
million'. 
SUNDAY: Now listen to this then ... Look S - -, let's return to facts. I can 
hear ... 
... (indignantly) That's copyright! 
KEVIN: (writing on his own draft - responds with mock affront to Sunday's 
accusation of plagiarism) Oh my God! 
SUNDAY: (with feigned incredulity) You done it again S - -! 
(They work silently for a several minutes). 
SUNDAY: (whispering) S---, what you think of my writing, right? It was ... 
(He turns back to Kevin's writing and objects abruptly and loudly in an 
appalled tone). You took that out of the book! 
KEVIN: (withfeigned lack of interest) Uh? 
SUNDAY: (with mock incredulity) You did! 
KEVIN: Uh? 
SUNDAY:You did! 
KEVIN: (He ignores the accusation of plagiarism and takes Sunday's script 
once more) I read it to you again ... OK? ... Plantation owners worked their 
slaves to death. (Writes on Sunday's paper). 
SUNDAY: (Genuinely concerned) How 'm I spell that, all right? 
KEVIN: (Reading Sunday's script) ... because it was cheaper to ... (pointing 
to the words on the page with his pen) to work, to ... to work them to a ... to 
work ... to do ... 
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SUNDAY: 
KEVIN: 
SUNDAY: 
(Not quite following, impatiently) Help me with that later! 
(Checks back over Sunday's text) ... to work them to ..• (sighs, 
pauses, crosses out 'work them to death', which he had 
written in on Sunday's draft and writes in) buy new slaves. 
Finish it off... (With the air of mas ter-to-servant) Ijus' goin' 
have a little nap. 
KEVIN: It won't be a very long one. 
SUNDAY: Wha' man? You finished that off quick! 
(Kevin passes the edited script to Sunday and returns to his own draft once 
more). 
SUNDAY: (Takes up his newly edited draft, repeating the words softly to 
himself) It was cheaper to ... it was cheaper to buy more 
slaves ... umm ... new slaves ... (He pauses to look at what 
Kevin is writing. He follows Kevin's text closely with visible 
satisfaction. ) 
KEVIN: (Kevin writes) Some slaves, newly imported to Jamaica, 
immediately escaped to the Blue Mountains and set up their 
own culture. They called themselves the Maroons. 
'Maroons' comes from a French patois word ... How you 
spell 'patois'? 
SUNDAY: (Responding instantly) Don't know. (Then, shouting) Sir! Sir! 
Sir! 
JH: (From the other side of the room, crossly) How do you spell what? 
SUNDAY: Patois. 
JH (Joins the pair) P-A-T-O-I-S. 
KEVIN (writes and vocalises) patois word. 
I want to pause over the substance of what the two boys are talking about, the 
history of plantation slavery. And I want to ask whether they were occupied with the 
same things. For instance, does Sunday see a material link between plantation 
owners striving to make a profit, and the brutal practice of working plantation slaves 
to death? Has he appreciated (in the way that Kevin seems to) the commercial 
'logic' of the plantation owners' 'dilemma'? (Should they work the slaves to death 
and 're-stock', or should they 'breed' slaves on the plantation, and thus reduce the 
expense of importing new ones?) It appears that Sunday sees merely contingent 
instances of European racism and greed. This matters because, on this view, racism 
is a cause of slavery, not an outcome. The ramifications of the answer to this 
problem would be difficult to exaggerate. Therefore I shall say something more 
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about the way the history of the origins of racism has been debated among historians 
in recent years. 
Historians have been divided both over the question of the ideological origins of 
slavery, and over the role of 'race prejudice' in establishing the plantation system. In 
the case of the USA evidence suggests that in slave-holding states like Virginia, 
Negroes were not 'listed' or treated as 'chattel slaves' in the first instance in the way 
that most nineteenth-century historians assumed they were. Rather, Africans were 
initially treated like European indentured labourers. So how and why did they come 
to be treated differently later on? The underlying question is this: 'Did slavery come 
before race 'prejudice', or did race 'prejudice' issue from slavery?' Our concern 
here is with the evidential bases of the answers that historians have given in recent 
years. 
After the Second World War, with the increasing tensions in race relations in the 
USA, and, later, with the civil rights movement, nineteenth-century theories about 
the origins of slavery were substantially revised. Fresh documentary evidence was 
offered to suggest that Negroes were not regarded as belonging to an inherently 
'degraded' or 'inferior' race until sometime in the 1660s, when they became 'chattel 
property' in law. Therefore it has been important to ask: 'Why did such a change 
occur at that moment and not before?' As one Black American historian has argued, 
Rather than slavery causing 'prejudice' or vice versa, they seem rather to 
have generated each other. Both were, after all, twin aspects of a general 
debasement of the Negro. Slavery and 'prejudice' may have been equally 
cause and effect, continuously reacting upon each other, dynamically joining 
hands to hustle the Negro down the road to complete degradation.31 
Day-to-day perceptions of difference - differences of complexion especially - were 
somehow distorted and regularised into a rationale underpinning theories of racial 
inferiority. 
Linguistic analyses of contemporary documents revealed shifts in terminology and 
what is more, they showed how attitudes changed towards Negroes in the second 
half of the seventeenth century. Structuralist researchers traced changes in 
terminology by looking particularly at binary 'opposites': Christians and pagans, 
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servants and captives, English and Negroes, and - after 1680 - whites and blacks. 
Subsequently, structural analyses of such terms were linked to other kinds of 
historical evidence to determine the changing importance of religious beliefs in 
making such social distinctions. It emerged that words like Indian and Negro began 
to function within an evolving system of racial classification. Such descriptive terms 
appear in various forms of documentation - inventories and legal proceedings and so 
forth - and they can be dated accurately. Previously, colonists had referred to other 
races as savages and pagans. Crucially, after 1680, Englishmen in the colonies 
stopped describing themselves as Christians and began to refer to themselves as 
white. The historian's task was to uncover the relations among changes in the 
discourses of slavery, especially racial classification, and to relate them to other 
developments such as change in the legal status of slaves or the volume of slave 
traffic between West Africa and America. 
Discussions around historical research methods were hardly on Kevin and Sunday's 
horizon. They were plotting their own course at this stage and making discoveries as 
they went along. (This is partly what I mean by the phrase 'developmental 
rhythms'). But explicit instruction in school had its place too. It became important 
for their teacher to envisage where their studies might lead them, and how their 
knowledge might be developed within the larger picture of the history of slavery. 
The kind of knowledge I am calling 'school knowledge' here is both 'theorised' and 
'systematic'. It is organised according to principles that derive chiefly from the 
professional activities of specialising historians. In this way official historical 
knowledge belongs to a body of 'scientific' work that is significantly different from 
everyday knowledge. Essentially, its status is judged by academic standards upheld 
among accredited historians through public debate. Specialising 'scientists' make a 
distinction between what we might call 'lay understandings' (,folk' or 'community-
based' knowledge), and the theorised, systematically ordered knowledge of 
disciplinary enquiry. Sometimes 'scientific' knowledge and 'folk' knowledges 
overlap. But, equally, they sometimes clash.32. Teachers and pupils are positioned 
and constrained in complicated ways in all of this. No individual possesses the 
complete picture. 
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Kevin was working according to the rhythm of his own development - that is, 
according to his particular, inward, intellectual and imaginative drives and needs. 
But crucially he did so inside a framework of school-based knowledge and school-
based instruction. However, in one telling instance he got hold of the wrong end of 
the stick, as we shall see. 
What I'm calling Kevin's 'drives' and 'needs' arose from the totality of his social 
situation. By 'drives' and 'needs' I don't mean metaphysical ones. I am not speaking 
about the essential properties of the 'human psyche' or 'the human condition'. 
Rather, I mean the particular 'drives' and 'needs' that arose from his concrete 
circumstances. Kevin~ wanted to know about the history of West Indians like 
himself. Moreover, while he learned more about this history his perceptions of his 
situation altered. Also he began to see Sunday in a new light and, as a consequence 
of this he related to him differently. 
It was sometimes difficult for Kevin's teacher to plan the next step because it was 
hard to judge when to intervene and when to hold back. For the teacher to point 
prematurely to a link between plantation slavery and merchant capitalism and then 
go on to analyse the historical evolution of racism might have been to miscalculate 
the direction of Kevin's expanding interests. Such teacher initiatives always risk 
underestimating (or indeed overestimating) the extent to which students have (or 
have not) consolidated the 'scientific' concepts they had met so far. Forcing the pace 
by introducing new information might overload the student or disrupt his way of 
making sense of things. There was always a risk of robbing him of the initiative. 
Students need a measure of control over the flow of new information. Besides, as 
Vygotsky argued so powerfully in the thirties, teaching is only effective when it 
points to the road for development.33 To be told something successfully, to borrow 
James Britton's apt phrase, Kevin had to have somewhere to put it.34 
The commercial nature of the slave owners' decision making was precisely what 
Kevin sought to clarify. Thus he crossed out Sunday's original phrase, 'work them 
to death' and substituted 'buy new slaves' A moment later, he extended the original 
sentence, so that it read, 'it was cheaper to buy more slaves'. After, when Sunday 
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read his edited script, he also started to grasp how commercial interests governed 
plantation slavery as an economic system. Only at a much later stage would they 
discover how commercial interests were instrumental in ending it. 
By making the connection between 'costs' and 'profits' explicit, and by showing 
how the slave owners were engaged in commercial decision making, Kevin not only 
consolidated what he had already begun to understand for himself, he also prepared 
the ground for future advances in his own knowledge. While he edited Sunday's 
script, he developed the logic of his analysis. And what followed depended, 
crucially, on his growing appreciation of the fact that slaves that were no longer 
capable of working in the cane fields were continually replaced with newly imported 
Africans right up to the time it was no longer commercially viable to continue 
shipping in new 'stock'. Indeed, at one stage in the Caribbean and the American 
South (the system worked differently in Latin America), the calculation was often 
that it was cheaper to 'restock' than to 'breed' new slaves. But this didn't last. Later, 
when the Black population of 'unseasoned' slaves grew to outnumber the whites 
(and people of mixed-race), recent arrivals from West Africa, who were not yet 
'acclimatised' to the discipline of the plantation regime proved increasingly difficult 
to control. Significantly, they were also more costly to govern. Slave rebellions 
became more frequent and they became increasingly expensive to put down. 
Eventually, large-scale plantation slavery lost its economic viability, especially 
when the market prices for sugar, cotton and other staples fluctuated because of 
unpredictable trade cycles associated with political events in Europe. 
Kevin's second draft marked a significant advance in his 'scientific' understanding 
of the history of slavery. In his first draft he had written, 'some slaves, newly 
imported to Jamaica immediately escaped to the Blue Mountains and set up their 
own culture'. (By now, both boys had discovered that the Maroon culture of Jamaica 
was essentially West African). In his second draft Kevin wrote, 'The Western 
Africans (mainly Western Africans) brought their superb farming skills'. When he 
added the adjective, 'superb', he showed that he had appreciated an appalling 
paradox: Africans contributed the necessary expertise in tropical farming needed to 
grow tobacco and sugar cane in the early years, when a 'plantation' merely meant an 
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estate were crops where raised. The question arises then as to what extent the 
commercial exploitation of the Caribbean region by Europeans made possible by 
Africans' technical knowledge. 
Kevin grasped that the West Africans were the bearers of an agricultural 
'technology' and that farming was the economic basis of the ancestral culture. Once 
he had understood this functional connection between traditional know-how and the 
plantation system, he gained new insight into the nature of West African history and 
culture before Africans were shipped off to the Caribbean .. Previously, he had 
shown little interest in (or regard for) African culture and civilisation as such. 
Indeed, in London classrooms like this one, there was no special affinity among 
West Indians and Africans. Kevin and Sunday were positioned differently in relation 
to the history that was unfolding. The new insight cut through their routine, mocking 
exchanges, Kevin recognised and openly acknowledged the substance of Sunday's 
heritage culture. In doing so, of course, he also acknowledged (or conceded) openly 
the fact that the African heritage was also, partly, his own. 
Sunday arrived at new levels of understanding through his collaboration with Kevin. 
We can't say for sure whether he would have arrived at the same destination by 
himself. But in the event, he got there with Kevin's help. Together the two boys 
started to co-construct a discourse that provided a foundation for future learning. 
They were taking first steps towards grasping the history of economic exploitation in 
West Africa and the Caribbean by Europeans that grew with the Atlantic slave trade. 
Crucially, such understandings were developed within the instructional framework 
that the school's Humanities syllabus afforded. And a key feature of their progress 
together was the degree of control that they had over the pace and the direction of 
their work together. Crucially, they were able to regulate the flow of new 
information, and what is more they had the space to fit it into emergent, but as yet 
unstable, frameworks of understanding. Given that their teacher supervised their 
progress and that he provided the overall orientation of the work, and given that he 
intervened from time to time to guide them and to offer additional resources, Kevin 
and Sunday found the framework broad enough to follow their interests and deepen 
their commitment to their project. 
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But in certain ways their understandings of the history remained undeveloped, and I 
want to indicate how this was so. Once Kevin grasped the idea that Maroon 
communities reconstituted West African culture in the New World, and that the 
Maroons successfully resisted the British, he began to see three centuries of Maroon 
society as three centuries of 'continuous resistance'. He quickly connected the 
Maroons to the Rastafarian movement in rural Jamaica and to reggae music. 
History, unfortunately, offers a less heroic picture. In reality, the Maroons who had 
established their own communities frequently collaborated with plantation owners 
by tracking down and recapturing escaped slaves.35 Such considerations could have 
constituted an important corrective to the 'heroic' story that Kevin was weaving. In 
the event, however, it did not, largely because the teacher had not yet understood the 
historical realities for himself. 
Kevin and Sunday were also growing interested in the languages of the Caribbean. 
For instance, Kevin wrote about the French patois derivation of the word maroon 
(he wrote, 'maroon comes from the French word'). Where did this information come 
from? Intriguingly, his textbook, The People Who Came, offered a different 
derivation: 'Maroon', it said, ' is derived from the Spanish word cimarron, meaning 
'wild' or 'untamed' .36 This is a small point, perhaps, but it suggests the way that 
Kevin was using more than one source, and that his understanding was developing 
'unofficially', that is independently of what was offered in class. Moreover, his 
interest in the roots of Caribbean words was (potentially) connectable to the kind of 
historical analysis of terminology that I mentioned earlier, associated with the 
change in attitude towards Africans in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. 
Several weeks after their work on migrations, the whole class read together Young 
Warriors, by the Jamaican novelist, Vic Reid37 , in which a group of Maroon boys, 
after a series of adventures, save their mountain village from destruction by British 
soldiers. The story, which evokes and celebrates the traditional folklore of the 
African Maroons for young readers in the Caribbean Young Warriors was an apt 
choice for Kevin and Sunday for the way it chimed with many of their own 
'discoveries'. Moreover, it opened up the possibility of going on to read New Day 
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(1949)38, a path-breaking novel for adult readers, written by the same author. New 
Day (which was also by now a possible learning destination on the distant horizon) 
traces the development of Jamaican society, from the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, 
to the new constitution of 1944. Reid has said about New Day, that it aims 'to tell the 
Jamaicans who they are, remind [them] ... where they came from to show them that 
the then self-government we were aiming for, and the then change in the constitution 
that we were getting was not entirely a gift' .39 For Kevin, it could have been a way 
of connecting his interest in the history of resistance to colonial rule, the setting up 
of Maroon societies and slave rebellions with contemporary social and political 
issues in the Caribbean. 
But some way down the road, as I have already hinted, these two young Black 
Londoners would meet a bleak corrective to the 'heroic' version of plantation 
slavery as the story of resistance and rebellion that they were constructing together.4o 
They would have, to engage with the fact of West African complicity in the slave 
trade. The Caribbean historian and political activist, Walter Rodney, (who was 
assassinated in Guyana in 1979) offers the following account: 
[For] nearly the whole of the period of the Atlantic slave trade in West Africa 
(and East Africa also), there were many Africans who were prepared to sell 
their fellow men in exchange for European manufactures such as cloth, pots 
and pans, beads and fire-arms. With the exception of the Portuguese in 
Angola, the Europeans never went inland to obtain captives. In fact the 
Africans on the coast prevented the Europeans from going into the interior, 
so that they themselves could bring down the slaves and receive as many 
European goods as possible. It must be emphasised that the rulers in West 
Africa were in full political control during the period of the Atlantic slave 
trade ... To a large extent therefore, the Europeans conducted their slave 
trading on the West African coast under conditions laid down by the 
Africans. (Walter Rodney, West Africa and the Slave Trade, East African 
Publishing House, 1967, p.7). 
Kevin and Sunday did not touch on this issue at the time. Like some of the other 
considerations I have mentioned, it was barely visible on their (expanding) horizon. 
But other students at the school did touch on it. Here is a moment from a taped 
conversation between an older student, Derek (age seventeen), with Edward 
Brathwaite, who besides being historian and poet, you will recall, was also the series 
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editor of the textbook, The People Who Came. Derek's father, who was a musician 
and a radical spirit, came from Georgetown, Guyana. He probably read Walter 
Rodney in the seventies, and the relation between father and son is an important 
(hidden) dimension in the background to this exchange. Bcathwaite is speaking about 
the significance of Akan (one of the ancestral languages of modem Ghana) for his 
epic poem, Masks, when Derek breaks in: 
BRATHWAITE: I think that's the idea of all poetry to lead you into 
something else, but before that I would say, if you don't have the Akan 
background, which very few people have, I hope that it doesn't destroy the 
poem. I think that the Akan Background will add to it, but the poem as a 
poem should still stand ... At school, when I read Eliot, for instance, I had to 
start reading about The Golden Bough, and the images Eliot presented. I did 
it because I was interested, but I also did it because it was on the syllabus, it 
was demanded. And they had books available, which helped, like Gardener's 
The Art ofT S Eliot. But in any culture when you come upon a poem in your 
own language, that is different. .. 
DEREK: You said that one of the aims of the poem, or one of the aspects of 
the poem was a celebration of Akan culture. But one of the things that you 
seem to have done, that seems to me very courageous, is that you don't seem 
afraid to look at aspects of African culture that you think perhaps are 
culpable. I mean the sections where it says, 'fever of quick sales rock the 
branches of bone' . As if the corruption of slavery affected the whole culture 
... the involvement of Africans themselves in the slave culture. How did you 
feel about taking that aspect on at a time when, for a large number of people 
in the Caribbean Africa still had a very bad image. It must have involved a 
tremendous amount of heart searching. 
BRATHWAITE: I agree. Yes, it took me a long time, but I had to do it 
because unless you do that, people would remain in a romantical relationship 
with Africa, which is no good to anyone. 'Cos the whole point of the Trilogy 
(The Arrivants) ... is to ask 'Why is it that that the slave trade was possible, 
how is it that fifty million people were exported to the New World?' 'What 
was the African resistance to that? 'What was the African Attitude?' And 
although it is clear that Europe has to take a great deal of the blame, some 
blame must also accrue to the native culture, right and therefore my concern 
is, ' What is it at that moment in time that made it vulnerable to that 
intrusion ?' 
When Derek challenged Brathwaite about the way he had chosen to approach 
African complicity with European slave traders, quoting the line from Masks -
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'fever of quick sales rock the branches of bone' - the teacher was startled. (He 
hadn't picked up on the line's significance). The atmosphere in the room chilled. It 
was a question that a white teacher could not have asked comfortably without 
arousing suspicion. However, Brathwaite was interested in the issues the question 
raised and he responded encouragingly in a way that welcomed Derek's challenge. 
There is no direct evidence to connect Derek's ideas about slavery with Kevin's 
work, beyond the fact that he belonged to the same socio-cultural milieu. They knew 
each other, though Derek was slightly older, and they were both prominent figures in 
the school's Black peer culture. But a connection existed nevertheless. Ideas like 
these ones circulated in classrooms and outside them. Sometimes the ideas stemmed 
from conversations with parents or older siblings. Indeed, this circulation of ideas 
went on most of the time without teachers' knowledge or approval. It was a 
powerful aspect of the intellectual culture of the school and the ideas were an 
important dimension of the social milieu. 
Like Derek, Kevin and Sunday grew to care passionately about their history. 
Emotional as well as conceptual development - affect as well as cognition - was 
involved. What these boys felt about slavery - and what they felt about each other 
when they were studying it - mattered a great deal to them. Yet it is difficult to say 
concretely exactly what Kevin felt, because his feelings were not open to direct 
observation. 
While he was editing Sunday's piece and redrafting his own Kevin broke off to say, 
'You know?' The tone was numbing. A moment earlier he had been teasing Sunday 
- playing the teacher, pretending to be unimpressed by Sunday's writing and 
deliberately withholding praise because he guessed that Sunday wanted his approval. 
It was a way of staying on top. Then he intervened. Sunday had originally written 
'absentee landlords who were making a enormos profit. Some plantation owners 
worked their slaves to death' in his first draft. At Kevin's suggestion, he changed it 
to 'some plantation owners worked their slaves to death because it was cheaper to 
buy new slaves'. Kevin read Sunday's amended draft approvingly. And when he said 
aloud, 'You know?' - ['Do] you know what I mean?', 'Wouldn't you know it?' 'I 
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could have guessed as much'.J Kevin was making a powerful evaluative comment. 
He was not asking Sunday whether he had followed the logic of the argument (that 
profit seeking among plantation owners led to the practice of 'restocking'). The 
utterance was not addressed to Sunday at all. Rather, it expressed powerful feelings 
- feelings of indignation, anger, sadness, disbelief, disgust and bitterness that I can 
only guess at. As a form of utterance 'You know?' solicited a common evaluation of 
the total situation, including the present condition of the descendants of slaves. 
Immediately after, he took up his own script and wrote 'twenty-four million " 
repeating the number aloud. But it's hard to be sure what he felt. So while I want to 
leave open what he felt, I want to insist that something had touched him to the core. 
Kevin and Sunday went on to borrow books on related topics and, as we shall see, 
Kevin's interest and independent research led him to reconsider his time in 
Montserrat. This reconsideration led to writing the poem, Piece of the Past. 
* * * 
Between December, 1980 and March 1981 the class studied more topics from the 
Caribbean, among them, Toussaint l'Ouverture's short-lived Black Empire in San 
Domingo. They touched upon the rise of the labour movement during the inter-war 
years and from the Cold War era, they studied the Cuban missile crisis. 41 Over time, 
Sunday grew more assertive about his Nigerian background. Sometimes his 
assertions provoked angry responses, and often they irritated other members of the 
class. In an altered climate, some boys grew openly resistant to the inclusion of 
Black history in the Humanities syllabus. And a handful grew mistrustful of the 
supposed aims behind the changes to the traditional curriculum. In a short space, the 
work on Black history had had an unforeseen impact on the social relations in the 
class, especially where issues of local status - the 'natural' pecking order - were at 
stake. In the following section I shall be looking closely at some of these unforeseen 
developments among the whole group. 
In their Humanities lessons the class was regularly divided into two groups for a 
double period once a week. Half the class did drama, and the other half worked on 
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various topics with one of their Humanities teachers. The two halves of the class 
alternated. Talk was an important feature of the 'non-drama' work, and class 
discussions were regularly videotaped. The following account is based on a 
transcription of part of a discussion that was recorded in March 1981. (03.04.1981) 
(Sunday and Kevin did not take part). The main speakers in this sequence are: 
Ricky, a white Londoner with a Jewish background; David, whose family came from 
Trinidad; and Simon, a white student who came from a long-settled, 'labour-voting' 
East End family. Importantly, too, as I mentioned earlier, David's family belonged 
to the Jehovah's Witness Church. Nominally, the topic for discussion was Standard 
English, which had been a focus for recent work in class. Initially, the discussion 
went according to plan. Then, after a short break (during which the boys' 
conversation was not recorded), things took an unexpected turn. 
RICKY: Yeah, sir. When we like, there does seem a topic where there's a 
sort of white person's view and a black person's view, then you get a 
lot of people and they always argue and like. Because like Sunday, 
right, sir, 
TEACHER: Yes? 
RICKY: He's always saying how bad Britain ... that is ... but he doesn't say 
it ... he wouldn't say it to W ... because he counts W ... when he's 
talking like that as a West Indian person. But when you're in like a 
normal class he counts him as what he is, English like. You know? 
TEACHER: Yeah? 
RICKY: (inaudible) .. .in an English country. But when you get a topic like 
that he starts saying about England and the crisises it's in, and 
Nigeria is doing so well for itself and things like that, which is 
probably true but you don't ... he wouldn't say it to, urn, like W ... or 
David or etc. He'll say it to a white person because he thinks that 
because you're white you've got .... er .... um ..... you're 
disagreeing with him. Because you're British. 
SIMON: What, so he's trying to be better than the white person? 
RICKY: Yes. He's trying to say that ... 
SIMON: Black is better than white. Nigeria is better than England. 
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RICKY: Yes. 
Ricky was addressing the teacher when he remarked that the introduction of 
controversial issues in Humanities lessons (slavery) somehow divides the class along 
racial lines. Implicitly, he was reminding the teacher of his responsibility for 
maintaining good race relations among the class members. Ricky was conscious of 
the way that some of the Black students in Humanities classes claim multiple 
identities for themselves. And he resented the way that Sunday's criticism of Britain 
was polarising Black and white students, both in and out of class. Simon sums up his 
argument: 'So he's (Sunday) trying to be better than the white person?' However, 
Ricky, is treading warily. His manner suggests that he is keen to present himself as 
the 'reasonable' commentator. 
Then David takes up the argument. Tellingly, he refers back to an incident from their 
shared past. He recalls an incident that occurred when the class was studying 
England in the Middle Ages. (02.80) (Possibly they had been talking about an 
incident during the break). The class had been looking at the three-field system as 
well as the structure of the medieval village. John, a white student (with a reputation 
for mischief), asked the teacher how it was that English houses used to be 
constructed out of wattle and daub (,sticks and mud') and in Africa, people were still 
living in 'mud huts'. This caused a major row. 
John's motives were not clear, and most Black members of the class were incensed 
by what they took to be racism. John seemed to imply that 'Africans' were 
'primitive'. However, if this really were the case, then it would have signalled an 
important departure from settled norms of behaviour. Racial insults were rare and 
there was a tacit agreement among the students that this was 'off limits'. 
Surprisingly, David chose to interpret Ricky's account of Sunday's recent criticism 
of Britain as an instance of Black 'prejudice'. But he couched his response within a 
'richer-heritage' discourse about the positive contributions that Black and other 
ethnic and minority groups had made to the wider culture. He speaks 
(uncharacteristically) in a conciliatory manner: 
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DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
Probably [there] is a bit of prejudice in this case. I'm not saying that 
black people can't be prejudiced, but going back to the point where 
.... about mud huts and all that .... urn .... probably if you, if, if, I 
said to that ... urn ... before West Indian people or black people 
came to this country or English people ate roast potatoes and urn ... 
mainly that for their dinner they didn't have no wide choice of food 
then you'd probably be a bit down-graded but that is actually a true 
fact from what I've read ... 
Can you tell me what food you've brought over here, please. What 
food? 
Well, there's rice ... 
Because we had meat ... but excuse me, I think you'll find that most 
people don't eat rice. 
(Several voices) They do. They do ... some do ... yeah. 
RICKY: White people I mean. Well ninety per cent of people I know. 
SIMON: Well I do ... I like rice. 
(Several voices speaking at once, taking sides) I eat rice. I like curry. 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
SIMON: 
DAVID: 
SIMON: 
DAVID: 
But I eat potatoes more than I eat rice. 
They ... Well, before all ... there was, was potatoes, they could jacket, 
roast it, fry it ... different ways they could have it, right, but since 
then the foods that I know that has been brought over is, urn ... the 
varieties of ways of doing meat, there's rice, there's different fruits 
... because you used to have, urn, honey ... but I don't think you had 
sugar before. 
So? 
Or did you have sugar but not in that quantity because we came from 
the West Indies with the cane production. And so forth ... and urn 
foods like dumplings ... things like that ... they're even cooking it for 
school dinners don't they? 
So what point is that on? 
No, but listen. I'm making a point, because if I said to you, you'd 
probably feel a bit hurt, so if somebody said to a black person that 
240 
RICKY: 
SIMON: 
RICKY: 
SIMON: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
they used to live in mud huts before, that's the kind of, the same 
down-graded thing, even though it was meant to be a question. 
But I think ... I said it wrong because I can remember exactly what 
John said. It was about when we done, when England was living in 
mud huts and things like that which is true ... right? 
And he thought, he thought we were talking about the time ... 
And he said ... How come, sir, that in Africa they were still living in 
mud huts when in England they wasn't. And then everyone started 
to go ... as if ... he meant that he was better than them because we 
were living in .. . 
They were uncivilised. 
Yeah, but a house and facilities, etc. etc. 
But that was the thought conveyed, I thought, don't you? But if 
someone said that he must be living in mud huts and we're living in 
But he never said you ... he said 'when they', he didn't say ... 
'When they' ... that's what I mean, 'when they' 
So really he's just asking a question that if you would have asked, 
nothing would have been said about it ... 
Yeah but this ... 
David usually kept his distance from Sunday, whom he regarded (with Kevin) as a 
'trouble maker'. Their different attitudes towards the school's Black peer culture 
were fairly striking. David was more inclined to conform to the school's official 
norms of behaviour than Sunday, as is instanced by his wearing full school uniform. 
(Recall his piece about Kevin's taunts). His way of speaking was usually closer to 
Standard English too (for example, 'that was the thought conveyed') than Kevin's 
and Sunday's. This was a fact that Simon mentions explicitly in the discussion. Yet 
David could speak creole when he chose to, and Kevin code switched towards 
Standard English when it suited him. And David was more open than the other 
students about his academic ambitions. This often led him into conflict with some of 
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his Black classmates, and, occasionally, with white ones too, especially Ricky. He 
quarrelled with Ricky from time to time, and though they were generally friends 
they were also rivals. 
In this discussion David consciously matched Ricky's 'reasonableness'. He explains 
(needlessly, because everyone knew) why many of the Black students found John's 
question offensive. Diplomatically, he implies that there was some kind of 
'misunderstanding' - one that could easily be rectified. He allows that John was 
genuinely asking a question, and that he spoke in good faith. However, this was not 
a view shared by the others. 
Ricky insisted that the Black students were seeing racial issues where they didn't 
exist. The temperature soared and the teacher quickly intervened to defuse the 
situation. He mentioned the history of handling controversial issues in Humanities 
lessons invoking a shared memory of successfullessons.42 
TEACHER: At this point ... This is not a discussion about mud huts is it? But 
your point is that there are a lot of difficulties you get into when you 
take on these kinds of questions that we take on in Humanities. 
Ricky, David and Simon were recalling an incident from the life of the class that had 
resulted in a furious row. (02.80). Such incidents belonged to the shared memory of 
the group. They went on to attempt a reconstruction of John's intentions from their 
fragmentary recollections of what was said at the time. No doubt they each put their 
own 'spin' on things, and an outsider might have found their style of interacting 
noisy and combative, but principally they tried to settle on a common version of 
events. Beneath the surface of their robust exchanges lies an 'ideal' model of what 
constitutes a 'reasonable' discussion. Mostly, they try to reach unforced agreement -
an agreement that is not achieved by invoking status, by insulting one another or by 
making intimidating threats. They argue. They make and demand relevant points 
('So what point is that on? and, "No, I'm making a point'). They criticise each 
other's contributions, they accommodate each other's views and they revise their 
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respective versions ('1 think 1 said it wrong because 1 can remember exactly what he 
said '). Indeed, for much of the time they appear to be prepared to give way to the 
better argument. 
David persists. He follows through a line of argument, suggesting that there are 
racial tensions in classes generally throughout the school, and that their class is no 
exception .. Ricky takes him up. 'But tell me', he says, 'have we got a racial thing in 
our class?' Perhaps he doesn't believe that David is serious, but David's response is 
sharp and to the point: 'Only when the subject [slavery] is going on'. And this, 
paradoxically, is precisely what Ricky is getting at. Lessons about slavery somehow 
divide the class. 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
SIMON: 
Yeah! See! So why is it that normally we haven't, but when you get a 
subject like that [slavery] there's sort of ... you have. 
I think it's because when a subject like that and they're talking about 
the Caribbean, a lot of Black people in the class ... try to grab on to 
their roots like, like, 'I come from the West Indies', 'I come from ... ' 
and so forth. When you're talking about another subject. .. [it's 
different]. Like the other day [it] happened to me and Nicky. He said 
I must go back to Africa. So I told him I was born in this country. So 
then he said you changed your roots to England, like you say you're 
English - as much British as the other person is. When the subjects 
change then you change your roots again. You know what I mean? 
It's funny how we can have only one roots yet you can have as many 
as you want. You can be Caribbean, African, English ... 
It's funny we planned to talk about [Standard English]. 
Ricky objects to David swapping his roots around. But, David has no difficulty with 
the idea of changing your roots to suit the circumstances. The inference Ricky wants 
to draw is that David is somehow being disloyal to Britain. Simon, (possibly 
because he can see where the argument is leading) tries to change the subject. But 
Ricky and David stick at it: 
RICKY: You're just having your one point of view. You can't have all 
different roots ... you ... you originally probably came from Africa. 
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DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
SIMON: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
SIMON: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
Not me I was born in England. 
But I am saying your ancestors originally came from Africa. 
Yes, I agree with that. But then your ancestors came from Rome. 
Yes, so? 
And from Scandinavia. 
Yeah, I agree. 
But then how could you say you're British then? 
Because ... 
He was born in Britain. 
So was 1. 
I was born in Britain. Yeah, right .. 
So was 1. 
So? I stick by what Britain does, I don't change myself and say, 'So, 
I'm going to do what the Italians do, right, I'm going to do what the 
Scandinavians do'. 
It's true. It's true. 
An' Scandinavia's doing better than what the Caribbean is. Like, it's 
not, but just saying it was. Well, I'm not going to pretend I'm 
Scandinavian. 
I think, when the point comes to it, it's really what a lot of people 
think about slavery. [It's] what their parents tell them, what they see 
on television - probably a biased view. And if it was from your view, 
it would be biased. It wouldn't be told to you like it was told to us, so 
there is two biased views. And when you try to discuss 'em everyone 
sticks to the biased view that they know if you know what I mean. 
[A short pause] 
Another thing I notice, sir, in Humanities is, is in any other subject 
like in, if you take the other Humanities lessons we have with Mr. 
Brennan, right, you, you get a lot of people mixing together. Like on 
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DAVID: 
each table you've probably got a black kid and a white kid, right. If 
you take our Humanities lessons, with you, you'll find the majority of 
the black children are at the front and the majority of the white 
children are at the back. And you'll have one white kid at the front -
like Simon, say. And you'll have Steven at the back. Mainly you'd 
get that. I don't know, sir, [I don't know] that's right, sir. But a lot of 
people are saying, especially white people in our class, that you're 
sort of splitting them. [That is] when you talk about that ... then it's 
... we're finding that in the end you're not making things better 
because it's moving the black people forward and the white people 
back. 
Yeah, but I think it's actually history. If we're learning History ... urn, 
we just can't skip History. And skip the whole matter of slavery. It's a 
fact. And even though when it's discussed a lot of urn, white people 
blush and they kind of [don't] like the subject; it's ... We can't really 
skip it. It's a fact in History. It has to be told. 
David grasps the nettle. He acknowledges the way that slavery is perceived divides 
the class. The subject is so powerful that it forces people to take sides. Everyone 
tries to hold on to positions of strength, he says, and they cling to the version of 
history that they know best: 'Everyone sticks to the biased views that they know'. 
Once the defences go up, and opinions become entrenched, he maintains, nobody's 
views will change. What the transcription cannot show is the measured style of his 
delivery. There is a calm assurance about David's manner of speaking as well as a 
marked degree of composure. 
David appeared to have concluded the argument, when Ricky suddenly switched his 
line of attack. Earlier, he drew attention to the way that the introduction of the topic 
of slavery had altered boys' behaviour towards one another in tangible ways. Now, 
his remarks are addressed directly to the teacher. In a 'normal lesson' , he says, the 
class integrates well. but with the recent concentration on slavery, sharp divisions 
have opened up. As he puts it, 'It's moving the black people forward, and the white 
people back'. The inference is clear: the new dispensation privileges the Black 
students. 
Ricky spoke unwelcome truths. Moreover, his statement (he was thirteen at the time) 
constituted a careful, articulate critique of the syllabus. He was probing an area 
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where the school's aims were not clear, and his forthright statement was 
unanticipated. Crucially, there was an underlying assumption that critique was 
permissible, and that students and teachers shared the responsibility for building a 
tolerant worldng environment. Interestingly, such a critique sat comfortably with the 
school's liberal traditions. 
For a brief moment Ricky gained the initiative. But then David snatched it back. He 
insisted that slavery was intrinsically a part of history - and what is more it was part 
of the history of most the class, though he didn't suggest that the topic of slavery 
was for Black students only. Besides, the history of slavery has to be faced as a 
common history, he says, and not glossed over because some white students feel 
embarrassed (' a lot of white people blush'), or appear bored. 
And Ricky's claim that he found the subject interesting should not surprise us. What 
struck him, he claims, was the contrast between home and school versions of Black 
history. And this leads me to paradox. On the one hand, the topic of slavery had 
produced (or revealed, depending on whose viewpoint you adopt) deep divisions 
among the class members. On the other hand, it produced a serious discussion 
around fundamental ethical and political issues that was conducted in an atmosphere 
of strildng openness and passion. A shared perception was beginning to emerge: 
history has to be dealt with 'properly', as Kevin put it later. 
David was beginning to expand in a rather teacherly way on the theme of prejudice 
when Ricky reminded him about a time in class when he had been especially 
vulnerable: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
RICKY: 
A prejudiced thing, isn't it? It's like saying that the white people 
treated black people so bad, which is true. But then from a white 
person's [view], if you've been accused of all these things, it weren't 
you it were your ancestors. But because of the race [issue] it makes 
you feel bad. That's what I'm saying ... 
But David what about in the first year right? 
Goon. 
When you were ... so strongly about your religion, right, and 
everyone was going against you. And I don't believe in the same 
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SIMON: 
RICKY: 
SIMON: 
DAVID: 
things as you, right, but yet I sat there and I tried to think, well, from 
both views. Then I started to say ... well, put it David's view. I think 
you can remember, and then I used to make them (Kevin, Sunday 
and the others) feel small. Because I was trying to work out where 
both of you was right, and (where) both of you was wrong. You 
have good points of your religion and probably a lot of things that 
... (inaudible) 
Both of them are right really. Whatever you want to believe, you 
believe. 
Well that's the same sort of thing. You get a biased view. But if 
you've got people ... Our class should think, well, just because you're 
black it doesn't mean you're different. 
That's true. 
That's true. 
David's argument around the common legacy of slavery and the nature of 
problematic, inherited guilt opened up productive new ground for discussion. 
Crucially, it was an issue he would return to again over a year later, as we shall see. 
But Ricky was chiefly concerned to settle the argument about bias and prejudice 
there and then because it raised fundamental issues about trust. Plus he wanted to 
regain the initiative. 
Once more, what the transcript cannot show, but what the video reveals clearly, is 
that while Ricky is speaking about religion, David is correcting him by forming the 
word 'evolution' soundlessly. In the first year, David had objected strongly to 
learning about evolution in humanities lessons. Here he is silently registering an 
important objection. The teaching of evolution was the issue, he insisted, not his 
religion. But as he recalled the episode, he was visibly discomforted. His body 
language changed: he shifted his posture, bent forwards, shook his head and smiled. 
Ricky's family was partly Jewish and lived locally. They were long-settled in 
Hackney in a way that very few of the West Indian, African, Pakistani, Turkish, or 
Greek families were. Moreover, Ricky was in tune with the school's ethos. It is 
important to grasp this point to understand his confident tone and the measured 
nature of his outspoken criticism of the syllabus. It was extremely well judged. 
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There was a robust tradition of debating controversial issues at the school going 
back at least as far as the inter-war years. To give just a couple of examples, in 1928 
the school's Debating Society decided, against the prevailing spirit of militarism and 
imperialism of the inter-war years, that 'the Great War had done more harm than 
good'. Also in 1930 it decided that India should be granted self-government.43 The 
distinctive character of the school's population powerfully shaped the schools' 
politically liberal climate. Early on, the Hackney Downs had served an almost 
exclusively Christian community. Later, especially during the inter-war years and 
the forties, it 'welcomed the sons of Jewish immigrants' .44 
By the 1950's over half the boys at the school were Jewish. By this time the school 
had an awesome academic reputation and pupils were enrolled from all over North 
London. Indeed, the Jewish presence in the school (pupils and staff) undoubtedly 
strengthened the schools' anti-racist ethos in the mid-seventies. But by then, the 
proportion of Jewish pupils had dropped to less than a third, as more boys were 
enrolled from what was then characterised as 'the coloured Commonwealth 
community' . Such changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the school 
population coincided with the changeover from a grammar school to a non-selective 
comprehensive. As a consequence, more children from white working class families 
(many of them with comparatively low levels of literacy) as well as comparatively 
more children from Black families, (especially from the Eastern Caribbean) entered 
the school. With the arrival of this new population, the school's academic status 
changed. 
Ricky's family was sharply conscious of the changing nature of the school's local 
reputation, which they perceived to be declining. Such complicated perceptions, 
along with a general sense ofloss of prestige among some of the school' s Jewish 
children lay behind his critique of the Humanities syllabus. Notwithstanding his 
coolness towards Caribbean history, Ricky got on extremely well with Kevin, for 
whom he showed genuine respect. There was as an assumption of equality between 
them and quarrels were rare. 
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The exchange between Ricky and David about the place of the history of slavery in 
the syllabus took place in February 1981. In June the following year the issue 
resurfaced. It came up in a way that harked back directly to the previous discussion. 
On this occasion, Kevin and Sunday, who had missed the earlier discussion took 
part. 
The class was reviewing the humanities syllabus. Still mindful of Ricky's stinging 
critique of the Humanities syllabus, the teacher put the following question to 
Sunday: 
TEACHER: Sunday, what would you say then if you took a white middle class 
teacher who was going to come and work in an area like this, right, 
and that white middle class teacher, whose probably just got trained 
says, 'Why should I raise issues like race in a classroom? Why 
should I handle black materials? Because all it's going to do is 
divide kids.' What answer would you give to a teacher like that? 
SUNDAY: Argue about it. You bring black boys and white boys closer 
together. They would know their point of view. 
TEACHER: But it might make the white kids, or the Asian kids feel out of things. 
SUNDAY: It depends how they're gonna take it, you know what I mean. If it's 
just young boys, the first years, you know how stupid they're going to 
go. But the more you get older, the more you gonna sit down and 
think about it. And you don't wanna fight about it. Jus' sit down an' 
get together. 
You know what I mean? It's not worth it. 
DAVID: Yeah. [Screwing up his face in concentration] I forgotten what I was 
going to say. Oh yes! Race: it applies to everyone. Because many 
people are interested to know about the history of Black people (and 
white people, of course) not just the present day racism because 
racism isn't (just) something that is happening now. It goes back a 
long way. It goes back to days of slavery, you could say. 
[Several competing voices] 
KEVIN: Its true, sir. When I was in the West Indies and we was in class ... 
TEACHER: Just a moment. Let Kevin speak. 
DAVID: [Cutting across Kevin] It goes back to the time of slavery. Because 
some Black people got views about slavery and how they were 
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RICKY: 
DAVID: 
treated, or how their ancestors were treated. And the reason why it 
offends some white people is because ... when black people would 
like to blame it on white people as a whole, and say, 'I hate this 
person', they would realise it's not them, it's their ancestors that's 
doing it. Or that cause' the state of things. So the race issue has got 
different views from different people, and it kind of like, boils down 
to what it is today. 
David, how can white people accept the fault of what their ancestors 
done? 
[Forcefully] They can recognise that it's not THEM! 
Recall that David had introduced the issue of inherited responsibility for slavery in 
his discussion with Ricky earlier (12.02.81». On that occasion, David had suggested 
that nowadays people should be able to distinguish personal responsibility from the 
collective legacy of guilt. But the issue was never resolved. Curiously, Ricky opens 
the way for an argument in favour of teaching about the history of slavery, which, 
implicitly, he had opposed earlier. 
RICKY: 
DAVID: 
How do you reckon that people know that, right? 
Don't you think that black people using that as an excuse? Sort of 
asking for more sympathy? 
Don't you think that some white people don't even know about the 
history of Black people? They know about what's happening today. 
But they don't know how far it goes back. 'Cos they wasn't actually 
[taught properly]. 
(David continues above a rising swell of voices} 
[Indignantly] I tell you something. From Primary School all we been 
learning is Romans. And that is one extreme. Celts and Normans an' 
all them. How much Black history is taught in school today? Not as 
much as white! 
Unusually, David has struck a chord with many of the Black class members who 
were looking forwards to quarrelling with him. There was a pause while individuals 
reconsidered their positions. 
KEVIN: [Thoughtfully] It's building up. 
DAVID: Black and white people live in England you know. 
(Several voices, inaudibly) 
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TEACHER: Listen to what he's saying. One at a time! Let Ricky speak. 
But before Ricky can say anything, Simon intervenes. He gestures towards the wall 
displays around the room. Two posters are especially relevant to the discussion. 
concerns African cultures before the European incursions. (The dominant image was 
of a tribal mask). The other poster was an annotated map of the Atlantic slave 
triangle. (Both posters were laminated, by the way, which indicated their 
'permanent' status.) 
SIMON: 
RICKY: 
(Pointing to the wall displays) There's Romans over there. There's 
Africans over there. There's ... I don't know, bleedin' Wales. 
(laughter) It's true, sir! Look how many things there are on the walls. 
As I said, though, you're living in an English country. So you learn 
an English history. You live in another country ... 
Ricky trails off without completing his sentence. Nevertheless, the inference is clear: 
schools should teach national histories. John takes up the theme. 
JOHN: What do you think they teach mostly in Jamaica or somewhere like 
that? English culture or Jamaican culture? Course they gonna 
favour it, ain't they? 
TEAcHER: Hang on. One at a time. Kevin next. 
KEVIN: I tell you, I tell you, when I was there, right, teacher tell me 'bout 
Columbus. Everything! Teacher didn't tell you 'bout slavery. 
Teacher didn't tell you anything. One time, when we go for walks 
and ting, I see one of those slave houses, right. I didn't know what it 
was then. But I know what it is now. We just walk pas' it like it was 
an old building that's been there for ages. Teacher didn't tell you 
what it was or anything. (He changes his tone and adds reflectively) I 
think he was afraid it might cause resentment ot anything. 
[Several voices] That's right! 
There followed a short pause while everyone drew breath. Then Ricky spoke up. 
RICKY: Why is it, this is just a question, they never told you, right? And in 
England they're trying to learn you, right, [your] history. And in 
your own country, right, they ain't even tellin' you what went wrong. 
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(Several raised voices) 
TEACHER: Hang on! Woah! 
Kevin wanted to return to the theme of his unfinished sentence (the one that David 
cut short earlier). In Montserrat, he says, when he was there, they didn't teach the 
history of slavery. Thus he challenged John's generalisation about the kind of history 
that is taught in the West Indies, and he ignored John's failure to make proper 
distinctions among particular islands, which was a common, though sometimes an 
irritating, mistake that the white Londoners routinely made when speaking about the 
Caribbean. Sometimes the entire region was referred to simply as 'Jamaica,45 'When 
I was there', he says, meaning when he was in Montserrat. 
Later, writing about this incident in April 1983 he slightly misrepresented his 
disagreement with John as an opposition between two large generalisations: 'They 
should only teach Caribbean history in the Caribbean'; and 'But they don't teach 
Caribbean history in the Caribbean.'. Thus, Kevin puts words into John's mouth. 
Actually, John was trying to suggest something more like this: 'Common sense' tells 
us that 'Jamaican' culture will be privileged in Jamaican schools, because each 
country 'naturally' teaches its own history and culture. John's implicit assumption 
was that it is both reasonable andfair to expect that English culture should be taught 
in London schools. 
Kevin's anecdote about his class's morning walk was intended both to prove a point 
and to settle an argument. He meant it to illustrate his point: 'they don't teach 
children about slavery in the West Indies'. But then, in a markedly altered tone - a 
sort of coda - he reflects about the reason why this was so, reflecting that it was 
because 'the teacher thought it might cause resentment or something' . Many of the 
Black pupils agreed with him on this point. But by now the whole nature of the 
interaction had changed. The discussion had thrown up a genuine problem that the 
group seems to want to resolve. 
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Ricky's response to Kevin's anecdote is delicately judged: 'Why is it', he asks 
quietly, 'this is just a question, they never told you, right?' Notice the way that his 
manner towards Kevin contrasts strikingly with the way he speaks to David. With 
David, for much of the time, he is really (as they both know) challenging the status 
of David's assertions. For example, he demands: 'Can you tell me what food you've 
brought over here, please?' The exaggerated tone of politeness barely masks his 
intention, which is to undermine the status of David's claims. Later, with Kevin, 
however, he is at pains to be clear that he is asking a genuine question. He is 
respectful of Kevin's status, and he doesn't want to offend him. Moreover, he is 
sensitive about the likelihood of his being misconstrued and mindful too of the row 
that John caused when he asked the question about mud huts. Ricky is on dangerous 
ground and he is not sure whether he can raise the issue of slavery at all without 
giving offence. 
Thus Ricky has to establish that he is asking a genuine question and that his 
intentions are 'honourable' . What actually prompts the question is a perceived 
contradiction. Previously, he had assumed (with John) that they teach Black history 
in the Caribbean. But this turned out to be wrong. He continues in a genuinely 
puzzled manner, 'And in England they're trying to learn you, right, [your] history. 
And in your own country, right, they ain't even tellin' you what went wrong?' 
I have no space here to describe where the discussion went from there. The boys 
carried on for over an hour. But I need to say a word more about what John was up 
to. He was impatient to tackle what he considered to be more urgent and more 
relevant questions than the teaching of Black history. He was keen to discuss 
contemporary politics and his classmates' future prospects. 
JOHN I think it's right to learn about the history and where you come from 
and all that. But they [teachers] should put more emphasis on the 
future. You know, about the governments and that. They should 
teach history, but they should do more about the future. 
John's father was a trade unionist. John, like Simon, came from a traditional Labour-
voting household. Round about the time that Kevin was in Montserrat, John's family 
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went to Australia. Things didn't work out there and they returned to Hackney. When 
John speaks of the future he means specifically of the steeply rising levels of 
unemployment in the local area during the late seventies and early eighties. 
Moreover, he shared the common perception among all the members of the class that 
levels of unemployment were significantly higher in the Black community. 
Unemployment had recently emerged as a powerful theme in the class's discussions 
as well as in their written work. Simon, for instance, wrote a long piece, Ambitions, 
where he tried to imagine his future beyond school. Immediately after, he wrote 
'Could it have been Different?' (28.06.82) in which he attempted to make realistic 
predictions about what would happen to his classmates when they left school. He 
was especially concerned about Audley, and he touched on Audley's increasing 
involvement in petty crime. It was a powerful piece that resonated for everyone. At a 
later stage, Simon revised 'Could it Have Been Different?' in collaboration with 
Kevin, who brought to the task of editing Simon's piece the experience that he had 
gained through his editing partnership with Sunday. It was later typed, duplicated 
and circulated among the class. 
* * * 
By this stage the class, now in its fourth year, had three years' experience of regular 
discussions behind it. The character of the interactions was generally calmer. The 
way that David, Ricky, Simon, Kevin, Sunday and John interpreted each other's 
intentions as well as the inferences that they made about meanings depended on their 
sharing tacit frames of reference that they carried forward from previous discussions. 
Further to this, these boys operated with what they knew of each other's' values and 
behaviour both in and crucially out of school. By and large, they knew who was 
likely to make a racist remark, who would try to dominate discussions and who was 
skilful at trading insults and so on. But the boys participated unevenly in class 
discussions. There were always issues around inclusion: getting a fair hearing; 
interrupting; tum-taking; resolving conflicts (verbal and physical) and ways of 
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negotiating one another's meanings. Whereas these features of classroom discourse 
were regularised by the class and their teacher over time, the crux was always the 
operation of social power and its mediation in discourse.46 
* * * 
Kevin claimed that the history of slavery was not taught properly in the West Indies. 
In reality, Caribbean history and literature was on the CXC (Caribbean 
Examinations Council) syllabus. However, he was generalising from his time in 
rural Monterrat, and it is likely that his experiences there reflected older educational 
attitudes and practices of the kind that George Lamming describes in pre-war 
Barbados: 
Moreover they [the pupils] weren't told anything about that [slavery]. They 
had read about the Battle of Hastings and William the Conqueror. That 
happened so many hundreds of years ago. And slavery was thousands of 
years before that. .. History had to begin somewhere, but not so far back. And 
nobody knew where this slavery business took place. The teacher simply said 
not here, somewhere else.47 
The discussion around Caribbean history took place in June 1982. Four months later, 
at the start of the new school year, Kevin wrote his poem, Piece of the Past. In truth, 
it took his teacher by surprise. By the end of his fourth year in school Kevin had 
been writing very little. Unusually, at the end of what had appeared to be an 
unproductive lesson (eighty minutes or so) he handed in four sides of untidy 
manuscript. The following lesson he began revising the 'rough version' of a 
narrative. Here is the final, edited version. 
Piece of the Past 
Cold Thursday morning 
Bright but cold 
Not English cold, but West Indies cold 
Teacher Lincoln checking our nails 
Checking our feet 
Checking our tree bark head 
'Time for we walk' say teacher 
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1 Frogs 
'No teacher it's too cold!' 
'Did you speak Margaret?' 
'No teacher.' 
'Everybody outside, MOVE' 
'Where we going?' 
'Colin's Gut.' 
All on the move 
Heading North 
'Teacher why you have stick?' 
'For beat the person who las" 
Poor Gregory stopped for his lace 
And he did feel the licks 
15 minutes pass 
Walking down hill 
On a road or path what was once there 
We strode up to this tower 
'Everybody res." 
There were cropus l everywhere 
Small and large, all dullish green 
I had never been here before 
'Teacher what is this place?' Frog Eye asked with interest. .. 
'An 01' building.' 
'What it use for?' 
'It's an ol'fashun win'mill' 
But I knew better, not totally, I wasn't sure at first 
On the other side of the path was a house. 
One floor, verandah outside and made purely from wood. 
Few of us explored inside. 
The floorboards creaked. 
No one was scared. 
For it was broad daylight outside. 
The shutters had been blown off from time. 
It definitely wasn't a W I style house. 
Certainly European styled. 
Possibly a mixture of both. 
There was a chair inside 
Utensils still lying around, 
Some covered in cobwebs. 
Then everybody become giggly. 
Gregory made jokes about Jancro in the house. 
No one was in there for much longer, 
We all ran round the back of the windmill 
Then climbed in for a peep. 
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We didn't manage to see everything 
For teacher called us out. 
What I did manage to see 
Was some form of contraption, 
Where slaves were made to pedal to create power for the windmill. 
Time to continue our walk. 
Most of these facts 
I never knew at the time 
I had an idea with no real meaning. 
Hackney Downs educated me with these facts 
What I saw was part of that fact. 
Behind stood a fascinating piece of history 
Probably some thing I'll never forget. 
For now, all I can do is remember. 
But someday I'll RETURN. 
In Kevin's poem the teacher and the children share a common creole. It is more 
usual to hear of and to read about teachers who maintain a rigid Standard English, 
whether or not this is always so. Teacher Lincoln's snappish manner creates a gulf 
between himself and his pupils. The naive question, 'Teacher why you have stick?' 
wins the brisk response: 'For beat the person who las'!' A bleak comedy is played 
out, and the account of Gregory's misfortunes is calculated to make the reader laugh. 
Read aloud in class, the phrase 'he did feel the licks' was a cue for a chorus from the 
Black students of 'murder' and 'blood' accompanied by a quick flurry of flicked 
wrists and snapped fingers. 
Teacher Lincoln is a familiar figure in Caribbean Literature. Here for instance is a 
moment from Austin Clarke's autobiographical account of growing up in Barbados 
in the forties: 
The entire school and the teachers were singing at the top of their voices 
Ride on, ride on, in Majesty 
In Lowly pomp ride on to die ... 
'Fingers!' he said to the six of us at the door. The boy at the end of the line 
held out his hands. The Headmaster inspected his fingers and nails. They 
were dirty. They were always dirty. We always had dirty fingernails. Not one 
of us in that school had a nail file. They were not common in our village. 
When the time came we cleaned our fingers with a stick. We pitched marbles 
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at noon and our nails bore that evidence ... We seemed to want the inspection 
and the punishment. 
He held the boy's ear and looked inside it.48 
As was customary, the boys received a flogging. 
Intriguingly, Kevin wrote a reminder to himself in red ink at the redrafting stage: 
'Change from dialect to English since most is in English but talking stays in dialect.' 
This instruction reveals the degree of linguistic sophistication at work. He knows 
most of the conventions of the English writing system, and he uses them (and 
occasionally subverts them) to make his poem more effective. This is especially true 
where he deliberately breaks with convention: 
1st draft 
Poor Gregory did stop fe do im lace an im did feel the licks 
2nd draft 
Poor Gregory stopped for his lace / And he did feel the licks 
The second version preserves the flavour of creole. If Kevin had simply followed his 
instructions to the letter he would have transposed all the dialect into Standard 
English, but the standard equivalent would be dull and unfunny by comparison. This 
is a fine, but crucial point. In Kevin's first draft there is no suggestion that the creole 
features are unintentional errors or miscues due to 'dialect interference'. Rather, they 
serve as markers to evoke a Caribbean narrative voice. There are other instances, 
however, where he simply made mistakes. For example, in his first draft Kevin 
confused the word 'lavenda' (his spelling) with 'verandah'. 
The way that Kevin uses what I have just called 'the flavour of creole' is especially 
interesting, not least because it is something that has occupied generations of writers 
in the West Indies. The novelist, Jean D'Costa has written about her own fiction for 
children as exemplifying some of the central dilemmas of Caribbean writers.49 
Linguists have suggested that the writers in the Caribbean operate within a 
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'polydialectal continuum' with a creole base. For D'Costa, the whole of the 
continuum is a 'felt reality' within a person's consciousness. She argues that the 
linguistic continuum corresponds to a cultural continuum in which the 'boundaries 
of grammar and its minimal shifting are not simple alternatives - but are tied to 
history and social consciousness, and to the very identities of speakers.' 
D'Costa's first novel, Sprat Morrison (1972) was written to meet specific criteria.5o 
The register had to be Standard Jamaican English because at the time the Ministry of 
Education in Jamaica would not admit literature with non-standard English in 
schools. D'Costa had to cut certain scenes of street life and backyard which could 
have been the liveliest aspects of a novel about a ten year old boy in his last year at 
primary school. Nevertheless, certain Standard Jamaican English phrases are used 
imaginatively to evoke the experiences of childhood. (Such phrases are sometimes 
spoken of as 'tonally creole') Yet, as she says, many expressions in normal usage 
would be in J arnaican creole. Thus she compares the 'meaning potential' of the two 
forms: 'A caning was handed out to all'/ 'a hot lick fe everyone adem'. D'Costa 
marks the shift from a style of punishment associated with school that has echoes of 
Victorian English literature to a particularly 'West Indian' style of punishment that 
is not confined to school. She hoped that for children who would normally use the 
creole form there would be an inward shift of perception and an appropriate cultural 
response (such as the chorus of 'murder' and 'blood' that I described above). 'Outer' 
audiences, she says, may perceive a thinner world of meaning.' 
In Kevin's first draft he used the creole word 'cropus'. He preferred it to 'frogs'. 
Indeed, it appears that he had originally intended to write frogs because he formed 
the first two letters, ('fr'), then changed his mind mid-word, and crossed out the 
letters before he completed the whole word. Then, having chosen cropus, he added 
a footnote explaining that it meant frogs. Thus he shows that he is familiar with 
'scholarly apparatus', but there is also a degree of playfulness involved). Kevin must 
have been aware that a general - that is an 'English' or a 'white' - reader would be 
unfamiliar with the creole word. The footnote was not an afterthought. Rather it was 
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something that he attended to during the composing process while he took the 
reader(s) into account. Crucially, there were no fixed alternatives, no clear choices to 
be made between Standard English and creole. Rather, the entire process was a 
dynamic one in which his alertness to the possibilities of different voices and 
audiences shaped the way that he constructed and maintained the narrative voice at 
the point of utterance. 
Let's look at another, contrasting instance of Kevin's use of creole. No sooner do 
the children stop at the ruins than they rush off to explore the abandoned house. 
Once inside, however, their confidence begins to ebb away: 
Then everybody became giggly 
Gregory made jokes about Jancro in the house 
No one was in there for much longer. 
The word Jancro has resonated powerfully for 'West Indian' audiences. With 
'cropus' Kevin acknowledged that a general ('English'/ 'white') reader would be 
unfamiliar with the term so he added the footnote. But he offered no help with 
'Jancro'. Moreover, it appears from his first draft that Jancro' was not his first 
choice. He originally wrote 'dopey' - a 'West Indian' ghost, sometimes spelled 
'duppy' - then, as he did earlier with the word 'frogs', he crossed out his first choice 
and wrote in 'Jancro' instead. 
I should say where the word 'Jancro' comes from. In Jamaica, according to 
Caribbean lexicographers, 'John-crow' is a folk etym formation from 'carrion 
crow,.51 It was reduced in popular pronunciation to 'cyancrow' and then to 'jankro', 
which is close to the African word Ewe 'dongr6'. Significantly here, 'Jancro' has 
rich folkloric associations. 'Jancro' is a favourite figure in proverbs and tales where 
the bird - a scavenging buzzard - often symbolises the 'unfavourable traits' 
attributed to 'the Negro' by other Negroes. (I touched on this theme earlier in 
connection with ritual insults.) For instance, one nineteenth-century folklorist and 
lexicographer recorded proverbs such as, 'John Crow neber make house till rain 
come' (lacks foresight) and 'John Crow tink him own pickney white' (gives himself 
airs and graces). Sometimes the scavenging nature of the buzzard is fore-grounded, 
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as with, 'When John Crow see mauger [sick] cow, him roast plantainfe him'. (Roast 
plantain implies a forthcoming feast). Like Anancy Spider, Jancro has remained a 
popular figure in the Caribbean, especially in Jamaican and Trinidadian folk-tales, 
where the folk tradition is chiefly West African. In some islands, for instance St 
Vincent the name 'Corbaux' or 'Corbo' (Scots 'Corbie') is commonly used. 
In the USA, the term is 'Jim Crow'. There, too, the figure of the crow has been used 
traditionally as a symbol of Afro-Americans. To give just one important instance, 
the Black American painter, Jacob Lawrence, has used 'crows' to symbolise African 
Americans in his magnificent series of painted panels. These panels depict the 
causes and effects of the migrati of Black people from the rural South to the 
industrial North during and after the Great War.52 
It was only after Kevin wrote Piece of the Past, that it came to light that 'Jancro' 
was a name that one of Kevin's classmates, Anthony, whose family background was 
Jamaican used to insult Audley, whose family, you may recall, was also from 
Jamaica. Usually in Jamaican folk culture Jancro denotes a combination of stupidity 
and low status. 
And we should not underestimate what Kevin was learning to do here. Consider by 
way of comparison, the opening lines of Martin Carter's magnificent poem of 
resistance, University of Hunger: 
is the university of hunger the wide waste. 
is the pilgrimage of man the long march. 
The print of hunger wanders in the land. 
The green tree bends above the long forgotten. 
We are given four ringing, declarative statements. The first two statements look like 
questions, but they are not. The Standard English form would read, 'The university 
of hunger is the wide waste', or 'It is the university of hunger that is the wide 
waste'. This is not a hand-wringing musing on the human condition. Rather it is a 
political statement about what grinding poverty teaches the poor in the Caribbean. 
University of Hunger is from the collection, Poems of Resistance (1954), and it was 
written during Martin Carter's detention in Guyana in 1953. It aims to give a voice 
to popular protest against colonial rule in the 'West Indies'. The syntax is 
261 
uncompromisingly Caribbean because it is addressed directly to the people of the 
Caribbean. As it appears on the printed page it evokes the tonal qualities of the 
popular voice. Such a voice evokes solidarity. Carter holds out an invitation 
(preserved in syntax) to an 'inner' audience - an audience that is attuned to the 
spoken language of the Caribbean - to bring forward for collective recognition and 
affirmation a shared web of cultural and political assumptions. And it is injust such 
a web that the poem's meanings are caught. These meanings emerge from an 
unwritten and largely unmarked history of brutal injustice and unspeakable 
suffering. An outer audience - a literate, metropolitan one - would perceive 'a 
thinner world of meanings'. In my view, Kevin is learning to do something similar. 
* * * 
I chose to look at a poem that arose from the conversation that a class conducted 
with itself over several years. An idea that started out as anecdotal evidence 
intended to settle an argument about the place of Black history in the syllabus, with a 
warrant of personal experience behind it, lay dormant for several months before it 
issued as a rather scrappy first draft. 
I claimed that the intersection between learning and instruction and development 
would be central in the story I would tell. I also claimed that development and 
instruction have different 'rhythms', and that they are in reality 'two interconnected 
processes, each with its own measure'. I have explained that by 'instruction' I mean 
the teaching of school knowledge, in this instance knowledge that was classified and 
framed by the school's Humanities syllabus. And instruction here includes material 
artefacts and 'instructional apparatus' - textbooks, maps and resources designed for 
'pedagogical purposes'. In this section I shall be looking at the history of some of 
these artefacts. 
I have shown how 'instruction' awakened one student's developmental processes. I 
have also traced the way that Kevin's development followed its individual trajectory 
according to his needs and interests. Such trajectories are rarely linear. Rather they 
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are recursive. Piece of the Past issued from a long cycle of lessons that extended 
over months (indeed years, if we take into account Humanities lessons that I 
mentioned on the Middle Ages, the Highland clearances and the Irish potato famine 
and so on). Kevin had a measure of control over the pace and direction of his work, 
especially so when he was working in the editing partnership with Sunday. The 
syllabus provided him with a starting point and a planned framework. Additionally 
he received specific guidance from his teacher. However, Kevin made progress 
unevenly, and by the time he was fifteen some lessons went by when nothing much 
was accomplished. Indeed, several of these apparently 'unproductive' lessons 
occurred between the class discussion around the place of Caribbean history in June 
1982 and the appearance of the first draft of Piece of the Past in September. In this 
next section I shall try to reconstruct something of what happened during this time. 
* * * 
Three lines from Kevin's poem baffle me. Here they are: 
What I did manage to see 
Was some form of contraption 
Where slaves were made to pedal to create power for the windmill. 
Has Kevin misunderstood how windmills work? Surely, slaves didn't pedal to create 
power to tum windmills. That seems senseless. Where did the tread-wheel 
('contraption') come from? Did he really see a tread-wheel in Monserrat? Where? 
He had seen drawings of tread-wheels in history textbooks when the class looked at 
England in the nineteenth century. Did he muddle the two things? I will try to show 
that the answer to this question lies in the way that Kevin made sense of the history 
textbook, The People Who Came. 
The People Who Came was an attractively designed, three-volume set of school 
textbooks written chiefly for use in the Caribbean. I should be clear that it was a 
uniquely valuable resource for the development of the school's Humanities syllabus. 
There were pictures, maps and photographs (many of them coloured), with tasks at 
the end of each chapter - 'things to do and think about' that were designed to 
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encourage students to extend their understanding of the book's under! ying themes 
and concepts. As I mentioned earlier, Edward Brathwaite was the series editor.53 
I want to look at some of the pictures in The People Who Came now from the 
perspectives of what I have called 'classroom archaeology'. This will entail scraping 
away many layers of accumulated dust. I shall be concentrating especially on the 
history of these pictures as instances of 'pedagogic artefacts', and I shall be looking 
in some detail at the history of these images of plantation slavery, at their origins and 
at what was problematic about the way they worked in the textbook. 
The students knew the book well. I mentioned already that Kevin and Sunday 
borrowed the term' absentee landlords' from The People Who Came and 
incorporated it into their work on migration. Indeed, they referred to the textbook 
continually over the years, more often than not, without being directed to do so by 
their teacher. Throughout this section I shall be concentrating especially on the 
visual material in the book to shed light on the baffling lines in Kevin's poem. 
T the start of chapter fifteen of The People Who Came, 'The Plantation' , there is a 
picture of a plantation house. It is a modem drawing that shows a wooden veranda 
similar to the one Kevin described in his poem. (Incidentally, one of the references 
to 'absent' landlords that Kevin and Sunday noticed appears in the opening 
paragraph.54 Over the page there are more drawings in a similar style, and then a 
page with four smallish coloured drawings (three inches by two inches) in a different 
style representing 'the five stages of sugar production'. (Figure 1) These four 
drawings - they are miniaturised reproductions of coloured engravings - belong to a 
set of ten engravings that were published at the start of the nineteenth century called 
Ten Views in the Island of Antigua by the English artist, William Clark. I shall be 
focusing on these drawings' complicated history. 
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Figure 2 
How sugar was tnade 
The whole routine of plantation life revoh'ed 
around the making of SUg:lr. The sugar-cane 
plant, which had been introduced into the New 
\V arid from l."ladeira by the Portuguese, had 
been brought to Barbados by the Dutch and 
Portuguese Jews moving out of Brazil. These 
later showed the colonists how best to convert the 
cane to sugar. Newly planted canes took about 15 
months to mature, while th,e older 'ratoon' canes 
took about 12 months. 
When the cane-carts came from the fields into 
the factory yard, they were unloaded and the 
canes were passed by hand into the mill. The 
mill, which was turned by two pairs of mules, 
a water-whec! or a windmill, consisted of three 
he:l\'\' iron rollers which crushed the cane and 
squc~zcd thl! juice out of them. A wooden gutter 
carried the juice to the boiling house where it 
ran into a large copper tank called a clarifier. 
Here it was heated with a small quantity of milk 
0/ lilll" (white lime) which made :111 the im-
purities rise to the surf:lcc as a scum. These 
impurities were scooped out with wooden ladles 
and used in the making of rum. 
Clark's Ten Views in the Island of Antigua were published by Thomas Clay of 
Ludgate Hill, London in 1823.55 They appeared at a significant moment in the 
history of the West Indies. In that same year, the Anti-Slavery Society was formed in 
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London. Thus Clark's Ten Views appeared after the slave trade was abolished 
(1807), but before the slaves were emancipated. Indeed, Ten Views were published 
when the national debate about the future of plantation slavery was at its height. 
Slavery was finally abolished in 1833. After that date, Africans were technically no 
longer slaves, but they were legally bound to work for their former owners as 
'apprentices'. Full freedom came in 1838 when it became clear that the 
apprenticeship system had failed. The debate about the future of plantation slavery 
in the West Indies and the nature of the work on the plantations is therefore a critical 
element in any consideration of the reception of Clark's engravings at the time, and 
the intentions that lay behind the publication of his book. 
Clark's drawings had an unusual claim to 'authenticity' in their day. For three years 
the author had served as an overseer on an estate owned by Admiral Tallemach in 
Antigua. The overseer's responsibility was to look after the daily running of the 
entire estate, and it is evident from Clark's drawings, as well as from the verbal 
commentary that accompanies them that he had an extensive technical knowledge of 
plantation work. One of Clark's aims was to inform a metropolitan readership about 
the nature of plantation economy. Intriguingly, seven of the ten views in the 1823 
edition (and four of the five views reproduced in the textbook) include 
representations of plantation windmills. It is on one these representations, The Mill 
Yard that I want to concentrate now. 
Clark's representation of the mill yard fairly bustles with industrious activity. (figure 
2) (Figure 2The process of cane crushing is in full swing and the various operations 
are clearly delineated. But the picture of slaves working in the yard resonates eerily 
today. For all that The Mill Yard depicts something particular - the technical 
business of milling the cut cane and the division of labour that it entailed - it also 
evokes disquietingly something larger, which is the brutal history of the plantation 
slavery. 
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Figure 2 
Plainly, the purpose of Clark's drawing was to explain to an early nineteenth century 
reader how sugar was extracted from raw cane stage by stage. Thus it describes 
graphically and in specific detail the technical nature ofthe slaves' work. As a 
consequence of this, the drawing may be read for evidence of the slaves' ordinary 
lives. Essentially, the subject of The Mill Yard is the mode of organised production 
that was evolved to transform a raw material, sugar cane, into a commodity, sugar, 
for profit - it shows slaves feeding a windmill that crushed newly cut cane to extract 
the juice. Long after the mode of production has disappeared (and when the 
conditions surrounding the creation of the representation, its publication and its 
distribution are beyond recall), the engraving documents the process of sugar 
production with an unusual degree of historical authority.56 The drawing is a primary 
source of historical evidence about plantation work. But it also speaks (unwittingly) 
of an inhumane system of exploitation on an unimaginable scale that still haunts us. 
Thus it constitutes a powerful representation of a site of remembrance, and one that 
must have resonated for Kevin. 
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Since its publication as one of the Ten Views, The Mill Yard has often been 
reproduced separately in textbooks, displays and exhibitions, and it is likely that 
Kevin met the image more than once.57 For instance, The Mill Yard appears on the 
front cover of a pioneering textbook for advanced studies in Caribbean history by J. 
H. Parry and Philip Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies (1956).58 Curiously, 
the image that is reproduced on the inside of that textbook is attributed to Edward 
Suter of London, and this strange misattribution deserves further 'excavation'. 
Evidently The Mill Yard was printed by Suter around 1830, three years before 
emancipation, specifically for The Ladies' Society for Promoting Early Education of 
Negro Children. Indeed, this particular instance of reproducing Clark's original 
image separately from the sequence of drawings suggests how Clark's print has been 
appropriated from very early on as 'illustrative' material for various pedagogic 
projects and enterprises. 
What kind of a drawing is it? Paradoxically,Clark's drawings borrow elements from 
a genre he inherited from the Enlightenment: the plates of Denis Diderot's 
Dictionaire des Sciences (1762). However, Clark's debt to the encyclopedie is not 
immediately obvious because he borrowed from at least two other genres besides, 
and I shall say something about them in a moment. 
Diderot's Dictionaire des Sciences contains a wealth of plates whose primary 
purpose is instruction. Each plate aims to teach an educated general reader (or a 
specialist one) about specific domains of technical - that is 'useful' - know ledge. 
Crucially, they constitute paradigmatic instances of Enlightenment 'pedagogic' 
apparatus and they are historically important today as the major precursors of 
modem textbook technical 'illustrations'. Altogether, Diderot's plates provide a 
detailed, comprehensive picture of the crafts, trades, arts and sciences practised in 
France in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Crucially, the subject matter of Diderot's plates was not confined to France. It is 
especially interesting in our context that his Dictionaire des Sciences contains a plate 
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depicting the typical features of 'an ideal plantation' in the West Indies, with a slave 
owner's house, slave huts, a boiling house, a windmill and so on. 
Each plate in the Dictionaire describes a 'model' or 'type' that contains all the 
elements necessary to explain how an 'object' (in this instance a sugar plantation) 
'works'. Thus Diderot's plates were specifically intended to provide condensed 
images of useful items of knowledge. Each element of the drawing is properly 
labelled, with words accompanying the visual representation. Typically, the plates 
represent practical know ledge of their' objects', such as how a windmill works and 
its place in the processes of sugar production. 
Diderot's plates constitute forerunners or prototypes of a particular kind of modem 
'pedagogical apparatus' - the textbook 'illustration'. Typically, textbook 
'illustrations' are meant to teach readers specific discourses (usually certain 
'scientific' principles and concepts) by 'visual means'. Illustrations in school 
textbooks usually work on the principle that pictures are, as the phrase goes, 'worth 
ten thousand words'. But in practice this is rarely straightforwardly so. Crucially, the 
Dictionaire rests on a body of well-defined epistemological principles. The 
encyclopaedic plates represent the 'idea' of the object. They present a discourse 
about the object of study: they do not represent (copy) the objects themselves as they 
'naturally' appear in the world. 
For Diderot, human knowledge derived from sensory experience. He took over the 
sensationalist explanation of how perceptions are transformed into ideas from his 
contemporary, the Abbe de Condillac. For Condillac, who was the epistemological 
father of encyclopaedic discourse, signs stood for ideas of things, not for things 
themselves. The 'illustrations' depict ideas and the ways that ideas are combined 
into conceptual discourse. Crucially, they do not hold up a mirror to nature. Instead, 
the structural organisation of the visual images is meant to reveal a human, 
conceptual ordering of nature rather than a reflection of the natural state of things. 
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It is not hard to see why Clark's drawings have wound up in school textbooks. But 
the way they appear in textbooks is problematic. The Mill Yard is one of a series of 
ten images that together present a step-by-step description ofthe processes of sugar 
production in the West Indies. The drawings, which represent the seasonal cycle of 
work on the plantation are meant to be looked at in a particular order. 59 The verbal 
text, which is printed on the facing page opposite each drawing explains what is 
going on in each drawing, but the relation between the verbal and the visual material 
is often a complicated one. 
The People Who Came shows only five of the ten scenes that appear in Clark's folio 
edition. And it gives a different verbal explanation of the processes. The explanation 
in the textbook is integrated into the 'body text' of the whole chapter. Four scenes 
are shown on a single page. (Figure 1) These scenes comprise: 'Hoeing cane' (Plate 
II, Digging, or Rather hoeing, the Cane-Holes); 'Planting sugar cane' (Plate III, 
Planting the Sugar Cane); 'Crushing the cane', (Plate VI, The Mill Yard); 'Interior 
of a boiling the juice' (Plate V The Boiling House). The explanations given make no 
explicit cross-references to the visual images. 
What is more, the drawings cannot be 'read' in the manner that Clark originally 
intended. There are at least three reasons for this: first, because the series is 
incomplete; second, because Clark's verbal commentary, which often contains 
supplementary information, does not appear; and third, because the instructions 
telling the reader how to read the images are missing. From Kevin's point of view, 
the arrangement of pictures in the textbook was less than clear 
In the original folio edition the verbal commentary printed on the facing page 
explains what each drawing is supposed to show. Words and pictures are meant to 
compliment each other and work together to tell the story. But significantly the 
verbal text does not simply mirror the visual information. Nor does the drawing 
simply 'illustrate' the verbal commentary that accompanies it in any consistent way. 
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In some instances, the visual text, and in others the verbal text supplies different 
kinds of information. 
Here is one telling instance. One drawing (Plate VIII) shows the exterior of the 
curing-house and stills, with a small building under some trees in the background. 
The verbal commentary tells us that this was 'the residence of the author, as 
overseer'. Crucially, this new information alters the manner in which the whole 
book 'works'. It diverts the reader's gaze towards the building in the background of 
the composition. Thus a relatively minor feature of the landscape - takes on major 
significance. What is in the background pictorially is brought to the foreground of 
the reader's attention by the verbal commentary to make an implicit claim about the 
'authenticity' of the representation and the status of what the reader is being shown. 
Additionally, the 'objective' representation of the plantation is suddenly 
personalised by Clark's subjective recollection. 
Clark's intentions were primarily didactic. The verbal commentary instructs the 
reader how to read the visual representations. It introduces a temporal sequence (the 
slaves do this, then this) into a composite set of landscapes, with vignettes that 
otherwise could not show the linear processes of sugar production. To 'read' the 
image correctly, the reader's gaze must reconstruct the sequence of steps by putting 
vignettes of various operations in linear order, although they appear simultaneous in 
the overall composition. This makes sense pictorially because the slaves' work is 
continuous, with several different operations going on at the same time. Thus the 
reader's gaze retraces the whole process, starting with the arrival of the cut cane on 
bullock carts and ending with the disposal of the 'bruised cane' trash after it has 
been crushed and the juice extracted. 
In the verbal commentary Clark describes the division of labour among the Negroes 
in the drawing of the mill yard like this: 
The bundles of Cane are carted and deposited as near as possible to the Mill, 
to lessen the labour of the Negro girls, who convey them on their heads to 
the mill door, where the junks are placed on a receiving board, and the tops 
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which bound them drawn away for the convenience of the Negro whose duty 
it is to feed the mill. 
In high winds, two, and sometimes three, feeders are required to supply the 
cylinders ... 
The Magos or bruised cane, returned by the dumb-turner glides down an 
inclined plane through an aperture in the Mill-wall, whence it is conveyed 
away upon wooden frames by women, and old negroes spread and tum it in 
the sun to be afterwards used as fuel. 60 
The People Who Came also describes how cane was crushed, but unfortunately the 
textbook description is not linked explicitly to the miniaturised reproductions of 
Clark's original drawing. The layout of the page is unfortunate too. The verbal 
description in the textbook begins in the top right hand comer of the page 
(diagonally opposite the drawing), so the reader's gaze can shift back and forth from 
the verbal description to the image, but the verbal description does not refer directly 
to the activities depicted in the drawing. Instead, it characterises the crushing process 
generally: 'The mill, which was turned by two pairs of mules, a waterwheel or a 
windmill, consisted of three heavy rollers which crushed the cane and squeezed the 
juice out of them. ,61 Thus, the reader has to somehow abstract an 'ideal' (free-
floating and generalised) reconstruction of the process from what appears to be a 
naturalistically represented scene. Clark's method of working holds the key. In 
reality, separate elements were drawn from nature to be combined later (as was 
common practice) into a landscape 'composition'. In The People Who Came the 
folio size of the original image has been reduced to a format two inches by three 
inches with the consequence that the three heavy rollers - only two of which are just 
visible in the original drawing - cannot be identified clearly. 
On the previous page (Figure 4) a modem drawing shows the insides of a sugar mill 
with three rollers driven by a water wheel (top left). Diagonally opposite (bottom 
right) there is another drawing in the same contemporary style of slaves being 
punished by whipping or, alternatively, by working a tread-wheel. 
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Inside a sugar 
mill. 
they cut and carted the cane to the mill. The third 
gang was made up of young children and weak or 
elderly slaves. They did light weeding and got food 
for the animals. There were also the domestic slaves 
who worked in the Plantation House and who felt 
superior to the field slaves. In addition, there were 
skilled slaves such as masons, carpenters, coopers 
and wheelwrights, whose services the planter could 
hire out; and the equally skilled slaves who worked 
inside the mills and boiling houses, producing sugar. 
The field slaves were summoned to the field 
before sunrise by the ringing of a bell 01' the blowing 
of a conch shell. They were checked by the overseer 
or book-keeper who, with the slave-driver (himself a 
slave), supervised their work. They worked for about 
four hours and then had half an hour's break for 
breakfast, which was prepared by certain of the slave 
women. The meal was usually boiled yams, okro, 
callaloo and plantains seasoned with salt and cayenne 
pepper. 
Work was resumed until midday when t here was 
a two-hour break for lunch. This meal was similar 
to breakfast, hut salted meat or pickled fish was 
usually added. Each sla\ e was supposed to receive a 
regular allowance of this. Thev then worked on until 
it was dlark. 
In the lull between planting and crop time, the 
slaves were put to work repairing the plantation 
roads and fences and manuring the helds. The skilled 
slaves, (luring this pcriod, made barrels (called 
hogslieads) for the sugar, and carried out repair work 
in the factory and other plantation buildings. 
During crop time the routine changed. The slaves 
were summoned to the hclcls earlier and worked 
until later in the evenings. There was less time for 
eating and rest. 'I-he slaves in the mill and boiling 
houses sometimes worked in shifts right around the 
clock. 
Some owners made the slaves work too hard and punished 
them cruelly for the slightest fault. 
Figure 4 
The caption reads: 'Some owners made the slaves work too hard and punished them 
cruelly for the slightest fault.' The modem drawing is based on a nineteenth century 
engraving of a tread-wheel in Jamaica. Like the image of The Mill Yard, the image 
of the tread-wheel has also been frequently reproduced. Indeed, a cropped 
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reproduction of the original engraving is printed in another school textbook, The 
West Indian Heritage: A History of the West Indies. 62 However, the representation of 
the tread-wheel is problematic and I shall come back to it in a moment. 
Crucially, in The People Who Came the contemporary style of the drawings has the 
effect of making the tread-wheel and the water wheel resemble one another. 
Confusingly, it appears as though the tread-wheel and the water wheel belong to the 
same mechanical assembly. It is therefore plausible that Kevin reasonably assumed 
that the water wheel and the tread-wheel both provided power to turn the windmill 
and this appears to answer our question about the baffling lines in the poem.63 But 
the confusion does not end there. 
A moment ago I claimed that Clark's Ten Views dreww on a genre associated 
especially with Diderot and the Encyclopedie. Yet, at first glance, Clark's drawings 
contrast strikingly with Diderot's plates. Clark's views are represented 
'naturalistically' whereas the plates present a discourse about the object of study, not 
the objects themselves as they appear 'naturally'. Moreover, Clark's views do not 
attempt to represent the processes of sugar production schematically, there are no 
accompanying labels and they don't use conventions of encyclopaedic 
representation such as 'cross-section and assembly' drawings of the kind favoured 
by Diderot that were common around the middle of the eighteenth century. Hence, 
the windmill is not drawn with its casing cut away to reveal the three rollers. Rather, 
at first glance, Clark's depictions appear to be executed more in the manner of 
topographical sketches that were popular in England around the turn of the century. 
Indeed, Clark's drawings owe much to the genre of the topographical sketch in the 
way that they follow established rules of landscape composition. (I mention 
composition again here because it will be important for what I shall go on to say 
about what Kevin was doing later). Indeed, Ten Views resembles many period 
sketches of Caribbean 'prospects', such as Johnson's English Harbour, Antigua. 
From Great George Fort, Monk's Hill. Monk's Hill is a particularly good example 
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of the military topographical sketch genre. Such drawings became fashionable 
around the tum of the eighteenth century. When public attention became focused on 
political developments in the West Indies, and Caribbean such subjects became 
lucrative.64 Like many drawings and paintings of the genre, Monk's Hill shows a 
'prospect' with a storm approaching. This is a conventional device used in 
topographical sketches to provide a focus on the horizon (to create an illusion of 
distance and depth), and to introduce dramatic narrative into the scene. Two years 
after Clark's Ten Views were published, another artist, James Hakewill produced A 
Picturesque Tour of the Island of Jamaica. Hakewill's drawings, like Clark's, depict 
sugar plantations, showing the arrangement of the key features on particular estates, 
such as the book-keeper's barrack, the still house, the boiling house and the 
overseer's residence and so on. 
I need to touch on the way that Ten Views figured in the market place of 
metropolitan art. With the advent of lithographic printing techniques in the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, travellers' topographical sketches became 
especially popular in England. Artists usually drew their designs on transfer paper 
and handed them over to a skilled lithographic printer, who reproduced them. 
Clark's drawings were published at the start of a highly lucrative period for British 
artists and engravers. A decade after the publication of Ten Views, John Frederick 
Lewis published Sketches and Drawings of the Alhambra (1835) and Sketches of 
Spain and Spanish Character. Shortly after, David Robert's magnificent collection 
of sketches, The Holy Land, Idumea, Arabia, Egypt and Nubia (1842-1849). The 
way that the market developed is illustrated by the fact that Roberts' sketches were 
issued in forty parts made up of two hundred and forty plates, which could be plain 
or coloured. Although these sketches record Roberts' subjects with an unusual 
degree of accuracy they are primarily aesthetic prints. Crucially, he recomposed the 
elements in his sketches to achieve certain 'artistic' effects.65 Above all, his 
paintings and lithographs were meant to convey the romance of exotic locations with 
an historical and cultural resonance for a nineteenth century, well-to-do readership. 
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Clark's views of Antigua, of course, held no such historical and cultural resonance 
for nineteenth-century readers. Instead, Ten Views offered aesthetically pleasing, but 
chiefly (where, allegedly, there were no historical associations) they offered 
'authoritative' quasi-anthropological descriptions of life and work in the West 
Indies. They are meant to show 'well-managed', rationalised Antiguan sugar 
plantations. Indeed, Clark's drawings also borrow from a genre of paintings 
depicting rational farming methods that were popular in England in the1740's, such 
as The Dixton Harvesters, (currently in the Cheltenam Art Gallery and Museum).66 
For those nineteenth century readers who were familiar with paintings of rational 
farming as images of modernisation and progress, Clarke's drawings depict the 
extension of essentially the same 'improving' methods to the colonies in the West 
Indies. 
Clark's drawings were not literal representations of 'real' places and events. They 
did not 'copy' nature. Rather, they were, like Roberts' landscapes, compositions. But 
the rules of composition that Clark followed differed significantly from Roberts' in a 
way that connects Ten Views to the Encyclopedie. Ten Views resembles Diderot's 
plates chiefly in the way it aims to instruct the reader about a particular domain of 
economic activity, 'useful' knowledge. For Diderot, technical development was 
explicitly and implicitly related to Enlightenment ideology around the progress of 
Mankind. 
In a way that resembles Diderot's plates, Clark's drawings typify the processes of 
modem sugar production to edify specialist and non-specialist readers. They instruct 
the reader how to read the images to see how sugar was produced on a well-
managed estate. Clark's style is 'naturalistic' not 'realistic'. The drawings depict the 
outward appearances of things, but they are structured in a way that is different from 
the way things 'really are'. As such, The Mill Yard is not a faithful representation of 
a particular place. Rather it is a composite of materials drawn from several locations, 
as Clark himself explains: 'The Mill is that situated at Gambles, and the accessaries 
[sic] are taken from other estates, to bring them under one point of view, to represent 
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the Mill-yard.' Hence, the organising principle for Clark's drawing is the pedagogic 
idea of the mill- it teaches the reader about what mills in Antigua were for and how 
they worked. It both specifies and concretises the operations involved. Thus the 
drawings and the text, words and pictures in combination represent a discourse 
about plantations. They do not depict plantations as they 'naturally' occurred. 
Moreover, Clark's discourse on sugar plantations is not a neutral one. It is 
ideologically accented in the way that it idealises plantations at the very moment 
when the future of plantation slavery was being debated at the national level. 
(Contrast Clark's drawings with William Elmes' illustrations for the Abolitionist 
tract, The Adventures of Johnny Newcome (1811) satirising the lives of slave-owning 
planters). In sum, Clark superimposes an Enlightenment discourse about the 
progressive nature of rationalised labour onto scenes of plantation slavery. 
However, the differences between Clark and Diderot are also telling. Here is a 
description of how Diderot' s plates work. 
The general image of the worker in the Encyclopedie is that of a body 
reduced to its hands. The individual carding cotton, for example, has no 
existence beyond the wrist and the hand that perform the task. It is not, 
moreover, the hands of innumerable workers and craftspeople that are 
shown, but rather two hands always the same ... It is this 'manualisation' of 
the worker that allows Diderot to propose the following explanation of why 
one method of manufacturing is superior to another ... It is the anonymity of 
the workers and their interchangeability that make it possible to rationalise 
production: that is, not only to subject the production process to the order of 
reason, but also to capitalize on methods designed to increase efficiency, 
quality and finally profitability. 67 
In Clark's drawings by contrast the slaves are not 'manualised' abstractions. Rather 
they are figured fully and concretised. Indeed, Ten Views teems with vital, 
individualised figures. This is strikingly so in The Boiling House where a voluptuous 
Black woman, wearing red turban and a yellow dress with red and white striped 
underskirts, sways down the gangway between the boiler (the teache) and the trays 
of crystalised sugar. 
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And Clark is unafraid to describe physical labour. In The Mill Yard women carry 
bundles of cane on their heads to the mill door. They stoop to gather and bundle the 
cane. Elsewhere he sketches the repetitive, mechanical nature of men and women 
hoeing, cutting cane, boiling cane juice. Indeed, Clark appreciated the skills and 
difficulties involved in performing specific tasks, as in this example taken from one 
of his verbal explanations: 
Opening the land preparatory to the planting of the sugar cane is the most 
laborious occupation for the Negroes; they are always allowed relaxation 
during the hottest hour, and on this occasion an extra allowance of rum, with 
a plentiful supply of sugar and water' 
And again: 
The younger Negroes distribute two or three plants into each cane hole, 
while the most experienced Negroes open cavities in the holes about six 
inches deep, place the plants horizontally, so that the buds may appear on 
either side and cover them. This process requires great attention on the part 
of the Negroes who are thus entrusted. 
Yet notwithstanding the differences between them, in a way that is strikingly similar 
to Diderot, Clark depicts the technical nature of human productivity. (Ironically, the 
verbal commentary in Ten Views provides an excellent primary source of evidence 
to support what Kevin and Sunday discovered for themselves during their editing 
partnership: slaves supplied the necessary, technical farming skills as well as brute 
labour that made the sugar plantations of the West Indies economically viable). 
What is particularly problematic though is Clark's Ten Views offer disquieting 
instance of instrumental rationality that constitutes the negative strand in the 
'dialectic' of Enlightenment. The discourse around rational forms of labour masks 
the violence that lies behind. 
Like the Diderot's encyclopaedic plates (but for different reasons) Clark's Ten Views 
speak of progressive modes ofproduction.68 The Mill Yard (image and word 
combined) explains how each separate operation contributes instrumentally to 
efficient productivity of a total enterprise - an enterprise that was in reality 
unspeakably harsh. Disquietingly, the compositional elements that Clark borrowed 
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from the genre of the topographical sketch contribute to an overall impression of 
harmony. The drawings filter out brutal social realities of enforced labour, the 
controlling threat of violence and the slaves' (reciprocally violent) resistance. 
Overall, Clark depicts the model plantation as a harmonised, calmly ordered, 
hierarchical world (superintended by the overseer and the slave-driver) where male 
and female, young and old are industriously employed in the business of 
transforming nature (in the form of raw sugar cane) into wealth that benefits 
mankind. 
I found it necessary to recover something of the material history of Clark's Ten 
Views to show how in this particular instance the original drawings were 
transformed by processes of selection and design into 'instructional materials', or 
what I have been calling 'pedagogical apparatus' and the artefacts of schooling'. My 
concern has been to uncover the diachronic depths of the signifier. These drawings 
have circulated in different social milieux, they have a history of distribution as well 
as a particular social character. Crucially, they refer back to their previous existences 
beyond the immediate contexts of their present articulations. What is more, they bear 
the marks - the scratches and dents - of their previous usage. I have tried to show 
how Clark's drawings were appropriated, reproduced and imported into new 
contexts where their meanings become unexpectedly problematic. Originally, The 
Mill Yard was intended to inform metropolitan readers about the efficient 
management of sugar production in Antigua. But in a school textbook, The People 
Who Came, Clark's images have been reduced, cropped, separated from his verbal 
commentary and turned into illustrations (pedagogic apparatus) to teach 
contemporary schoolchildren, chiefly in Caribbean schools, about the realities of 
plantation society. As a consequence of this, the drawings are given new ideological 
accents, and the morally and politically ambiguous nature of Clark's original 
drawings lay buried. Crucially, this ambiguity could have been a focus for Kevin 
and Sunday, but as it was the opportunity was missed because the history of Clark's 
drawing only emerged for the teacher long after Kevin's poem was written. 
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I may seem to have strayed from the story of how Piece of the Past came to be 
written, but I don't think so. I shall conclude the story with a discussion of creativity 
and imagination that relates directly to my account of The Mill Yard. This relation 
turns on a notion of composition from the perspectives of psychological processes 
rather than from text description of forms and structures. 
When Kevin wrote about the windmill, he showed that he had grasped the 
fundamental principle on which the entire plantation system depended: slaves 
provided the energy needed to produce sugar for profit. In the Caribbean, as 
elsewhere in the New World, enforced labour transformed a crude, raw material into 
a valuable commodity. Despite some confusion over the function of the tread-
wheel, Kevin's learned much from The People Who Came. Indeed, his conceptual 
grasp of the principle behind plantation slavery penetrated and transformed the very 
structure of his memories. 
Here is an ironic twist to finish this section. The nineteenth-century engraving of the 
Jamaican tread-wheel that was reproduced in the early edition of The People Who 
Came was in reality a copy of a wood engraving (1834) representing a scene from a 
'house of correction'. (Figure 5) The plate depicts the punishment of convicted 
'apprentices' in a Jamaican prison, not slaves on a plantation. (Slavery was 
abolished in 1833). However, the fate of former slaves, who were legally 
apprenticed to their former owners became a serious cause for concern for The 
London Anti-Slavery Society from 1835 on. As part of a mass publishing campaign 
against the abuse of apprentices they reproduced a pamphlet in 1837, written by an 
ex-slave, with a wood engraving showing conditions in a house of correction in 
Jamaica. The engraving, which is the model for the modern drawing in the textbook, 
had a huge impact at the time. Recently, a historian of visual representations of 
slavery has described the original plate like this: 'The landscape format is dominated 
by the enormous cylinder of the treadmill, the line of prisoners strapped by the 
wrists to a pole, and performing their appalling parody of dance' .69 
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Figure 5 
The tread-wheel, which was one of the new 'technologies of penal discipline', was a 
relatively recent invention (it was introduced in 1818). Notwithstanding its novelty, 
by 1834 it was already a standard feature in most English prisons. It is therefore 
additionally interesting to see how quickly and efficiently penal technology spread 
to the colonies. Ironically, Kevin assumed that the slaves were somehow engaged in 
enforced, productive labour. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 'work' 
required to tum the wheel was purposely unproductive, futile and therefore 
deliberately a waste of the prisoners' time. As a consequence convicts spoke aptly of 
time on the tread-wheel as 'grinding the wind'. 
* * * 
In this closing section I shall be looking at how Kevin's emergent grasp of 
Caribbean history shaped his childhood memories. So far I have been concentrating 
on the story of his growing understanding of the history of plantation slavery. I have 
suggested how school instruction awakened certain developmental processes, and 
how these processes progressed according to 'their own rhythms'. Further to this, I 
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have indicated why Kevin's progress cannot be adequately described without 
looking at his particular circumstances and at the concrete situations that unfolded in 
the classroom over time. Now I want to focus on the role of Kevin's imagination in 
relation to his memories. Specifically, I want to look at his poem, Piece of the Past 
in the light ofVygotsky's striking claim about the nature of adolescent thought: 'A 
child's thinking is governed by sense. An adolescent's thinking is intellectual 
thinking' . 
In a characteristic passage about the changing role of signs in shaping human 
behaviour, Vygotsky describes an incident that occurred during an experiment where 
a child of five and a half had been drawing a streetcar. The child's pencil breaks: 
He tried, nevertheless, to finish the circle of a wheel, pressing down on the 
pencil very hard, but nothing showed on the paper except a deep colorless 
line. The child muttered to himself, 'It's broken,' put aside the pencil, took 
watercolors instead, and began drawing a broken streetcar after an accident, 
continuing to talk to himself from time to time about the change in his 
. 70 pIcture. 
The description of the child' struggle to complete the drawing arises in connection 
with Vygotsky's discussion of the fate of egocentric speech. He is taking issue with 
Piaget's view that egocentric speech gradually dies away as the child is socialised 
into new forms of behaviour. Rather, says Vygotsky, it is the case that, 'Besides 
being a means of expression and of a release of tension, it [egocentric speech] soon 
becomes an instrument of thought in the proper sense - in seeking and planning the 
solution of a problem.'7! In his analysis of the incident, Vygotsky claims that the 
child's accidentally provoked egocentric utterance 'so manifestly affected his 
activity that it is impossible to mistake it for a by-product, an accompaniment not 
interfering with the melody.' 
Thus Vygotsky's analysis throws light on the changing interrelations between 
egocentric speech and activity. At the first stage of development, egocentric speech 
marks the end of the activity; later, it shifts to the middle; and eventually it appears 
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at the beginning of the activity, where it takes on a planning function that raises the 
child's actions to the level of purposeful behaviour. 
The Soviet psychologist was the inheritor of Condillac, who was the first to argue 
that signs are necessary for achieving mastery over mental operations.72 Without the 
use of signs, insisted the French Enlightenment thinker, man could never achieve 
voluntary control over his faculties. For Condillac, language is no longer just the 
chief means of communicating ideas. Rather, it is a necessary instrument for the 
development of thinking itself - what we might call the mental manipulation of 
ideas. Condillac summarised this seminal insight in a sentence: 'In order to develop 
the real cause of the progress of the imagination, contemplation and memory, we 
must inquire what assistance these operations derive from the use of signs. ,73 
Two centuries later, Vygotsky noted the pivotal role of signs in his genetic account 
of a child's gradual mastery of planning functions. He writes: 'A small child draws 
first, then decides what it is that he has drawn; at a slightly older age he names his 
drawing when it is half done; and finally he decides what he will draw.'74 Thus he 
links the changing character of egocentric speech powerfully to the child's growing 
mastery of new forms of behaviour. And, crucially, something similar happens with 
the changing character of perception in adolescence, when abstract thinking begins 
to penetrate and transform concrete and visual features typical of a child's thinking, 
and it is on this development that I want to focus now. 
Vygotsky insisted that the key to understanding the nature of such developments was 
the changing character of structural relations among intellectual functions. He 
challenged contemporary views (1931), which assumed that adolescent thinking was 
a stage dominated by imagination. By contrast, Vygotsky argued that the changing 
role of fantasy has to be understood as a function of related psychological 
developments. 'Fantasy', he writes, 'is not really a primary, independent and leading 
function in the development of adolescent psychology, and its development is a 
consequence of the function of concept formation, an end result which completes 
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and implements all the complicated processes of change which the adolescent's 
whole intellectual life has to overcome.,75 Children do not 'outgrow' fantasy. Rather 
fantasy is transformed by the development of new functions so that what was once 
dominated by concrete visual images is reconfigured by conceptual thinking. 
I shall say more about the genetic picture of the development that Vygotsky 
constructed now, and I want to connect this picture to the philosophy of symbolic 
forms that Ernst Cassirer developed in the twenties. This connection is a reminder, 
by the way, that for all the differences among them, and these were substantial, 
Vygotsky shared an essentially German philosophical outlook with the Berlin 
School of Gestalt Pychology with which Cassirer was associated.76 
Vygotsky read Cassirer's major work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 
III almost as soon as it appeared in Berlin (1929). We know this for certain because 
the Soviet psychologist discusses Cassirer's account of patients exhibiting complex 
disorders of the higher mental functions in the opening section of his chapter 
'Imagination and creativity of the adolescent' (1931). The full significance of speech 
pathology was brought to Cassirer's attention by his cousin Kurt Goldstein, a clinical 
psychologist, and his associate Ernst Gelb.77 Indeed, Cassirer observed their work 
first hand in the Frankfurt Neurological Institute. 
Vygotsky discovered striking evidence in Gelb and Goldstein's clinical research to 
support his picture of the mediating role of signs in the development of mental 
functions. The German clinical psychologists' case studies of aphasics showed how 
patients experienced difficulty with sorting colours. Such difficulties opened 
windows onto developmental trajectories. When patients who had lost the ability to 
recall the names of colours were invited to perform a sorting task with coloured 
strands of wool, they proved unable to do so, even though there was evidence to 
show that they saw the colours correctly. But when the colours were present as 
concrete objects the patients were able to choose 'with great certainty and precision': 
the colour of a ripe strawberry, a mailbox, a billiard table, chalk, violets, forget-me-
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nots etc. In sum, aphasics succeeded when the concrete object was in front of them 
and when they were able to point to the colour of the named object, but they were 
unable to use colours as categories and to collect the samples into sets.78 
From their clinical observations Gelb and Goldstein concluded that the normal 
psychological connections that enable us to classify colours were disturbed among 
aphasics in ways that caused them to revert to an earlier developmental stage. This 
stage was not only more elementary it was also less 'rational'. 'Normal' individuals 
were able to use colours as representative instances of a category: redness, blueness, 
yellowness and so on. By contrast, aphasics suffered from what Gelb and Goldstein 
called 'an impeded categorical attitude' .79 In other words, they were unable to move 
from a particular instance to a representative instance of a category. Gelb and 
Goldstein took this to be hugely significant because it seemed to suggest an 
important difference between what they called immediate and mediated perceptions. 
For Vygotsky such cases provided a 'zero' point from which he could construct a 
genetic account of the development of the imagination. His account turns on the way 
that perception is gradually liberated from being tied to immediate, concrete 
circumstances by 'progressively filling itself with symbolic meaning'. 
Gelb and Goldstein's findings revealed how growth in our capacities to handle 
symbolic meaning makes possible new forms of psychological behaviour. Cassirer 
took up their discoveries and absorbed them into his phenomenology of symbolic 
forms. Indeed, he connected their findings from clinical research to the question of 
the origin of language - almost as Herder had posed it in the eighteenth century. 
Cassirer reflects, 'Here it seems pertinent to ask whether the new degree of freedom 
which perception gains in the purely representative achievement is due to language, 
or whether it does not make language first possible?,8o 
Essentially, Cassirer rediscovered Herder. For the neo-Kantian thinker, Herder's 
achievement was one of the greatest intellectual triumphs of the European 
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Enlightenment. His reading of Herder suggested a new direction for philosophy. He 
became especially interested in Herder's notion of the way that language ( 
symbolisation) liberates humans from the immediate constraints of their concrete 
circumstances to afford (in James Britton's apt phrase) both a prospect and a 
retrospect of experience. According to Herder, the state of reflection that signs of 
man's own making (objective symbols, artefacts) make possible releases man from 
'the vast ocean of sensations, which permeates [the soul] through all the channels of 
the senses'. 81 Herder distinguished between natural cries and human speech, a 
distinction that corresponded broadly to Condillac's division between 'natural' and 
'instituted' signs. And human speech, says Herder, depends on the uniquely human 
capacity for reflection (Besonnenheit). Thus he singles out reflection, not as it 
features in Condillac' s account, as one faculty among others, but rather as the chief 
faculty on which the other faculties hinge. 
Herder saw the appearance of language as the key moment in the progressive 
development of Mankind. Reflection is what separates humans from animals. It 
provides the semiotic tools with which humans both order the world and mediate 
their inward operations. He did not picture language as a static system of 'instituted' 
signs in the manner of Condillac, rather he saw it as a fundamentally constitutive 
human activity. 
Reflective consciousness enables us to engage in acts of primary signification. Such 
acts make recollection (voluntary control over memory) possible. It is just this 
capacity - to recognise and signify within a unitary mental operation, Herder 
claimed, that makes us intrinsically human. Correspondingly, Gelb and Goldstein 
concluded that perception and language are not in a relation where one depends 
upon the other, or that one is primary and the other secondary. Rather it seemed to 
them that they exist in a reciprocal relation to one another in what they call 'the 
same basic attitude'. 
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Vygotsky discovered in Gelb and Goldstein's research into aphasia a clue to 
understanding the development of imagination and creativity in the adolescent child. 
Moreover, he fully appreciated the German psychologists' reading of Herder: 'Gelb 
formulates the idea in a paradoxical but quite correct manner, when he recalls 
Herder's thesis, which says that the language of thinking is the language of 
freedom.' 82 What is more, Vygotsky was especially interested in Cassirer's 
description of the behaviour of one particular patient who was incapable of pouring 
himself a glass of water when asked to do so, but who was able to perform this 
operation without the slightest difficulty when he was thirsty. Intriguingly, 
Vygotsky connected this description to the way that children gradually break away 
from the support they find in concrete, tangible objects through fantasy. The patient 
was completely unable to do something that was not motivated by the actual 
situation. Thus he exemplified a complete absence of imagination. He couldn't free 
himself from his concrete situation, which is precisely what imagination enables us 
to do. 
At the start of this chapter, I mentioned the concrete character of memory in small 
children, and I suggested that 'they can still reproduce real perceptions in the 
fullness of the original experience, the full richness of their tangible details and with 
the vividness of a hallucination.'83 I want to concentrate on memory now. Vygotsky 
discusses the quality of memory among small children in connection with research 
into eidetic images that was carried out at Marburg by Erich J aensch. 84 The key 
issue for Vygotsky concerned the fate of eidetic images, just as the fate of egocentric 
speech was the key issue in his critique of Piaget. J aensch claimed that eidetic 
images dominated the 'primitive stages' of human culture. However, with the 
development of cultural phenomena (essentially what I have been calling 
'technologies of memory') eidetic visual images are gradually replaced with abstract 
ideas. With the intensification of abstract thinking, eidetic visual images proper tend 
to disappear. But in Vygotsky's view this is not the end of eidetic visual images in 
thinking. 
287 
For Vygotsky, Jaensch's special contribution was the discovery that visual eidetic 
images are analogous to concepts in the sphere of concrete thinking. It is not at all 
the case that abstract thinking simply replaces concrete visual thinking and that 
eiedetic visual thinking dies away (in the manner of Piaget's egocentric speech); 
rather, abstract thinking qualitatively transforms visual thinking, as fantasy 
combines concrete visual imagery with abstract thought. Further to this, the visual 
reworking of concrete sensory images is the basic characteristic feature of the 
imagination. 
Crucially, the function and character of fantasy alters over time: 'The essential 
change that fantasy undergoes in adolescence is its liberation from purely concrete, 
imagistic features and at the same time, its infiltration by elements of abstract 
thinking.,85 From a genetic standpoint, Vygotsky claims that imagination in 
adolescence is the successor to child play. Just as children find support for play in 
concrete objects that stand for things in the 'real' world (for example, 'a chair 
representing a steam engine') images - visual conceptions - begin to play the same 
pivotal role for the imagination. Essentially, fantasy in adolescents strives for 
concretisation. 
The example that Vygotsky gives resonates with the story I have been telling about 
Kevin. It comes from a contemporary novel by Jacob Wassermann, The Maurizius 
Case (1929). In the novel a sixteen-year-old boy reflects on the unjust sentence 
given to Maurizius who has been in prison for eighteen years due to a legal error: 
, ... whilst thinking about the fate of this man, the boy's inflamed brain draws 
pictures while at the same time [he] desires nothing more than it should function in a 
logical way.' First, the boy tries to calculate the time that Maurizius has spent in 
prison: He calculates that eighteen years and five months equals two hundred and 
twenty-one months or approximately six thousand six hundred and thirty days and 
six thousand six hundred and thirty nights.' The description of the boy's increasing 
frustration as he tries to concretise the abstraction is particularly harrowing. 
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Recall the moment when Kevin is trying to grasp the scale of the Atlantic slave 
trade: 'What? Plantation owners worked their. .. worked their. .. slaves to death 
because it was cheaper to work them ... You know? Twenty four million ... ' Thus he 
struggles to concretise the human meaning of what otherwise would remain an 
abstraction - the estimated number of Africans transported to the New World. 
Vygotsky uses the example from the Maurizius Case to show how tightly adolescent 
fantasy is still bound up with the concrete support which adolescents finds in 
sensory conceptions. 'In this sense', says Vygotsky, 'the genetic fate of visual or 
concrete thinking is of great interest. Visual thinking does not disappear from the 
intellectual life of the adolescent along with the appearance of abstract thinking. It 
only moves on to another place, goes off into the fantasy sphere, partly undergoes 
change under the influence of abstract thinking and then, like any other function, 
rises to a higher level.' 86 
The quotation from George Lamming's novel, In the Castle of My Skin with which I 
began this chapter poignantly evokes similar efforts by a small boy, G, to make 
sense of slavery. G struggles to concretise the notion of owning a man or a woman: 
He asked the teacher what was the meaning of slave, and the teacher 
explained. But it didn't make sense. He didn't understand how anyone could 
be bought by another. He knew horses and dogs could be bought and 
worked. But he did not understand how one man could buy another man.' G 
concludes, 'It was simply unreal. The idea of ownership' .87 
For Kevin, slavery was a historical reality, but no less difficult to grasp for that. As 
one historian has put it recently, the last ten years have witnessed a phenomenal 
increase in books which attempt to describe the minutiae of day-to-day existence on 
plantations. In addition to such descriptions there have been studies of images of 
slavery that have exerted an immediate and frequently lasting, impact on Western 
culture - especially visual culture.88 Interest here focuses on the way that Kevin 
drew upon a particular instance of such imagery to make sense of the past. He used 
visual information that was available to him both to make sense of slavery - to 
concretise the historical abstraction - and, crucially, at the same time, to 'rework' his 
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childhood memories of Montserrat by a process which Vygotsky's work on 
imagination powerfully illuminates. 
The impressions that we carry away from scenes and events are not identical to our 
perceptions at the time. What we believe we remember, we imagine. Experimental 
psychology in the twenties revealed the way that the most elementary impressions -
eidetic images - are duly 'altered' by mental processes. For Vygotsky, Erich 
Jaensch's research into eidetic images at Marburg shed light on the processes of 
combination whereby images are combined into new formations that are analogous 
to concepts. Crucially, Jaensch's experiments showed that whole new images are 
created from several concrete impressions that constitute visual concepts. He 
claimed that this happens in two ways. First, there is a type of combination based on 
a process of 'fluxion' , where the eidetic image represents a dynamic combination of 
separate concrete impressions. With fluxion, one image changes into another. The 
second type of combination is composition, and it is this type which chiefly concerns 
us here. 
Vygotsky describes composition as consisting in 'the subject forming a new sensible 
whole which is constructed according to a known usable attribute selected from 
various features of concrete objects' .89 But a concept, says Vygotsky, is not just a 
combination of images, rather it is a 'combination of assessments'. Through a 
combination of assessments we gain a mediated knowledge of the object. And this 
holds the key to the difference between the thinking of a child and the thinking of an 
adolescent - 'a child's thinking is governed by sense. An adolescent's thinking is 
intellectual thinking' .90 Essentially, concepts are a condensation of assessments. 
They have a non-visual character. However, visual thinking does not break off in 
adolescence. Rather it undergoes what Vygotsky calls 'a vigorous transformation' 
under the influence of concepts, which cannot be excluded from the influence of the 
imagination' . 
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Vygotsky characterised the qualitative difference between imagination in childhood 
and adolescence like this. It does not take much, he says to satisfy children's fantasy: 
'Days on end can be filled with thoughts about a horse drawing a qut.' Imagined 
scenes hardly differ from reality. It was Wilhelm Wundt, he notes, who first pointed 
out the extreme poverty of the creative aspects of children's fantasy. Researchers 
have pointed to an inner drive for creative expression and an inner tendency for 
productivity during adolescence. This is sometimes associated witl"} writing poetry. 
Vygotsky quotes Charlotte Buhler who remarks: 'It is startling how people without 
any talent for poetry begin to write poetry in adolescence. ,91 
Indeed, in the research of Charlotte Buhler in Vienna, Vygotsky found clear 
evidence of a lack of co-operation between abstract thinking and visual thinking in 
adolescence, where internal images, coloured by emotion, follow one another 
without being influenced by 'creative' thinking. From a genetic perspective, the 
separation of thinking and imagination is only a stage in the whole. process. Whereas 
thinking proper consists in establishing logical relations among entities, imagination 
focuses on content as such and breaks up existing combinations between images and 
thoughts to make new combinations. 
Gelb and Goldstein's clinical research on aphasics' loss of speech as a means of 
concept formation was particularly revealing for the way that it threw light on the 
earlier stages of development. Additionally their findings showed how patients 
showed an inability to comprehend metaphors and figurative language that 
resembles adolescent behaviour. The individual is unable to divert his or her 
attention from the concrete situation, to transform it creatively, to regroup the 
attributes and to free himself from the actual situation. Development hinges on the 
dynamic relations between abstract and concrete thinking which constitute the main 
feature of fantasy in adolescence. Vygotsky encapsulates the whole dynamic like 
this: ' ... purely concrete thinking, which is devoid of any concepts, also lacks any 
trace of fantasy. For the first time the formation of concepts brings with it a release 
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from the concrete situation and a likelihood of a creative reworking and 
transformation of the elements'. 92 
Concrete images of childhood made up the memory traces that Kevin carried back to 
London from Montserrat. Later, in school, he conceptualised plantation slavery as an 
economic system. Along the way he met visual representations of plantation slavery 
such as The Mill Yard, and textbook drawings in The People Who Came. Then a 
memory of a particular incident in Montserrat flashed up during a discussion around 
Black history. In the aftermath to the discussion, Kevin drew together ~omposed­
various elements creatively in his poem Piece of the Past. And thus he reshaped his 
memones. 
His overriding insight - that slaves provided the labour necessary to transform raw 
materials into wealth - marked an important level of conceptual understanding. This 
understanding subsequently shaped his visualisation of the scene in his poem where 
the boy manages to peer inside the ruined building. An additional complication 
occurred where confusion around the separate functions of the windmill 
(productivity) and the tread wheel (punishment) entered the picture. The confusion 
this gave rise to (as instanced by the three puzzling lines) offers a clue to the 
processes at work. 
Kevin mixed up the two functions (productivity and punishment) and as a 
consequence the picture he drew in the poem is a confused one. But this is not the 
whole story. The paradox that lay behind his original utterance - his quarrel with 
John - was that his teachers in the West Indies failed to teach children the facts of 
slavery, whereas in London they did. His poem seeks to concretise this paradox. The 
figure of Teacher Lincoln; Margeret's complaining voice (,Teacher, is too cold'); 
Gregory's antics; the dullish-green 'cropus'; the house with it shutters blown off 
from time; jancro; and the wind mill with its dark secret all contributed powerfully 
to the total composition. Together they constitute an evocation of Kevin's time in 
Montserrat. Furthermore it was an evocation that was offered for enjoyment in a 
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contemporary London classroom (witness the joke at Audley's expense), as well as 
settling an argument about the importance of teaching Caribbean history in London 
schools. 
Vygotsky summarises his argument about imagination and creativity among 
adolescents like this: 
But one of the characteristic features of imagination is that it does not stop 
developing at this stage and that, from its standpoint, abstraction is only a 
transitory link in the chain, a stage along the road of development, or simply 
a leap forward in the process of its movement towards the concrete. From 
our point of view, imagination is a creative transforming activity which 
moves from one form of concreteness to another. But the mere movement 
from a given concrete form to a newly created form of it and the very 
feasibility of creative construction, is only possible with the help of 
abstraction. So abstraction is incorporated into the process of imagination as 
an indispensible constituent part, but it does not form its centre. The 
movement from the concrete through the abstract to the construction of a 
new form of concrete image is the path which describes imagination in the 
adolescent age.93 
Earlier I quoted a contemporary historian writing about the memory of slavery: 
'There can be no archaeology of the memory of slavery that corresponds to an 
emotional identification with a lost reality.' Yet the impulse to re-imagine slavery 
and to recover the lost reality has been a powerful one. This is exactly what Kevin 
was attempting to do. 'It is the creative character of concrete expression,' says 
Vygotsky, 'and the construction of a new image which exemplify fantasy. Its 
culminating point is the achievement of a concrete form, but this can only be 
achieved with the help of abstraction. An adolescent's fantasy moves from the 
concrete visual image through a concept to an imaginary image.' For Kevin, 
concrete images in this context took two forms. The first form was the visual trace 
of the landscape that he remembered as a nine-year-old child - the traces of visual 
memory. The second form was the 'instructional material' that he met in school. He 
reworked these forms in the light of his historical understanding of slavery and, 
finally, the whole sequence of development culminated in the creation of an 
imaginary landscape, a site of remembrance, in his poem, Piece of the Past. 
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their future learning. I want to return to this theme. Before I do, I should make it clear, that I am 
seeking a conception of classroom discourse that goes beyond formal linguistic analysis, and which 
includes the historical and social dimensions of language as social behaviour. What I have in mind 
turns on a theory of discourse suggested to me by my colleague, Tony Burgess. In his article, Diverse 
Melodies, Burgess offered a critical account of traditions of classroom discourse research. He makes 
two theoretical moves. The first move is to enter a crowded debate among applied linguists (Sinclair 
and Coulthard, Stubbs), sociologists, psycho-linguists and English researchers. He wanted to flag the 
limitations of a picture of classroom discourse that concentrates exclusively on the underlying forms 
and structures of verbal interactions in classrooms. Secondly, Burgess wanted to draw upon on a 
radically different conceptualisation of discourse that derives chiefly from the work of the French 
philosopher Jean Michel Foucault, especially as it was being interpreted by sociologists like Valerie 
Walkerdine in the eighties. This radical conceptualisation attends to the role of historically 
constructed discourses in the constitution of subjectivities in conjunction with the operations of social 
power: 
In referring to this classroom process as one of the construction of discourse I am 
making a very wide set of assumptions. By discourse I have in mind a concept 
which cuts across accepted divisions between spoken and written language, 
between language and context and social relations, and between form and content. 
I am not using discourse to refer, then, just to the verbal level of actual utterance. I 
am meaning more than merely stretches of utterance and more than the internal, 
systematic organisation, which such stretches of utterance may display. Because my 
use of this term has a bearing on thinking about language outside as well as inside 
the classroom, it is necessary to explain this more fully. Discourse is offered here 
as a category, which, above all, preserves the perception that behaviour in language 
is behaviour. In using language, something is done. Language reflects intentions, 
motives, purposes, interests actions. Intentionalities of this sort, however, do not 
simply happen. Even in their individual origins, they are socially constructed and, 
as they become regularised, are socially maintained. I am seeking, then, to include 
within the notion of discourse these further assumptions, as well as that of 
behaviour. Discourse is also offered here as a category, which preserves the 
perception that behaviour in language is social and historical as well as just 
linguistic. (Burgess, T. Diverse Melodies, (1984) p.61.) 
What appealed to me with this particular formulation when Burgess wrote it was that it insisted that 
discourse is developed and maintained socially and historically. Further to this, it suggested that 
social identities (class, gender, and race) are constituted within particular 'discursive formations' .. 
These two articulations seemed especially illuminating for my analysis of the interactions between 
Sunday and Kevin, and equally so for an analysis of the discussion between Ricky and David about 
racial and ethnic identities. When David says, 'I think it's because when a subject like that and 
they're talking about the Caribbean, a lot of Black people in the class ... try to grab on to their roots 
like, like, 'I come from the West Indies', 'I come from ... ' and so forth', discourse theory seemed to 
explain how the topic of slavery positioned children differently in ways that reordered their identities. 
On Burgess' account, the discourses that are constructed in classrooms stand in relation to wider 
discourses circulating beyond the school with which they intersect and overlap. Behind the wider 
discursive formations, as Foucault appeared to show, lie historically specific practices. Thus, the 
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operations of social power appear to be constitutive elements in all discourse. 'Critical discourse 
analysis' -which is the term that is usually used to describe the tradition of research that has grown 
from such ideas - refers to more than the formal system of self-generating structures that is the object 
of modem, structural linguistics. Rather, regularity, in the Foucauldian sense, seeks to account for the 
way statements, or claims to knowledge, are combined within determinate historical conditions and 
historically constructed practices. 
At issue is a way of theorising SUbjectivity. Foucault (1972) suggests that there are a number of 
discursive positions available to subjects, inscribed within specific discursive practices, from which 
they (subjects) speak. Positionality governs the knowledge claims that individuals can make. An 
obvious example is the professional who speaks from within an institutionally defined field, a 
specialist field with its internal discipline regulating what mayor may not be said. The 
psychoanalytical mechanism that was necessary to explain the process of the constitution of 
subjectivity in discourse was supplied by the French thinker Jaques Lacan Valerie Walkerdine and 
Cathy Urwin, working in this tradition considered discourse additionally from the perspectives of 
'post-structuralism'. Using Lacanian theory, they aimed to suggest ways that we might begin to 
conceptualise language and learning in classrooms. Typically, WaIkerdine asks how children learn to 
enter and speak from discursive positions. She argues that at a very early stage children acquire 
knowledge of discursive formats, and that they learn how to create new ones by internalising the 
system of rules that make discourse possible. Moreover, they learn without ever being shown 
explicitly how to do so. By the age of three, she claims, children are able to switch in and out of 
discursive positions and to take up positions in play that would not be available to them in their actual 
lives. Through play, she says, children learn that an opening metaphor calls up an appropriate 
discursive format, and this it is claimed carries significance for subject learning and teaching 
strategies in schools. 
Teachers implicitly draw on children's capacities to imagine situations and to be able to 'inhabit' them 
in games, Walkerdine and Urwin suggest, but sometimes things go wrong. For instance, a maths 
teacher who introduces an imaginary every day object or a familiar situation to anchor or to 
contextualise an abstract problem may unwittingly send children off in entirely the wrong direction. 
Sometimes this is done to make the topic seem more relevant. Thus children start sifting their own 
everyday experience to 'ground' arithmetical problem and simply overlook or ignore the kind of 
abstract operation that, say, subtraction requires .. So for example, when a teacher says, 'When I go to 
the supermarket, and I buy an apple, which costs twenty five pence, and I give the check-out girl a 
pound coin, how much change will she give me?' , she may get unpromising answers such as, 'I don't 
like apples' or 'we go to Tesco' .. Children take up positions in a familiar discourse about shopping, 
when it's really all about sums. (Of course, the children might also be saying something about why 
they don't want to or can't take up positions in the teacher's discourse). They are being invited to 
suppose that such things happen in their lives; they have to substitute themselves for the teacher in the 
make-believe to occupy the teacher's subject position, or slot. The pedagogic assumption is that they 
already possess the means to solve the problem. All they must do is draw on their own life-
experiences. What happens usually? How do people behave? What does the checkout girl do? How 
does it go? The point is that there are underlying patterns of regularity that structure everyday 
interactions; and once we become familiar with them, once we know how things go, we can predict 
what is likely to happen because we have unconsciously grasped an implicit knowledge of the 
constitutive rules. If it were otherwise the make-believe would be simply unintelligible. Thus we 
move through the day. In a rather different context (and in a way that took me closer to 
understanding the interactions between Ricky and David) Valerie Walkerdine (1981) used discourse 
theory to examine language and power from a feminist perpective. She suggests how the authority of 
a woman teacher is subverted by primary-age boys' use of sexist language. How is this possible? She 
writes, 
The boys are not grown men yet they take up the positions of men through the 
language, which has material effect because particular individuals are produced 
differently within a variety of discursive practices. Their power is gained by 
refusing to be constituted as powerless objects in her discourse and recasting her as 
the powerless object of theirs. 
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This is a striking analysis, but there are difficulties with this kind of formulation. Here are a couple of 
them. It can lead to an assumption that discourse constructs passive subjects, thus removing human 
agency from the picture altogether. Through her analysis of the way children resist certain discursive 
positions in their games, Walkerdine's work tries to avoid this cul-de-sac. Moreover, she suggests the 
potential for actively constructing new discourses in classrooms: 'Niether the children nor the teacher 
can change without the production of new discourses in which to read their actions and to produce 
different actions and different subjectivities. Thus, Walkerdine envisages classrooms as sites for 
constructing new discourses where new identities will emerge. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
I have told the story of how a poem came to be written by a Black student in a 
Hackney classroom. This has entailed reconstructing in detail events that took 
place over five years in all. In telling the story I have tried to describe something 
of the learning that went on and to show how the debates and discussions that a 
class conducted over time contributed to a student's intellectual engagement with 
powerful themes and issues. Further to this, I have also attempted to connect the 
changing social relations among the students to wider social realities outside 
school. Kevin's poem emerged from his deepening interest in and understanding 
of the history of plantation slavery and its legacy at a moment when family links 
to the West Indies were problematic. Indeed, his writing about an episode from 
his childhood had much to do with forging an identity. Kevin's story calls for a 
theoretically complex picture of the dynamic relationship between memory, 
IJ-w. 
conceptual thinking and imagination.is~entral theme in my description of his 
overall development. 
Crucially, I have found it necessary to build detail into the story to concentrate 
the level of theoretical awareness. I selected just one from many possible 
narratives, but my contention is that the account is true for more than a single 
case. One of the major implications of this account is that English teachers will 
need a long-term view of learning as well as a broad developmental approach to 
language, literature and culture in classrooms today. Additionally, such an 
approach needs to be aware of the dynamic social relations among students 
within the wider currents of cultural change. Another implication is that teachers 
will need an historical understanding of the role of signs in learning and 
development, as a background against which to read contemporary classrooms. I 
have attempted to provide such a background in my accoun.:]he history of ideas. 
A picture of language in learning and development that is capable of making 
sense of how Piece of the Past came to ~itten has to include, centrally, history: 
not just the particular language biography of the writer, but also the history of the 
language and its use. This also holds true for more than a single poem. An 
adequate picture of language also will need to include a strong sense of the 
essentially creative business of binding words to experience. The drive to 
represent our experiences to one another, to make sense of it and to give our past 
significance in the present is a fundamentally self-constitutive activity. This is 
both an ordinary and a miraculous, humanising business - a process we all must 
engage in to maintain a sense of who we are. It is my contention that teachers 
will need to understand such processes if they are to plan for and foster the kind 
of conceptual and imaginative development I have been describing. 
Three of the chapters concentrate on the intellectual history of language studies. 
It is fair to say that the historians oflanguage have not been primarily concerned 
with education as such. Therefore I have attempted to connect the history of 
ideas to key developments in education in a way that I think is new. A picture of 
language as a creative, constitutive activity first emerged in the late eighteenth-
century in the writings of Herder. With Herder, languages are linked to a vision 
of cultural development. But the Herder legacy is in some ways a deeply 
problematic one. For Herder, the historical experiences of peoples issue in 
particular linguistic world outlooks. On this view, linguistic world outlooks are 
evolved in a fundamentally historical fashion. Thus language is seen as centrally 
part of a long historical process of collective, cultural development. 
Herder has been a major source for notions like national 'mentalities' and 
'literature as the expression of the spirit of a people', where nations are spoken 
about as 'organic' communities and national identity is defined as belonging to 
historical cultures. Indeed, German thinkers like Herder and von Humboldt 
began to suggest that the languages and cultures that we inherit not only make us 
what we are, they actually prefigure what we become. Thus language was linked 
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to a dynamic, quasi-anthropological conception of individual and collective 
cultural self-realisation. On this view, the defence of heritage languages and 
cultures becomes a matter of survival, for without them cultural continuity is 
inconceivable. Such currents of thought run deep in European nationalism. 
With the early formulations of the language-culture link, out and out 
nationalistic impulses were counterbalanced by generous cosmopolitanism in the 
works of thinkers like von Humboldt, for whom difference was a necessary 
condition for human development. But nationalistic tendencies were carried 
forward powerfully into nineteenth-century literary and linguistic studies right 
across Europe. More often than not, they were connected to political nationalism 
and to damaging notions of race. Yet they also galvanized scholarly research into 
a wide range of languages and both classical and vernacular ancient texts. Such 
ideas remain embedded in the culture today where they have traditionally 
provided a rationale for state language and literature syllabi. English teachers 
might usefully know something of their complicated European origins. 
In my account, quasi-metaphysical notions like 'national mentalities' and the 
'expression of the spirit of the people' represent the negative side of the dialectic. 
But Herder also took from the thinkers of the French Enlightenment a seminally 
powerful picture of language as the means by which we gain mastery over 
mental operations. On this view signs afford the means whereby we gain 
conscious control over our behaviour. Thus, with the aid of signs we develop our 
conceptual understanding of the world as well as the potential for changing it. On 
this view, signs playa central role in the story of human development. 
From the perspectives of Kant's epistemology, Von Humboldt fashioned this 
notion into a principle of world history. Following the French ideologues, he 
gave language studies the central role in the reformed Prussian education system. 
He also gave German philology an institutional base from which to develop its 
hugely influential teaching and research programme. I have tried to show how 
many of the features of modem education systems, such as the notion of phases 
of education with no overlap (primary, secondary and tertiary), which reflect a 
coherent sense of students' intellectual development and progression, come from 
the educational discussions in which von Humboldt played a leading part. In the 
aftermath to the French Revolution, intellectuals linked language education to the 
creation of a new citizenry for the Republican social order. The importance that 
de Tracy afforded the analysis of signs (ideology) as a foundational element in 
the French curriculum is especially striking in this context. Although the 
ideologues' project was cut short, it might provide a new vantage point from 
which to reconsider the purposes of English. 
The history of the intellectual developments I have given carries significant 
implications for the way that English is presently understood. Recent histories of 
English have been content with criticising the presuppositions of nation in the 
founding moves in thinking about English language and literature. Frequently, 
they have missed the scale of the European project that lay behind it. Lacking 
proper historical perspectives, contemporary accounts of English studies have 
failed to appreciate the scale of the earlier vision that might usefully inform 
contemporary debates about the future of the discipline. 
In returning to developments taking place in the eighteenth and nineteenth-
centuries, I have attempted to restore both a broad picture and a sense of scope 
that English is in danger of losing. Additionally, I have attempted to uncover the 
intellectual roots of English, which extend across a range of disciplines, 
including philosophy, philology, linguistics, literary studies, education, 
anthropology, history, cultural sciences and psychology. English has been a 
loosely bonded aggregate of many disciplinary approaches, and this, surely, is 
the reason why no single shaping idea dominates its heartland. Further to this, it 
also suggests why English has been an arena for competing (residual and 
emergent) professional domains. Paradoxically, I have needed to restore the 
enlarged picture of English to make sense of the local particularities of 
contemporary classrooms at a moment when English appears to fragmenting. 
In calling for a unified approach to language literature and culture I was led to 
examine fundamental questions about the purposes of English. I contend that 
English has much to do with the public discussion of human experience. Such a 
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notion, which emerges in Locke's writings, links citizenship to a conception of 
individual sovereignty in matters of what we may claim to know. 
I see least two directions for future work. The first direction concerns further 
research in the history of ideas. In Chapter Six I discuss Vygotsky's theories 
about memory and imagination in connection with learning and development. 
My overall aim was to shed light on a student's progress from the perspective of 
the role of signs in development, and my analysis carried forward themes and 
arguments from earlier chapters. Implicitly, I located the work of the Soviet 
psychologist in traditions of thought that have their roots in the European 
Enlightenment. Although I discussed Vygotsky's ideas in relation to 
contemporary work in philosophy and especially to developments in clinical 
psychology in the aftermath to the Great War, I did not make explicit 
connections to the work that was going on, particularly in Berlin and Vienna, at 
the time. Specifically, I did not link work stemming from Brentano's philosophy 
of mental acts in detail to the work of the Gestalt psychologists, especially 
Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Lewin, or to the fascinating research programme in 
child psychology that the Buhlers established in the twenties. 
A full account ofVygotsky's relation to such work would make clear, for 
instance, the grounds of his refusal to go along with reductive accounts of mind 
that emerged in the Soviet Union concerning reflexes. By such accounts mental 
operations are explained primarily in terms of physiological causes. By contrast, 
for Vygotsky, new forms of mental behaviour are developed with the aid of 
historically evolved signs. 
In the history of ideas that I have been giving, Vygotsky is the inheritor of the 
European Enlightenment, and his conception of development as an inward 
process as well as an external one owes much to the tradition of von Humboldt. 
However, as with many of the psychologist I have just mentioned, his relation to 
German idealism was a complicated and in some ways a problematic one. 
Finally, Vygotsky's relation to Brentano's philosophy, which explicitly rejected 
the idealist tradition of Kant and Hegel, calls for further investigation. 
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The second direction for future work concerns the subject English. In the 
Introduction I make the point that histories ofthe subject lack perspectives that 
might be usefully gained from the historiography of European language studies. 
The commonplace notion that modem English studies freed students from the 
dead hand of philology, though it contains truth, needs handling carefully for the 
very reason that some of the subject's fundamental values were imported from 
European philological scholarship. (I touch on this theme in Chapter Three). I 
should like to know more about the complicated ways that these values entered 
English education during the nineteenth-century. Chiefly, however, I should like 
to revisit the history of continental philology for the relevance it might hold for a 
unified developmental approach to language, literature and culture in 
contemporary classrooms. 
My main concern has been to sketch theoretical traditions of thought about the 
role of signs in development and to recover a vision of education that might be 
powerfully relevant to contemporary discussions about pedagogy. However I 
also see Kevin's story as contributing to a theoretical awareness among 
researchers of the need for historical perspectives in reading classrooms. Recent 
research has vastly enriched our theoretical understandings of learning contexts 
and processes. Ethnographies have shown us that qualitative data drawn from 
individual instances can expand our theoretical insights. While the focus of my 
work has been on history and with setting the dimensions of time within the 
frame of theoretical consideration, I also think that it would compl6nent 
ethnographic work too. 
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